Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06BEIRUT2935
2006-09-12 10:36:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Beirut
Cable title:  

LEBANON: SINIORA UNCONCERNED BY AOUNIST THREAT

Tags:  PREL EAID MASS LE SY 
pdf how-to read a cable
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 002935 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE NEA/ELA FOR ABERCROMBIE-WHINSTANLEY/WILLIAMS/DONICK
NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/MARCHESE/HARDING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/12/2016
TAGS: PREL EAID MASS LE SY
SUBJECT: LEBANON: SINIORA UNCONCERNED BY AOUNIST THREAT

REF: BEIRUT 2920

Classified By: Jeffrey D. Feltman, Ambassador. Reason 1.4 (b) and (d)

SUMMARY
--------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 002935

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE NEA/ELA FOR ABERCROMBIE-WHINSTANLEY/WILLIAMS/DONICK
NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/MARCHESE/HARDING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/12/2016
TAGS: PREL EAID MASS LE SY
SUBJECT: LEBANON: SINIORA UNCONCERNED BY AOUNIST THREAT

REF: BEIRUT 2920

Classified By: Jeffrey D. Feltman, Ambassador. Reason 1.4 (b) and (d)

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) During a September 11 meeting with the Ambassador
and poloff at the Grand Serail, Lebanese Prime Minister Fuad
Siniora reviewed his recent visit to Saudi Arabia as well as
British Prime Minister Tony Blair's stop in Beirut. On the
reconstruction effort, Siniora provided a clearer picture of
the key GOL personnel with whom the donor community should
coordinate. Despite the Ambassador's misgivings, he insisted
that the GOL will move ahead in providing prefab housing as a
temporary shelter strategy, absent any other workable option.
Siniora said he would be able to handle any civil strife
campaign launched by the Aounists, but asked again for
immediate support to the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) and
Internal Security Forces (ISF). On UN issues, Siniora said
that he is staying out of the negotiations involving the IDF
captives held by Hizballah, and is -- perhaps prematurely --
confident the GOL will pass the statute for the special
tribunal for the Hariri assassination (once it receives the
UNSC-agreed draft). Siniora was joined by senior advisers
Mohammad Chattah and Rola Noureddine. END SUMMARY.

BLAIR MEETING AND SAUDI VISIT
--------------


2. (C) Looking worn-out after having hosted the British
Prime Minister all day, Siniora said that he had focused
Blair on three issues: Sheba'a Farms as the key to
Hizballah's disarmament, the 1949 Armistice Agreement as the
destination that allowed creativity in Israeli-Lebanese
contacts, and the Middle East peace process as reversing the
declining reputations of the U.S. and UK in the Arab world.
Siniora told the Ambassador that "the time is ripe" for
movement on all three issues, assessing that the Olmert
government is in a precarious position right now and has to
"think outside the box and keep moving forward, otherwise it
will fall." He views Olmert's recent positive movement on

the Sheba'a Farms issue in this context.


3. (C) Siniora said that his weekend trip to Saudi Arabia
had been very positive, and that the Saudis are "very
supportive." He remarked that King Abdullah had "lavished
praise" on him, which made him "very embarrassed" (though he
clearly enjoys these little boosts). According to Siniora,
the Saudis are fed up with Syria and Hizballah, though are a
bit more circumspect on Iran, whom they "have to deal with".
The Saudis are also urging a return to the Middle East peace
process.

DEALING WITH RUMORED AOUNIST STRIFE
--------------


4. (C) The Ambassador asked about the rumors of a planned
Aounist disobedience campaign following Ramadan. Noting that
the relatively muted demonstration -- we heard estimates of
only 2,000 protestors -- in downtown Beirut to protest
Blair's visit had been easily contained by a strong ISF
presence in the streets, Siniora said that he would "clamp
down" in the event of an Aounist challenge. The Ambassador
suggested that the LAF should be deployed instead of the ISF
to contain any post-Ramadan strife since the Aounists will
seek to provoke the Hariri-aligned, Sunni-commanded ISF into
firing on the protestors. Siniora agreed with this, but
added that he hopes to defuse the campaign by immediately
directing funds towards "special projects" in the Aounist
strongholds of Jbeil and Keserwan.

A CLEAR ADDRESS FOR RECONSTRUCTION
--------------


5. (C) Regarding the rebuilding effort, the Ambassador
asked for a definitive answer on the GOL point of contact on
reconstruction issues. Siniora said that his special adviser
Ghassan Taher-Fadlallah is in charge of overall project
coordination, while Finance Minister Jihad Azour is in charge
of coordinating donor funding. Siniora assured the

BEIRUT 00002935 002 OF 003


Ambassador that Taher is the primary contact for foreign
donors. (Comment. We met with Taher earlier on September 11
and will report that meeting septel. Interestingly, Siniora
did not once mention the name of Nabil Jisr, the new head of
the Council for Development and Reconstruction and Taher's
predecessor. End Comment.) In response to the Ambassador,
Siniora said that he hopes to host a Beirut I conference by
the second week of November.


