MGLE01: INFORMATION ON SA'AD HARIRI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 07 BEIRUT 001915

SIPDIS

SIPDIS
NOFORN

DEPARTMENT FOR INR/I; NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/SINGH/WERNER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/09/2031
TAGS: PINR PGOV FR LE SA
SUBJECT: MGLE01: INFORMATION ON SA'AD HARIRI

REF: STATE 93004 (NOTAL)

Classified By: Jeffrey Feltman, Ambassador. Reason: Sections 1.4 (b)
and (d).


1. (C/NF) Reftel requested information on Member of
Parliament Sa'ad Hariri. Embassy Beirut's answers are keyed
to the questions as set forth in reftel.

HARIRI'S PERSONALITY
--------------


2. (C/NF) Hariri is open, engaged, generally warm and
friendly, and easily accessible (when he is in Beirut) to USG
officials. With his Georgetown University education and
fluent, colloquial English, he easily adopts an
American-style approach to visiting Americans (while
affecting a more "Saudi" demeanor to traditional Arab
visitors, or so we have been told). He is also prone to
quick anger, especially when facing criticism. When angry,
he tends to sulk and cut off discussions. He is particularly
sensitive to any whiff of patronizing attitudes on the part
of those whom he suspects of seeing him as inexperienced. We
note, however, that he often shifts course after hearing
criticism, suggesting to us that, whatever his initial
discomfort, he mulls over even those messages he does not
like.


3. (C/NF) His attention span is fairly short, with his mind
quickly digesting broad outlines of subjects and racing from
one topic to the next. It is rare for him to stay on one
topic for more than a few minutes at a time, and he often
engages in "multi-tasking" -- flipping through channels on a
flat screen TV (which, like so many Hariri possessions, is
supersized),clipping cigars, paging aides, all while keeping
track of the discussion at hand. Unlike his father, who
consistently mantained a poker face that masked his true
feelings, the younger Hariri is expressive. Like his father,
however, he exudes supreme self-confidence, often saying, in
reassuring tones, "Don't worry," when questioned about
tactics. Many accuse him of overconfidence, in fact, while
others (playing the game of amateur shrinks) argue that his
projection of supreme confidence is a mask for insecurity at
discovering himself in a political leadership position thrust
unexpectedly upon him.


4. (C/NF) We have noticed that Hariri becomes impatient in
particular when two general subjects are raised: first,
other prominent Sunni figures in Lebanon, and, second,
Christian perceptions of excessive Sunni/Hariri power and
ambitions. When we suggest, for example, that he have more
high-profile consultations with Tripoli MPs like Mohammed
Safadi or Mosbah al-Ahdab (two Sunnis who are allied with,
but not formally part of, Hariri's Future Movement),he is
dismissive. "I am the Sunni leader of Tripoli," he once told
us (although whether out of misguided conviction or out of
bluster we do not know) when we suggested that his neglect of
Tripoli's Sunnis might allow pro-Syrians to fill the vacuum
-- as seems now to be happening.


5. (C/NF) As for the Christian fears (also present during
his father's lifetime) that Hariri's stupendous wealth and
power allows him (or even compels him) to increase Sunni (or,
to quote paranoid Christians, "Saudi") power in Lebanon at
the Christians' expense, he accuses the Maronites of being
simultaneously demanding and paranoid. He dismisses, for
example, as exaggeration the many Christian complaints
(including from Maronite Patriarch Sfeir) about the high
ratio of recent Sunni appointments in the Internal Security
Forces. We learned more recently from first-hand experience
that Hariri also refuses to discuss the negative perception
left on the Christians and on UNIIIC Chief Serge Brammertz by
one of his closest advisors. We wonder if this indicates an
inability to look honestly at the quality of his inner
circle. If, as some of those amateur shrinks say, he is
insecure, perhaps this insecurity prevents him from asking
whether those loyal to him are really the most valuable
advisors he could pick.


