Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06BEIRUT2566
2006-08-08 16:54:00
CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN
Embassy Beirut
Cable title:  

MGLE01: BERRI IS UNDER THREAT DUE TO HIS PIVOTAL

Tags:  MOPS PREL PTER SY IS LE 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BEIRUT 002566 

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NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/SINGH/HARDING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/08/2016
TAGS: MOPS PREL PTER SY IS LE
SUBJECT: MGLE01: BERRI IS UNDER THREAT DUE TO HIS PIVOTAL
ROLE


Classified By: Jeffrey D. Feltman, Ambassador. Reason: Section 1.4 (d)
.

SUMMARY
--------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BEIRUT 002566

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NOFORN
SIPDIS

NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/SINGH/HARDING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/08/2016
TAGS: MOPS PREL PTER SY IS LE
SUBJECT: MGLE01: BERRI IS UNDER THREAT DUE TO HIS PIVOTAL
ROLE


Classified By: Jeffrey D. Feltman, Ambassador. Reason: Section 1.4 (d)
.

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) Ambassador and TDY poloff met with several Lebanese
politicians of different confessions on August 8 in order to
guage attitudes toward the draft UN resolution and sense
whether there is a strategy for moving ahead in Lebanon
following a ceasefire. In addition to Maronite former
President and Kata'eb party leader Amine Gemayel (septel),
meetings were with former Prime Minister Najib Mikati
(Sunni),Nabih Berri aide Ali Hamdan (Shiite),and Minister
of Telecommunications and Walid Jumblatt ally Marwan Hamadeh
(Druze). Mikati, Hamdan, and Hamadeh all believe that
Hizballah is ready for a cease-fire but that the success or
failure of the cease-fire deal, as well continued as
Sunni-Shia harmony, hinges on Speaker of Parliament and Amal
Party leader Nabih Berri. In a worrying development, Hamdan
said that his office had seen a list showing the Speaker as
the number one target for assassination. In a break from his
previous sentiments, Mikati said that it might be time to get
rid of President Emile Lahoud following a cease-fire and LAF
deployment to the South. He believes that Berri will sign on
to this plan. Hamadeh gave an overview of last night's
meeting of the Lebanese Cabinet which decided unanimously to
deploy 15,000 LAF troops to the South upon an Israeli
withdrawal behind the Blue Line. Our interlocutors gave
different descriptions - ranging from a heated argument to a
fraternal chat - of the August 7 meeting between Berri and
visiting Syrian Foreign Minister Walid Mu'allim. All agreed
that, once the dust has settled from the conflict, the
majority of Lebanese will blame Hizballah for provoking the
destruction and the party will be politically weakened as a
consequence. End Summary.

"SOMEONE WANTS TO SOW TROUBLE IN LEBANON"
--------------


2. (C) Berri's senior foreign policy adviser called the

Ambassador for an urgent meeting early this afternoon.
Sitting in a cafe in the Phoenicia Hotel, without lights or
air conditioning due to power shortages, Hamdan motioned for
poloff to stop writing and whispered to the Ambassador, "We
have a list showing targets for assassination, and Speaker
Berri's name is at the top," adding that others mentioned in
the list include pro-Syrian MP Suleiman Frangieh and Free
Patriotic Movement leader Michel Aoun. He did not bring a
copy with him, he said, since he did not want to remove it
from the office. Hamdan does not know who generated the
list, only saying that it is from "someone who wants to sow
trouble in Lebanon." Noting that Berri is the critical
backer of the GOL plan to deploy the LAF to the South, Hamdan
said that his assassination would likely cause the plan to
fail, leading to the collapse of the Lebanese government and
enflaming sectarian tensions, particularly among Sunni and
Shi'a.


3. (C) When asked about the Lebanese public's perception of
Hizballah, Hamdan said that "Hizballah had peaked" as an organization sometime before the kidnapping and killing of
IDF soldiers on July 12. As long as the conflict continues,
people will be supportive of Hizballah fighters, but "once
the dust settles, people will see" the destructive result of
Hizballah's unilateral adventurism. Hamdan predicted that
Amal will be in a much stronger position vis-a-vis Hizballah
following the conflict. Regarding the prospect of Berri
possibly lending his critical support to a constitutional
move to replace President Emile Lahoud, a step which Berri
has opposed in the past, Hamdan gave a guarded response,
saying that Berri hoped to reinitiate the "National Dialogue"
following a ceasefire and that the issue of the presidency
"perhaps might be reopened in that context." Hamdan also did
not give anything away regarding Berri's August 7 meeting
with Syrian FM Mu'allim, saying Mu'allim had "simply
expressed support for the government."

