MGLE01: WASHINGTON-BOUND JUMBLATT REACHING OUT TO

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 BEIRUT 000281

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/WERNER/SINGH
LONDON FOR TSOU
PARIS FOR ZEYA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/30/2016
TAGS: PGOV PTER KISL LE SY SA
SUBJECT: MGLE01: WASHINGTON-BOUND JUMBLATT REACHING OUT TO
AOUN, WAITING FOR SA'AD HARIRI TO RETURN

REF: BEIRUT 241

BEIRUT 00000281 001.2 OF 004


Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey D. Feltman for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d
).

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (S) In a 1/28 meeting, Druze leader Walid Jumblatt
described his efforts to find a candidate for an upcoming
parliamentary by-election on which both his "March 14" allies
and Michel Aoun can agree. He reiterated his belief that
Sa'ad Hariri needs to return to Lebanon, but not before
soothing the feelings of the "annoyed" Saudi leadership
(which maintains a stranglehold on Hariri finances). Seeing
Hizballah content to maintain a "balance of terror" against
the March 14 forces, he described Prime Minister Siniora's
strategy for bringing boycotting Shi'a ministers back to the
cabinet as ill-advised, and said Siniora's proposed
memorandum of understanding with those ministers takes the
country "back to square one." He warned us of a new
disinformation campaign against the UN International
Independent Investigation Commission (UNIIIC),and described
his plans to visit Washington in early March. End summary.

DEALING WITH AOUN ON THE BAABDA-ALEY RACE
--------------


2. (S) Called on by the Ambassador and emboff at his
residence in Moukhtara on January 28, Walid Jumblatt said he
would try to seek a compromise candidate between the Aoun and
March 14 forces to fill the late Edmond Na'eem's seat in a
parliamentary by-election for the Ba'abda-Aley district. The
question was: would Aoun agree to one? Jumblatt expected
Aoun to oppose newscaster and assassination attempt survivor
May Chidiac as a candidate, since she was the nominee of
Lebanese Forces leader Samir Ja'ja'. Liberal Party leader
Dory Chamoun -- son of President Camille Chamoun (1952-1958)
and the other announced contender for the seat -- "won't get
many votes," Jumblatt said.


3. (S) Even though two "March 14" candidates with no chance
of getting Aoun's support -- Chidiac and Chamoun -- were
already in the race, there was still a chance of finding a
consensus candidate, according to Jumblatt. Former Beirut
Bar Association head Shakib Qortbawi, "a patriot," fit the
bill. Former MP Salah Honein (whom Jumblatt unceremoniously
dumped from his candidate list in the 2005 parliamentary
elections in order to make room for Lebanese Forces
candidates) was also good, but Jumblatt doubted that Aoun
would accept him. Jumblatt was not enthusiastic about former
MP Pierre Dakkash (whom Aoun described as a possible
compromise candidate in a January 29 television interview).
The problem was that Aoun would reject even Qortbawi's
candidacy if it were Jumblatt's initiative. The trick would
be to get Qortbawi nominated by Aoun's side, Jumblatt
suggested.


4. (S) Failing a compromise candidate, the outlook was not
promising. If the March 14 and Aounist forces ran opposing
candidates, "this time the Shi'ites will be massively against
us while the Christian vote will be divided." In addition,
the election would be cast as a struggle between Jumblatt and
Hizballah leader Hassan Nasrallah -- one which, given
Hizballah's ability to tip the balance in a district roughly
evenly divided among Shi'a Muslims, Christians, and Druze --
Jumblatt and the "March 14" forces would humiliatingly lose.


5. (S) To avoid this possibility, it would be worth it to
"sell Aoun one more MP" in Ba'abda-Aley if Aoun and the March
14 side could agree on a common candidate. Aoun was being as
difficult as ever, however: "nothing embarrasses him!"
Jumblatt continued, "Suddenly (Aoun) decided to forget about
(UNSCR) 1559, suddenly he decided to support foreign hostage
taking!" (Note: Jumblatt was referring to unguarded
comments Aoun made on New TV that seemed to justify
Hizballah's taking of hostages in the 1980s. End note.)
Even so, the March 14 forces would continue to try to work
with him. "We will be sending him a message" soon, he said.
Aoun's real problem in the March 14 forces was with Samir
Ja'ja'. Personal relations between Aoun and Ja'ja' were bad,
and there was tension on the ground between the rank-and-file
of Aoun's Free Patriotic Movement and that of Ja'ja''s
Lebanese Forces.