6. (C/NF) We also note that rumors constantly circulate
about Saad's private life -- numerous mistresses, unseemly
drinking habits, rambunctious behavior, etc. Since his
assumption of a public role, we have seen no evidence in
Lebanon to confirm these "wild boy" stories. Samir Ja'ja'
once remarked to us with wonder that, besides non-alcoholic
beverages, Saad served only saki rice wine at a dinner he
attended in Qoreitem. We noted a particular impressive

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collection of Cheval Blanc vintages on the Hariri plane lent
to Siniora for the PM's March Washington visit. But, if Saad
is pursuing wine, women and song these days, he is doing so
extremely discreetly in Beirut or else confining such
extracurricular activities to his frequent foreign travels.
Saad tells us that he keeps his family in Saudi Arabia rather
than Lebanon for security reasons. (According to rumors, one
reason why Saad -- Rafiq's second son -- was given the
political mantle rather than Baha', the eldest, was because
Baha' had some personal issues that might have harmed his
political chances.)

HARIRI'S MANAGEMENT STYLE
--------------


7. (C/NF) In his discussions with us, Hariri tends to stick
to the big picture, focusing on regional strategies, broad
issues affecting Lebanon, etc. In keeping with his
self-perception as Lebanon's Sunni leader, he wants to be
seen, we believe, as someone engaged in "Big Think," leaving
the details to be filled in by others. When Fouad Siniora
was forming his cabinet in July 2005, for example, Hariri was
involved in the discussions of the policy statement of the
cabinet and the overall balance within the cabinet. He
believed strongly that Hizballah should be included for the
first time, as a means to nudge Hizballah toward becoming a
more normal politial party.


8. (C/NF) But we know from Siniora that Hariri (who had
only recently moved to Lebanon) did not get involved in the
selection of the names for the cabinet, letting Siniora work
out who would take what portfolio. While Siniora surely had
a good sense of where Hariri "red lines" might be, we know
that he in some cases made appointments that even then made
Hariri uncomfortable. Tariq Mitri's appointment as Minister
of Culture comes to mind: Hariri told us that he didn't
trust Mitri (whom he suspected -- since proven incorrectly --
as being a "closet Lahoudite") but did not veto Siniora's
choice.


9. (C/NF) Now, it appears that, the more familiar Hariri
becomes with the Lebanese scene, the more involved he is
becoming with the details as well as the broader picture, in
the same way his father could both think strategically and
manipulate the details to his political advantage. For
example, Hariri has suggested to us that he now regrets
permitting Siniora to appoint so many "technocrats"
(shorthand here for Minister of Finance Jihad Azour and
Minister of Economy and Trade Sami Haddad) rather than people
with useful political bases of their own. Certainly the
perception exists that people close to Hariri have obtained
his approval for a number of appointments within the civil
and security services. When we have a concern about a
particular appointment or government policy, we now play it
safe and try to explain our concerns to both Hariri (if he is
in town) and Siniora. We are convinced that it was Hariri
who finally pushed Siniora into accepting a slate of judges,
resisted by Siniora for weeks, for the Higher Judicial
Council.


10. (C/NF) Saad's democratic credentials have yet to be
proven, but nothing in his background would suggest that
democratic rough-and-tumble politics and power-sharing comes
naturally to him. His management style suggests that he is
much more comfortable with top-down decision-making. He does
not tend to be broadly inclusive of people or alternative
views. Perhaps reflecting his business background or his
Saudi connections, he prefers making deals in
cigar-smoke-filled rooms far from the public eye over
give-and-take consultations with his Lebanese electorate.


11. (C/NF) When Hariri meets with his own constituents, he
often tries to strike populist sentiments, but we do not see
much evidence of public opinion having much of an impact on
his views. He views himself as a leader and, indeed, the
"primus inter pares" among the other political figures in
Lebanon. He has a proclivity to expect deference, not
dissidence or debate. He postures as one who does not
cultivate public support as much as expect it as his natural
due.

STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES
--------------


12. (C/NF) Saad's position as the son of Rafiq Hariri
includes both strengths and weakness. As a strength, he
inherited an effective political and financial machine that

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is at his service. As demonstrated by the frequency of his
meetings with world leaders, he also has, because of his
father's connections and influence, many international
contacts that he can use in the service of Lebanon. In
addition, at least initially, he also enjoyed widespread
public sympathy and support in Lebanon, even beyond the Sunni
community, because of his father's assassination. It is
worth remembering that, twice, Saad pulled off what most
people described as impossible: first, in the final round of
Lebanon's 2005 legislative elections, Saad's personal
interventions in the north led to the March 14 movement's
total sweep of the seats; second, when Saad defied popular
expectations and used the Hariri machine to get perhaps half
a million Lebanese to gather on the one-year anniverasry of
his father's death. His success in these two events is due
to a combination of the strengths of his father's legacy as
well as impressive personal charisma as a public speaker.


13. (C/NF) But the inheritance from his father is also a
curse. Saad is not Rafiq. The expectations that he could
immediately assume the role of his father inevitably led to
disappointments. Saad does not have the local knowledge base
of his father, and, while astonishingly rich, he does not
have the same massive fortune: the Hariri money is now split
among six heirs (five siblings plus Saad's step-mother). In
just over a year since he entered public life, Hariri still
needs to find the right balance between using his father's
legacy and emerging as an independent political player in his
own right. We believe that his recent disenchantment with
Hizballah (after his flirtation with Nasrallah, with whom he
hoped to conclude some kind of deal on Emile Lahoud's
presidency, among other issues) shows a welcome maturity in
his political views. But he still puts, in our view, too
much emphasis on deals made among political leaders while
neglecting to cultivate needed public buy-in.

SAAD'S INNER CIRCLE AND ADVISORS
--------------


14. (C/NF) Like many rich and powerful people, Saad has
acquired an almost "royal court" around him, with loyal
retainers and opportunists filling the halls outside his
office. Few within this crowd dare to offerQst
assessments (nor would Saad solicit them). In terms of those
with whom he does share policy thinking, we believe that Saad
relies most closely on Salim Diab, Hani Hammoud, and Wissam
Hassan, with Ghattas Khoury on the outer fringes of the inner
circle. While jettisoning some of his father's advisors, he
inherited this circle from his father, although Hassan is
playing a more important role under Saad than under his
father:

-- Salim Diab: A wealthy Sunni businessman from Beirut, Diab
is unique among Saad's advisors in that he does not need to
rely on Hariri money or influence. He is the most
independent of Saad's circle, although we do not know whether
he uses this independence to share candid views or not. We
estimate that he is around 60 years old. Once an MP in Rafiq
Hariri's bloc, he chose not to run again in 2000. An
old-style political "fixer," he is deeply involved in local
political issues. He is often the one to decide who is
appointed or nominated to what local post, what services
should be extended to whom, etc. (Diab was in charge of the
olive oil distribution to the poor that got Rafiq Hariri in
trouble with the GOL only two days before he was
assassinated, when Syrian-appointed security chiefs accused
Hariri of trying to bribe potential voters through charity.)
We do not think Diab gets involved in broader strategic
thinking. Diab is one of the few of Beirut's upper-class
Sunnis who joined the Hariri political movement, which is
otherwise dominated by the Sunni "masses." Others of Diab's
class-fixated Sunni elite tend to look down their noses at
Rafiq Hariri's humble beginnings and hope to recapture the
role of Beirut's traditional Sunni elite at the expense of
the "arriviste" Hariri clan.

