Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06BEIRUT1870
2006-06-09 15:11:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Beirut
Cable title:  

MGLE01: NATIONAL DIALOGUE DISCUSSIONS REVEAL

Tags:  KDEM PGOV PINS KISL PTER KPAL LE SY 
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DE RUEHLB #1870/01 1601511
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O 091511Z JUN 06
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3972
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIRUT 001870 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NSC FOR ABRAMS/WERNER/DORAN/SINGH

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/09/2016
TAGS: KDEM PGOV PINS KISL PTER KPAL LE SY
SUBJECT: MGLE01: NATIONAL DIALOGUE DISCUSSIONS REVEAL
PRO/ANTI-STATE DIVISIONS


Classified By: Jeffrey Feltman, Ambassador. Reason: Section 1.4 (b).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIRUT 001870

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NSC FOR ABRAMS/WERNER/DORAN/SINGH

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/09/2016
TAGS: KDEM PGOV PINS KISL PTER KPAL LE SY
SUBJECT: MGLE01: NATIONAL DIALOGUE DISCUSSIONS REVEAL
PRO/ANTI-STATE DIVISIONS


Classified By: Jeffrey Feltman, Ambassador. Reason: Section 1.4 (b).


1. (C) On June 8, the Lebanese national dialogue
reconvened. Two important events hung over the discussions
of this round: 1) the Blue Line incidents of May 28 in which
Hizballah positions were destroyed by Israeli air strikes,
and 2) the June 1 riot that followed the television spoofing
of Hizballah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah. The first
order of business for the dialoge meeting had been a response
to the national defense strategy as presented by Hizballah's
Hassan Nasrallah at the previous dialogue session. Post had
already received a copy of a written response to Nasrallah
worked out by the March 14 movement, as well as a verbal take
on Michel Aoun's strategy for the meeting. The discussions
inside the dialogue revealed a clear division between those
who sought a strong, sovereign Lebanon, and those allied to
Hizballah's vision of a state within the state.

THE MARCH 14 RESPONSE TO NASRALLAH
RESPECT THE STATE
--------------


2. (C) Walid Jumblatt and Samir Ja'ja' took the lead for
the March 14 coalition in responding to Nasrallah's Hizballah
defense strategy. Jumblatt and Ja'ja' had collaborated on a
paper that outlined their basic principles. When Ja'ja' took
the floor, he spoke more of the technical aspects of the
defense strategy, outlining how the Lebanese Armed Forces
(LAF) might be better equipped to protect Lebanon from
Israeli aggression. Ja'ja' also proposed an increase in the
number of UN troops along the Blue Line.


3. (C) Hizballah presented technical objections to Ja'ja's
proposals without accepting his chief argument that defense
was the responsibility of state institutions. Instead,
Nasrallah attempted to pick apart the details of the March 14
presentation. During this exchange, Michel Aoun, former
commander of the LAF, and the only professional military

person in the room, remained silent. When challenged by
March 14 to make some comment, he said, "I am not here as a
soldier but as an advocate."

AOUN AIMING AT THE GOVERNMENT
AND MISSING ALL ELSE
--------------


4. (C) Michel Aoun participated in the national dialogue
session, but during the defense discussion, he refused to
speak to technical issues. Instead, he proposed that the
dialogue resolve the political problems that give rise to a
need for resistance. He said Lebanon must decide on how to
proceed with its relationship with Israel. The former
general said that if Lebanon were still at war with Israel,
the response to Nasrallah would be different than it would be
if they all accepted a truce with Israeli.


5. (C) Aoun spoke on the issue of the Palestinians as well.
According to Aoun advisor Gebran Basile, Aoun criticized the
government for not disarming Palestinians outside of the
refugee camps, as previously agreed. Aoun said that the
national dialogue had empowered the GOL to disarm the
Palestinians and to discuss the border with Syria. Neither
of those projects has been started. In response, Aoun
proposed that the national dialogue create an ad hoc
committee to travel to Damascus to open discussions with
Syria on national sovereignty issues. The committee would
comprise members of the March 14 Coalition, the
Hizballah-Amal alliance, and Aoun's own Free Patriotic
Movement. Aoun's people told us that this idea met with
broad resistance. March 14 Minister Marwan Hamade described,
in a conversation with the Ambassador, Aoun's proposed
delegation as, "...like sending chained slaves to Damascus."


6. (C) The resettlement of Palestinians in Lebanon was also
a matter of concern for Aoun. He proposed that the GOL
request a UNSC resolution declaring that no Palestinian
refugees would be settled on Lebanese soil. Aoun saw this as
the natural follow-up to other resolutions with speak to the
future of Palestinians in the region. His aide Basile said,
"the right of return is protected, but what about those who
did not want to return?" The dialogue also rejected this
idea. Aoun, at the end of the session, was bitter at the
flat rejection of what he still considers good ideas.

THE MARCH 14 GROUP:
THE STATE ABOVE THE RESISTANCE
--------------

BEIRUT 00001870 002 OF 002




7. (SBU) The Jumblatt-Ja'ja' paper was a statement of
principles framed around the idea that the resistance could
and should be replaced by the Lebanese state. Rather than
challenge Nasrallah on the value of the resistance, or the
technical details of defense strategy, the March 14 coalition
laid out, for the first time, a philosophy for the future
development of the country. The document declares: 1)
Israel is the enemy; 2) the resistance was of value to the
country and the people of the south suffered
disproportionately under Israeli occupation; and 3) given the
present political realities, the state should have exclusive
control over the defense of the nation.


8. (SBU) Jumblatt followed up with a reported political
declaration that the state and its institutions must be built
up as the decisive authority for the entire country. The
building up of the state was quickly endorsed by other March
14 dialogue participants: Ghassan Tueni, Boutros Harb, Amine
Gemayel, and Saad Hariri. This response was perhaps the most
significant aspect of the dialogue session: March 14 put
forth a clear vision of a single authoritative state, with an
uncontestable dividing line that separates the March 14 group
from those, led by Hizballah, who either favor or at a
minimum condone the concept of a state within a state.

FELTMAN