Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06BEIRUT2093
2006-06-23 12:36:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Beirut
Cable title:  

MGLE01: MICHEL AOUN RATCHETS UP THE

Tags:  IS KDEM LE PGOV PREL SY 
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DE RUEHLB #2093/01 1741236
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 231236Z JUN 06
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4246
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 002093 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/WERNER/SINGH

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/23/2016
TAGS: IS KDEM LE PGOV PREL SY
SUBJECT: MGLE01: MICHEL AOUN RATCHETS UP THE
CRITICISM...CONSIDERS QUITTING NATIONAL DIALOGUE


Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey Feltman. Reason: Section 1.4 (b).

SUMMARY
-------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 002093

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/WERNER/SINGH

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/23/2016
TAGS: IS KDEM LE PGOV PREL SY
SUBJECT: MGLE01: MICHEL AOUN RATCHETS UP THE
CRITICISM...CONSIDERS QUITTING NATIONAL DIALOGUE


Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey Feltman. Reason: Section 1.4 (b).

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) Free Patriotic Movement leader Michel Aoun strongly
attacked an array of perceived enemies in a televised speech
on June 21, and the next day led a combined FPM/Hizballah
delegation to Lebanon's Constitutional Council to protest
judicial "inactivity" regarding a number of FPM challenges to
last year's parliamentary election results. Senior Aoun
advisor Gebran Bassil informed the Embassy that in recent
weeks the Aounists have been debating two possible courses of
action: attempt to reach out to Saad Hariri and PM Siniora,
or, alternatively, quit the National Dialogue process and put
even more pressure on what they perceive is a beleaguered
Siniora government. Bassil stated that former General Aoun's
harsh rhetoric earlier in the week and the subsequent protest
against the Constitutional Council was a clear indication
that Aoun, after diligently trying to open a channel to Saad
Hariri, "has had enough" and is now committed to bringing
down the government. End summary.

AOUN OPPOSED TO SUMMER BREAK
--------------


2. (C) Senior Aoun advisor Gebran Bassil met poloff on June

22. Without much prelude, he flatly stated that Michel Aoun
will not allow the Siniora government to "glide" through the
summer, but has decided to turn up the heat wherever possible
to highlight the "incompetence and selfishness" of the
governing Sunni-dominated majority.


3. (C) Bassil maintained that Michel Aoun had tried to
build rapport with Siniora and Hariri during the National
Dialogue process, but in the general's view, had been
continually rebuffed. The influential advisor (and
son-in-law) said that in recent weeks, FPM's senior members
had seriously discussed the idea of proposing a unity
government, but felt the words and actions of the
Sunni-dominated majority continued to be exclusionary.
Although he said he had not been personally involved, Bassil

indicated the Aounists have been in discussions with Walid
Jumblatt in an attempt to reach out to the March 14 alliance,
but that the initiative had gone nowhere.


4. (C) Irrespective of the traditionally slow months of
summer when Lebanon's Parliament is in recess and many of the
country's politicians travel abroad, Bassil emphasized that
Michel Aoun has decided to keep pressing the Siniora
government as hard as possible. The advisor recited a litany
of perceived government failures and missteps: the
deliberate exclusion of the country's Maronite president from
an international conference in Romania, an ill-conceived
economic reform plan that was drafted in isolation, a
politicization of the judiciary and its refusal to hear cases
involving electoral irregularities, a hybrid draft electoral
law that pleased no one, a "botched" initiative to meet with
Syrian President al-Asad, a covert Sunni takeover of the
ISF's intelligence capabilities, and a continuing campaign of
filling almost every bureaucratic vacancy with a Sunni
appointee.


5. (C) Bassil echoed the language Michel Aoun had used in a
June 22 interview when he characterized Siniora's government
as paralyzed and "rebellious." Without specificity, Bassil
argued that despite Michel Aoun's patience and willingness to
discuss almost any issue with the March 14 alliance, Aoun's
overtures had been "rudely" ignored.


6. (C) Bassil implied that Aoun's attempt at
reconciliation was drawing to an end and that Aoun and his
senior advisors have decided to attack PM Siniora at every
opportunity. The one area that the advisor held out some
hope of cooperation was the electoral law, but even there
Bassil argued that the government was being opaque and
indecisive. Bassil emphasized that in the nearly three weeks
since the release of the draft statute, neither PM Siniora
nor Saad Hariri have clearly stated their positions. He
argued it was yet another example of indecisiveness and lack
of progress.

