Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06BEIRUT2766
2006-08-25 17:16:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Beirut
Cable title:  

RECONSIDERING THE AIR EMBARGO OF LEBANON

Tags:  EAIR PREL MOPS PGOV LE SY IS 
pdf how-to read a cable
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIRUT 002766 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/MARCHESE/HARDING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/25/2026
TAGS: EAIR PREL MOPS PGOV LE SY IS
SUBJECT: RECONSIDERING THE AIR EMBARGO OF LEBANON

REF: A. BEIRUT 2672


B. BEIRUT 2680

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIRUT 002766

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/MARCHESE/HARDING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/25/2026
TAGS: EAIR PREL MOPS PGOV LE SY IS
SUBJECT: RECONSIDERING THE AIR EMBARGO OF LEBANON

REF: A. BEIRUT 2672


B. BEIRUT 2680


1. (C) Via septels, we are reporting the Ambassador's
meetings today (8/25) with Prime Minister Siniora and Deputy
Prime Minister/Defense Minister Murr on the 8/24 unanimous
cabinet decision empowering Siniora to request international
help, from whatever source, for Lebanon's land borders,
seaports, and airport. Both Siniora and Murr made it clear
that the PM will use this authority to ask for technical
assistance, training, and equipment from Germany. The
request will fall short of asking the Germans to supervise
customs, immigration, and other border procedures; the
Germans will not be asked to "police" what happens at the
border. Despite the pressure the air and sea embargo places
on them, the Lebanese will continue to reject any kind of
arrangement that whiffs of infringement of sovereignty or
that smells like the EU work at the Rafah crossing between
the Gaza Strip and Egypt. Whatever the requirements of UNSCR
1701, Siniora knows that he will be seriously undermined if
he moves in that direction.


2. (C) Thus, the request to the Germans falls short of the
assurances the Israelis seek. Nevertheless, we should
consider asking the Israelis to lift the ban on passenger
travel in and out of Rafiq Hariri International Airport (BIA)
entirely and on air cargo traffic between BIA and at least
North America and the EU. Whatever security gains might
accrue from the air blockade, they are now outweighed
considerably by the political costs. There would seem to be
even a security cost to Israel of the blockade, in that it is
contributing to the impoverishment of an increasingly
disgruntled neighbor and the weakening of a moderate Arab
leader.


3. (C) With the major security and smuggling problems
related to the land border, keeping the airport closed
(except for the Beirut-Amman air bridge) hurts our interest
in the success of the Siniora government more than it

addresses Israel's security concerns. There are also direct
costs levied on us. Only a few weeks ago, we were unjustly
accused of delaying a cease-fire and unfairly held
responsible for civilian casualties and destruction by
"made-in-USA" ordnance. These charges stuck, and generous
reconstuction and humanitarian assistance alone will not
reverse the damage done to our reputation. Now, our enemies
here have latched onto the air and sea blockade to further
tarnish our image. The blockade has become the current
equivalent of maimed babies and destroyed homes in the
propaganda war against us. Just as our humanitarian
assistance was pointedly contrasted by Israeli bombs, we are
accused of hypocrisy: we preach reconstruction, while
preventing the private sector from the trade and travel that
would lead to reconstruction. With all foreign visitors to
Lebanon (including allies like the French) calling publicly
for lifting the "siege," we alone are seen as culpable.


4. (C) The people who have the most to gain from the air
and sea blockade are Syrian black marketeers and those who
try to paint the United States as the implacable enemy of
Arabs in general and the Lebanese specifically. In last
night's cabinet meeting, the Hizballah ministers made a
strong case that the GOL should ask the Syrians for extra
facilities for trade and travel, given the ongoing blockade.
Having just won Hizballah's acquiesence in asking for help at
the international borders, the March 14 ministers did not
have a ready answer about why not to ask for Syrian help,
when the economy so desperately needs immediate relief.
While Syria right now seems in no mood to help Lebanon (as
the cut-off in electricity deliveries shows),it would seem,
from a security angle, that diverting trade and travel to
Syria actually makes it easier to hide people and weapons in
the increased traffic that would result. The Syrians must
take great comfort from a Lebanese cabinet debate on whether
to ask for Syria's help in evading an Israeli embargo (and
Syria starts looking like Lebanon's friend and savior, while
we appear to be the enemy).


5. (C) It is clear that Lebanon has unambiguous obligations
under UNSCR 1701 to secure its borders and combat arms
smuggling. It is also clear that Hizballah and others have
used Lebanon's entry points for alien and weapons smuggling.
But international representatives in Lebanon, save us,
believe that the GOL has taken sufficient, credible measures
in response to UNSCR 1701 that change the procedures at the
airport (reftels): the Hizballah-sympathizing head of
airport security has been sidelined; a new airport security

BEIRUT 00002766 002 OF 002


committee is headed by a general loyal to Walid Jumblatt; and
the Sunni-loyal ISF has replaced the LAF for some processing.
However imperfect the situation at the airport, the "status
quo ante" does not prevail. In addition, Siniora is on the
verge of sending a letter to the Germans requesting
additional technical assistance, training, and equipment. As
far as these go, these are all victories -- and would not
have come about without the pressure of the embargo and our
near-daily (sometimes twice daily) demarches to the PM. But
we come to a split in view: the Israelis and we hope for
some kind of international control or monitoring, whereas the
Lebanese are backed by virtually everyone else in saying that
the Lebanese have the sovereign right to remain in control
but with international assistance in the form of training,
technical assistance, and equipment.


6. (C) Seaports are not in the same category as the
airport. To the best of our knowledge, there have not yet
been the same sort of changes made at the seaports as at the
airport. Moreover, there is an easy tripwire that could
signal when to allow the seaport to open for all commercial
traffic: either Lebanon acquires, installs, and actually
uses container scanners (reportedly on order but not yet
delivered),or Lebanon agrees to some kind of maritime check
of incoming cargo. We also need to keep the pressure on
installing a credible system of controls along the
Syrian-Lebanese border. The Ambassador will see the German
ambassador to see if we can gain a better understanding of
just what the Germans are proposing for the land border,
which is the biggest problem and where we should focus most
of our attention.


7. (C) But, while the Lebanese could solve the airport
problem on their own simply by citing UNSCR 1701 to invite
international monitors to watch the procedures, political
realities prevent Siniora from proceeding in that direction.
We have two ways of seriously undermining Siniora now: we
could push him into asking for international monitors (giving
his -- and our -- enemies a wonderful propaganda tool),or we
could permit the continuation of the air embargo. We should
consider whether it is time for the USG to consider
exercising the means that could get BIA reopened for all
passenger traffic and air cargo between Lebanon and North
America and the EU (at least). The U.S. should get credit
for BIA's reopening, not blame for its closure. If the air
blockade is still in place at the time of the Stockholm
Conference next week, the embargo, not Lebanon's
reconstruction, will be the primary focus of Stockholm
participants. It will surely feature prominently in the GOL
presentation. As the only defenders of the embargo present
in Stockholm, we will be put in an extremely awkward
position. The intended message of support to Lebanon will be
lost, as we are forced to battle an image that we alone are
indulging Israel's air blockade. However unfair, accusations
of U.S. hypocrisy will hang over the Stockholm proceedings.
FELTMAN