BEIRUT 00000281 002.2 OF 004




6. (S) Aoun's current insistence on dialogue and consensus
on all issues threatened to bring the political process to a
halt for "years," Jumblatt said. Even so, Jumblatt admitted,
Aoun "has a point" in his criticism of the Siniora
government's handling of certain recent high-level
appointments in the Interior Ministry, all of which had gone
to Hariri-oriented Sunni Muslims.

SA'AD HARIRI AND THE SAUDIS
--------------


7. (S) Jumblatt thought it important that Sa'ad Hariri reach
out to Aoun in person. Even more important, however, was
that Hariri use his connections to placate a Saudi leadership
that was "annoyed" by the demise of its most recent (comment:
and unhelpful) attempt to mediate between Lebanon and Syria.
The Saudis were "panicked," and that explained their attempt
to broker an understanding between Syria and Lebanon on
Syrian terms. "They're terribly rich, and afraid," Jumblatt
said of the Saudi leadership. The Saudi ambassador in
Lebanon, a key player in the mediation process who outraged
Siniora and the March 14 forces with a well-publicized call
on the disgraced President Lahoud January 24, appeared to be
"listening too much to Nasrallah."


8. (S) Jumblatt said Hariri had called him the night before
from Washington (January 27) to say that his meeting with
President Bush had been "excellent." "I said 'okay,'"
Jumblatt recalled, "'but don't forget about King Abdullah.'"
Until Hariri soothed Saudi feelings, he would continue to be
"squeezed" by the Kingdom, which -- by Jumblatt's account --
owed Hariri something in the range of USD 4 billion.


9. (S) Jumblatt expressed frustration with Sa'ad Hariri's
continuing absence from Lebanon. Hariri had given no
indication of when he might return, and time was running out
to make plans for February 14, the first anniversary of his
father Rafiq Hariri's assassination. Were Sa'ad Hariri in
Lebanon by February 14, it would be appropriate to stage a
massive rally on that day. With him absent, it was not clear
how to commemorate the event.


10. (S) Hariri's presence was essential to keep the Sunni
community firmly in the "March 14" camp. "I can't replace
him" in that capacity, Jumblatt noted. It would also allow
him to put some direction back into the political party
founded by Sa'ad's father Rafiq, the Future Current, which is
now "completely disorganized." It would also allow him to
use his family's financial resources more effectively. For
example, Hariri could spend the money he would otherwise pay
"staying a week at the Athenee" -- the exclusive Paris hotel
that has become something of an alternate "March 14"
headquarters -- in politically useful patronage in Lebanon's
remote, impoverished, predominantly Sunni Akkar region,
Jumblatt said.

CABINET CRISIS AND HIZBALLAH
--------------


11. (S) The Ambassador described as seriously flawed and
dangerous the draft memorandum of understanding, described in
previous reporting, that Prime Minister Siniora hopes will
make possible the return of the cabinet's Hizballah- and Amal
Movement-aligned Shi'a ministers and so end the cabinet
crisis. The paper, as currently drafted, states that
Hizballah is not a militia (and therefore not subject to
UNSCR 1559's requirement to disarm). In which case, Jumblatt
said, "we're back to square one." The fact that Siniora
continued to offer this concession to Hizballah suggested
that he was "badly advised," Jumblatt added.


12. (S) Jumblatt described Hizballah as maintaining a
"balance of terror," and sending a message to the March 14
forces along the lines of "we're here, we have a state within
a state, go to hell." He saw Speaker of Parliament and Amal
Movement leader Nabih Berri taking a position in favor of
"reshuffling" the 1989 Ta'if Agreement in a way that would
require consensus for practically any cabinet decision of
consequence. "If you want to have a cup of coffee, we need
consensus," said Jumblatt, describing the extreme to which
Berri seemed to be going. Jumblatt said he was not in
contact with Berri, and wondered why Berri felt compelled to
meet Iranian President Ahmadinejad during Ahmadinejad's

BEIRUT 00000281 003.2 OF 004


recent visit to Damascus.


