Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06BEIRUT1808
2006-06-07 12:53:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Beirut
Cable title:  

MGLE01: A STRATEGY TO SUPPORT ELECTORAL REFORM

Tags:  PGOV KDEM KMPI EAID KPAO LE 
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PP RUEHAG RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK
DE RUEHLB #1808/01 1581253
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 071253Z JUN 06
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3880
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE
RUEHROV/AMEMBASSY VATICAN 0589
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 06 BEIRUT 001808 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR DRL A/S LOWENKRON AND DAS BARKS-RUGGLES
DEPT ALSO FOR NEA/ELA AND NEA/PI
NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/WERNER/SINGH
PARIS FOR ZEYA
LONDON FOR TSOU
TUNIS FOR MEPI-MULREAN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/04/2016
TAGS: PGOV KDEM KMPI EAID KPAO LE
SUBJECT: MGLE01: A STRATEGY TO SUPPORT ELECTORAL REFORM

BEIRUT 00001808 001.2 OF 006


Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey D. Feltman for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d
).

SUMMARY
-------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 06 BEIRUT 001808

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR DRL A/S LOWENKRON AND DAS BARKS-RUGGLES
DEPT ALSO FOR NEA/ELA AND NEA/PI
NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/WERNER/SINGH
PARIS FOR ZEYA
LONDON FOR TSOU
TUNIS FOR MEPI-MULREAN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/04/2016
TAGS: PGOV KDEM KMPI EAID KPAO LE
SUBJECT: MGLE01: A STRATEGY TO SUPPORT ELECTORAL REFORM

BEIRUT 00001808 001.2 OF 006


Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey D. Feltman for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d
).

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) Reform of the electoral law is the bellwether of the
Lebanese government's overall reform plan, and U.S. support
for it is in entirely keeping with the President's Freedom
Agenda. While there is widespread popular support for
replacing the electoral law currently in effect -- associated
as it is with past Syrian interference -- the reform process
faces many obstacles. We need a diplomatic strategy that
creates an enabling environment for electoral reform, working
with the UN, other foreign missions, and local political
players and opinion-makers. On the programmatic side,
continued, uninterrupted USG support will be critical for
civil society partners as they build constituencies for
reform and generate "bottom-up" pressure on lawmakers who
otherwise have little incentive to challenge the status quo.
We recommend additional DRL Bureau funding for IFES and NDI
in order to provide seamless support to our electoral
assistance strategy at this decisive juncture in the
electoral reform process. We also recommend extending MEPI
grants for public awareness campaigns and opinion polling.
End summary.

WHY ELECTORAL REFORM IS IMPORTANT
--------------


2. (SBU) The USG has stated its clear interest in the
sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political
independence of Lebanon. In the aftermath of Syria's
military withdrawal -- and in the face of a resurgence of
Syrian influence by non-military means, backed by Iran --
there is now an urgent need for reform on a number of fronts:
economic, political, and administrative. Reform can build
the capacity of the Lebanese, in both the public and private
sectors, to run Lebanon on their own.


3. (SBU) Of the several reform fronts on which the Siniora

government has tried to move forward, electoral reform is
arguably the one in which meaningful near-term results are
most within reach. Early on, Siniora's cabinet identified
electoral reform as a priority, stating in August 2005 that
it is "one of the important issues that should be treated
without any delay." Success in delivering electoral reform
will give a boost to the Siniora government's efforts on
other fronts, such as its economic reform program.
Alternatively, failure will cut into its ability and
credibility to deliver reform anywhere else. Electoral
reform is therefore a leading indicator of the overall
prospects of reform in Lebanon.


4. (SBU) Siniora's cabinet declared in August 2005 that the
goal of electoral reform is "to establish parliamentary
democracy." This involves "achiev(ing) as much fair
representation and equality between candidates and voters as
possible, and... provid(ing) the necessary conditions for a
free electoral competition and impartiality required for the
administration of the electoral process by competent
authorities." Siniora's cabinet also noted that electoral
reform makes possible the creation of modern, non-sectarian
political parties, which parliamentary democracy arguably
requires, and which Lebanon, with few exceptions, has
historically lacked. U.S. support for Lebanon's electoral
reform process is therefore entirely consistent with the
goals of President Bush's Freedom Agenda in the Middle East.

HOW ELECTORAL REFORM GOT STARTED
--------------


5. (SBU) A widespread demand for something better than the
electoral law currently in effect provided the impetus behind
today's reform process. The existing law, which dates back
to the year 2000, is widely (but not fondly) known as the
"Ghazi Kena'an law," referring to the chief of Syrian
military intelligence in Lebanon at the time, under whose
auspices it was drawn up. Its purpose was to ensure that
political players friendly to Damascus dominated the
Parliament.


