Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06BEIRUT286
2006-02-01 16:33:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Beirut
Cable title:  

MGLE01: SINIORA NOT OPTIMISTIC THAT SHIA

Tags:  IS LE PGOV PREL PTER SY 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO8959
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHMOS
DE RUEHLB #0286/01 0321633
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 011633Z FEB 06
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1767
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 000286 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/WERNER/SINGH

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/02/2016
TAGS: IS LE PGOV PREL PTER SY
SUBJECT: MGLE01: SINIORA NOT OPTIMISTIC THAT SHIA
MINISTERS WILL RETURN ANYTIME SOON

REF: SECSTATE 12817

Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey Feltman. Reason: Section 1.4 (d).

SUMMARY
-------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 000286

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/WERNER/SINGH

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/02/2016
TAGS: IS LE PGOV PREL PTER SY
SUBJECT: MGLE01: SINIORA NOT OPTIMISTIC THAT SHIA
MINISTERS WILL RETURN ANYTIME SOON

REF: SECSTATE 12817

Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey Feltman. Reason: Section 1.4 (d).

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) Following a two-hour meeting with Hassan Nasrallah
on February 1, Prime Minister Siniora told the Ambassador the
next morning that he was "not optimistic" the boycotting Shia
ministers will soon return to his government. Siniora stated
further that his cabinet cannot push through the necessary
political and economic reform packages without legitimate
Shia participation in those decisions. He said he will
continue to engage with Nasrallah in an attempt to convince
the Shia ministers to return. While Siniora is confident
that his partners in the March 14 coalition (Hariri, Jumblatt
and Samir Ja'ja') will in the end support his efforts at
reconciliation with the Shia, he is annoyed and frustrated by
the damaging sniping from the Aoun camp. Siniora confided
that the Sunni (i.e., Sa'ad Hariri) will never support an
Aoun presidency. Additionally, the prime minister said he
has some fence mending to do with the Saudis, who resent him
for the recent collapse of their Lebanon-Syria mediation
effort. Regarding fugitive Mohammad Ali Hamadei, Siniora
listened intently to the demarche delivered by the
Ambassador, and the implications on U.S.-Lebanese relations
of a failure to turn over these terrorists, but he asked for
USG understanding of the political reality of Lebanon at this
time. He stated his belief that Syrian President Bashar
Asad, and the radical elements in Hizballah and the
Palestinian rejectionist groups, would like nothing better
than for the Hamadei situation to damage relations between
the U.S. and the reformist Siniora government. Finally, the
prime minister appeaerd relaxed about the impending start of
USG-funded Radio Sawa broadcasting from transmitters located
in Lebanon. End summary.


2. (C) Prime Minister Fouad Siniora received the Ambassador
and poloff at his office in Beirut on February 2. The prime

minister's senior advisor, Mohammad Chatta, and his
assistant, Roula Nouraddine, also attended the meeting.
Siniora patiently described his political difficulties and
displayed a resolute commitment to find a solution, but he
also voiced increasing pessimism about an early resolution.

THE CRITICAL WORDS
--------------


3. (C) As part of his now six-week old effort to resolve
the cabinet crisis, Siniora again met with Hassan Nasrallah
on February 1 in an attempt to convince the Hizballah leader
that no one was benefiting from the current impasse -- the
government was essentially paralyzed on matters of
importance, and Hizballah was increasingly being viewed by
the non-Shia communities as an obstructionist pawn of Syria.
According to Siniora's description of the meeting, however,
little-to-no progress was achieved. As in the last meeting
with the Ambassador nine days earlier, Siniora displayed an
increasing degree of pessimism that an agreement could soon
be reached. Nasrallah is apparently holding out for "three
critical words" from the government, i.e., that his
organization is not considered a militia. For his part,
Siniora indicated to the Ambassador that he was holding fast
to the wording of the July ministerial statement that
recognized the organization as the "resistance" (but made no
mention of militia) and was trying to convince Nasrallah to
leave well enough alone. From Siniora's comments regarding
the lack of progress, however, it seems that the
Siniora-Nasrallah conversations are almost endless exercises
in circular reasoning.


4. (C) The Ambassador, in the wake of his recent meetings
with Walid Jumblatt and Samir Ja'ja' (during which the
veteran pols criticized the closed nature of Siniora's
dialogue with Nasrallah),asked the prime minister if his
political flank was covered. Siniora claimed he understood
the concerns of his March 14 colleagues, but insisted they
would support his position in the end. After all, Siniora
commented, what was the alternative? He maintained that with
the Shia community united behind Hizballah (and its Amal
vassal),the government was compelled to resolve the crisis
by enticing the Shia back into the fold. Siniora said that
he had often solicited creative options from his political
allies, but all he ever received was silence.


5. (C) The real problem in terms of eroding support,

BEIRUT 00000286 002.2 OF 003


continued the prime minister, was the highly critical and
sometimes difficult-to-decipher positions of Michel Aoun.
Siniora asked for U.S. assistance with Aoun -- to lessen the
damage he was inflicting on the government (and the political
cover he was giving Hizballah). But Siniora conceded that
Aoun probably understands he would never have the support of
the Sunni political establishment in his transparent quest
for the presidency, hence his increasing opposition to the
Siniora government.