MIKATI SAYS TIME MAY BE RIPE TO GET RID OF LAHOUD
-------------- --------------

BEIRUT 00002566 002 OF 004




4. (C) Meeting in his downtown Beirut office, former Prime
Minister Najib Mikati, who in the past has held firm in his
belief that Lahoud would end up serving out his three-year
extension until August 2007, said that following a ceasefire
may be the right time to get rid of Lahoud. "I've always
thought he would stay until the end, but haraam if we need to
wait a whole year to launch Lebanon on its new path!"
Mikati, who is close to Berri, believes that the Speaker will
be on board with this initiative. "He's good," said Mikati,
"He will be where we want him," mentioning that Berri
exchanged heated words with Mu'allim on August 7 and lectured
him on the Sheba'a Farms issue like "a professor to a
student." Mikati, a former Bashar buddy who fell out with
the Syrian leader last December, suspects Syria is using this
conflict to "try and hold some cards" regarding the
international tribunal which is being set up to try suspects
in the Hariri assassination.


5. (C) Turning to Hizballah, Mikati estimated the group had
suffered physical losses of only 25 percent. Though the
group still has plenty of reserves, they are ready to find a
solution to this conflict. While Mikati supports Hizballah's
fighters in the current conflict, he added that he wants to
see the group disarmed and hopes it will be weakened
politically following a cease-fire, but suspects they will
keep many of their arms even following a LAF deployment to
the South. "They will make a token handover of 500 to 1000
Katyushas to the LAF, send some back to Syria, and bury the
rest in underground bunkers." He said he could guarantee
that Hizballah would not launch any attacks for at least six
months following a ceasefire, allowing time to broker a
permanent political deal. He added that whatever the
outcome, Hizballah will portray itself as the victor, but
noted, "on the Lebanese political scene, it is better to deal
with Hizballah as a winner rather than as a loser." In
reality, Hizballah will emerge from this conflict weaker both
militarily and politically.


6. (C) Mikati, who has designs on some day regaining the
premiership, said that Siniora is under a great deal of
strain, as he demonstrated during his tearful August 7
statement during the Arab League ministerial. Siniora does
not believe himself to be a real leader, claimed Mikati, but
rather feels like a caretaker for Saad Hariri. In fact, the
deal for the LAF deployment was brokered between Nabih Berri
and Saad Hariri, with Siniora merely the mouthpiece.
However, Saad himself is naive and easy to fool, according to
Mikati, which is why Hizballah doesn't mind working with him.
This highlights the lack of real, uniting, charismatic
leadership of the Sunni Lebanese. In the event of a
Sunni-Shi'a clash, which Mikati thinks will grow more likely
as the conflict continues, the Sunnis will not be able to
face up to the more united and more armed Shi'a.


7. (C) On the prospect of 粑 successful LAF deployment to
the South, Mikati said that though the army is still weak and
fragmented, it does meet a minimum operational standard and
will be very well received in the South. It is important to
have international support for the army. Mikati described
the army commander Michel Sleiman, whom many perceive to be a
Syrian stooge but who played a critical role in avoiding a
violent crackdown on the huge anti-Syrian protests in Beirut
in March 2005, as "a honest and good guy." Regarding
humanitarian relief, Mikati expressed concern that, unless
the United States and others stepped forth quickly and
generously, Iranian money would fund most of the rebuilding
in the South.

"MU'ALLIM WAS LIKE AN ORPHAN"
--------------


8. (C) Meeting in the Ministry of Telecommunications
building, Marwan Hamadeh described the August 7 Cabinet
session which led to the unanimous vote in favor of deploying
the LAF to the South. According to Hamadeh, both Hizballah
ministers Mohammad Fneich and Trad Hamadi were present at the
meeting, though President Lahoud did not show up. Defense
Minister Murr had also not planned to attend, but Hamadeh
insisted that Murr show up. "There will be no meeting on

BEIRUT 00002566 003 OF 004


deploying the army without the Minister of Defense." When
Murr presented the deployment plan to the Cabinet, he said
that the LAF could not deploy "except in the conditions of
1992," meaning that all militias must be disarmed and
dissolved. Murr said that the LAF would not accept any armed
militias in the deployment area, on which point the Hizballah
ministers supposedly hesitated, but, "realizing that they
needed to catch this instant," ultimately they conceded.
Fneich also raised the Sheba'a Farms issue, but Hamadeh did
not elaborate on what was said. To avoid potential outbreaks
of violence, most ministers had also wanted to cancel all
protests until the end of the war, but this was vetoed by the
Hizballah ministers who (without a touch of irony) said that
"democratic life" should not be stopped.


