Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06BEIRUT2322
2006-07-10 14:57:00
CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN
Embassy Beirut
Cable title:  

MGLE01: JA'JA' SAYS FEAR OF SECTARIAN CLASHES IS

Tags:  PGOV PTER KISL KDEM ASEC MCAP LE SY IZ 
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VZCZCXRO4266
PP RUEHAG RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK
DE RUEHLB #2322/01 1911457
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 101457Z JUL 06
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4536
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE
RUEHROV/AMEMBASSY VATICAN 0627
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHMFISS/COMSOCCENT MACDILL AFB FL
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BEIRUT 002322

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/SINGH/HARDING
LONDON FOR TSOU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/10/2016
TAGS: PGOV PTER KISL KDEM ASEC MCAP LE SY IZ
SUBJECT: MGLE01: JA'JA' SAYS FEAR OF SECTARIAN CLASHES IS
MODERATING HIZBALLAH

BEIRUT 00002322 001.2 OF 004


Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey D. Feltman for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d
)

SUMMARY
--------------

1 (C/NF) According to Lebanese Forces leader Samir Ja'ja',
intense concern over potential Sunni-Shiite violence is
acting as a political restraint on Hizballah, and usefully
serving to promote cooperating between Lebanon's various
security services and sectarian communities. Furthermore,
Hizballah is so troubled by Syrian-backed Sunni militant
attacks on Shiite civilians in Iraq that its leadership is
re-evaluating its strategic relationship with the SARG.
Meanwhile, Michel Aoun, oblivious that he is considered a
lightweight and junior partner by Hizballah, is focusing all
his energy on blocking the formation of the Constitutional
Court, a final gambit to secure his chances of winning the
presidency. Ja'ja' believes that many of Aoun's recent
political gestures have been part of an ongoing attempt to
court favor with Damascus. Ja'ja' also confided to the
Ambassador that, in an attempt to break Lebanon's political
deadlock, he is working on a plan with Sa'ad Hariri to
replace Michel Suleiman as commander of the Lebanese Armed
Forces (LAF). (Presumably, Suleiman's replacement would
facilitate the removal of President Lahoud from the Baabda
Palace.) Ja'ja' criticized Prime Minister Fouad Siniora's
government and the "March 14" alliance as lacking
decisiveness and coordination. He did express his support
for the draft electoral law, however, and said that he was
working with other "March 14" leaders to study the law and
come out with a unified platform regarding electoral reform.
Unprompted by the Ambassador, Ja'ja' added that he thought
IFES technical support would be useful in this regard. End
summary.

SECTARIAN TENSIONS PRODUCE CALM

--------------


2. (C) On July 8, the Ambassador and emboff called on
Lebanese Forces leader Samir Ja'ja' at his redoubt high in
the northern reaches of Mount Lebanon, near the ancient stand
of cedar trees known as the "Cedars of God." Ja'ja' began
the two-hour meeting by discussing the current security
situation, focusing especially on Hizballah and the dual
effects of ongoing Shiite-Sunni tensions. Ja'ja' explained
that Hizballah, along with the rest of Lebanon, is terrified
of al-Qa'ida-style Sunni militant attacks in Lebanon, fearful
that they will initiate a series of Shiite reprisals that
will quickly escalate out of control. "Let me tell you how
it will go. One of these groups, Asbat al-Ansar, will hit
Hizballah. The Shiites will hit back. And from there it
will go crazy. No one will be able to control it." Ja'ja'
explained that the ongoing terror attacks in Iraq are the
primary source of Lebanon's fear of Sunni-Shiite violence
within its own communities. "This is all about Iraq. They
are terrified it will happen here."


3. (C) Therefore, in an attempt to lower political tensions,
Ja'ja' said that Hizballah is now taking a more moderate
political line. It has even, for the time being, forsworn
any Blue Line operations. He pointed to recent Hizballah
statements in support of the government, and their mere
token, low-level participation in Aounist-led demonstrations
against the Constitutional Council.


4. (C) Ja'ja' added that Sa'ad Hariri and his predominantly
Sunni Future Current supporters are equally worried about
Sunni extremists. They are also trying to play down
tensions. The most amazing thing, said Ja'ja', is that the
intense concern about the possibility of Sunni-Shiite
violence has prompted unprecedented levels of cooperation
between Lebanese security services, including the LAF,
Internal Security Force (ISF),and Surete General (SG). In
Lebanon's confessional system, each service is associated
with one sectarian community or another -- Christian, Sunni,
or Shia. Improved coordination among them is a noteworthy
event. "It's ironic," Ja'ja' said, "that the tensions bring
us together like this. It's useful in a way."

