MGLE01: PM SINIORA UPBEAT ON ELECTORAL REFORM AND

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 001902

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/WERNER/SINGH

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/12/2016
TAGS: IS KDEM LE PGOV PREL SY
SUBJECT: MGLE01: PM SINIORA UPBEAT ON ELECTORAL REFORM AND
CONTINUED POLITICAL PROGRESS


Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey Feltman. Reason: Section 1.4 (b).

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) PM Siniora is optimistic that Lebanon's draft
electoral law will survive intact upcoming debates in the
Cabinet and Parliament. Although the size of the electoral
districts could be a sticking point with several
constituencies, Siniora believes the overall beneficial
impact of a new electoral law (and a fundamental desire to
replace the flawed 2000 Electoral Law) will produce
sufficient support for its passage. Concerning his two
principal adversaries, Michel Aoun and Hassan Nasrallah, the
Prime Minister believes both figures have suffered loss of
support among Lebanon's moderates due to recent missteps. In
particular, Siniora stated his opinion that Aoun has
consistently misread popular sentiment and is now stumbling
badly. Siniora maintained that despite the efforts of the
March 8 alliance (Hizballah, Amal, Free Patriotic Movement)
to undermine his government, both political and economic
reforms are steadily advancing. End summary.


2. (C) PM Fouad Siniora received the Ambassador and poloff
at his offices in the Grand Serail on June 9. His senior
advisor, former Ambassador Mohammed Chattah, and his
assistant, Rola Nourradine, also attended the meeting.
Siniora was noticeably upbeat about recent political
developments and projected considerable confidence regarding
future prospects, particularly with what he perceived as a
perceptible loss of power by his political nemesis, Hassan
Nasrallah.

ELECTORAL LAW
--------------


3. (C) Prime Minister Siniora acknowledged that the
emphasis on smaller electoral districts in the draft law is a
concern to Saad Hariri's Future Movement because it will
probably reduce the ruling party's majority in Parliament.
But Siniora said dispassionate analysis also indicates that
all of the major political blocs will lose delegates,
including Hizballah and Michel Aoun's Free Patriotic Movement
(FPM). But as long as the projected losses are minor and do
not change the relative distribution of power, Siniora
believes the other broadly popular features of the draft --
overseas voting, lowered voting age, equitable financing and
media rules, more "genuine" confessional representation --
will persuade Lebanon's political elite to endorse its
adoption.


4. (C) In Siniora's opinion, the fact that the draft law
was written by a professional commission with broad
confessional representation, makes it somewhat impervious to
sectarian criticism. Siniora admitted the law's complexity
(with a combination of small "qada" districts and
proportional representation in larger "muhafaza" districts)
is off-putting to many (including Maronite Patriarch Sfeir).
But if the law is given a reasonable hearing in Parliament,
he believes the advantages of the proposed system will become
apparent.


5. (C) Another argument in the law's favor, according to
Siniora, is that the only real alternative to the draft law
is for Lebanon to remain with the flawed existing statute,
which was implemented under Syrian guidance in 2000 and is
universally recognized as incompatible with the country's
political aspirations. Siniora stated that everyone across
the political spectrum understands that the hard-fought
achievements of the electoral law reform commission are
unlikely to be repeated if the draft is rejected outright.


6. (C) The Prime Minister observed that there will always
be criticism of any electoral proposal, because Lebanon is
constantly trying to reconcile the fact that while the law
says Christian-Muslim political power will be a 50-50
proportion, the reality is that only about 38 percent of the
population is now Christian. At the end of the day, he
concluded, both groups have to compromise.

MISSTEPS BY BOTH AOUN AND NASRALLAH
--------------


7. (C) Commenting on the June 8 session of the ongoing
National Dialogue, PM Siniora said that because no one wishes
to be the person to end it, the process will probably
continue beyond its next scheduled meeting on June 28.

BEIRUT 00001902 002 OF 003


Siniora said he thought the March 14 response to Hizballah's
earlier presentation of its defense strategy was
"appropriate." He said that prior to the meeting, the March
14 alliance decided "not to push Hizballah hard and produce
the stubbornness that develops when they are cornered."
(Comment: Marwan Hamadeh told us separately that March 14
took this relatively low-key approach because of fear that
confessional tensions, after the June 1 Shia demonstrations,
were to the point of breaking out into renewed civil war.
End comment.)


8. (C) In Siniora's view, Hizballah was already on the
defensive as a result of the chaotic hostilities along the
Blue Line on May 28 and the similar lack of control exhibited
in the street demonstrations of June 1. Siniora said that
Hassan Nasrallah doesn't like to be seen as reactive and
Hizballah as undisciplined, because he realizes those
perceptions greatly increase non-Shia anxiety toward the
organization. Although Hizballah continues to have
near-monopolistic support in the Shia community, Siniora
believes the organization's miscues are mounting and have
definitely eroded its prior widespread support among
Lebanon's larger body politic. He implied that Hizballah was
painting itself into the corner, and this outcome has always
the goal of the March 14 alliance.


