Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06BEIRUT2256
2006-07-05 14:21:00
SECRET//NOFORN
Embassy Beirut
Cable title:  

MGLE01: SCENESETTER FOR ELIAS MURR'S JULY 16-19

Tags:  PREL PARM PTER PGOV MASS LE SY 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO9409
OO RUEHAG RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK
DE RUEHLB #2256/01 1861421
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 051421Z JUL 06
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4449
INFO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 BEIRUT 002256 

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

STATE FOR NEA, S/CT, INL, PM, AND DS;
NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/SINGH;

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/05/2026
TAGS: PREL PARM PTER PGOV MASS LE SY
SUBJECT: MGLE01: SCENESETTER FOR ELIAS MURR'S JULY 16-19
WASHINGTON TRIP

Classified By: Jeffrey Feltman, Ambassador, per 1.4 (b) and (d).

SUMMARY
-------

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 BEIRUT 002256

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

STATE FOR NEA, S/CT, INL, PM, AND DS;
NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/SINGH;

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/05/2026
TAGS: PREL PARM PTER PGOV MASS LE SY
SUBJECT: MGLE01: SCENESETTER FOR ELIAS MURR'S JULY 16-19
WASHINGTON TRIP

Classified By: Jeffrey Feltman, Ambassador, per 1.4 (b) and (d).

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (S/NF) Just over a year since surviving what is thought
to have been a Syrian-ordered assassination attempt, Deputy
Prime Minister and Defense Minister Elias Murr heads to
Washington July 16-19. The scion of a powerful and wealthy
Greek Orthodox family closely linked to Syria, Murr has
forged an independent path broadly consistent with USG hopes
for an independent Lebanon. He supports close security
cooperation with the USG. He is privately hostile to
Hizballah and advocates for a strong Lebanese army and
Lebanese state to stand up to Hizballah. As Minister of
Interior two years ago, he displayed unusual courage in
ordering the arrest of Sunni extremists linked to Syria. Yet
Murr's enthusiasm for highlighting his own role sometimes
leads him to exaggerate or suggest expertise he may not
possess.


2. (S/NF) Murr's visit coincides with growing fears in
Lebanon that the ongoing political stalemate is leading to
renewed sectarian violence. By receiving Murr at high levels
in Washington, we reassure the Lebanese that the United
States supports a strong Lebanese army (the LAF),arguably
the only national institution with popular support that
crosses sectarian lines. After the visits of Saad Hariri,
Walid Jumblatt, Fouad Siniora, Ashraf Rifi and Ahmed Fatfat
-- all Muslims -- to Washington, Murr's visit also provides a
modicum of sectarian balance. As Deputy PM, Murr occupies
the second-most-senior Christian office in the GOL. (Murr's
former father-in-law, President Emile Lahoud, disreputably
occupies the first.)


3. (S/NF) By sharing our thinking for assistance to the LAF
and by announcing -- if possible -- Section 1206 assistance
and plans for out-year help, we provide encouragement to Murr

and the LAF to continue modernization and training to prepare
for deployment over all Lebanese territory in the future. We
also give Murr an example to use in pressing other foreign
partners for help to the LAF. Ideally, Murr should leave
Washington feeling not only strengthened but also sobered:
he needs to see that the levels of USG support for the LAF
are linked to tangible progress both on security
reform/coordination and on eventual disarmament of militias.
We suggest that Washington interlocutors press Murr in
particular on how he envisions implementing the National
Dialogue's decision on disarming Palestinian militants
outside of the refugee camps and issues related to UNIFIL
renewal. End summary.

