LEBANON: BRAMMERTZ PURSUES SEVERAL LEADS; MAY NOT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BEIRUT 002803

SIPDIS

SIPDIS
NOFORN

NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/MARCHESE/HARDING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/28/2016
TAGS: PTER KCRM PINR ASEC SY LE
SUBJECT: LEBANON: BRAMMERTZ PURSUES SEVERAL LEADS; MAY NOT
BE READY FOR JUNE 2007 TRIBUNAL

REF: STATE 140003

Classified By: Jeffrey D. Feltman, Ambassador. Reason 1.4(b) and (d).

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C/NF) During an August 28 meeting with the Ambassador
and poloff, an alternately cagy and revealing Commissioner
Serge Brammertz, head of the United Nations International
Independent Investigation Commission (UNIIIC),indicated that
"Lebanon's next-door neighbor" is still the chief suspect in
the assassination of Rafik Hariri. He said that the latest
UNIIIC report, delayed until the end of September, will be a
"status report" containing "no surprises," but will contain a
good deal of technical and forensic data. Brammertz said his
investigators are pursuing several promising leads, including
using computer modelling to plot the movements of six cell
phone users surveilling Hariri on the day of the murder.
UNIIIC team members have conducted several interviews with
mid-level officials in Syria since the June UNIIIC report,
and Brammertz plans to interview higher-level officials as
well as Hussam Hussam, the Syrian Kurd who publicly recanted
his previously damning testimony. In a vague aside,
Brammertz said that a connection is beginning to emerge
linking the Hariri assassination to the other 14 bombings
between October 2004 and December 2005.


2. (C/NF) Regarding the framework document to establish a
"special tribunal with international character," the latest
draft of which has been edited by the Lebanese and awaits
signature by the UN Legal Advisor Nicholas Michel, Brammertz
wants to have as wide a berth as possible in prosecuting the
Hariri assassination and any other crimes considered of a
"similar nature and gravity." He believes that allowing the
tribunal to prosecute defendents for "crimes against
humanity" lends the tribunal international legitimacy.
However, Brammertz is not confident his case will be ready
for the tribunal by summer 2007, and cautioned that it would
be "indecent" to rush Michel out to Lebanon to sign the
framework document so soon after the recent conflict in which
roughly 1200 Lebanese were killed. END SUMMARY.

REAR BASE IN CYPRUS
--------------


3. (C/NF) Brammertz, who has been in Cyprus for most of
July and August, will remain in Lebanon only until August 30.
He wants to get the bulk of his team back to Lebanon as soon
as possible to increase the "urgency" of their work, but
plans to keep Cyprus as a rear operating base. That way, he
can keep some of his staff in Cyprus, as well as copies of
investigation files (one reason UNIIIC decamped so quickly to
Cyprus during the crisis was the fear that their Monteverde
headquarters might be targeted by groups opposed to their
presence, and all of their files irretrievably lost). In
addition, some interviews could be conducted in Cyprus.
Brammertz noted that UNIIIC is still woefully understaffed,
and that there are 20 vacancies on the staff, which is
insufficient to follow up on all the leads in the
investigation.

SEPTEMBER REPORT
--------------


4. (C/NF) Brammertz said that the UN Security Council has
asked him to delay the next UNIIIC report until the end of
September due to the heavy traffic of upcoming
Lebanon-related Council business, including the UNSCR 1701
30-day report in early September. The September report will
have "no surprises, no smoking gun," according to Brammertz.
Much like the last report, it will be a pro forma update
noting that there have been several further requests made for
"Syrian and international cooperation". (Note: While in New
York in late September, Brammertz hopes to send his lead
investigator Peter Nicolson to Washington for further
coordination with interested agencies. End Note.)


5. (C/NF) The report will also deal with results of
forensic and technical research. Brammertz says that
Japanese researchers have identified and provided him with a

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technical description of all the car parts found at the
bombing scene. Brammertz said that his team had also
finished examining 100 body parts and managed to identify all
23 people killed in the explosion. He added that one
"victim," formerly thought to be in 27 body parts but now
identified from 35 pieces, is the suspected suicide bomber.
Brammertz, verging on the macabre, said that one piece of the
"35-part person" was in fairly good condition and might be
used to identify age and ethnicity.