-- Hani Hammoud: Probably in his late 30s, Hani is
editor-in-chief of Mustaqbal (Future) newspaper, having taken
over Future when Rafiq Hariri fired his predecessor, Fadl
Chalaq (now head of the Council for Reconstruction and
Development and a reliable foe of Siniora). Smart and
excitable, Hani is the rabble-rouser of the Future political
movement, always pushing for more radical positions and in
favor of street action. Hani predicatably pushes for street
demonstrations and rallies as the solution to all ills.
Hariri turns to him for advice on Lebanese media and PR,
leaving the international press advisory role to the

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Washington-based Amal Mudalalli. (Hammoud and Mudalalli are
known to be wildly jealous of one another.) Hani probably
has more "face time" with Hariri than anyone else among the
advisors.

-- Wissam Hassan: Previously in charge of Rafiq Harri's
security detail (but absent from Hariri's side on the day of
his assassination -- leading to all sorts of conspiracy
theories),Hassan now advises Hariri on all security-related
matters, from how to mantain personal security to what
Lebanon's security policies and even procurement should be.
Hassan now heads a new up-and-coming intelligence bureau
inside the Internal Security Services. Hassan is distrusted,
even hated, by other Lebanese figures, including most March
14 Christian leaders as well as Walid Jumblatt, but Hariri --
who claims to have examined Hassan's background and loyality
with particular scrutiny -- is a stout defender of his
advisor.

-- Ghattas Khoury: Saad uses Khoury (a former MP from
Beirut on Hariri's list, who was "sacrified" in the 2005
elections in favor of Solange Gemayal) to convey messages to
Maronite Patriarch Sfeir, Druse leader Walid Jumblatt, and
this and other embassies. Saad has told us that he trusts
Ghattas' ability to deliver messages in both directions
accurately and without embellishment. Unlike the previous
three advisors, Ghattas is Christian, significant in the
Sunni-dominated Hariri circles. Ghattas claims to us that he
can speak candidly with Saad, but we have never heard him do
so in our presence. Saad may feel a certain obligation to
Ghattas, given that he was loyal to Rafiq yet removed by Saad
from elections Ghattas would have readily won. Ghattas
showed some independence even from Rafiq, when he defied the
elder Hariri's order to his parliamentary bloc to vote in
favor of Emile Lahoud's presidential extension. As another
example of Saad having allowed Siniora to -- largely -- pick
his own cabinet in July 2005, Ghattas expected to be rewarded
with a ministerial portfolio after he withdrew from the
legislative elections at Saad's request. Saad asked Siniora
to consider Ghattas but did not push when Siniora did not
include him.


15. (C/NF) To the distress of some of his more
confessionally-focused Sunni followers, Saad also surrounds
himself during his travels with Shia MP (from the Hariri
bloc) Bassam Saba' and Deputy Parliament Speaker (and Greek
Orthodox) Farid Mekkari. For weeks earlier this year,
Mekkari even cited an unknown security threat to justify
moving into the Hariri's Qoreitem residence. But, as neither
of these figures has much influence within their own
communities, we get the sense that they serve more as amusing
company and "yes-men" than as candid advisors. Saad also
seems to take the views of Minister of Telecommunications
Marwan Hamadeh (a Druse MP from Jumblatt's bloc) seriously,
although we note that he uses Khoury, not Hamadeh, to
communicate with Jumblatt.


16. (C/NF) One mystery for us is the extent of the
influence of the Paris-based Nazek Hariri, Rafiq's widow and
Saad's stepmother, on Saad. People tell us that Nazek and
Saad eye each other suspiciously, yet Nazek potentially could
use the power of the purse over Hariri charities she controls
to influence Saad. (Nazek is also widely believed to be the
keeper of Hariri family grudges, always looking to get even
with those she believed slighted her late husband.) We do
not believe that elder brother Baha' has much influence on
Saad, and the other siblings (Fahd, Eyman, and Hind) are not
playing a political role.


17. (C/NF) What is also interesting is who Hariri does not
rely on: The two advisors closest to his father were Fouad
Siniora and former Minister of Justice Bahej Tabbarah.
Hariri does not seem to rely on Siniora for advice (see
below). Tabbarah remains influential through Nazek, but --
unlike during Rafiq's lifetime -- he is no longer part of the
circle of advisors and syncophants at the Hariri household.
Tabbarah seems to have no independent relationship with Saad.