BEIRUT 00001808 002.2 OF 006



6. (SBU) When Syrian President Bashar al-Asad's regime
overreached in Lebanon by orchestrating the extension of
President Emile Lahoud's term in office in 2004, two of its
primary allies, Rafiq Hariri and Walid Jumblatt, turned
against it. After Hariri's assassination in February 2005,
members of his parliamentary bloc, along with Jumblatt's,
played key roles in the subsequent "independence intifadah."
Demonstrations against Syrian interference in Lebanon
culminated in a massive one in Beirut on March 14, 2005. The
withdrawal of Syrian military forces and overt intelligence
personnel took place in April.


7. (SBU) While they were no longer the SARG's allies, both
the Hariri and Jumblatt parliamentary blocs found a common
interest with Syria's two most important remaining allies on
the political scene, Hizballah and the Amal Movement, in
retaining the electoral law of 2000. After winning the
argument to keep the law in effect for the parliamentary
elections of May and June of 2005, what became known as the
"March 14 forces," led by Hariri's son Sa'ad along with
Jumblatt, won a 72-member majority (since reduced to 71 seats
by death of an incumbent).


8. (SBU) The law of 2000 was widely resented, however,
particularly among Christians. Many of them rallied around
Michel Aoun in protest against the unlikely "Quadripartite
Alliance" formed by "March 14," Hizballah, and Amal to keep
the law of 2000 in effect. Prime Minister Fouad Siniora, who
took office in the summer of 2005 with the backing of the
"March 14" parliamentary majority, responded to public
opinion by taking the unprecedented step of establishing a
blue-ribbon commission to draft a better electoral law. He
appointed senior statesman Fouad Boutros to head the
commission, made up of respected lawyers and academics, three
of whom were founding members of the primary civil society
organization lobbying for electoral reform.


9. (SBU) After a systematic effort to maximize civil society
input -- also unprecedented -- the commission went behind
closed doors to hammer out a new draft law. While it
experienced delays, setbacks, and even the temporary
resignations of two of its members, the commission eventually
reached consensus on a draft law by the end of May. Its
members handed over the draft to Prime Minister Siniora on
June 1, moving the electoral reform process from "Phase I"
(deliberation and drafting within the commission) to "Phase
II" (submission of the commission's draft for approval by the
cabinet, then by Parliament).

WHY ELECTORAL REFORM IS HARD
--------------


10. (SBU) This draft, which appears to include many
important, reform-oriented provisions, is still far from
being enacted into law. For that to happen, it needs to
emerge unscathed from the cabinet, and, following that, from
Parliament. While there is a good chance it will get cabinet
approval without major tinkering -- electoral reform, after
all, has been Siniora's initiative -- Parliament will be
another story. There, debate over the draft law will take
place among 128 people, all of whom were elected under the
electoral law of 2000. Not surprisingly, they are unlikely
to be intent on changing the status quo. The danger of the
law literally getting locked in the desk drawer of the
Speaker of Parliament -- he has the authority to do it -- is
real.


11. (SBU) Alternatively, there is a danger of the draft law
getting hijacked by political actors for whom reform is the
vehicle, not the destination. One's attention turns to the
array of Syrian allies -- former Prime Minister Omar Karami;
anti-Jumblatt "rogue Druze" politician Wi'am Wahhab; the
baron of the Maronite stronghold of Zghorta, Suleiman
Franjieh; even the Syrian regime's loquacious former implant
in Rafiq Hariri's bloc, Nasser Qandil -- who have
opportunistically aligned themselves with Michel Aoun in the
aftermath of last year's Syrian military withdrawal. In the
hope of terminating what they call the Hariri-Jumblatt
"counterfeit majority" in Parliament, this cast of characters
is pressing for parliamentary elections now, rather than 2009
(when they would normally take place).


BEIRUT 00001808 003.2 OF 006



12. (C) The pro-Syrians are energetically marketing the
argument that, because the electoral law of 2000 was so badly
flawed, the results of the 2005 parliamentary elections are
unacceptable; new elections must be held under a new law as
soon as possible. They are betting that concessions offered
to the Christian community -- which by and large despised the
2000 law -- on districting, plus a change in the political
atmosphere caused by a Syrian resurgence in Lebanon and in
the region, would be enough to sweep them to victory. Aoun
-- intent on seeing a new Parliament, one willing to elect
him President of the Republic -- would surely go along with
this, as would Hizballah and Amal. President Lahoud would
clap and mince-step with delight in the background.