9. (C) Likewise, Siniora felt that Michel Aoun, who only a
few weeks earlier had been calling loudly for the resignation
of the government and new elections, had committed mistakes
that were slowly, but steadily, eroding his influence in the
Christian community. Dating back to the FPM/Hizballah joint
communique of February 6 and the labor demonstrations of May
14, Siniora said the Aounists had created the public
perception that there was little political space between the
FPM and Hizballah. (Note: This stance was reinforced on
June 11 when the FPM was highly visible at the launch of
Sulieman Franjiyah's pro-Syrian Marada party in Zgharta. End
note.)


10. (C) The Prime Minister remarked that Aoun, in his
political arrogance, didn't realize that many of his
anti-government strategies could also be viewed as
anti-reform, and eventually result in some loss of his
community's support. But recent polling seems to have shaken
Aoun, and one consequence, in Siniora's opinion, had been a
series of "increasingly stupid" Aoun proposals. These
included: that Aoun should travel to Damascus with Siniora,
that the UNSC should pass a resolution rejecting settlement
of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, and that a "national
determination" be enunciated on Lebanon's status with Israel.
Siniora stated that Aoun is desperately trying to re-seize
the initiative and recoup his evaporating support.

EMPHASIZING NATION BUILDING
--------------


11. (C) Instead of needlessly antagonizing Hizballah,
Siniora suggested that March 14 wisely took the high road in
the June 8 national dialogue session, and emphasized nation
building. He assured the Ambassador that the pro-reform
alliance had answered Hizballah point-for-point with regard
to defense strategy, but did so in such a way that Hizballah
will be hard pressed to argue against the March 14 message,
because it would in effect be arguing against Lebanon as a
sovereign state.


12. (C) "Nasrallah definitely wants to go back to the
mountain top," commented Siniora, alluding to the Shia
leader's previous status as the unassailable personification
of the "resistance." But the Prime Minister said that
Nasrallah's participation in the dialogue as simply one of
several leaders, as well as his organization's seeming lack
of discipline in recent events, had made that wish improbable.


13. (C) Overall, PM Siniora indicated the March 14 alliance
was in a better political position than it had been for
several months. He informed the Ambassador that his
government was gradually, but surely, pushing through
appointments and measures that would create an ever more
stable foundation for reform.

KOFI ANNAN'S LETTER
--------------


14. (C) Siniora conveyed satisfaction with the letter from
Kofi Annan that recommended a bilateral delineation of the
Syrian-Lebanese border as a prelude to a resolution of the

BEIRUT 00001902 003 OF 003


Shebaa Farms question. He indicated it was one more tool
with which to prod the Syrian regime into matching its words
with action. Siniora said he would be discussing the letter
with all of Lebanon's political blocs, employing it
extensively in media interviews, as well as sending it to the
Syrian government to prompt a response. Siniora clearly
appreciated this additional piece of international leverage
with which to deal with Bashar al-Asad's regime.

REACTION TO U.S. BUSINESS DELEGATION
--------------


15. (SBU) When cautioned that a private U.S. business
delegation (Business Executives for National Security)
intended to visit Damascus next week and meet with Bashar
al-Asad -- and that the delegation had no USG connection --
Siniora had little reaction. He said he appreciated the
advance warning and the fact that private delegations were
merely that. Siniora did ask if there might be some way to
take advantage of the delegation's visit, perhaps to deliver
a message, but on second thought essentially set the idea
aside. He asked to be notified if the visit were canceled.

FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION RE-EMPHASIZED
--------------


16. (SBU) PM Siniora unequivocally stated that freedom of
expression was and will remain a basic tenet of Lebanon's
democracy. He said that discussion of a recommendation from
the Higher Media Council to penalize the Lebanese
Broadcasting Corporation for the broadcast of a program
satirizing Hizballah's Hassan Nasrallah was discussed in the
Cabinet on June 8, but the recommendation was dismissed.
Siniora did say that the Cabinet chastised the station for
needless provocation, but had also taken Hizballah to task
for the senseless street demonstrations that followed the
broadcast. Siniora expressed hope that all Lebanon's
political parties might observe a more moderate tone in their
criticisms, but that criticism itself was an essential right.

COMMENT
--------------


17. (C) We hope that Siniora's optimism about overcoming
reluctance to the electoral law is not misplaced. Our
impression is that Saad Hariri, focused on what he sees as
disadvantageous electoral districts, will oppose it, despite
what his Prime Minister says. Hariri and Siniora had a
one-on-one luncheon on 6/10 (the day after the Ambassador's
meeting with Siniora),and both are mum about what was
discussed. But we expect that the election law draft was
among the topics, as was the subsequent announcement that the
Higher Judicial Council has at last been appointed. In the
matter of the Judicial Council, Saad's perspective -- to
accept the nominations of Minister of Justice Charles Rizk --
prevailed over Siniora's position, which was to accept a list
of nominees assembled by judges themselves.
FELTMAN