RELATIONS WITH THE PRIME MINISTER, OTHERS
--------------


18. (C/NF) The Hariri-Siniora relationship is currently a
troubled one, although both men vow to fix it. (We do not
know yet whether a 6/10 one-on-one lunch, brokered by various
intermediaries, "fixed" the relationship or not.) The
problem seems to be one of pride: Siniora bristles under the
perception that Saad views him as a hired hand, and Saad

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perceives that Siniora treats him as a little boy. Other
leaders in the National Dialogue have told us that they
cringe when Saad addresses Siniora around the table, using
what they describe as a patronizing tone and theatrically
correcting himself in addressing Siniora -- "Fouad, oh, I
mean (laughing),'Mr. Prime Minister.'"


19. (C/NF) From a close partnership in the period
immediately following Rafiq Hariri's death (when Siniora more
than anyone seemed to guide Saad through those initial
terrible weeks of condolences and political consolidation),
Hariri and Siniora now seem to share mutual antipathy. This
seems based on style and personalities more than substance.
Siniora tends to micro-manage and plods methodically (and
often painfully slowly) through issues, mastering details
along the way. Siniora is extremely cautious but, once he
makes up his mind, stubborn. Hariri is impatient, desirous
of action, and does not understand why Siniora does not
simply follow orders. Whereas Siniora often adopts a
conciliatory approach, Hariri chooses confrontation. (Both
approaches, of course, have their place, and Siniora and
Hariri strike us as equally bad in choosing which path to
pursue when.)


20. (C/NF) While Saad vigorously denies it, most people
believe that Saad is jealous of the international attention
and respect given to Siniora. As Siniora is despised by
Rafiq's widow Nazek (who finds Siniora's wife particularly
unbearable and allegedly screamed when she heard Siniora was
taking his wife with him to Washington in March),Nazek may
also have poisoned Saad's view of Siniora or at least fanned
the flames of resentment in his mind.


21. (C/NF) As for Walid Jumblatt, Saad has always expressed
deep respect to us regarding Jumblatt, even when the Druse
leader was making statements about Hizballah and Syria that
Saad dared not repeat and thought were unwise. We get the
sense that Hariri views Jumblatt as a legitimate and valuable
partner. While some Lebanese claim that Saad defers to
Jumblatt as the more senior politician, we think it would be
uncharacteristic of Saad to see Jumblatt (or any other
Lebanese figure) as his superior. Jumblatt recently revealed
to us an interesting dimension of his relationship with the
Hariris: apparently, for years, Rafiq Hariri provided
Jumblatt with USD 250,000 monthly to consolidate his
political position among the Druse. Saad has not provided
any financial support to Jumblatt since the May-June 2005
legislative elections.


22. (C/NF) As for Ja'ja', Saad seems to have almost wistful
hopes that Ja'ja were more popular among the Christians. We
guess that he would like to have a tidy troika -- Saad,
Jumblatt, Ja'ja' -- in which decisions for the March 14
movement could be made swiftly and safely out of public view
and away from criticism. While Saad has indicated an earlier
falling-out between Nassib Lahoud and his father, Saad now
claims (sincerely, we believe) to support Nassib Lahoud's
presidential ambitions. He expresses impatience with Boutros
Harb and Nayla Mouawad, seeing them as "too Christian" to be
good for Lebanon (although we are certain he would back
either for president, if he was assured Lahoud was on his way
out).


23. (C/NF) We believe that Michel Aoun is the Lebanese
politician Saad Hariri most detests. The bad feelings are
mutual. Even when there are tactical issues on which they
share interest, Aoun and Hariri stubbornly refuse to
contemplate working with each other, with each accusing the
other of the original sin that prevents any possibility of
cooperation. Saad occasionally sends Ghattas Khoury to meet
with Aoun, but, as Ghattas tells us, these are pro-forma
meetings, devoid of substance. We believe that the bad blood
extends at least back to May 7, 2005, the day of Aoun's
return to Lebanon after his 15-year exile: Avoiding the
topics of Syria and Rafiq Hariri's assassination altogether,
Aoun used the occasion of his first speech in Martyrs' Square
to denounce "financial politics" (a universally understood
reference to Hariri) and "feudal politics" (a swipe at
Jumblatt).