13. (C) Dependably lacking any sense of shame, the
pro-Syrians will denounce the electoral law of 2000 as a
travesty, a particularly corrupt example of gerrymandering,
and a subversion of the will of the Lebanese people. They
will then blame it on Hariri, Jumblatt, and their Christian
allies. (Needless to say, they will not mention Ghazi
Kena'an or their own votes in 2000 in favor of the law.) To
make the case for redeeming the results of 2005 through new,
presumably fairer elections, all they need is a new electoral
law. Any new electoral law will do.


14. (C) The pro-Syrians' need for instant elections would
rule out genuine reform measures that could take months,
possibly even years, to fully implement. An example is the
establishment of an independent commission, one with staff,
resources, and teeth, to supervise elections instead of the
interior minister (who in all likelihood is someone running
for parliamentary office himself). The probable result, if
the pro-Syrians have their way, would be an emasculated
electoral law, one devoted almost exclusively to the number
and boundaries of electoral districts, leaving more
substantive reforms for another day.


15. (C) This leads to the issue of how electoral reform
plays in Lebanon's Christian community (which, in the absence
of census figures, we estimate to be at least one-third of
the population -- although the new law preserves the current
50-50 split in parliamentary seats assigned to Christians and
Muslims). United by a feeling that the law of the year 2000
effectively disenfranchised them, many Christians have zeroed
in on districting as the make-or-break issue of electoral
reform. The main problem with the existing electoral law,
many of them believe, is that it deprives them of effective
political representation by leaving most Christian MPs
elected by Muslim majorities. To be successful, Christian
politicians have to hitch their wagon to the star of
non-Christian "za'eem" (communal leader) -- Hariri, Jumblatt,
Berri, even Nasrallah -- leaving the Christian community
without a "za'eem" of its own. (Aoun's Christian supporters
feel he meets that job description).


16. (C) The danger is that debate in the Christian community
over the national commission's draft law will quickly narrow
down to a question of how many Christian MPs are elected in
majority-Christian districts. In that case, the draft law as
written will die in the cradle. Most of its reform-oriented
provisions -- which are arguably more important in the long
run than districting -- would be lost.

HOW WE CAN HELP THROUGH DIPLOMACY
--------------


17. (C) President Bush's Freedom Agenda requires that we do
whatever we can to keep the electoral reform process on
track. On the diplomatic side, we need a strategy for
creating an enabling environment for reform. This strategy
would provide an umbrella under which civil society
organizations can lobby for reform, using some funding and
technical assistance from us. (For more on this, see the
discussion of a programmatic strategy, below.)


18. (C) A premise of our diplomatic strategy must be that,
while the UN can play a helpful role for electoral reform in
a number of ways, we cannot expect it to take the lead. We
are already seeing plenty of reasons why. The three
stakeholders in Lebanese electoral reform within the UN
organization -- the Secretary-General's Personal
Representative, the New York-based Electoral Assistance

BEIRUT 00001808 004.2 OF 006


Division (EAD),and the Lebanon mission of the UN Development
Program (UNDP) -- have worked out a careful division of labor
among themselves, but competing missions and interests may
leave it working better on paper than in real life.


19. (C) Emblematic of the UN approach here is the UNDP
permanent representative's invitation of chiefs of foreign
diplomatic missions to a meeting to discuss support for
electoral reform in "Phase II" of the electoral reform
process. The meeting, however, is not until June 21, weeks
after "Phase II" has begun with the presentation of the draft
law to the prime minister. EAD is, the last we heard, still
searching for a candidate to serve as their Beirut-based
chief technical representative. In any event, we understand
from EAD that the UN will maintain a low profile during
"Phase II," seeing it as an internal Lebanese process in
which they -- and we -- should not appear to be interfering.


20. (C) This concern about perceived interference is
reasonable enough, but the fact is that there is an ongoing
resurgence of Syrian-Iranian influence in Lebanon that
jeopardizes reform on all fronts. We have a stake in the
success of reform, electoral reform included, and can
potentially use our influence here in ways that can advance
it without making life difficult for reformers, by exposing
them to accusations of foreign influence.


21. (C) A diplomatic strategy can support the electoral
reform process by encouraging a wide range of political
actors to take the commission's draft seriously. We must
dissuade them from making the perfect the enemy of the good.
The commission's draft law may not be perfect from anyone's
perspective, but too much tinkering could cause the whole
electoral reform project to unravel.


