LEBANON: GEIR PEDERSEN ON ANNAN'S VISIT

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 002805

SIPDIS

SIPDIS
NOFORN

NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/MARCHESE/HARDING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/29/2016
TAGS: PREL PTER LE SY
SUBJECT: LEBANON: GEIR PEDERSEN ON ANNAN'S VISIT

REF: BEIRUT 2797

Classified By: Jeffrey D. Feltman, Ambassador. Reason 1.4 (b) and (d).

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (S/NF) On August 29, the UNSYG's Personal Representative
for Lebanon Geir Pedersen and UN Senior Political Affairs
Officer Salman Sheikh (please protect both throughout)
briefed Ambassador Feltman and poloff on UNSYG Kofi Annan's
Beirut meetings on August 28. While Pedersen covered much of
the same information conveyed to the Ambassador by UN envoy
Terje Roed-Larsen earlier on August 29 (reftel),he provided
a read-out of Annan's meeting with Hizballah Minister of
Energy Mohammad Fneish (at which meeting Larsen, much to his
chagrin, had not been present). Pedersen said that Annan
also met briefly with Justice Minister Charles Rizk, who
asked for UN Legal Advisor Michel to come to Lebanon as soon
as possible to sign the agreement for the special tribunal to
try suspects in the Hariri assassination (and possibly other
attacks). The Ambassador asked specifically about Annan's
comments to the GOL on arms smuggling. Pedersen said that
Annan had not pushed this as much as other issues - such as
prisoner exchange - but that Siniora agrees to UN maritime
patrols along the coast of Lebanon. However, there no
further clarity emerged regarding the Lebanon-Syria frontier.
Towards the end of the meeting, Sheikh showed poloff a
memcon of a UNIFIL-LAF meeting indicating that the UN has
asked the GOL to provide a comprehensive report on measures
taken to secure points of entry and further GOL needs.
Finally, Sheikh and Pedersen provided a rough sketch of how
they believe the Lebanon UN mission should be structured in
order to be most effective. END SUMMARY.

INCIDENT IN THE SOUTHERN SUBURBS
--------------


2. (S/NF) The Ambassador criticized the decision by
Pedersen's office for Annan to go on a walking tour of the
southern suburbs. Pedersen, obviously upset by the whole
episode, said that Hizballah had "screwed us in a big way" by
staging a pro-Hizballah, anti-UN/US/GOL protest during the
delegation's visit to the suburbs. "It was the worst thing
they could have done," Pedersen remarked, admitting that
Larsen had borne the brunt of the protestors' anger for
comments he had made which supposedly, in Hizballah's warped
mind, invited a renewed Israeli bombing campaign on Lebanon.
The Ambassador suggested that perhaps this incident might now
convince Pedersen, who maintains close contact with Hizballah
at the behest of certain of his staff, that the group is not
to be trusted. It is also of concern that Hizballah knew the
exact time and place of Annan's arrival, who was supposedly
under GOL protection. The Ambassador noted that the incident
was easily predictable and that proceeding on the visit to
the southern suburbs was ill advised.

MEETING WITH FNEISH
--------------


3. (S/NF) Pedersen provided a read-out of Annan's meeting
with Hizballah Minister Mohammad Fneish (the more serious of
the Hizballah duo in the Cabinet, the other being Labor
Minister Trad Hamadeh, who is always careful to claim he is
not a Hizballah member, just supporter and ally). The only
other people in the meeting were Pedersen and a Hizballah
translator. Larsen was not invited to join. Annan told
Fneish that Hizballah must find a way to peacefully disarm
now, adding that it is important for the unity, stability,
and diversity of Lebanon that no one group in the country be
afraid of any other. Fneish did not respond directly to
this, but said simply that Hizballah respects UNSCR 1701,
welcomes the deployment of UNIFIL, and will not respond to
Israeli "provocations". Fneish said the main Hizballah
concerns are land mines, Sheba'a Farms, and prisoners, which
to Pedersen was Fneish's indirect way of giving the Hizballah
conditions for disarmament. "It's important that they didn't
raise the bar," said Pedersen optimistically. Pedersen noted
also that Fneish attacked Larsen during the meeting about
what Hizballah claims were his provocative comments.


4. (S/NF) Annan discussed the issue of prisoners, urging

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Hizballah to hand them over as a "humanitarian gesture", and
offering to act as arbitrator for an exchange. Fneish
replied that he was not authorized to speak on the prisoners'
issue during the meeting. Hizballah later contacted Pedersen
to say that they would accept Annan's offer of arbitration.
Pedersen said there was no information given on the
whereabouts or well-being of the two captured Israeli
soldiers.

MEETING ON SPECIAL TRIBUNAL
--------------


5. (S/NF) Pedersen said that Annan had a brief,
"five-minute" meeting with Justice Minister Charles Rizk to
discuss the "special tribunal with international character"
to try suspects in the Hariri assassination (and possibly
other attacks). Rizk had asked for UN Legal Advisor Nicholas
Michel to come to Lebanon quickly in order to sign the
agreement on the tribunal. Pedersen said that Michel had
also called him to say he wants to come soon. (Note. Annan
had considered a meeting with President Lahoud, with Pedersen
advising against it. Annan decided to raise it through Rizk,
a close friend of Lahoud's who -- as with most Maronites --
entertains his own presidential ambitions. Pedersen reported
that Rizk "did not want to get involved" in setting something
up with Lahoud. End Note.)

