MGLE01: WITH SYRIA AND ITS ALLIES ON THE

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 BEIRUT 002220

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/WERNER/SINGH
PARIS FOR ZEYA
LONDON FOR TSOU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/29/2016
TAGS: PGOV KDEM PTER KPAL ECON SY LE
SUBJECT: MGLE01: WITH SYRIA AND ITS ALLIES ON THE
OFFENSIVE, JUMBLATT SUGGESTS PUTTING THE PRESIDENCY BACK ON
THE TABLE

BEIRUT 00002220 001.2 OF 004


Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey D. Feltman for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d
).

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (S) In a 6/28 meeting -- a day before the National
Dialogue was to reconvene -- Druze leader and "March 14
Forces" figure Walid Jumblatt described a "stalemate" among
National Dialogue participants over the deadline they had set
on disarmament of Palestinian militias outside the refugee
camps. While "March 14" experienced internal difficulties
(including a lack of Hariri family patronage) and stumbled in
its quest to win foreign friends, Syrian President Asad
appeared to be making strides. Asad's opponents in exile
were also having problems, and Jumblatt detected disturbing
signs that a potential leader among them, Hikmat Shihabi,
might be seeking a separate peace with Asad's regime.
Against this depressing background, Jumblatt suggested that
it might be time to put the Syrians and their allies in
Lebanon off-balance by reopening the issue of Emile Lahoud's
Lebanese presidency. End summary.

NATIONAL DIALOGUE AT A "STALEMATE"
--------------


2. (S) In a call on Jumblatt at his ancestral home in the
Chouf Mountains on June 28, the Ambassador asked if he and
his "March 14" allies had settled on a common position for
the coming round of the National Dialogue talks, scheduled to
take place the next day, June 29, Jumblatt spread his hands,
chuckled, and rolled his eyes heavenwards. "Of course not,"
he said.


3. (S) The Ambassador raised one of the few substantive
issues on which National Dialogue participants had reached
consensus: a six-month deadline for the removal of all
Palestinian arms and armed personnel to within the refugee
camps. With less than three months left to go before the
deadline was up, was anyone taking this seriously? "No,"
Jumblatt answered, there was a "stalemate." This was in part
due to the hesitancy of parliamentary majority leader Sa'ad
al-Hariri, who feared that holding firm to the deadline
risked a violent clash with the Palestinians. Prime Minister
Siniora was, if anything, more hesitant.


4. (S) As for Hizballah, Jumblatt said it was "covering" for
those Palestinian groups that maintained an armed presence
outside the camps in defiance of the National Dialogue's
decisions, chief among them Ahmad Jibril's Popular Front for
the Liberation of Palestine-General Command. "Something has
to be done," Jumblatt said, the question was what. A start
would be appointing a replacement for Hassan al-Saba'a, who
resigned in February as interior minister, and in whose place
Youth and Sports Minister Ahmad Fatfat has been acting.
However, the Hariri camp had yet to settle on a suitable
permanent replacement. (Comment: Since the position was
vacated by a Sunni Muslim "March 14" minister, the decision
on a replacement falls to Hariri, as the would-be leader of
the Sunni community. End comment.)


5. (S) Beyond that, Jumblatt said, in order to tackle the
disarmament of Palestinian militias outside the camps, "we
need a real Palestinian Authority." The current situation,
characterized by the difficulties between President Mahmoud
Abbas and Hamas, and the ongoing situation in Gaza, made this
difficult.

WARNING SIGNS ABOUT SYRIAN OPPOSITION
--------------


6. (S) Jumblatt described seeing Abd al-Halim Khaddam and
Hikmat Shihabi, two former top officials of Syria's Ba'athist
regime, now both living in exile and in opposition to Syrian
President Bashar al-Asad, during a recent visit to Paris.
Khaddam had complained about lack of access to, and
cooperation from, some of Jumblatt's other fellow "March 14"
leaders in Lebanon, notably Samir Ja'ja' and Sa'ad al-Hariri.



7. (S) Jumblatt said he had suggested that Ja'ja' was not in
much of a position to help the Syrian oppositionists. He did
not have full control over the Lebanese Broadcasting

BEIRUT 00002220 002.2 OF 004


Corporation television station, for example. As for Hariri,
it was likely that his foreign backers, particularly Saudi
Arabia, had discouraged him from being too helpful to the
likes of Khaddam and Shihabi.