MURR'S VISIT CAN COMBAT PERCEPTION
THAT FATFAT'S VISIT WAS A "FAILURE"
--------------


4. (S/NF) Pro-Syrians in Lebanon have viciously -- and
successfully -- spread the story that Acting Minister of
Interior Ahmed Fatfat's June visit to Washington was a
failure. Fatfat, they argued, returned to Lebanon
empty-handed. Despite Fatfat's private and public praise for
the trip, the charge has stuck. With exaggerated
expectations about the translation into dollar amounts U.S.
support would supposedly take, the Lebanese were susceptible
to the nefarious argument that our unprecedented assistance
to the ISF (through INL, FBI, ATA, etc.) is insignificant.
Both Fatfat and Internal Security Forces (ISF) Commander
Ashraf Rifi (who also visited Washington earlier in June)
insist that U.S. support is important and welcome. But their
words are drowned out in the Lebanese chorus that our
tangible commitments supposedly do not match our rhetorical
support for Lebanon. Acting Interior Minister Fatfat has
authority over the ISF and Surete Generale, while Murr has
authority over Lebanon's third major security institution,
the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF).


5. (S/NF) Given this (tiresome but predictable) perception
that Fatfat's visit was a failure, we hope that something
specific can be announced (assuming all approvals are in
place) during Murr's visit: the nearly USD 10 million in
Section 1206 funds, to be obligated in this fiscal year. We
recommend that hints be made that, subject to congressional
approval, this is part of a multi-year, multi-million dollar
effort to provide support essential to the modernization of

BEIRUT 00002256 002 OF 005


the LAF and support state-building activities.


6. (S/NF) We are aware that there is preliminary thinking
in USG circles suggesting that the USG consider giving
Lebanon USD 20 million in FMF for each of the next five
fiscal years. As a mission, we strongly support this
proposal (and, in fact, are including this figure in our
assistance dialogue with Washington). Particularly in light
of the USD 1 million in FMF this year (the first time FMF has
been offered to Lebanon in more than a decade),these figures
demonstrate the type of commitment that would electrify
public opinion in a positive way here.


7. (S/NF) Thus, we hope that there could be some way to use
Murr's visit to make a reference to the possibility of a USD
110 million commitment to the LAF over the next five years
(Section 1206 for this year plus FMF for the next five
years). Depending on what IMET numbers are under
consideration for Lebanon, this multi-year package could be
even higher. Even if these figures are too preliminary to be
stated publicly, we encourage an honest discussion of our
thinking with Murr. Murr can then quietly share our thinking
with PM Siniora and others, showing that the strong support
the President offered Lebanon during Siniora's April visit
might, subject to appropriations, materialize in increased
help to the LAF.

MURR'S VISIT CAN REASSURE CHRISTIANS
--------------


8. (S/NF) As Deputy Prime Minister -- a position reserved
for a Greek Orthodox -- Elias Murr is the second-ranking
minister, just after PM Siniora (a Sunni),and the most
senior Christian cabinet member. General Michel Aoun and
pro-Syrian Christian politicians like former MP Suleiman
Franjieh argue that U.S. invitations to Muslim politicians,
combined with our boycott of the presidency (a Maronite
Christian),"prove" that we are implicated in marginalizing
Lebanon's Christians.


9. (S/NF) Adding fuel to their fire, the pro-Syrian
fearmongers are now trumpeting the fact that Maronite
Patriarch Sfeir, visiting the United States, has not been
invited to Washington. Instead of accepting our explanation
that the Patriarch was already received by POTUS in March
2005, the Christians fear that we have "demoted" the
Patriarch's status by "ignoring" him this time. Thus, by
highlighting Murr's visit, we take some of the sting out of
the alleged snub of Sfeir and restore some confessional
balance, after the visits of Sa'ad Hariri, Walid Jumblatt,
Siniora, Rifi, and Fatfat (all Muslims).

SUPPORT TO LAF ALSO REASSURING
--------------


10. (S/NF) The support we show during Murr's visit to the
LAF, traditionally commanded by a Maronite Christian and with
a strong (but not exclusively) Christian officer corps, is
also part of the reassuring message to the Christians, who
fear that the Sunni-commanded ISF is growing in strength at
the expense of the LAF. While traditionally considered a
Christian institution by virtue of its command, the LAF is in
fact one of the few -- many would say only -- Lebanese
national institutions that is truly cross-confessional and
that has the strong support from Lebanese representing all of
the bewildering confessional landscape here. Receiving Murr
prominently amounts to symbolic support for the LAF.


