Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06BEIRUT2732
2006-08-23 15:46:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Beirut
Cable title:  

SUMMARY OF GOL REQUESTS, IDEAS

Tags:  PREL PARM EAID PGOV LE SY IS 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIRUT 002732 

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SIPDIS

NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/SINGH/HARDING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/23/2016
TAGS: PREL PARM EAID PGOV LE SY IS
SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF GOL REQUESTS, IDEAS

Classified By: Jeffrey Feltman, Ambassador, per 1.4 (b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIRUT 002732

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/SINGH/HARDING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/23/2016
TAGS: PREL PARM EAID PGOV LE SY IS
SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF GOL REQUESTS, IDEAS

Classified By: Jeffrey Feltman, Ambassador, per 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Ever since Hizballah initiated the current
Israeli-Hizballah crisis, PM Siniora and other GOL officials
have asked us for help in several specific areas. In most
cases, we have politely explained why we could not help (or
why any assistance was contingent upon the Lebanese taking
action first -- e.g., persuading the Israelis to lift the air
and sea embargo completely). But we endorsed some of the
requests that we thought had merit, and we forwarded them on
for Washington's consideration, in hopes that action on them
might help restore a positive image of the U.S. in Lebanon.
Many of these requests remain relevant now, even after the
cessation of hostilities. In addition, the Embassy has,
based on our understanding of the situation here, suggested
some ideas of our own. Given that these requests and ideas
have appeared (and sometimes reappeared) in various messages,
we wanted to compile them all into a single checklist. We
would be grateful for any updates on Washington thinking
regarding these requests and ideas.


2. (C) ASSISTANCE IN ACQUIRING 10,000 KALISHNIKOVS OR
EQUIVALENTS (per Beirut 2680 and Beirut 2701). The Internal
Security Forces, undergoing recruitment and with expanded
responsibilities to replace Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) units
deployed to border areas, do not have sufficient weapons. PM
Siniora, wanting to give us what he calls "a digestible"
figure, lowered the actual request to 2,000 in conversations
with USG officials. But we are confident that the 10,000
figure cited by Acting Minister of Interior Ahmad Fatfat and
and ISF Commander Ashraf Rifi is closer to the real need.
The GOL holds out faint hopes that we would buy the weapons.
But the GOL, as a fallback, wants us to (a) identify and push
another donor, which the Lebanese assume will be an Arab
country, and (b) coordinate on the incoming shipment, so that
the Israelis do not block or seize the weapons.



3. (SBU) OBTAIN ISRAELI AGREEMENT TO UNINTERRUPTED FUEL
SUPPLIES TO LEBANON (per Beirut 2522, Beirut 2587, and Beirut
2615). While we thought that the labor-intensive, often
frustrating coordination (which relied on extraordinary
efforts by Embassy Tel Aviv and CCC, to whom we remain
grateful) for fuel deliveries was behind us, it appears as
though the Israelis have resumed the blockade on fuel imports
to Lebanon. Rather than wait until another debilitating and
psychologicaly damaging fuel crisis threatens, we hope that
Washington would agree to work with the Israelis on blanket
clearances for fuel deliveries (with Israel able to stop
suspicious fuel ships on the high seas for inspection). If
the sea blockade remains in place, we do not want to have to
scramble as we did in recent weeks, relying on the good will
of our colleagues posted to Israel, to prevent the
humanitarian crisis that would spread if power plants shut
down for lack of fuel. Moreover, we do not relish the
profiteering the Syrian black marketeers will again enjoy,
once panic over fuel breaks out again. Contracting for fuel
deliveries must occur weeks in advance of the actual arrival
of the ships, and four ships have been denied clearance by
Israel this week alone.