24. (C/NF) Hariri has been convinced ever since that Aoun
was sent back to Lebanon by the Syrians to divide the March
14 movement, and he is convinced that Aoun is a witting
accomplice in the current pro-Syrian resurgence. For his
part, Aoun seems to resent that Hariri's refusal to recognize
Aoun as the head of the pro-independence movement or to
support Aoun's presidential aspirations. The March 14

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Christians who are allied with Hariri, of course, are most
threatened by Aoun's popularity (especially when the
presidency is discussed). It is a safe bet that they feed
Hariri stories about Aoun that fuel the antipathy.

HARIRI'S VIEWS OF HIZBALLAH
--------------


25. (C/NF) Hariri is proud of, and loyal to, his Sunni
heritage, to the point of being slightly, but unconsciously,
prejudiced against those of other confessions (During a
chance meeting with one of our political FSNs, an aide
whispered to Hariri that the FSN was trustworthy because
"he's one of us," i.e. a Beirut Sunni.) Even if they share
Lebanese citizenship, he sees Lebanon's Shia as something
altogether different, and potentially even threatening. We
believe that, above all, his relations with Lebanon's Shia
leaders are governed by his desire to manage Shia-Sunni
tensions in ways to avoid open conflict where the Sunni would
surely lose out to the better-armed Shia. This fear of
Shia-Sunni conflict is at the heart of why Hariri tends to
use a softer tone when discussing Hizballah publicly than he
uses regarding other topics.


26. (C/NF) Hariri had an electoral alliance with Hizballah
for the 2005 legislative elections in the Beirut and West
Biqa' districts (similar to Jumblatt's electoral alliance
with Hizballah for the Baabda-Aley district and Aoun's with
Hizballah for Zahle). But this alliance has since
evaporated, with Hariri expressing disgust over some recent
Hizballah tactics (such as Hizballah demonstrators on May 10
and June 1 chanting anti-Rafiq slogans). Based on comments
Hariri has made to us and others, it seems that he now knows
not to trust Nasrallah or Hizballah. He expressed particular
outrage to us about what he saw as a Hizballah about-face in
the National Dialogue, when Nasrallah tried to revisit and
water down the requests the National Dialogue forwarded to
Damascus. We have heard from several sources that Hariri had
to intervene personally via overseas telephone calls to keep
the guards around his father's tomb from firing at Shia
demonstrators on June 1 who were chanting insults about Rafiq
from just outside the tomb area.


27. (C/NF) While he publicly gives verbal support to the
"resistance" much more than we like, our guess is that he is
pursuing expediency, not principle. Consistent with his
deal-making-behind-closed-doors tendencies, Hariri still
meets periodically with Nasrallah, often for hours at a time.
His March 14 allies look askance at these Hariri-Nasrallah
encounters, as they fret that the less experienced Hariri
will be outfoxed by Nasrallah. (People who see Nasrallah
tell us that Nasrallah finds Hariri naive in these lengthy
sessions.) Hariri seems to be looking for acceptable working
arrangements with Hizballah rather than any broad strategic
alliance. Our conclusion is that Hariri hates Hizballah for
a variety of reasons -- pro-Syrian allegiances, possible
complicity in assassinations such as his father's, ties to
Iran, threats to Sunni predominance, etc. -- but feels he has
has no choice but to work with Hizballah for the time being.
Regional developments and growing Sunni-Shia tensions in the
Gulf reinforce his basic distrust of Hizballah.