6. (C) Noting that the previous GOL shelter strategy
devised with UNHCR seemed superior, the Ambassador questioned
the GOL plan to provide prefab housing for those who lost
homes in the recent conflict. Siniora said that the initial
UNHCR proposal to build a single permanent room (with kitchen
and bathroom) for families to live in for the time being and
expand on later is "not very workable." Instead, Siniora
wants to provide prefabs for now and start disbursing money
for people to begin building a permanent home. "Nabih
(Berri) is very supprotive, and there is no other credible
alternative," claimed Siniora, "What can I do?" When the
Ambassador pressed him more on this, Siniora admitted that
"Nabih is the man behind" the prefab idea. (Comment. We note
again (reftel) that there is a Berri-allied company in the
Biqa' Valley that produces prefab housing. End Comment.)

EYE ON THE LAF
--------------


7. (C) On military assistance, the Ambassador asked if the
LAF and ISF have controls to ensure that any weapons would
not fall into the hands of Hizballah. Siniora said that some
support needs to be provided as soon as possible as a "show
of confidence" in the army, noting that the LAF's performance
in southern Lebanon and the border with Syria will be
monitored closely. "The LAF will have to fulfill its
mission," Siniora stressed, "They will be worried that
someone is always looking over their shoulder." The
Ambassador confirimed that, indeed, both Israel and the
international community would be watching Lebanon's security
performance, particularly in fighting arms smuggling. In
addition, Siniora said he is willing to continue the
LAF-UNIFIL-IDF coordination sessions in Naqoura, but needs a
plausible excuse to do so, such as discussions on amending
the 1949 Armistice Agreement. Siniora promised to speak to
UNIFIL Commander Alain Pelligrini about this.

SPECULATING ON SHEHADE ASSASSINATION ATTEMPT
--------------


8. (C) Regarding last week's assassination attempt on ISF
Lieutenant Colonel Samir Shehabeh south of Beirut, Siniora
said that it appears to have been a professional hit with a
serious organization behind it. While acknowledging that the
investigation still has not provided any indications of
suspects, Siniora speculated that Syria is most likely
involved, perhaps in collaboration with a local group such as
Ahmed Jibril's PFLP. He discounts theories that Shehade is
the victim of a turf conflict among the Lebanese intelligence
services. Notably though, Siniora said that it is "rash" to
say that Shehade was targeted "just because he was involved
in the Hariri investigation."

UN ISSUES
--------------


9. (C) On the establishment of a tribunal to try suspects
in the Hariri assassination (and possibly other related
acts),Siniora optimistically expects to be able to present
the statute to the Cabinet in "about a month" and does not
believe he will have any trouble getting Hizballah to agree
to the tribunal (Comment. We received a less rosy perspective
on timing and Hizballah buy-in from Minister of Justice
Charles Rizk, also on September 11, which we will report
septel. End Comment).


10. (C) The Ambassador noted the importance of getting
information to Israel regarding the Israeli soldiers
kidnapped by Hizballah on July 12. Siniora said he has been
in contact with UNSYG Annan regarding the two IDF captives
and has arranged for a meeting between UN representatives,
including Special Representative for Lebanon Geir Pedersen,

BEIRUT 00002935 003 OF 003


and Minister for Energy and Water and Hizballah member
Mohammad Fneish. Otherwise, Siniora said he intends to
remove himself from the matter and, concerned about
potentially interrupting a delicate process, claimed to have
told Annan that "I won't interfere unless you tell me to do
so."

UNGA PLANS/AMBASSADORS' LIST
--------------


11. (C) Siniora confirmed that he will not be travelling to
the United Nations General Assembly and prefers to let
President Emile Lahoud "enjoy New York on his own." The
Ambassador probed on Lebanon's potential ambassadorial
appointments. Not giving too much away, Siniora said the
list of MFA recommendations has yet to come up for Cabinet
approval, but that the suggestion of Nawaf Salam for New York
is "valid", while the name of Boutros Assaker for Washington
is "not valid," intimating that Assaker himself does not want
Washington and is aiming for Paris (to be near his wife who
has reportedly been tapped as the Lebanese representative to
UNESCO).

COMMENT
--------------


12. (C) Siniora, visibly tired, did not focus in depth on
any topic in this hour-long session. Inter alia, we tried to
focus him on the importance of keeping the IDF-UNIFIL-LAF
coordination going beyond Israel's withdrawal from southern
Lebanon and on the leadership role he should be seen as
playing in trying to secure information, and release, of the
Israeli captives. Yet much of what Siniora said -- Shebaa,
Armistice Agreement, revived peace process -- was simply
recycled from numerous earlier sessions with him, as if he
was on automatic pilot. When we asked specifically about the
German and UNIFIL assistance at the airport, seaports, and
land border crossings, Siniora confessed that, between his
Saudi trip and Tony Blair's visit, he needed to update
himself before answering. Even the sympathy he expressed to
us on the sad anniversary of the 9/11 attacks had an
uncharacteristic pro-form ring to them. Siniora sounded
refreshed when we talked with him this morning (9/12) to
object to his reported request to Kofi Annan to drop all
references to UNSCR 1559 from the UNSCR 1701 report:
claiming to want disarmament of Hizballah "more than anyone,"
Siniora said that he was merely trying to get Annan to make
references to 1701 itself and to Ta'if more than to 1559,
since 1559 has been so thoroughly discredited locally as a
U.S.-Israeli project. It's not the concept of disarmament
that causes problems, Siniora said, but rather than the basis
needs to be more Lebanese than 1559 is perceived.
FELTMAN