8. (S) Jumblatt was more worried about Shihabi than Khaddam.
Shihabi appeared to dropping "hints" that he would be
willing to consider returning to Syria, and had even
described receiving entreaties to do so from Syrian
intelligence supremo (and President Asad's brother-in-law)
Assef Shawkat and another Syrian intelligence official,
Muhammad Nassif. As if to justify doing so, Shihabi had gone
on at length about how circumstances did not make the
overthrow of Asad's regime feasible. It was too strong and
not facing enough pressure, he had told Jumblatt.


9. (S) Jumblatt suggested to the Ambassador that Shihabi
might also be concerned about losing ownership of his
extensive properties in Syria, as had happened to Khaddam,
were he to take the risk of joining Khaddam in open
opposition to Asad's regime. Adding to Jumblatt's suspicion,
he had heard from Khaddam's son an account, however
unlikely-sounding, of Shihabi being feted at a private dinner
in Washington hosted by Syrian Ambassador Imad Mustafa.

"MARCH 14" SLIPPING...
--------------


10. (S) Jumblatt's "March 14" allies were still in a
difficult position. Sa'ad al-Hariri did not appear to have
resolved his cash flow problems with the Kingdom of Saudi
Arabia (comment: which reportedly owes the Hariri family's
business enterprises billions of dollars). The reasons for
Saudi slowness to pay were unclear, but the effects of a lack
of Hariri family patronage on the "Sunni street" were both
obvious and ominous to Jumblatt.


11. (S) There were also issues within the Hariri family that
were making it difficult for "March 14," according to
Jumblatt. Rafiq al-Hariri's widow, Nazik, was "stingy," he
said, quoting her stepson, Sa'ad. As for Jumblatt himself,
"I'm a bit squeezed," he said, referring to the resources he
has available for political patronage.

HARIRI AIMING TOO HIGH
FOR BEIRUT I CONFERENCE
--------------


12. (S) Sa'ad al-Hariri is nonetheless "aiming high,"
Jumblatt said -- perhaps too high. Convinced of the need to
"do something" in the short term, Hariri is determined to see
a "Beirut I" -- or, alternatively, a "Riyadh I" -- conference
of friends of Lebanon take place before the end of the year.
Hariri expects to obtain USD 10-15 billion in foreign
economic assistance through such a conference, according to
Jumblatt, who agreed that this was a jaw-droppingly
unrealistic figure.


13. (S) Hariri is also claiming that Hizballah has agreed to
step aside and allow the so-called Elissar Project -- a
massive redevelopment of the coastal southern suburbs near
Beirut's international airport, analogous to the
reconstruction of Beirut's central district by the Solidere
Corporation that Rafiq al-Hariri founded -- to proceed.
Elissar, like LENOR, a cousin planned for the northern
coastal suburbs of Beirut, would provide needed economic
stimulus.


14. (S) Hariri is therefore intent on "cooling it down with
Hizballah," Jumblatt said. Jumblatt was skeptical that
either Hizballah or its ally, Asad's Syria, would really want
to do anything that was helpful for the Hariri-backed
government of Prime Minister Fouad Siniora, however. In the
meantime, Siniora was having a hard enough time at the hands
of Hariri's apparently somewhat miserly stepmother, Nazik.
While in Paris, Jumblatt had met with Nazik, who recounted
the recent visit paid on her by Siniora, olive branch in
hand, and his wife. Nazik had apparently been quite tough on
Siniora, according to Jumblatt.

GERMANY WARMING UP TO SYRIA?
--------------


BEIRUT 00002220 003.2 OF 004



15. (S) While still in Europe, Jumblatt met with a
sympathetic EU Commissioner Javier Solana. A meeting with
members of the European Parliament's socialist bloc, however,
had left him uneasy. Adding to suspicions raised in
Jumblatt's mind by former German Chancellor Schroeder's
recent visit to Damascus, a German member of the bloc had
told Jumblatt, apparently with some misgivings, that
Germany's position on Lebanese sovereignty was "changing,"
driven by what the German MEP described as "big interests" in
Syria and Iran.

SA'AD FAILS TO IMPRESS RUSSIANS
--------------


16. (S) Sa'ad al-Hariri has also been conducting some
foreign diplomacy to drum up support for a sovereign Lebanon
and call attention to Syrian interference, Jumblatt noted.
However, the results left something to be desired. Although
Hariri supporters hyped his recent visit to Moscow, a
longtime (going back to the Soviet days) contact of Jumblatt
there reported that Sa'ad had in fact made a poor impression,
and that no shift in Russia's frankly pro-Syrian policy was
in the offing.