4. (SBU) OBTAIN ISRAELI CONCURRENCE TO UNINTERRUPTED
HUMANITARIAN AND FOOD SUPPLIES (per Beirut 2615). This is
similar to the fuel supply question above. This week, the
Israelis denied clearance to a shipment of beef cattle, which
began dying on board. Eventually, the cattle were unloaded
in Latakia and shipped overland at increased cost. We know
that the Israelis see the seaport blockade as one of the few
pressure points available to prod the Lebanese into taking
steps along the Syrian border to stop arms smuggling, but the
reports of dying beef cattle and higher-priced meat shipped
in from Syria does little to promote our own image here. (We
note as an aside that, with the cessation of hostilities now
in force, there is probably nothing more harmful to our image
than the perception that we are indulging Israel in keeping
the air and sea blockade in place. Our response -- that the
GOL has the power to get the blockade lifted by asking for
UNIFIL help on the borders and at the air and seaports -- is
accurate but has little resonance here.)


5. (SBU) CONTINUATION OF THE BEIRUT-AMMAN AIR BRIDGE (per
Beirut 2522). While the passenger shuttle we proposed is
working (thanks to help we greatly appreciate from Embassy
Tel Aviv, Embassy Amman, and Washington),the Lebanese civil
aviation authorities tell us that the Jordanians report that
Israel will not give approvals for any flights beyond August

27. While we would hope that the Lebanese will have taken
the security steps at the Rafiq Hariri Beirut International

BEIRUT 00002732 002 OF 002


Airport (BIA) that would allow a full lifting of the blockade
by August 27, we suggest that we secure continuation of the
air bridge now, just in case. We would like to see a second
city added -- a European destination with credible security
arrangements -- but, at a minimum, we hope we can get Israeli
concurrence now on a continuation of the current service.


6. (C) ACCELERATION OF THE VISIT OF UN/OLA CHIEF NICOLAS
MICHEL TO BEIRUT (per Beirut 2703). The Ambassador will meet
Minister of Justice Charles Rizk on Friday to discuss
progress toward the establishment of the special tribunal
with international character to try the Hariri assassination
suspects. Many Lebanese contacts urge that, to signal to
Syria that the focus remains on the Hariri assassination,
UN/OLA Chief Michel, whose office is responsible for the
draft UN-GOL protocol on the tribunal, come to Lebanon
quickly to initial an agreement we understand is virtually
complete. One idea is that UNSYG Annan bring Michel with
him, to demonstration high-level attention to the tribunal.
This would help compensate for the chilling effect Annan's
anticipated visit to Syria is likely to have here. But
whether Annan includes Michel or not, we agree that it would
be preferable for Michel to come to Beirut as soon as
possible.


7. (SBU) PROVISION OF STEEL TRESTLE, BAILEY-TYPE, OR OTHER
TEMPORARY BRIDGES (per Beirut 2535, Beirut 2615, and Beirut
2702). This is something PM Siniora has requested of our
British and French colleagues as well. He seeks the sort of
military bridges that could be dropped over spans pending
permanent construction. We raise this for Washington's
consideration simply because of the insistence in Siniora's
voice when he mentions the issue. This is lower on our list
of priorities, given that we do not think it is a good idea
for high-profile U.S. military assets to be working on
construction projects in Lebanon now.


8. (C) SUGGESTION TO THE UN ON ITS INTERNAL COORDINATION
(per Beirut 2615). As we noted, UN coordination efforts on
humanitarian relief and reconstruction are hindered by the UN
organization here. Given the weakness of GOL central
coordination of donor efforts, the UN's role needs to be that
much stronger. One needed fix is the transfer of the UN's
Designated Security Officer (DSO) away from UNDP and UNICEF
(where it is temporarily housed in the UNDP Director's
absence) to either UN Humanitarian Coordinator David Shearer
or UNSYG Personal Representative to Lebanon Geir Pedersen.
This may sound on the surface to be unnecessary micromanaging
of what should be a UN decision, but the current set-up is
devastatingly dysfunctional. The DSO decides which UN
officials can come to Lebanon in this problematic security
environment. The UNDP Director uses this gatekeeping role as
a tool to maintain power over her peers. The UN personnel
permitted to come to post, then, are not based on the current
needs but on what they can do for the UNDP Director. Given
that the international community's non-security priorities in
Lebanon revolve around humanitarian relief and
reconstruction, the UN Humanitarian Coordinator should not
have to grovel before UN colleagues to get the staff he needs
in place. We wonder whether a discreet phone call could be
made to UN headquarters suggesting this change.
FELTMAN