9. (C) At one point in the session, according to Hamadeh's
account, Minister of Industry Pierre Gemayel asked whether
the army is perhaps being tricked by certain Lebanese into
deploying into the South where it could then be dragged into
a war with Israel. Hamadeh described Trad Hamadi's reaction
to this question as "primitive, saying the army would become
a part of the resistance." The cooler Fneich appeared
embarrassed by Hamadi's outburst, and "had to shut him up."
Judging from the reaction of the Hizballah ministers, Hamadeh
wonders whether Gemayel's question was in fact right on
target and worries the Iranians and the Syrians may be
setting a trap for the LAF. Hamadeh agreed that Nabih Berri
would not be part of any game to trap the army, which Berri
has traditionally supported.


10. (C) Describing Mu'allim's visit to Lebanon, Hamadeh
said that Berri was "very frank" during their meeting and
that Mu'allim met with a cold reception at the Arab League
foreign minister's luncheon. "He was like an orphan
yesterday. Nobody came over to say hello at the luncheon, so
he left early, claiming he had a long road home." While the
Arab ministers ignored Syria on the issue of showing support
for Hizballah in the final communique, there were also
Lebanese protestors outside Mu'allim's hotel and Mu'allim was
told he was not welcome in the Lebanese coastal town of
Jbeil, forcing him to move his meeting with Lebanese FM
Salloukh. According to Hamadeh, Mu'allim left Lebanon "very
mad."


11. (C) Regarding the draft UN resolution, Hamadeh hopes
that the text can be "Lebanized" and the French prevailed
upon to accept relatively tough language regarding the
mandate of an international stabilization force. Hamadeh
said he would tell Siniora to push the French to accept,
while also getting assurances from Hizballah, via Berri, on
whether they would accept the stabilization force. Hamadeh
said that the time for the resolution is now, while Hizballah
could still save face. If the IDF advances to the Litani
River, then Hizballah may just decide to fight it out. While
acknowledging that Defense Minister Murr may have a hidden or
mixed agenda, since it is well known he has been dining
secretly with his ex-father-in-law Lahoud, Hamadeh believes

SIPDIS
that Murr sees himself playing "a historic role" in leading
the LAF back to the South, and can be counted on. Hamadeh
also noted that Amr Moussa had been a surprisingly positive
force during his recent visit to Lebanon, telling some
ministers not to stand against the international community in
rejecting a resolution.


12. (C) As an close ally of Walid Jumblatt, Hamadeh has
been on the anti-Lahoud bandwagon for some time. He thinks
Berri is now ready to support this effort, and that Michel
Aoun might also be brought on board if his Free Patriotic
Movement were offered positions in the new government.
Hamadeh stressed, however, that Aoun would not be offered the
Presidency.

COMMENT
--------------


13. (C/NF) Several common themes emerged from our meetings
with Hamdan, Mikati, and Hamadeh, and also from our
discussion with Amin Gemayel (septel). It is clear that all
view Nabih Berri as the lynchpin holding this tenuous
agreement together and bridging the gap between Siniora and

BEIRUT 00002566 004 OF 004


Hizballah. Without him, the whole plan could collapse, with
the potential for a violent Sunni-Shi'a conflict and
escalation in the Hixballah-Israeli fighting. In this
context, the possible assassination of Berri would present a
nightmare scenario of government collapse and sectarian
strife, with Hizballah, having the most arms and best
organization, stepping in to fill the vacuum.


14. (C/NF) There was also full agreement that, in the event
of a ceasefire, Hizballah would emerge from this conflict in
a weakened political position, which Hamadeh and others vowed
to exploit. While a proposal to deploy 15000 LAF troops to
the South would have been unimaginable on July 11, it is now
the unanimously-accepted position of the Lebanese government.
This would be a significant feather in Siniora's cap, and
the government could take the lion's share of the credit for
negotiating a ceasefire which strengthens Lebanon, whereas
Hizballah would bear the brunt of the blame for provoking a
conflict which has left over a thousand dead and millions of
dollars of damage to Lebanon's infrastructure.


15. (C/NF) Finally, general feeling could swing towards
removing Emile Lahoud following a ceasefire. Again, Speaker
Berri would be the critical player in this, as the addition
of his Amal bloc to the March 14 MPs would provide the
two-thirds parliamentary vote needed to remove the President.
However, Berri will not move in this direction unless he
feels stronger vis-a-vis his fellow Shi'a in Hizballah, who
have leaned on Berri in the past to maintain unity in support
of Lahoud. Berri may gain this leverage if he is able to
successfully implement the planned LAF deployment and achieve
a lasting cease-fire.
FELTMAN