13. (S) On Nasrallah, Jumblatt asked, "How can (he) be a
Lebanese leader with this link to the extreme left wing in
Tehran?" Hizballah would only grow stronger with the
consolidation of a "Shi'ite empire" ranging from Afghanistan
to Lebanon. Dealing with Hizballah effectively, in his view,
required a regional strategy. "We need to work on Najaf," he
said, referring to the center of Shi'a learning in Iraq. In
addition, it was necessary to "cut the Syrian link" that gave
Hizballah geographic continuity, following the fall of Saddam
Hussein's regime, with Iran.

LATEST "TRICKS"
--------------


14. (S) Jumblatt warned that there was "a new trick" being
used to derail the UN investigation of Rafiq Hariri's
assassination. An apparent disinformation effort was taking
the form of a "fishy story" picked by a daily "as-Safir"
writer close to "renegade Druze" leader (and Jumblatt enemy)
Wi'am Wahhab. The story referred to a Palestinian currently
living in Sweden who was allegedly involved in the Hariri
assassination. On the presumption that this person is an
Israeli agent, SARG apologists would use the story to "prove"
that -- contrary to the UNIIIC's conclusions to date --
Hariri had in fact been killed by Israel's Mossad. This
character would become "a new Hossam Hossam," claimed
Jumblatt, referring to the UNIIIC witness whose recanting of
his testimony was showcased by SARG officials in an attempt
to discredit the investigation.


15. (S) Jumblatt claimed that, in the meantime, the SARG was
distributing weapons in Lebanon. Some of them had reportedly
wound up in the hands of the Druze community's
distant-number-two hereditary leader, "Prince" Talal Arslan.
Asked how much of a popular following his rival, Arslan, had,
Jumblatt answered: "enough to create some trouble."

JUMBLATT ON HAMAS ELECCTION IMPACT
--------------


16. (S) Jumblatt worried that the victory of Hamas in the
Palestinian parliamentary elections would "radicalize" the
Palestinian camps in Lebanon. If Iran were to become more
active in financing certain Palestinian factions in the
Lebanese camps, it would "create a big problem," he said. As
it was, Ahmad Jibril's Popular Front for the Liberation of
Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC) had reinforced its based
in Na'ameh, on the coast between Beirut and Sidon. In
addition, a suspiciously large number of Syrian "workers" --
800, Jumblatt claimed -- were based in a factory near
Na'ameh, perhaps kept there in reserve in case Lebanese
authorities attempted to disarm the Na'ameh base.

WASHINGTON VISIT
--------------


17. (S) Jumblatt said that he would visit Washington during
the first week of March for private speaking engagements, and
would be available for meetings with USG officials from March
6 onward. He would see if his longtime political ally,
Minister of Telecommunications Marwan Hamadeh, would be able
to travel with him. In any event, Jumblatt planned to depart
Beirut for Paris, where he would spend a few days before
departing from there for Washington. He was also considering
stopping in London and Cairo on his return trip, having
received an invitation to visit the UK from British
Ambassador James Watt. He mused about stopping by Saudi
Arabia as well, to help Lebanon make amends with the Saudi
royal family.

COMMENT
--------------


18. (S) As we have maintained in previous reporting, Prime
Minister Siniora's proposed memorandum of understanding with
his boycotting Shi'a ministers would be a disaster if agreed
upon. It would immediately put the GOL in non-compliance
with UNSCR 1559 while seemingly placing a GOL stamp of
approval on any cross-border actions that Hizballah
undertakes in the future. At the same time, it would do
nothing to prevent the Hizballah- and Amal Movement-aligned
ministers from walking out and pulling the rug out from

BEIRUT 00000281 004.2 OF 004


Siniora yet again. The most optimistic scenario would have
the memorandum, if agreed upon, quickly forgotten, like the
cabinet's summer 2005 policy statement, which similarly
offered an open-ended endorsement of Hizballah. At the very
least, the Siniora government should try to extract as high a
price as possible from Hizballah and Amal in return. Siniora
needs to take another look at his bargaining position, to see
how he can get Hizballah-Amal concessions on issues such as
support for reform, credible appointments of senior personnel
in the security sector, and removal of Lebanon's Hizballah
apologist ambassador to the United States. But, at this
writing, we do not believe that Siniora has any support for
his approach. Not only is Walid Jumblatt, a key ally,
opposed, but so are the Christians. Over lunch with the
Ambassador on 1/29, Lebanese Forces leader Samir Ja'ja' noted
that he, like Jumblatt, will not agree to Siniora's
memorandum.
FELTMAN