OTHER MEETINGS
--------------


6. (S/NF) As Larsen reported earlier, Pedersen said that
Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri had been positive and
supportive during his meeting with Annan, but clearly does
not want to touch the prisoner exchange issue, perhaps since
he does not expect it to be solved easily. Pedersen said
Annan, who had a dim view of Berri based on earlier meetings,
had been impressed with Berri this time, as the Speaker gave
a "very serious, statesmanlike performance."


7. (S/NF) Pedersen said that in the meeting with Siniora,
the PM focused on ending the air and sea blockade of Lebanon
and ensuring the complete IDF withdrawal as soon as possible.
The Secretary-General, who has made public statements
calling for an end to the blockade, agreed that the Israelis
should not be "the referees" as to whether the GOL has done
enough on monitoring -- that is the UN's role. As Larsen
also reported, Annan suggested mediating a meeting between
Siniora and Bashar al-Asad in "a neutral location" -- Larsen
said Cyprus. Siniora agreed to the idea, but Pedersen
suspected that Asad would likely reject it, which would be
bad publicity for him. Annan was also very impressed with
Siniora, who Pedersen says has "matured" since he first took
office.


8. (S/NF) Annan also had a security meeting with Siniora,
Defense Minister Elias Murr, Acting Interior Minister Ahmad
Fatfat, LAF chief General Michel Sleiman, LAF G2 Intelligence
chief George Khoury, ISF commander Ashraf Rifi, and others
during which they discussed LAF/UNIFIL coordination on
deployments. While Larsen said that UNIFIL commander
Pelligrini had been mum at the meeting about coordination
issues, Pedersen said that the UN side raised concerns that
coordination below the senior levels is lacking. They also
queried why the LAF was not deploying up to the Blue Line in
the Sheba'a Farms area, which surprised Murr and Sleiman, who
thought the LAF had done so.


9. (S/NF) Pedersen said Sleiman also gave details on the
LAF deployment of 8600 troops to the Lebanon-Syria border.
"Sleiman was very firm on this," said Pedersen, "He admitted
they haven't stopped everything." The Ambassador noted that
the Embassy assessment of the LAF troop numbers on the border
was much less than the purported 8600, and suggested that the
GOL could request UNIFIL to send a small team to verify the
numbers. Pedersen promised to discuss this with Murr. He
said that Annan reiterated that the GOL just has to ask for
help from UNIFIL regarding the Lebanon-Syria border, and it
will be provided.


10. (S/NF) Pedersen said that Siniora has no problem with
accepting UNIFIL maritime patrols, which will be composed of
German, Dutch, Danish, and Norwegian naval forces. The

BEIRUT 00002805 003 OF 003


Germans have offered a naval task force to patrol the entire
Lebanese coastline. Pedersen said that the UNIFIL officers
thought an advance contingent of naval forces could be in
Lebanese waters by "the end of the week". The Ambassador
queried this since the contingents still needed to get
political approval from their capitals. Shaykh also pointed
out that there are still some concerns about the UNIFIL naval
Rules of Engagement.


11. (S/NF) Annan also pushed the Lebanese for a resumption
of the 1949 Armistice Agreement, and discussed this in some
detail privately with Siniora. According to the armistice,
the UNSYG has the right to amend the agreement. Annan
suggested that a political meeting be set up at the level of
Defense Ministers. Siniora balked at this, but said he would
support higher-level military meetings (perhaps on the level
of LAF chief Sleiman). Pedersen noted that if the 1949
Armistice Agreement were to be reactivated, that Hizballah
and Syria could still play the role of spoliers, but then
that would reveal their true face. (Comment: As if there
isn't already sufficient evidence of their "true face." End
comment.)

UN MEMCON REGARDING MONITORING SUPPORT
--------------


12. (S/NF) Shaykh (again, please protect) handed poloff a
highlighted copy of a memorandum to DPKO U/SYG Guehenno of an
August 28 meeting between Pelligrini and LAF General Shaaythy
(who has been liaising for the LAF with UNIFIL and the IDF).
Pelligrini writes that he asked Shaaythy to "present a
comprehensive report of all measures they (the LAF) have
taken (on securing points of entry) and the kind of
assistance they require from UNIFIL". Shaaythy promised to
ask Siniora to prepare such a report and to "address to the
UN a specific request to verify the security of the borders
and all entry points." Shaaythy also said the GOL requests
UNIFIL naval contingents "all along" Lebanon's shores, as
well as air patrols.

UN LEBANON MISSION STRUCTURE
--------------


13. (S/NF) Discussing the possibility that Annan may assign
a Special Representative (SRSG) for Lebanon, both Pedersen
and Shaykh said that the French and Italians would never
accept civilian control over the military mission in Lebanon.
Both are also deeply surprised that Annan would deploy a
SRSG so close to the end of his term. Pedersen asked Shaykh
to show us a diagram for their suggested structure for the UN
mission in Lebanon. In their scheme, which makes a great
deal of sense, the office would be headed by a Special
Coordinator (SC) who would directly oversee the political,
humanitarian, and information sections of the mission. Each
section would have a coordinator, while the political section
would have an additional five officrs and the humanitarian
section a further two officers. The SC would not directly
oversee the UNIFIL forces but would liaise directly with the
force commander (the SC's office would have a military
liaison and UNIFIL headquarters in Lebanon would have a
political liaison). Pedersen and Shaykh -- who made sure
poloff copied the sketch in detail -- argued that this would
be a much lighter, less bureaucratic structure which would
alleviate UNIFIL TCCs' fears about civilian control of the
military mission.
FELTMAN