SAUDI AND FRENCH INFLUENCE
--------------


28. (C/NF) Saudi Ambassador to Lebanon Abdelaziz Khoja
claims that the Saudi royal family has a sentimental
attachment to Saad out of deference to the memory of Rafiq
but that Saudi Arabia's political influence is now, by
design, more limited than it was when Rafiq was alive. We
question this statement. A major part of the Hariri fortune
remains based in Saudi Arabia, giving Saudi Arabia
considerable financial leverage over Saad. (A persistent
rumor circulates in Beirut that Saudi Arabia is paying Hariri
at a most leisurely pace for millions of dollars of services
rendered, in order to keep Hariri a bit financially squeezed
and thus susceptible to Saudi influence.) Earlier this year,
when Hariri publicly criticized the so-called "Saudi
initiative" to calm Syrian-Lebanese relations (through steps
that even a casual reader could see clearly favored Syria),
the Saudi royal family was reportedly deeply annoyed.


29. (C/NF) We do not know for certain who in Saudi royal
family is closest to Saad, and we defer to any information
Embassy Riyadh might have. We note, however, that Walid
Jumblatt and Marwan Hamadeh frequently refer to Saad's
relations with Abdulaziz bin Fahd. Jumblatt has also

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mentioned friendship between Saad and Prince Bandar (perhaps
dating from Saad's Georgetown days, when Bandar was the KSA's
ambassador in Washington) and a "Prince Mukram.


30. (C/NF) As for France, the real French-Lebanese axis
bypasses Saad, running instead through the phone line between
Nazek Hariri and Jacques Chirac. French Ambassador Emie has
told us that Nazek and Chirac often talk multiple times a
day. Given Nazek's hatred for Siniora, this probably acrues
to Saad's benefit by default. Certainly Saad has unusual
access to Chirac, visiting the French President twice in as
many weeks. While we have no evidence one way or another, we
note the persistence of the rumors that Chirac has benefitted
from Hariri money. We know of one recent example where the
limits of Chirac's influence were clear: two weeks ago,
Chirac told Hariri not to return to Lebanon for his own
safety. Hariri chose to ignore that advice in favor of
returning for the National Dialogue and addressing the
deteriorating relationship with Siniora.

U.S. INFLUENCE WITH HARIRI
--------------


31. (C/NF) Hariri listens to us, but it is hard to predict
when he is swayed by our arguments. It is clear, however,
from two examples that he wishes to avoid our public
criticism. After listening to our description of how we
would react to him publicly meeting with Nasrallah and
traveling to Iran (two appallingly bad decisions he said he
had already made),he backtracked, so far doing neither. He
has not, however, dropped his verbal support for the
"resistance," despite our repeated requests, nor has he
accepted our suggestion that he treat Siniora more like a
partner than a hired hand.


32. (C/NF) When we have an important message for him, we
try whenever possible to combine our messages with those of
Frennch Ambassador Emie and, depending the issue, others
(Geir Pedersen from the UN, the Saudi and Egyptian
Ambassadors, etc.). Soon after the 2005 legislative
elections, for example, when Saad had zeroed in on two
potential PM candidates -- Siniora and Tabbarah -- Emie and
the Ambassador both explained why Siniora would probably be
the better choice. While we can predict that Nazek was
pushing in exactly the opposite direction, we do not know
whether our interventions were decisive in Saad's
decision-making process or not.

HARIRI'S SECURITY DETAIL
--------------


33. (C/NF) Hariri does not share details of his security
arrangements with us, nor have we pressed him to do so. From
what we can see from casual observation, he (like all of us
here) utilizes a variety of tools: layers of perimeter
security that include checkpoints, bomb dogs, surveillance
detection, etc.; reliance on surprise and multiple motorcades
for movements; "decoy" meetings set up only to be cancelled
later; etc. Both GOL and Hariri-provided security in the
Qoreitem neighborhood where Hariri's house is located is far
heavier today than in Rafiq Hariri's lifetime. The streets
directly in front and behind the house are now closed to
through traffic.
FELTMAN