11. (S/NF) In addition, by receiving Murr and announcing
generous additional help for the LAF, we stand with an
institution that should be a model for confessional
co-existence in Lebanon. The fearful Christians will welcome
this message, as well other segments of Lebanese society.
Christians in particular, but Lebanese more generally, see a
strong LAF as the best insurance against the growing
confessional tensions becoming violent.

MURR'S VISIT CAN ALSO SOW
UNEASE IN RANKS OF PRO-SYRIANS
--------------


12. (S/NF) Because of the car bomb that nearly took his
life on 7/12/05 -- approximately one year ago -- Murr has
also become a surprising symbol of Lebanon's struggle for

BEIRUT 00002256 003 OF 005


independence. He, Marwan Hamadeh (survivor of a 10/1/04 car
bomb),and LBC journalist May Chidiac (badly maimed in a
9/25/05 car bomb) are dubbed "living martyrs" by the Lebanese
pro-independence forces. This term is meant both to honor
them and to distinguish them from those actually killed (like
Rafiq Hariri). While no one has been arrested in the case of
Murr's attack, in the court of popular perception Syria is
judged guilty. Murr himself is convinced that the Syrians,
aided by Hizballah-organized surveillance, tried to kill him
-- and will do so again, if given the opportunity to do so
without leaving fingerprints.


13. (S/NF) In the small world of Lebanese politics, many of
the victims of the 2004-2005 bombings are connected: Murr is
the ex-brother-in-law of Gebran Tueni, the al-Nahar publisher
and MP killed on 12/12/05, and thus the uncle of Nayla Tueni,
the 20-something daughter of Gebran who took on the role of
family spokesman after Gebran's death. And Marwan Hamadeh,
as the uncle of Gebran (whose mother was Marwan's celebrated
sister Nadia),also is part of this tragic family circle.
Admitting to a shared "survivor's experience," Marwan and
Elias have drawn close, politically and personally. Early in
her career, May Chidiac worked for Elias Murr, and the two
remain friends. Murr's visit to Washington will thus be seen
-- rightly -- as a reproach to the Syrians for trying to
eliminate Lebanese politicians and journalists. To our
satisfaction, Lebanon's resurgent pro-Syrian politicians will
be uncomfortable with Murr's Washington consultations.

PROGENY OF A PRO-SYRIAN POLITICAL BOSS
--------------


14. (S/NF) Murr is a particularly fascinating character
because of the political trajectory he has traveled.
Lebanon's pro-independence politicians did not immediately
embrace him, given his past. Murr was seen as a key figure
in the Syrian-Lebanese post-Taif status quo. His powerful
father Michel, a political boss (in the Mount Lebanon Metn
region) now part of Aoun's parliamentary bloc, built a
billion-dollar real estate empire through questionable
tactics and cozy relations with the Syrian-Lebanese security
regime.


15. (S/NF) Murr himself was married until recently to the
daughter of Lebanon's discredited president, Emile Lahoud.
When Siniora was putting together his cabinet a year ago, in
fact, Murr was one of three men (along with Charles Rizk and
Yacoub Sarraf) included as "Lahoud's ministers," the price
Siniora had to pay in order to gain the essential signature
of Lahoud on the cabinet decree. Murr, like many in the
Syrian-Lebanese establishment circles, even had a brush with
the notorious Bank al-Medina, selling his house at well above
its appraised value and earning a brief mention in the
Central Bank's investigation report into the collapsed bank.
(Murr has gone to court to deny any wrong-doing, claiming
that the contents of the house were included in the sale.
The case is pending.)

BOMB BLAST RE-ORIENTS HIS POLITICS
--------------


16. (S/NF) With a talent for revisionist history, Murr
would deny that he was ever as blindly pro-Syrian as his
former reputation suggests. He has talked sorrowfully -- and
we believe sincerely -- about the emotional pain he
experienced since his attack, breaking politically with his
father and father-in-law and going through the collapse of a
15-year marriage while undergoing more than a dozen surgical
procedures since the car bomb attack. Whether he was always
quietly a genuine Lebanese patriot in a pro-Syrian milieu or
rather was blasted from one side of the political spectrum to
another is now a moot question: he has readily proven his
credentials since his attack to be an independent,
pro-independence minister. He has been increasingly vocal,
publicly and privately, about the need for Lebanon to stand
up to Syria, the Palestinian rejectionists, and even to
Hizballah. When asked how he could so easily abandon his
previous alliances, Murr talks about trying to cross a busy
highway: if you stop halfway across, you will be killed; you
need to dash all the way to safety on the other side. (We
would argue, of course, that Murr was literally blasted from
one side of that highway to the other.)