17. (S) This was typical for Hariri, according to Jumblatt.
He can arrange high-level visits, perhaps with some help from
French President Chirac (as appeared to be the case with the
Moscow visit). He then shows up with a huge entourage that
his hosts find off-putting. Only a few people likely to be
found in the entourage (MP Bassem al-Saba'a, media executive
Hani Hammoud, and former MP Ghattas Khoury) bring any
substance to the table. Sa'ad himself is "charming," but has
no sense for the follow-up these visits require in order to
have an impact, Jumblatt said.

...WHILE ASAD ADVANCES
--------------


18. (S) In contrast, President Asad appeared to be making
strides in building up international support. Jumblatt
expected Asad to attend an upcoming Non-Aligned Movement
summit in Cuba. (Jumblatt's confidante, fellow Druze, and
Minister of Information Ghazi al-Aridi would also attend, if
for no other reason than to keep on eye on what Asad was up
to.) There was a possibility that President Asad would
continue from Cuba to Argentina and Venezuela.


19. (S) Visits by Asad to these countries would be
unhelpful, in Jumblatt's view, because both have sizeable
Lebanese and Syrian immigrant populations that could
presumably be drawn out in a public display of support for
Asad. (Comment: We would assume that the Lebanese immigrant
communities in question are predominantly Shi'a and
pro-Hizballah.) Venezuela's President Chavez made Jumblatt
uneasy -- he was both "crazy" and had ample amounts of
petrodollars at his disposal, and his anti-American
orientation might well lead him to throw support behind Asad
in unhelpful ways.

COUNTERATTACK VIA THE PRESIDENTIAL PALACE?
--------------


20. (S) In light of all these unappealing developments,
Jumblatt thought it was worth considering re-opening the
issue of the Lebanese presidency. This would involve again
challenging the legitimacy of President Emile Lahoud, whose
term in office received a made-in-Damascus extension of three
years in 2004. The hard part would be finding a candidate
around which he and his "March 14" allies could unite around,
without alienating all the other would-be presidential
candidates on the "March 14" side. (Comment: This means
practically every Maronite within "March 14," except perhaps
Samir Ja'ja'.)


21. (S) As far as potential replacements for President
Lahoud go, Lahoud's cousin and political rival, former MP
Nassib Lahoud, is "the best," Jumblatt said. With the "March
14" majority in Parliament short of the votes necessary to
cancel Emile Lahoud's extension in office and elect a
successor, Nassib Lahoud's chances were virtually nil,
however. Other contenders within "March 14," such as MP
Boutros Harb, were considerably less appealing to Jumblatt.


BEIRUT 00002220 004.2 OF 004



22. (S) The second-best candidate, in Jumblatt's view, might
well be Justice Minister Charles Rizk. The Maronite Rizk is
a personal friend of President Lahoud and not a member of the
"March 14" coalition -- this would presumably help his
chances with getting the necessary votes from the opponents
of "March 14" in Parliament: the blocs of Michel Aoun,
Speaker of Parliament Nabih Berri, and Hizballah. At the
same time, Rizk had, surprisingly, "made a good impression"
on Nazik al-Hariri. While Rizk was close to Lahoud at a
personal level, he had no known relationship with Syria.
Rizk, Jumblatt argued, had done more than anyone in "March
14" to promote the "special tribunal with international
character" to try Hariri murder suspects.


23. (S) In any case, Jumblatt said, the question was what
"price" Hizballah would demand in return for getting rid of
Emile Lahoud. This price might well be too high,
particularly with regards to Hizballah's obligation to disarm
under UNSCR 1559. Jumblatt and his fellow "March 14" leaders
needed to figure out Hizballah's price, figure out how to
keep it as low as possible, he said.

ADVICE FROM A FRIEND: "TAKE CARE"
--------------


24. (S) One promising development for Jumblatt and "March
14" had been the publication, the day before -- and just in
time for the upcoming round of the National Dialogue -- of
Jumblatt's plan for an alternative national defense strategy
in Beirut's daily "as-Safir." Such an alternative strategy,
emphasizing the need to build a strong state, would not rely
on Hizballah remaining an indefinite paramilitary presence on
the border with Israel. Nuhad al-Mashnuq, a longtime
confidante of the late Prime Minister Hariri and a writer for
"as-Safir," had facilitated its publication. Even this step
forward had its downside: Mashnuq (who, following Rafiq
al-Hariri's assassination, publicized his firsthand
impressions of President Asad's abusive treatment of Hariri)
had advised Jumblatt, for the first time, to "take care."
Jumblatt said that he took Mashnuq's warnings quite seriously.
FELTMAN