6. (C) Siniora said he was trying to save the situation --
and the reform movement -- by "allowing things to cool down."
Siniora stated that in his meetings with Nasrallah, the
latter had said that he would "do his utmost" to keep the
Shia in the government, that is to prevent outright
resignation of the boycotting ministers. Siniora stated that
Amal leader Nabih Berri was continuing to help also, but his
own approach to resolving the standoff (with a new
ministerial statement) had the advantage of being
comprehensive. If successful, not only would it bring
consensus back to cabinet deliberations, but it would expand
the role of the UNIIIC, as well as limit Hizballah's
influence in Lebanon "in both duration and extent." Siniora
argued that at this point in time, consensus rule in Lebanon
was necessary, and as such, compromise with Hizballah was the
only way forward. Siniora concluded by saying that as a
pragmatist, he would not pursue a "mirage." Although the
prime minister acknowledged he was "not confident" he could
achieve a solution, the stakes for Lebanon and the region
were too great not to keep trying. Siniora maintained there
were many in Syria, and some in Lebanon, who were keenly
interested in having things "spin out of control" and he was
firm in his resolve to prevent that from happening.


7. (C) Siniora also indicated he would soon be traveling to
Saudi Arabia for "fence mending" negotiations with the Saudi
regime, whom he described as resentful of the manner in which
their recent mediation efforts were rejected. Concerning the
announced visit of Egyptian Intelligence Director Omar
Soliman and the apparent opening of a GOE mediation effort,
the prime minister said, despite what was being avidly
reported in the Lebanese press, there was "no real Egyptian
initiative in the actual sense of the word." Although the
press reported Soliman would arrive today, Siniora said that,
because of Egypt's involvement in pressing Palestinian
issues, the Soliman visit to Lebanon (and Damascus) was not
yet scheduled. Siniora said he welcomed GOE assistance, but
that the solution of the crisis was in Lebanon. What Siniora
said he would welcome from the Egyptians would be assistance
to: convince Syria "to stop its killing machine" in Lebanon,
as well as address the subject of Palestinian arms located
outside the refugee camps, an issue which had regional
complications.

MOHAMMAD ALI HAMADEI
AND OTHER TWA HIJACKERS
--------------


8. (C) Using the points in reftel, the Ambassador delivered
a copy of a diplomatic note requesting that Lebanon extradite
the four suspects (Mohammed Ali Hamadei, Hasan Izz-al-Din,
Ali Atwa, and Imad Fayiz Mughiyah) in the 1985 TWA 847
hijacking. Prime Minister Siniora listened to the
Ambassador's extended discourse on the importance of action
and its possible implications on U.S.-Lebanese relations. As
in previous discussions of this critical issue, Siniora
expressed genuine appreciation of the seriousness of the US
government to bring these terrorists to justice, but he urged
understanding in Washington of the impact of complying with
the requested action in Lebanon. He argued that nothing
would please Syria and its supporters more than an
opportunity to accuse the GOL of breaking its own laws to
support a U.S. request, or to enjoy the benefits of strained
U.S.-Lebanese relations in the event of non-support. Siniora
acknowledged that the Ambassador would be meeting with both
the Minister of Justice and Minister of Foreign Affairs the
following day to press this issue and stated he would
seriously study the options open to his government.

RADIO SAWA
--------------


9. (C) The final item discussed involved a notification to
the prime minister that as a result of a recent contract
executed between USG's Broadcasting Board of governors and a
Lebanese media provider, USG-funded Radio Sawa was scheduled
to begin broadcasts from four transmitters located in Lebanon

BEIRUT 00000286 003.2 OF 003


on February 6. Siniora said he had already been aware of the
plan, but appreciated hearing the details before the
transmissions commenced. Although his advisor sought
clarification about the content of the broadcasts, the prime
minister did not voice any concerns.

COMMENT
--------------


10. (C) Siniora seems to have abandoned his efforts to
draft a text that would induce the five Shia ministers to
return to the cabinet. This is good news, as his proposed
(and much edited) text crossed international red lines and
did not have the support even of Siniora's closest cabinet
allies. But, with Plan A for cabinet reunification shelved,
he does not seem to have a viable Plan B. UNSYG's Personal
Representative for Lebanon Geir Pedersen told us separately
that, in his conversations with Hizballah members, it is
clear that Hizballah has no intentions of backing down from
its insistence that the cabinet declare Hizballah
"resistance," not a militia, and therefore not subject to
UNSCR 1559.


11. (C) Siniora did not create this cabinet crisis and
understands fully that it needs to be resolved -- if it can
be resolved -- as quickly as possible. But we also think
that he needs to do a much better job of broadening his base
of consultations. So far, he has been running a one-man show
of negotiations. The PM would be in a much stronger position
if, when he sees Nasrallah, he can speak authoritatively that
Sa'ad Hariri, Walid Jumblatt and his ministers, Samir Ja'ja'
and his minister, and the other cabinet ministers are all
with him. Even better, but more difficult, would be if he
can somehow woo Michel Aoun to his side.
FELTMAN