TFLE01: UNSYG PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE URGES

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIRUT 002427

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/SINGH/HARDING
LONDON FOR TSOU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/19/2016
TAGS: MOPS EAID PREF PREL LE IS
SUBJECT: TFLE01: UNSYG PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE URGES
ACTION ON HUMANITARIAN CORRIDORS


BEIRUT 00002427 001.2 OF 002


Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey D. Feltman for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d
).

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C/NF) In a 7/19 meeting, the Personal Representative of
the UN Secretary-General (PRSG),Geir Pedersen, told the
Ambassador there is an urgent need to establish humanitarian
corridors to southern Lebanon in order to address an
"increasing humanitarian disaster" there. Among these routes
would have to be one connecting Lebanon to the outside world.
Pedersen suggested that a sea route would be superior to a
land route running through Syria. Securing permission for
humanitarian supply ships to cross Israel's blockade of the
Lebanese coast would be the primary (if not sole) challenge.
Pedersen and his senior political affairs officer recommended
that the USG persuade the UN Secretariat to reorganize the
way in which senior UN management in Beirut coordinates
emergency humanitarian response. The system in its present
form, with the top UNDP official in Lebanon taking the lead,
was a "disaster" in itself, they said. Pedersen subsequently
told us that he hoped the USG would support his idea for a
senior humanitarian coordinator to report directly to him,
bypassing UNDP. (Comment: We agree. End comment.) End
summary.

INCREASING HUMANITARIAN DISASTER IN SOUTH
--------------


2. (C/NF) Called on by the Ambassador on July 19, Pedersen
said there was an "increasing humanitarian disaster" in
southern Lebanon as fighting between the Israeli Defense
Forces (IDF) and Hizballah continued. Villages were cut off
from food and medicine. There was an urgent need to
establish humanitarian corridors in response. At the very
least, Pedersen said, there was a need for:

-- a north-south route;

-- a route connecting the city of Tyre to the rest of
southern Lebanon; and

-- a route connecting Lebanon to the outside world,
presumably via Syria.

BETTER TO BYPASS SYRIA IF POSSIBLE
--------------


3. (C/NF) Pedersen said he was recommending a route to Syria
with some reluctance. (Comment: It would appear to reward
the SARG even as the SARG continued to strongly support
Hizballah while failing to contain its glee at the prospects
of Prime Minister Siniora's government collapsing and the UN
inquiry into the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafiq
Hariri getting sidetracked. End comment.) He suggested that
a more preferable humanitarian corridor to the outside world
would be by sea, possibly by way of Cyprus.

IDEAS FOR A SEA CORRIDOR
--------------


4. (C/NF) The problem with a sea corridor, Pedersen said,
would be the need to secure Israeli permission for ships
using it to cross its ongoing, total blockade of the Lebanese
coast. How could the Israelis be assured that there were no
weapons on board any of the ships? There were several
possibilities for inspection, he said, at:

-- the point of origin;

-- a maritime "hub," possibly Cyprus;

-- the point where ships crossed the blockade; and

-- a port of entry in Lebanon.


5. (C/NF) Pedersen asked if the USG could provide inspectors
for a notional maritime "hub" in Cyprus. The Ambassador
explained that this kind of operation would not be something
for which a U.S. Embassy could provide personnel. Another
alternative -- one oriented toward inspection at the port of

BEIRUT 00002427 002.2 OF 002


entry -- would be for a detachment of UNIFIL to conduct
inspections. Finally, the Israeli navy could simply inspect
the ships at the 50-mile limit from the Lebanese coast.

LET GOL TAKE THE LEAD
--------------


6. (C/NF) Regardless of how exactly international assistance
is conveyed to Lebanon, Shaikh recommended that the Lebanese
government take the lead in coordinating the internal
humanitarian relief effort to the greatest extent possible.
This would be one way to help build the capacity of state
institutions to eventually assert state authority over
southern Lebanon in a post-conflict phase, he suggested.

UN MANAGEMENT ON THE GROUND: ANOTHER "DISASTER"
-------------- ---


7. (C/NF) Currently, the UN Development Program (UNDP)
Permanent Representative, Dr. Mona Hammam, has the lead
within the UN for emergency humanitarian response in Lebanon.
Pedersen and his senior political affairs officer, Salman
Shaikh, described Hammam's performance to date as a
"disaster." Her latest decision had been to deny clearance
for representatives of the UN Office for Coordination of
Humanitarian Relief (OCHA) to enter Lebanon.


8. (C/NF) According to Pedersen and Shaikh, Hammam insisted
on controlling all humanitarian activities, but lacked the
necessary competence to manage them. Pedersen suggested that
U.S. officials might use their contacts with the UN
Secretariat, possibly Deputy Secretary-General Mark Malloch

SIPDIS
Brown, to have Hamman removed. This would be a prerequisite
to the establishment of any effective international
humanitarian relief effort, they suggested.


9. (C/NF) Subsequently, Pedersen called to say that he was
proposing to UN headquarters that a senior UN humanitarian
coordinator to assigned to Pedersen's unit. This person
would coordinate all UN agencies as well as work with other
donors, bypassing UNDP altogether. Pedersen expressed hope
that we would support his idea. (Comment: Locally, we
certainly do. Pedersen is easy to work with, always
accessible, and generally attuned to global political
realities. Cooperation with Hammam has proven extremely
difficult in other areas, such as promotion of electoral
reform. She has a deadly combination of being a
micro-manager and unorganized, all with an "attitude" about
the United States. End comment.)

COMMENT
--------------


10. (C/NF) The internal humanitarian corridors are the most
urgent. For now, there are sufficient quantities of most --
but not all -- food and medical supplies inside Lebanon. But
there are areas of dire need, particularly in the south, and
matching supplies with needs should, in our view, be our
first humanitarian priority. We know that the Israelis will
be suspicious of any humanitarian convoys to the south, for
fear that Hizballah could use the convoys to smuggle weapons
or fighters. Truck convoys have been hit in recent days,
presumably because the IDF believed they were carrying
weapons for Hizballah. Any truck convoys in the South would
be particularly at risk. We hope that the USG can work with
the Israelis to determine how this problem can be overcome --
UN or ICRC escorts? -- on an urgent basis.

FELTMAN