17. (S/NF) Ministers in the cabinet with the strongest

BEIRUT 00002256 004 OF 005


pro-independence credentials -- Nayla Mouawad, Marwan
Hamadeh, etc. -- all agree that Murr now stands aggressively
on their side in cabinet decisions, voting against the wishes
of Lahoud and the pro-Syrians. (Revealing presidential
ambitions, Charles Rizk has made a similar trajectory,
although without going as far as Murr. Lahoud is now left
with only the ridiculous Sarraf as "his man" in the cabinet.)
By February 14 this year, Murr was formally ushered into the
pantheon of those who sacrificed for Lebanon's independence,
when his name was added to lists being chanted in a mass
demonstration in Martyrs' Square. PM Siniora, too, was
initially suspicious of Murr but has lately counted him as an
ally, citing Murr's sacrifice in a speech he gave on the
occasion of the one-year anniversary in June of journalist
Samir Kassir's murder.

WHY WAS MURR ATTACKED?
--------------


18. (S/NF) Given his family's pro-Syrian past, the question
remains why the Syrians would want him dead. Murr himself
has a theory that is as plausible as any other we've heard:
because Murr, as Minister of Interior in the last Hariri
cabinet, ordered in September 2004 the arrests of the "Majdal
Anjar gang," Sunni extremists linked to the Iraqi foreign
fighter pipeline. While some of the plots of this gang --
blowing up the Italian and Ukrainian embassies in Beirut --
may not have been as operationally prepared as was argued at
the time, the Majdal Anjar gang was involved in the Iraqi
insurgency and was discovered to have connections to Rustom
Ghazali, then Syria's strong man in Lebanon.


19. (S/NF) Despite the dangers of annoying the
then-ubiquitous Syrian overlords, Murr backed up the ISF's
detention of the gang, even once the ties to Ghazaleh and the
Syrian regime were revealed. But, especially after one of
the detainees died under mysterious circumstances (presumed
to be torture),Murr faced death threats. When the Hariri
cabinet resigned in October 2004, Murr fled with his family
to Switzerland, where he remained until after the departure
of the Syrian troops in April 2005.

MURR CARVES OUT MORE POWERFUL ROLE
--------------


20. (S/NF) Readily accessible and friendly to our
interests, Murr has worked with us closely on a variety of
security, intelligence, and counter-terrorism issues, proving
to be politically courageous and supportive. The elite
commando ISF Black Panthers unit in the ISF, the recipient
for some of our ATA assistance, was set up under his
direction when he was Minister of Interior. As Minister of
Defense, he is a strong supporter of the LAF.


21. (S/NF) As an active, engaged minister who likes to
insert himself into the details of security issues, he has
broken with his predecessors, who saw their role as largely
protocol-oriented, with the LAF commander a more powerful
figure who in effect reported directly to the president. The
international boycott of Lahoud, in fact, has encouraged Murr
in his efforts to build a substantive role for himself, since
foreign interlocutors now see Murr on security/defense issues
they would have previously discussed with the president.


22. (S/NF) Our impression is that the leaders of the LAF --
Commander Michel Suleiman and G-2 (military intelligence)
Commander Georges Khoury -- overcame whatever initial
bureaucratic hesitations they might have had to accept the
expanded role of the Minister of Defense as defined by Murr,
especially given the vacuum in the discredited presidency.
Repeatedly, in meetings with the Ambassador, Murr has
received phone calls from Suleiman and Khoury (as well as
from Ashraf Rifi, who officially reports to Fatfat, not
Murr),suggesting positive and collaborative relations. Murr
is an additional advocate for the LAF within the cabinet and
with international partners.