6. (C/NF) Brammertz added that the UNIIIC is trying to
establish the modus operandi for the attack, and has been
interviewing survivors from the Hariri bombing as well as
family members to establish a timeline for Rafik Hariri's
movements in the days leading up to the attack.
Interestingly, UNIIIC is also interviewing survivors and
relatives of victims of the other 14 bombings between the
attempt on Marwan Hamadeh in October 2004 and the murder of
Gibran Tueni in December 2005 in order to establish
"potential links."


7. (C/NF) Noting that the Hariri assassination was an
"extremely sophisticated operation," Brammertz said that only
a limited number of "countries and organizations" could have
carried it out. One of his most promising leads is the use
of telephone communications, and in particular that there
were six cell phone numbers that only called each other in a
closed circuit on the day of the attack (and were never used
again after the attack). UNIIIC is using computer graphics
to plot the movements of the six numbers in relation to
Hariri in the hours leading up to the attack. Brammertz
hopes eventually to be able to connect the SIM cards to
individuals. The cell phones are a "promising avenue,"
according to Brammertz.

SYRIA BEHAVING, BUT BRAMMERTZ CLEARLY SUSPECTS
-------------- -


7. (C/NF) There has been no change in the extent of Syrian
cooperation since the last report, according to Brammertz.
UNIIIC routinely gives the Syrians a two-week deadline for
responding to requests for information, and the Syrians
always oblige, often sending a representative to Cyprus to
hand over documents. Brammertz says this indicates that
there is a "clear senior-level decision" to cooperate.
UNIIIC interviewers (not Brammertz) have been to Syria "three
to five more times" since the June report, with still further
trips planned, and are currently interviewing "mid-level
people."


8. (C/NF) Brammertz is looking into various avenues for
continuing the interviews, and said that the UNIIIC will move
to senior-level Syrian officials soon. He added that an
interview of Hussam Hussam, a Syrian Kurd intelligence
official who gave and then publicly recanted testimony
damning of the Syrian regime, is "on the program." While
Brammertz is pleased that some Syrian interviewees have given
information, while others have been more reluctant, he does
not believe that the answer to the puzzle will come from the
Syrians themselves, but through other lines of inquiry.


8. (C/NF) Noting that Zuhair Mohammed Saddik, whose
testimony against Syria was later discredited, could never
appear as a witness in any eventual tribunal, the UNIIIC
investigators are nevertheless going over his evidence to
establish whether there may be a kernel of truth in any of
Saddik's avowals. "We're looking into whether even 10 per
cent is true," said Brammertz, adding that Saddik is "close
to people in a neighboring country" and may have picked up
some solid information and then layered his own lies on top
of it. Brammertz said that the UNIIIC had received many
documents from the Syrian authorities concerning Saddik's
criminal record, but Brammertz could not be sure they weren't
"falsified" (which shows how much Brammertz trusts Syrian
"cooperation"). Noting that he doesn't believe Saad Hariri
had any interest in providing Saddik as a false witness for
an investigation which is, after all, seeking the truth about
his father's murder, Brammertz does not rule out that Saad
could be "easily manipulated."


9. (C/NF) Following another track, Brammertz remarked that

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the Bank al-Medina scandal could potentially implicate
high-ranking Syrians (though many more Lebanese) and that he
may travel to Brazil to interview a principal suspect in the
scandal, Rana Qlaylat, if she is not extradited first.
According to Brammertz, Hariri may have been intending to
open up the Bank al-Medina files once he returned to become
Prime Minister. That possibility, Brammertz said, might have
contributed to the motivation for the murder.


10. (C/NF) Brammertz is also pursuing information related
to the "Naba cell" of Sunni militants arrested in May 2006
with whom suspected Hariri suicide bomber Abu Adas may have
been connected. He says that the cell members are "in the
top-level of upcoming interviews." Brammertz, again bringing
in Syria, remarked that the cell had been kicked out of Syria
before they were arrested in Lebanon. He added that he has
requested information related to the group from the Syrians.


11. (C/NF) The Ambassador asked Brammertz if he has
eliminated any of the possible culprits in the assassination.
Brammertz responded -- very carefully -- that the "main
hypothesis is still the next-door neighbor," and that UNIIIC
is focusing more and more resources on investigating that
"avenue" while not ruling out other possibilities.