HIZBALLAH AND DAMASCUS
--------------

BEIRUT 00002322 002.2 OF 004




5. (C) According to Ja'ja', Hizballah was deeply shaken
recently when it discovered that three Palestinian militants
from the Ain el Hilweh refugee camp -- whose transport to
Iraq Hizballah facilitated under Syrian coordination -- were
killed carrying out suicide operations against Shiite Iraqi
civilians. "Hizballah is vexed and sad. Very sad," Ja'ja'
explained. This revelation has affected Hizballah's
leadership so deeply that they are re-evaluating their
relationship with Damascus. "Hizballah knows the Syrians are
supporting these attacks in Iraq, and they are starting to
distance themselves from Syria." For now, Ja'ja' added,
Hizballah is for stability, and Syria is not. Ja'ja' warned,
"Syria will work with its other allies, from Ahmed Jabril to
Sleiman Franjieh, to cause chaos in Lebanon."

HIZBALLAH AND TEHRAN
--------------


6. (C) The Ambassador asked if Ja'ja' believed that
Hizballah was re-evaluating its relationship with Iran as
well. Ja'ja' said they were still close, and that Tehran,
not Damascus, remains Hizballah's primary partner. At the
same time, however, he said that fear of an eruption of
sectarian clashes in Lebanon has focused Hizballah on the
need to put Lebanon first. Hizballah actually has quite a
bit of independence on strategic policy from Tehran, despite
the hundreds of millions of dollars they receive in
assistance every year. The Ambassador then asked what Ja'ja'
thought Hizballah's response would be if the nuclear
situation with Iran worsened. Ja'ja' thought for a moment,
and then said that, in the case of limited western strikes in
Iran, Hizballah would show restraint. "Three months ago, I
would not have hesitated to say that they would attack Israel
and drag Lebanon into war. Now, I don't know. I think they
would be quiet."


7. (C) Ja'ja' did point out, however, that these are small
steps and minor concessions on Hizballah's part. Hizballah
would lower its rhetoric, and possibly work with the
government on Palestinian disarmament, but no one should
suspect cooperation from Hizballah on major issues like its
Iranian funding and its own eventual disarmament. "Maybe
(they will disarm) in a few years, after this crisis with
Iran and the international community has passed, and Iran is
the loser," Ja'ja' said.

AOUN'S BAABDA GAMBIT
--------------


8. (C) The conversation soon turned to Free Patriotic
Movement (FPM) leader Michel Aoun and his alliance with
Hizballah. Ja'ja' said that Aoun was definitely the junior
partner in his relationship with Hizballah, but that his
"psychic constitution" will never let him recognize that, or
recognize the odds against his winning the presidency.
Ja'ja' described Aoun as the only major Lebanese political
leader moving against the current stream of public moderation
and discretion. At a time when even Hizballah is seeking to
keep the South quiet and is refraining from criticism of the
government, Aoun is still calling for the government's
downfall. "Even Hizballah won't join him," Ja'ja' said,
describing how, during a recent FPM-orchestrated protest
against the new Constitutional Court, Hizballah showed only
token participation. The real sign, according to Ja'ja', was
Hizballah's agreement with Sa'ad Hariri on a "Lebanese Unity
League." "They picked Sa'ad over him (Aoun). Aoun was
furious. But what can he do?"


9. (C) What he thinks he can do, Ja'ja' explained, is to
block the formation of the new Constitutional Court as his
last and final chance at the presidency. It has nothing to
do with the contested 2005 parliamentary elections, Ja'ja'
explained; "this is for the presidency." Ja'ja' said that,
with only 18 months until new presidential elections, the
current Parliament, with its Hariri-led majority, will decide
the presidency. Historically, Parliament has agreed on the
necessity of a two-thirds quorum to hold presidential
elections. This has been in effect a "gentleman's
agreement," however, exceeding the constitutional requirement
of a simple majority. "March 14 will really only need 65
votes to keep (Aoun) out of Baabda. He won't have a chance."

BEIRUT 00002322 003.2 OF 004


Because the Constitutional Court validates all parliamentary
and presidential elections, Aoun wants to block its formation
in order to prevent any election that would not go in his
favor. His only hope, Ja'ja' continued, is the requirement
of a two-thirds majority for presidential elections as his
price for accepting the new council.


10. (C) The Ambassador then mentioned that, when he had
called on Aoun earlier in the week, Aoun had made sure that
no media were present for the meeting, a highly unusual move
from someone as publicity-conscious as Aoun. The Ambassador
asked Ja'ja' from whom Aoun may have been trying to hide the
meeting. Ja'ja' thought for several seconds, then firmly
replied, "Syria." He described a string of recent events,
from Aoun's agreement with Hizballah to his calls against
Siniora's government, as part of an ongoing campaign by Aoun
to court Syria's favor. Aoun was becoming jealous of
Suleiman Franjieh as Syria's "man in Lebanon," and would
start making more dramatic gestures of his own to ensure
Syria's attention and support, Ja'ja' predicted.

