Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06BEIRUT2293
2006-07-07 15:14:00
SECRET//NOFORN
Embassy Beirut
Cable title:  

MGLE01: BRAMMERTZ SLOGS ON WITH UNIIIC BOUND BY

Tags:  PTER KCRM PINR ASEC SY LE 
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VZCZCXRO2172
PP RUEHAG RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK
DE RUEHLB #2293/01 1881514
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 071514Z JUL 06
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4502
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHMFISS/COMSOCCENT MACDILL AFB FL
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 BEIRUT 002293 

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/WERNER/SINGH

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/06/2016
TAGS: PTER KCRM PINR ASEC SY LE
SUBJECT: MGLE01: BRAMMERTZ SLOGS ON WITH UNIIIC BOUND BY
RED TAPE

Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey D. Feltman for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d
).

SUMMARY
-------

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 BEIRUT 002293

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/WERNER/SINGH

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/06/2016
TAGS: PTER KCRM PINR ASEC SY LE
SUBJECT: MGLE01: BRAMMERTZ SLOGS ON WITH UNIIIC BOUND BY
RED TAPE

Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey D. Feltman for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d
).

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (S/NF) According to United Nations International
Independent Investigation Commission (UNIIIC) Commissioner
Serge Brammertz, administrative delays with the UN's
bureaucracy have taken up 50 to 70 percent of his time in the
last month and have significantly hindered the UNIIIC's
efficacy and progress. The situation has become serious
enough, Brammertz explained, that he is considering a
presenting a formal briefing to the Security Council to
address this issue. But he specifically asked the USG
not/not to raise this on its own. Brammertz is also waiting
for the International Criminal Court (ICC) to approve his
leave of absence so that he can continue on as UNIIIC
Commissioner through December 2006. The ICC is expected to
make its decision by July 15, but Brammertz said that a good
word from the USG to UN Legal Advisor Nicholas Michel, asking
Michel to press the ICC, would help his case. In the
meantime, the UNIIIC continues various interviews and
forensic investigations, and is establishing material links
between suspects through cell phone records. The
Commissioner explained the level of Syria's cooperation with
the investigation in some detail, but surprisingly said that
some western "allies" -- we learned from another UN official
he meant France -- are flatly non-cooperative with Commission
requests for assistance. Brammertz is also beginning to
consider potential locations for a UNIIIC rear-operating base
and the international tribunal. End summary.

THE COMMISSIONER'S SHORT TENURE
--------------


2. (C) On July 6, the Ambassador and emboff met UNIIIC
Commissioner Serge Brammertz at his Monteverde headquarters.
Brammertz had requested the meeting to update the Ambassador
on the investigation's progress before his meetings in
Washington on July 11 and 12. Brammertz repeated his request
that the Washington consultations not be publicized. During

the 90-minute meeting, Brammertz described a slew of
administrative headaches that he claimed had taken 50 to 70
percent of his time in the past month, hindering the UNIIIC's
efficacy and investigatory progress. Most of the delays
appeared to be the result of a cumbersome UN bureaucracy,
which seemed to affect everything from the UNIIIC's hiring
procedures to housing issues and even its food supply. Asked
by the Ambassador, Brammertz said that he did not/not want
the USG to raise these issues now with the UN.


3. (C) The issue of most immediate importance, however, had
to do with Brammertz's very appointment as UNIIIC
commissioner. Brammertz explained that his leave of absence
as the ICC's deputy prosecutor general expires on July 15,
and that his future on the Commission will depend on whether
or not the ICC's member nations approve his extension to
remain on the international investigation through December of
this year. Brammertz was hopeful that his extension would be
approved. However, as a public servant working at the
pleasure of the ICC, he would respect the ICC's decision on
the matter. Brammertz explained that the United Kingdom and
France strongly support his extension, but that other ICC
member countries, including Germany, are against it.


4. (C) The Ambassador asked if there was anything the USG
could to help his bid to stay on as UNIIIC commissioner.
Brammertz suggested that a call on UN legal director Nicholas
Michel and Larry Johnson in New York, expressing strong USG
support for his work on the UNIIIC, would be helpful. Michel
and Johnson could then work on ensuring the support of
Germany and fence-sitting ICC countries.