23. (S/NF) Murr, however, has a tendency to want to impress
visitors, and he frequently exaggerates information or speaks
knowingly on military subjects on which he could be better
briefed. On broad strategy and how politics interface with
security policies, we have found Murr to be a credible
interlocutor. But when it comes to precise details, we have
learned to double-check what Murr tells us with those

BEIRUT 00002256 005 OF 005


responsible for the issue in question.

DEALING WITH MURR IN WASHINGTON
--------------


24. (S/NF) Murr is one of the few politicians here -- Walid
Jumblatt comes to mind as another -- who speaks candidly
about Hizballah and who shares our concerns about Hizballah
as an Iranian proxy. He also sees Sunni extremism as a real
threat in Lebanon, albeit one on which the GOL has been doing
some work. But, unlike Jumblatt, Murr in general prefers to
speak privately about Hizballah, lest he be seen as preparing
the LAF to strike Hizballah militarily. (No one in Lebanon
would support such a move. Even those who fear Hizballah,
like Murr, have a greater fear: Lebanon's destabilization,
which they believe military action against Hizballah would
provoke in the current environment.)


25. (S/NF) Murr's hope is to modernize and strengthen the
LAF so that Hizballah becomes weaker by comparison and so
that the LAF is prepared operationally to exercise control
over all Lebanese territory, once that mission becomes
politically possible. To an unusual extent, Washington
interlocutors will have the opportunity to talk about
Hizballah candidly with a senior Lebanese figure, but we
believe that Murr will open up more easily in restricted
meetings where all but his closest aides are out of the room.


26. (S/NF) We suggest that, in the larger meetings,
Washington interlocutors probe Murr on his plans to modernize
the LAF and push for comprehensive security reform, drawing
on the UK strategic assessment and thinking. While being
reassured of U.S. support through Section 1206 and out-year
FMF, Murr should also feel some pressure about the need to
implement the National Dialogue's decision to disarm the
Palestinians outside of the refugee camps. We do not expect
Murr to bring anything specific on that issue to the table --
he is particularly worried about how long the LAF could
sustain a gunbattle with the Palestinians, given the shortage
of ammunition in LAF stocks -- but he should report back to
the cabinet that our assistance is coming with the
expectation the Lebanese will implement the political
decisions taken regarding the Palestinians.


27. (S/NF) One specific area where we recommend pushing
Murr hard in Washington -- as we are doing here -- is
regarding south Lebanon, in the context of the anticipated
renewal of UNIFIL: Murr should understand that we expect the
joint GOL-UNIFIL planning unit recommended to Prime Minister
Siniora by UNIFIL Commander Pellegrini should be stood up now
(and which, to be serious and to address operational needs,
should be under the LAF or MOD, not/not the MFA). Also, we
recommend urging Murr to increase the operational size of the
Joint Security Forces (ISF and LAF) in the south immediately
to the 1,000-troop authorized level and to increase the JSF
patrols. While the ISF nominally may already be at troop
levels approaching the 1,000 authorized level, there are far
fewer on the ground at any one time. In our view, Murr
should focus on the JSF becoming an active, not a reactive,
force. This may be an area where Murr could also be asked
for his impression of the Lebanese National Dialogue
discussions on national defense strategy. Both Hizballah and
the Hariri-led March 14 representatives have made
presentations on national defense strategy during the past
two months.


28. (S/NF) Ideally, Murr should leave Washington with a
promise -- as specific as possible -- about USG support to
the LAF. Such a message will reassure the Christians in
particular and the Lebanese more generally, and it will give
Murr a tool he can use in trying to get others (Saudi Arabia,
etc.) to offer assistance to the LAF. Strong support to the
LAF through Murr's visit will demonstrate in a tangible way
the President's firm and non-negotiable support to Lebanon.
But Murr should also report back to the cabinet that, while
the United States will be patient and does not want to push
Lebanon toward destabilization, the Lebanese need to begin
exercising responsibility for their own country, in accord
with their own national dialogue and consistent with the
international resolutions regarding Lebanon.
FELTMAN