NATIONAL DIALOGUE...PULLING THE PLUG?
--------------


7. (C) According to Bassil, Michel Aoun "has had enough"
and is seriously considering withdrawing from the National

BEIRUT 00002093 002 OF 003


Dialogue process, which has been meeting intermittently since
early March. He said Aoun is expected to make a decision
shortly after the next meeting scheduled for June 28. Bassil
stated that if "more of the same" comes from the March 14
members in that session -- i.e. political and economic
positions arrived at without inclusive coordination -- he
believes former General Aoun will announce his intention to
withdraw from the process.


8. (C) When asked what that would accomplish, Bassil said
it will make the Christian community realize that Siniora's
Sunni-dominated government has few answers and evaporating
support. Bassil stated the Free Patriotic Movement would
apply constant political pressure throughout the summer, with
the intention of eventually forcing the formation of a new
government. He was also emphatic that even though the
Aounists make no attempt to hide their disdain of the
pro-reform Siniora government, they deeply resent the attempt
by certain March 14 members to paint Michel Aoun as a
ill-disguised supporter of Syrian interests. Bassil argued
strongly that Aoun only had the interests of a sovereign
Lebanon at heart and his entire political career proved that.

COMMENT
--------------


9. (C) Although most of the country's political class seems
to be throttling down for the summer, it is clear that former
General Aoun wants to up the pressure. Numerous observers
have noted that recent Aoun missteps (the May 12 labor
protests, presence of Aounists at the launch of the
pro-Syrian Marada party, lack of progress on issues addressed
in the February 6 joint memorandum with Hizballah) have made
the former general most anxious about the gradual, but
perceptible loss of confidence in his leadership by the
Christian community. As a consequence, Aoun may feel it is
necessary to commence a heavy-hitting campaign against the
Siniora/Hariri ruling bloc to regain what his detractors
hopefully describe as his ebbing support. If Aoun withdraws
from the National Dialogue, he will certainly recapture the
headlines, but perhaps not in the light he desires. As
Speaker Nabih Berri rhetorically asked us several weeks ago,
"who wants to be the person who is blamed for ending the
flawed, but useful process?"


10. (C) In part, Aoun, with his bloc left out of the
cabinet, has chosen an obvious course of action: across the
globe, opposition leaders oppose sitting governments in hopes
of replacing them. Yet it is worth keeping in mind Aoun's
history of going sharply against the grain. In 1989,
exhausted Lebanese political leaders and the international
community all embraced the Taif Accord as the best path
available to ending the 15-year civil war. Aoun rejected
Taif and deployed his followers to beseige the Embassy and
humiliate Maronite Patriarch Sfeir. In 1990, when Iraq
burnished its regional and international pariah reputation
after invading Kuwait, Aoun welcomed money and arms from
Saddam Hussein. In May 2005, when pro-independence Lebanese
were still looking to end covert Syrian interference in
Lebanon, Aoun returned to Lebanon and choose to ignore Syria
in favor of attacking (as he said in his first public speech)
"financial politics" (i.e., the Hariris) and "feudal
politics" (i.e., Jumblatt). In February 2006, when Lebanese
politicians, prodded by Walid Jumblatt's statements, finally
began an honest assessment of Hizballah's arms, Aoun
concluded his memorandum of understanding with Nasrallah,
giving Hizballah political cover. Now, even Hizballah has
reportedly agreed with the March 14 movement's desire to cool
the overheated rhetoric and keep the security situation calm,
in order to allow a normal tourism season and breathe needed
life into the Lebanese economy. But Aoun again is moving in
the opposite direction, in choosing to up the pressure on
Siniora and Hariri in ways that could lead to street protests
and even violence. His hints at pulling out of the National
Dialogue that other Lebanese strongly support (even while
recognizing its limitations) is another example of his
contrarian spirit. He is playing a most dangerous game.


11. (C) Appealing to populist instincts and playing on
Christian and Shia fears of Sunni power, Aoun will certainly
find followers willing to go anywhere he leads them. But his
approach -- rooted in intentionally exacerbating confessional
tensions -- seems as ill-advised in terms of Lebanon's best
interests as all of his previous diversions from the
mainstream. Certainly he is once again proving that his
tactics diverge significantly from U.S. policy as well as our
hopes for Lebanon. End comment.

BEIRUT 00002093 003 OF 003


FELTMAN