MGLE01: MICHEL AOUN -- STILL NOT READY TO TAKE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 001811

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NSC FOR WERNER/ABRAMS/DORAN/SINGH

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/08/2016
TAGS: KDEM KISL PTER KPAL PGOV LE SY
SUBJECT: MGLE01: MICHEL AOUN -- STILL NOT READY TO TAKE
THE MORAL HIGH GROUND

SUMMARY
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1. (C) In a meeting with Ambassador and PolChief, Michel
Aoun fended off attempts to nudge him back into the
mainstream of Lebanon's political life. We told Aoun that
the Lebanese may be ready to accept a leader with strong
moral authority who is neither March 14/Hariri, nor March
8/Hizballah-Syria. The Ambassador told Aoun that his
reputation and his record of resistance to Syria can serve
him as a means to attract support from Lebanese dissatisfied
with the present government, but frightened of the pro-Syrian
politicians with whom Aoun has surrounded himself. Aoun,
steadfast in his defense of his Hizballah pact, blamed the
Siniora government and its campaign against him for his
radical, anti-Hariri stances. The Ambassador suggested to
Aoun that it would be a good outcome if Hassan Nasrallah left
the June 8 dialogue session feeling isolated in the face of
real unity between March 14 and Aoun. The meeting with Aoun
took place just five days after Shia crowds rioted in Beirut
protesting a television lampooning of Nasrallah, and a week
after Hizballah and Israel exchanged fire along the Blue
Line. End summary.

AOUN AND HIZBALLAH--A JUSTIFIED ASSOCIATION
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2. (C) The Ambassador and PolChief traveled to Aoun's home
to discuss the June 8 resumption of the National Dialogue and
to get a sense of how Aoun saw his agreement with Hizballah
in light of recent Hizballah-inspired violence across the
Blue Line and in Beirut. Aoun was prepared to defend his
agreement with Hizballah, but not the violence that erupted
on June 1 in Beirut. He said that Lebanese are highly
politicized, and react emotionally to political topics. He
personally did not accept the idea that political criticism
should lead to violence. Aoun smiled and said he has
frequently been the subject of lampooning, and even
mean-spirited attacks. He turned to his son-in-law cum
advisor, Gebran Basile, and said Basile had been subjected to
libelous personal attacks. Of his own press image, Aoun
smiled and said, "They say I am crazy; I should be
institutionalized, and I throw ashtrays at my deputies. But
this is politics." The Ambassador asked Aoun about his own
much-publicized comments about "burning Future (Hariri) TV."
Laughing, Aoun said, "they deserve it!" But Aoun said that
he had made that comment to show how reasonable he is: while
Future TV should be burned for what was said about Aoun, Aoun
did not unleash his supporters to do so.


3. (C) The Shia had a different, more volatile political
culture that did not allow for a sense of humor to touch
religious figures. Hizballah acted to contain a spontaneous
show of force, preventing damage rather than causing any.
However, Nasrallah had agreed to put the matter behind him,
saying the television producer was blameless. The Shia also
agreed to pay reparations for any damages done. According to
Aoun, it is the Siniora government that is blowing the June 1
events out of proportion. The government is creating an
atmosphere of tension that lends itself to confrontation and
distrust.

AOUN AND THE PRO-SYRIANS
--THE COMPANY HE KEEPS
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4. (C) The Ambassador asked Aoun how a man of his
reputation could countenance having political allies like
Hizballah, Omar Karame, Suleiman Franjieh and other
pro-Syrian figures. Aoun said he did not agree with all the
things done by his allies. He objected that the pro-Syrian
label is often unjustly placed on those who are simply
anti-Hariri. Aoun cited scores of occasions when the
Hariri-controlled press stamped him pro-Syrian as a form of
character assassination. But, he countered, he is
transparent in his dealings with Hizballah and others.
Anyone can see what he is doing and ask him why he is doing
it. But the government and the parliamentary majority carry
out their activities behind a veil. Discussions between
Nasrallah and Hariri were not made public as were his own
discussions with Nasrallah. Aoun claimed that his
transparency has allowed him to bring Nasrallah closer to the
people, and has alleviated the fears of many Christians.