BOMBINGS LINKED?
--------------


12. (C/NF) In what he described as the "beginning of an
interesting avenue," Brammertz let on that there may be links
between the Hariri assassination and some of the other 14
bombings. Claiming that it has to do with "media support
areas," he said that "several people" are linked. Suddenly
clamming up, Brammertz said he couldn't tell us any more than
that, adding cryptically that, "We are convinced this must be
seen in a broader context. We don't have the clear link, but
we believe it's there."

FORMER LEBANESE SECURITY HEADS
--------------


13. (C/NF) Regarding the four former Lebanese security
chiefs who are still being held in prison on the basis of
Saddik's discredited testimony, Brammertz said that there is
"no reason to feel any more comfortable" with the fact that
the four are still behind bars. He said UNIIIC had received
a letter from the defense lawyers requesting the release of
the four prisoners. Concerned about jurisdictional issues,
Brammertz forwarded the letter to Lebanese Prosecutor-General
Said Mirza for the GOL to take action. Acknowledging that
Mirza is in an awkward position as he cannot hold the four
former chiefs without evidence, Brammertz has handed over all
of UNIIIC's information related to them. Brammertz was quick
to point out that the four were arrested on the
recommendation of his predecessor, Detlev Mehlis. The UNIIIC
is also making a full assessment of Saddik's testimony --
again, to establish if there is even an ounce of truth -- but
so far has been unable to corroborate any of the information.


SPECIAL TRIBUNAL SOME TIME AWAY
--------------


14. (C/NF) Raising reftel points, the Ambassador argued
that the U.S. does not object to the tribunal having
jurisdiction over other serious crimes closely linked to the
Hariri assassination, and that this would not have to be
restricted to the October 2004 through December 2005
timeframe. However, the language in the current draft
framework for the special tribunal, giving it jurisdiction
over "related acts of a similar nature and gravity," is too
broad. Brammertz said it was his impression that the wording
in the current draft implies that there be a "concrete link"
between the acts. He says he prefers the open-ended language
in order to avoid a situation where some acts are being
prosecuted by the special tribunal, whereas others not
covered by agreement can only be tried on the level of
national courts. Brammertz prefers to leave the language
sufficiently broad so that all suspects can be tried by the
special tribunal. He acknowledged that there is disagreement
within the P5 regarding this broadened mandate, especially

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from Russia, and while from a prosecutorial standpoint he
prefers to include all of the cases in the special tribunal,
he realizes that for "political reasons" the Hariri case has
priority.


15. (C/NF) The Ambassador expressed concern about Article 3
of the draft tribunal framework which gives the tribunal
competency to try "crimes against humanity." Brammertz said
this was added at the insistence of the UN Legal Advisor's
Office as it gives the tribunal more legitimacy than even a
"complex murder case." In order to prove crimes against
humanity, Brammertz said, there needs to be evidence of a
widespread, systematic attack on a civilian population (such
as the 15 attacks in Lebanon, he suggested, if these can be
tied together).


16. (C/NF) The Ambassador asked when the tribunal will be
ready to start hearing cases, to which Brammertz responded
that, "I'm not confident we'll be ready by next June. I
cannot guarantee there will be a case to go ahead with the
tribunal." Brammertz cautioned that there is no need to rush
to sign the framework agreement for the tribunal, and he
advised Nicholas Michel not to come to Lebanon until after
UNIIIC's late September report. "It's too chaotic for Michel
to come," according to Brammertz, noting that it would be
somewhat indecent to pursue the tribunal for the
assassination of one man so soon after a conflict which had
left more than 1,000 dead. "The bodies are not yet cold".


17. (C/NF) The Ambassador argued that the objective in
moving ahead quickly on signing the tribunal agreement would
be to prevent any further attacks on Lebanon. UNSCR 1701 is
a setback for the Syrians, and the last two times Syria
suffered a defeat in Lebanon - UNSCR 1559 in September 2004
and their withdrawal in April 2005 - there followed a series
of presumably recriminatory bombings. Brammertz understood
the Ambassador's concerns, but preferred that his
investigation be kept separate from the regional political
situation.
FELTMAN