5. (C) Even assuming that his extension request is approved,
however, Brammertz said it was very unlikely that he could
stay on as commissioner past December. "I'll get another
five months and then that's it." (COMMENT: A widely-shared
hope in Lebanon is that, by January 2007, the international
tribunal charged with trying the Hariri assassination case
will be in place, and that Brammertz will have assembled
enough evidence to begin the prosecution, assuming the new
role of chief prosecutor himself. End comment.)

GROWING PAINS: TRAILER PARKS AND FOOD POISONING

BEIRUT 00002293 002 OF 005


-------------- ---


6. (C) If his expiring tenure were not enough to keep him
occupied, Brammertz also described a whole range of
administrative issues that demand his constant attention and
that of his staff, prying them away from the pressing
business of tracking down the killers of Rafiq Hariri.
Brammertz said his staff has now far exceeded the available
space in the Monteverde hotel that is the UNIIIC's main
operating base. The UNIIIC is trying to secure trailers to
house staff on the hotel's grounds. A small "trailer park"
has already sprouted on the grounds, but it is insufficient
to meet the UNIIIC's housing needs. More trailers are on
order, but, with UN procurement being painfully slow, the
investigation is experiencing a serious housing shortage.


7. (C) Even worse, Brammertz said that bacterial
contamination in the Monteverde hotel's kitchen is laying out
four to five staff members a day with food poisoning.
"Usually they are out for three or four days, some have
required hospitalization. Thankfully, I haven't gotten sick
yet, nor have my senior staff. That would be a real problem."

CONSIDERING A REAR OPERATING BASE
--------------


8. (C) One possible solution to the housing issue would be
to relocate some of the UNIIIC's support staff to a rear
operating base outside of Lebanon. This would also have the
benefit of lowering their security profile and providing a
second fallback base in the event that the main operating
base is targeted by a major terrorist attack (something
Brammertz and his staff are obviously working to avoid, but
are forced to consider nonetheless).


9. (C) Brammertz said he would prefer that the location of
the rear operating base serve as the location for the
international tribunal as well. "I've discussed this with my
staff, and they prefer Spain or Italy, of course. But these
may be good options. They have military bases we could use
as secure locations." Brammertz added that they are
considering Cyprus as well. The main difficulty, however,
would be to convince another country to agree to host a
UNIIIC base and an international tribunal, something that
would surely raise concern about retributive terrorist
attacks.

STAFF SHORTAGES
--------------


10. (C) In the meantime, however, Brammertz said his work is
being slowed down by insufficient staff numbers and a slow,
inefficient UN hiring process. Brammertz said that he has
selected 15 new investigators who have been stuck in limbo
since May, many waiting for medical clearances. Brammertz is
also having an ongoing dispute with the UN about hiring
people at the "correct" grade. "I want to hire a qualified
person at a certain position, but they tell me I can't
because they are at a lower grade. I find other people who
want to come on for other positions, and they tell me I can't
because that person would be overqualified."


11. (C) "They tell me that I would get in trouble if my
administrative practices were reviewed by a UN panel, but I'd
rather complete my mission than worry about meeting all of
their bureaucratic requirements," Brammertz said. He
explained that, if he were in the process of establishing a
permanent UN office, it would make sense to focus on so many
administrative details. However, with a temporary commission
established to carry out a specific, highly time-sensitive
goal, it is "insane" to hinder progress for the sake of the
fulfilling self-imposed bureaucratic requirements. "What's
the point of waiting five months to hire someone when the
Commission only has five months to do its work?" Brammertz
complained.


12. (S) Translators are another sensitive problem, as
Brammertz is trying to fill 10 new positions for foreign
translators. Brammertz said that, shortly after he took
charge of the UNIIIC, he concluded that most of the leaks
that occurred under the tenure of his predecessor, Detlev
Mehlis, came from the UNIIIC's four locally-employed
translators. As a result, Brammertz has restricted them from
access to any sensitive information (COMMENT: the leaks have
now stopped too),but now he has a backlog of several hundred

BEIRUT 00002293 003 OF 005


pages of Syrian and Lebanese documents for translation, and
only one trusted, non-Lebanese translator to do the work.
"At the present rate, it would take three months for us just
to get through the backlog, never mind the new material that
is coming in all the time." Brammertz said that he is trying
to hire 10 new foreign translators, but that, like his
investigators, the new arrivals are being held up in the UN's
glacial hiring process.