JA'JA'S BAABDA GAMBIT
--------------


11. (C/NF) Then, Ja'ja' leaned towards the Ambassador, and
lowering his voice, said he wanted to tell him something in
utmost discretion. He claimed to be working with Sa'ad
Hariri on a plan "to revive Lebanon from her torpor."
According to Ja'ja', he and Hariri are looking at a
"constitutional mechanism" to force the replacement of LAF
Commander Michel Suleiman. Ja'ja' described Suleiman as the
lynchpin that keeps President Lahoud in the Baabda Palace.
Remove Suleiman, Ja'ja' suggested, and you remove Lahoud.
Ja'ja' explained that the LAF commander supervises the
President's Republican Guard. Ja'ja' said they would select
a replacement for Suleiman who would instruct the President's
very own guards to remove him from office. The Ambassador
reminded Ja'ja' that, given his own history, he should be
extremely careful even considering such a plan.

A COORDINATED PLATFORM FOR MARCH 14,
INCLUDING ELECTORAL REFORM
--------------


12. (C) Turning his attention back to mainstream political
activity, Ja'ja' said he blamed Prime Minister Siniora and
his fellow "March 14" politicians for failing to take
decisive political action or to coordinate their own
political activity. Against Aoun's well-oiled political
machine, the "March 14" group has lost considerable political
ground through organizational and strategic weaknesses.
While the prime minister has a number of worthy goals, he
lacks the strong will and decisiveness necessary to achieve
them, especially given the contentious climate of Lebanese
politics. "Look at (Siniora's) cabinet. It's a bunch of
technocrats: Jihad Azour, Sami Haddad. He needs more
politicians, people who actually know how to get things
done," Ja'ja' said.


13. (C) Ja'ja' did say, however, that "March 14" is looking
at the Boutros Commission's draft electoral law, and that
they hope to come out with a unified platform on electoral
reform "in about two weeks." Jumblatt and Hariri still have
reservations about the proportional elements, Ja'ja'
explained, but he expected that "March 14" would endorse most
of the electoral package. In the meantime, they may benefit
from assistance in understanding some of the more technical
aspects of the law. The Ambassador mentioned that the
Embassy had provided some research assistance to the
electoral commission. "Yes, IFES," Ja'ja' grinned, adding
that IFES's technical expertise would be useful for Lebanon's
political leaders as they study the complicated draft law.

REBUILDING THE LEBANESE FORCES
--------------


14. (C) The Ambassador then inquired into the legal status
of the Lebanese Forces. Ja'ja' replied that they were now a
legal political party, officially called the Party of the
Lebanese Forces. However, after the Lebanese Forces were
disbanded and Ja'ja' imprisoned in the 1990s, their
organizational structure and financial resources severely

BEIRUT 00002322 004.2 OF 004


atrophied. Ja'ja' explained that, as part of an attempt to
build the party's financial base, they were investing in
logistics and construction companies, and hoped to develop
business contracts in Iraq.


15. (C) As for the formerly Lebanese Forces-run television
station, the Lebanese Broadcasting Corporation (LBC),Ja'ja'
said that he is still involved in an ownership dispute with
LBC's director, Pierre Daher. Fifty-four percent of Ja'ja's
own controlling interest was transferred to Daher when he was
arrested, Ja'ja' explained. Former Deputy Prime Minister
Isaam Fares owns another 20 percent. Ja'ja' said he is now
involved in a battle not only to re-assert control of LBC,
but also to control its news content. Ja'ja' blamed Daher
for "too much" coverage of Aoun and Franjieh, and said he was
looking forward to the return of news anchor May Chidiac, who
has been recovering in France from injuries sustained in a
September 2005 assassination attempt. Chidiac would be able
to return to broadcasting within a month. "May is on our
side, and Pierre won't be able to stop her," Ja'ja' said.

COMMENT
--------------


16. (C/NF) Ja'ja' has joined a chorus of Embassy contacts
who are starting to argue that Lebanon's Sunni-Shia tensions
-- up to a point -- can be useful in encouraging restraint.
But Ja'ja' goes further than most, in arguing that Hizballah
is now reevaluating its relationship with Damascus because of
the latter's support of anti-Shia violence in Iraq. In
essence, Ja'ja' says, Hizballah is cooling to Damascus, while
Aoun is moving closer to the Syrians. We'll keep Ja'ja's
theory in mind, but we're skeptical that Hizballah is ready
to move away from Damascus. As for Ja'ja's hope for removing
LAF Commander Suleiman, we counsel caution. Suleiman is
fence-sitting now. If he gets wind that Ja'ja' and Hariri
are plotting against him, he might try to turn the LAF
against the March 14 movement. And, even if it is possible
and desirable to remove Suleiman now, Ja'ja' shouldn't be
involved: having been notorious for execution-style murders
of LAF officers during Lebanon's civil war, Ja'ja', along
with any plot traced to him, would not garner the support of
the LAF officer corps.
FELTMAN