5. (C) The Ambassador encouraged Aoun to look to the
political center for his support base. He explained that the
choices for the Lebanese have become so polarized that an

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important group finds itself unable to move toward Hariri or
Aoun. Aoun, without his questionable allies, has a natural
connection with many centrists inside and outside of March

14. These people would make useful allies.


6. (C) The Ambassador asked Aoun if any members of March
14, especially Jumblatt, had approached him to cooperate.
Aoun replied that Jumblatt's associate, and Minister for
Information, Ghazi Aridi had called Aoun asking for a
face-to-face meeting. The Ambassador explained that the USG
foresees continued political inertia while Emile Lahoud
completes the remaining 18 months of his extended mandate.
In order to facilitate change, Aoun could serve as a natural
ally for forces stuck between the ineffective government and
the intimidating pro-Syrian alliance. These forces might not
oppose an Aounist presence in a new, reorganized cabinet.
Aoun said he took part in the negotiations that formed the
Siniora governmeQand yet he was rewarded with nothing. The
Hariri majority brought Hizballah and Amal into the cabinet,
and still he is accused of being pro-Syrian.

AOUN AND THE DIALOGUE:
PRINCIPLE NOT DETAILS
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7. (C) Aoun said that he will not be addressing what he
called technical details during the upcoming session of the
national dialogue. Instead, he will look for statemenQof
principle covering the use of Hizballah's weapons exclusively
for national defense. He will press to have action on the
issue of Palestinian arms outside of the refugee camps. Aoun
said that the broad public consensus on Palestinian arms
should push the government to act. But there has still been
no action.


8. (C) The Ambassador suggested it might be useful for Aoun
and March 14 to wrest from Nasrallah an agreement that
Hizballah's weapons were not to be used in regional conflicts
against Israel or to aid Iran. Nasrallah has made public
statements to this effect, but a written agreement would be
useful to state clearly that Hizballah is Lebanese, and not
an Iranian agent. the Ambassador warned Aoun that the USG
believes Nasrallah will block any attempt to address the
Palestinian issue. He suggested that Aoun and the forces of
March 14 might use this consensus issue to unite, and with
that, scotch Nasrallah's efforts to obstruct progress. Unity
between March 14 and Aoun would leave Nasrallah feeling
justifiably isolated, and more willing to negotiate. Aoun
replied with a mute, impassive nod.

COMMENT--AOUN FIRM, PARTY DEPUTIES
WILLING TO TRY RECONCILIATION
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9. (C) Aoun is still too angry with his exclusion from the
cabinet last year to seek opportunities to come together with
March 14. As the Ambassador and Poloff left Aoun's
residence, the motorcade of Suleiman Franjieh pulled up on
what we believe is a rare visit to Beirut. Franjieh plans to
announce soon the creation of his own political party
dedicated to close relations with Syria and an end to the
Siniora government.


10. (C) Immediately following the June 6 meeting with Aoun,
the Ambassador and poloff met with Free Patriotic Movement
(FPM) deputies Farid el-Khazen and Ghassan Moukhaiber, both
of whom are used by Aoun as intermediaries with Lebanon's
various political factions. The Ambassador made a
presentation similar to the one addressed to Aoun, namely,
that the FPM should reposition itself as an alternative to
the March 14 bloc and the Amal/Hizballah alliance but one
based on principles shared with March 14 ideals. But both
el-Khazen and Moukhaiber insisted that Hariri and Siniora
continued to reject any overtures from the FPM. MP
Moukhaiber admitted that certain avenues of communication
(and possible cooperation) had been gradually developing --
specifically, between Aoun and Walid Jumblatt -- but more
contacts were necessary to rebuild trust.


11. (C) Addressing the upcoming national dialogue,
el-Khazen indicated that Aoun did not plan to engage the
national dialogue on defense issues until he could evaluate
the March 14 position. The Ambassador remarked that such
passivity would likely be interpreted as quiet support for
Hizballah's position, but el-Khazen argued that would be an
incorrect interpretation. The meeting ended with both
el-Khazen and Moukhaiber indicating they would be discussing

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all of these issues with Aoun.

FELTMAN