13. (C) Overall, administrative problems have become so
severe that Brammertz intends to send a deputy to New York to
discuss how they are impeding the investigation. Brammertz
said that he would like to go himself, but that it would be
impossible for him to travel to New York unnoticed, raising
all kinds of speculation about the investigation. Still, the
situation is seems to be serious enough that Brammertz is
considering raising the issue with the Security Council, at
least through a deputy, if not himself.

YET, THE INVESTIGATION CONTINUES
--------------


14. (S) Despite his administrative headaches, however,
Brammertz reported that he was making progress on substantive
areas of the investigation. He said that the UNIIIC has
collected hundreds of phone numbers from the calling records
of six Tripoli cell phones associated with the February 14,
2005, assassination of Hariri. They are now establishing
calling patterns and conducting interviews with individuals
associated with certain numbers. Brammertz said he thought
this would be a productive line of inquiry.


15. (S) He also said that the UNIIIC is conducting
interviews with members of the "Naba cell," Sunni militants
detained by the ISF in May. Brammertz said that the detained
suspects still have not been formally charged by Lebanese
authorities. As a result, they have had no contact with
defense attorneys. The UNIIIC has questioned them about 14
other bombing cases on which the UNIIIC is assisting the
Lebanese authorities, not the activities that led to their
arrest by the ISF. "As long as we restrict our questioning
to these areas, we can use the information in an
international court," Brammertz explained.

THE LEGACY PROJECTS
--------------


16. (S) Brammertz said that much of his work, though, is
focused on completing three "legacy projects," final
appraisals of the testimony provided by Zuhair Mohammed
Saddik, Hussam Hussam, and "X", a "protected witness located
in a Nordic country." As he prepared his final evaluation of
each witness, Brammertz said he could discount most of the
testimony from all three. Maybe 20 percent of Saddik's
testimony was based on fact, Brammertz suggested, but his
credibility as a witness is so low that none of his testimony
would stand up in court. He described Hussam Hussam also as
an unreliable witness, but suggested that he probably does
have important information. The Ambassador reminded
Brammertz of the photo showing Hussam at the scene of George
Hawi's assassination only minutes after the attack.
Brammertz agreed that Hussam was probably involved somehow,
but now he had to sift through a whole layer of lies and
half-truths to get to any worthwhile information.


17. (S) Brammertz said that the UNIIIC is also pursuing
links related to the Abu Adass video tape, the unidentified
remains of a "27th man" found at the scene of the Hariri
blast, and the 14 other bombings that have taken place since
October 2004. Regarding the 14 other cases, Brammertz said
that the UNIIIC is also now interviewing survivors like
Marwan Hamade and May Chidiac, as well as the surviving
family members of victims like Samir Kassir and Gebran Tueni.
Again raising the issue of his staff shortages, Brammertz
said that the other 14 bombing cases are being investigated
by three European investigators, all of whom are expected to
leave the investigation between August and September.


18. (C) Nonetheless, Brammertz said it was obvious, from an
analytical if not purely material perspective, that the 14
bombings are linked to the Hariri assassination. "You have
enough links," Brammertz explained, "same modus operandi,
same explosives, similar targets." Phone numbers that had
turned up in the Hariri investigation had turned up in some
of the 14 other cases as well. Piles of cigarettes found at

BEIRUT 00002293 004 OF 005


the scenes of some of the bombings might provide a link as
well, he said.

"SATISFIED" WITH THE SYRIANS
--------------


19. (C) The Ambassador asked the Commissioner what his
feelings were on Syrian cooperation with his investigation.
Brammertz acknowledged that he said he had been "generally
satisfied," with Syria's cooperation in his last report,
although this meant that Syria had yet to achieve full
cooperation. Brammertz described Syria as cooperating in
form if not always in function. He experienced no problems
gaining access and interviews. However, on two occasions,
two senior Syrian officials he interviewed were uncooperative
and were clearly lying. After Brammertz complained to the
SARG, the disposition and cooperation of the two Syrians
markedly improved in later interviews.


20. (C) The Ambassador then mentioned a recent interview in
the pan-Arab daily "al-Hayat," where Syrian President Bashar
al-Asad said that any Syrian officials implicated in the
Hariri assassination would be tried in Syrians courts. The
Ambassador asked Brammertz if he thought that Damascus was
starting to realize they might be held accountable for
Hariri's murder. Brammertz rejected the possibility of
trying suspects in Syria, and explained that he was
interested only in putting individuals on trial, not entire
nations or governments. "You know," Brammertz explained,
"Syria has five different state security apparati. I can't
imagine that an order came down from the President and worked
its way through all the security services and until they
killed Hariri. If anything, you probably had one security
service involved, and the order came from on high .... and,
how high, we'll have to figure out."

NOT SO SATISFIED WITH OTHERS
--------------


21. (C) Brammertz confessed, however, that not all of his
allies were showing the same level of cooperation as the
Damascus regime. He mentioned "one particular EU country,
one we have good relations with and that I lived in for some
time." After Brammertz asked this country's ambassador in
Lebanon for access to interview a suspect in that country's
territory, the ambassador came back with all kinds of
conditions about how the interview would take place, how the
testimony could or could not be used, in order to comply with
EU standards. Brammertz said, "I told him, if you were
Syria, I would write in my report that you refused to
cooperate with the investigation. He was shocked, of course,
but it's true. I've had better cooperation from Syria than
some of the EU countries."

THE TRIBUNAL
--------------


22. (C) Looking forward, Brammertz said that, while he is
considering a location for the tribunal, he is also working
with the Lebanese to make sure that their methods and
procedures for handling evidence and witness testimony would
hold up in international courts. This, he said, will be
especially challenging if the international tribunal tries
any of the other 14 bombing cases that have taken place in
Lebanon since October 2004.


23. (C) Brammertz also admitted that the Lebanese and the
international community have to come to a decision on how
they are going to hear the other 14 cases. "If we do it
right, this would be a model for trying international
terrorist cases. But how long will this go on? Are we
looking at an open-ended trial? Do we give it a time limit
of five or ten years?" Brammertz argued that the
international tribunal should only hear cases that can be
materially linked to the Hariri assassination, but that many
other important modalities still need to be worked out.

THE FOUR GENERALS
--------------


24. (S) Finally, Brammertz and the Ambassador discussed the
fate of the four Lebanese security chiefs held in Lebanese
custody on suspicion of involvement with the Hariri
assassination since August 2005. Brammertz said that all
four are being held on basis of discounted testimony by

BEIRUT 00002293 005 OF 005


Zuhair Mohammed Saddik, and that the Lebanese government has
failed to prepare any prosecution case against them. In the
meantime, the attorneys for Jamil as-Sayyid and Ali Hajj have
contacted Brammertz a number of times, asking that he call on
the GOL to release them. Brammertz's reply was that such a
matter is entirely beyond his jurisdiction and needs to be
addressed to the Lebanese Ministry of Justice, a position
that he says the defense attorneys have incorrectly
interpreted as his support. "I wouldn't get anywhere near
this case," Brammertz said. "It's no-win either way."


25. (S) Brammertz explained that, if any sort of
international legal standards were applied, the four generals
would be released immediately. At the same time, however, he
acknowledged that doing so would be an political disaster for
Lebanon. The Ambassador pointed out that the Lebanese should
have sufficient evidence, even outside of Saddik's testimony,
for them to pursue a prosecution. For example, there is no
question that Ali Hajj tampered with the crime scene and
tried to conceal evidence right after the blast.


26. (C) Brammertz admitted as much, but suggested that, in
order to prosecute Hajj this specific charge, criminal intent
would have to be proven. "It easily could have been
criminal, bulldozing the crime scene right after the blast.
But it could have been sheer incompetence as well. Sometimes
in Lebanon it's hard to tell the difference." Brammertz
emphasized that, even if the generals were released, that
would not prove their innocence. They could still be
indicted and tried later.
FELTMAN