22. (C) We may need to push particularly hard with the
"March 14" coalition, with whom we have normally agreed on
virtually all of the pressing issues related to Lebanese
sovereignty and reform. As described above, the existing
electoral law served Sa'ad Hariri and Jumblatt (if not their
Christian allies) well in 2005, and they do not want to
strengthen their adversaries' case for early elections. We
need to emphasize to them that it is imperative that they
back up Prime Minister Siniora -- who is, after all, a "March
14" prime minister -- and his reform agenda. (Ironically,
Speaker of Parliament Berri, who has been unhelpful on both
sovereignty and reform over the past year, reportedly may
favor the draft law, seeing it as an opening to give his Amal
Movement greater latitude vis-a-vis Hizballah.)


23. (C) With Siniora's government, we should continue to
convey the message, bilaterally and via the Core Group, that
political reform is as important as economic reform. The
Siniora government's ability to deliver genuine electoral
reform will build its credibility with the Core Group and
strengthen its case for international assistance for an
economic reform package.


24. (C) If the draft law becomes a lightning rod for
confessional grievances, its days will be numbered. We
therefore may need to conduct quiet advocacy for the
commission's work with Christian opinion leaders, the
Maronite Patriarch most prominent among them. (In a recent
meeting with the Patriarch, the Ambassador has already
started to work on this.) In order to explain why the
Christian community has a stake in genuine electoral reform
(as opposed to simple redistricting),we need to be well
versed in the details of the draft. For this, IFES's
continued analytical work will be essential (see below),as
will be our close working relationship with key commission
members.


25. (C) Regarding the Christian community, our public
diplomacy will need be ready for intensive
counter-disinformation efforts. The pro-Syrians will
probably attempt to play on existential Christian fears,
portraying U.S. support for electoral reform as the latest
example of the United States undermining the Christian
community, forcing it to submit to second-class citizenship
under Muslim-majority rule. We can anticipate, for example,
a revival of the oldie-but-a-goodie urban legend that the USG
quite literally tried to sell Lebanon's Christians down the

BEIRUT 00001808 005.2 OF 006


river in 1976, allegedly offering to evacuate them en masse
by boat.


26. (C) We do not detect that other foreign missions are
giving a very high priority to supporting the electoral
reform process, at least not at this stage. However, to
maximize international support as well as avoid duplication
of effort, we need to coordinate with other Core Group
missions. Besides the UN, the European Union may be most
capable of complementing our efforts on the programmatic as
well as diplomatic fronts (see below).


27. (C) While conducting all of the above diplomatic
activities, we need to maintain as low a profile as possible.
Our public diplomacy should emphasize that we support the
Lebanese government and people as they come up with genuinely
"made in Lebanon" reforms, including in the electoral field.
Civil society organizations pushing for electoral reform are
aware of our support for their efforts and are glad for it,
but they do not want to be exposed to accusations of being
"foreign agents." This is of particular importance in the
Shi'a community, which is, as usual, fertile ground for
accusations of U.S. interference.

HOW WE CAN HELP THROUGH ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS
--------------


28. (C) While our diplomatic activities work to create a
positive environment for electoral reform, our assistance
programs will support civil society activists as they build
constituencies for electoral reform. Ultimately, the sort of
bottom-up pressure these efforts generate is the only way to
give members of Parliament an incentive for changing the
status quo. Post will continue to work with a host of
Lebanese and international NGOs providing critical support
for the electoral reform process.


29. (SBU) The primary actors in a growing consortium of
pro-electoral reform civil society organizations are:

-- the Lebanese Association for Democratic Elections (LADE);

-- the Lebanese Center for Policy Studies (LCPS);

-- the Lebanese Transparency Association (LTA);

-- Statistics Lebanon, Ltd.; and

-- three U.S.-based NGOs: the National Democratic Institute
for International Affairs (NDI),IFES, and the International
Republican Institute (IRI).


30. (SBU) Since the formation of the national commission
charged with rewriting the electoral law in August 2005, all
of these organizations except for LADE have received USG
funding to support the electoral reform process. LTA (with
LCPS as a sub-grantee) and Statistics Lebanon have received
MEPI funding for public awareness campaigns and opinion
polling, respectively. The Lebanon programs of NDI, IFES,
and IRI are funded by the DRL Bureau.


31. (SBU) Now that the electoral reform process has entered
"Phase II," the direct involvement of our civil society
partners is more important than ever. Continued,
uninterrupted USG support for these organizations will be
critical for the success of electoral reform in Lebanon.
With this in mind, we recommend the following programmatic
strategy:

-- Extend the MEPI grant for LTA.
--------------


32. (SBU) LTA and its sub-grantee, LCPS, are arguably the
two civil society organizations with the best administrative
and intellectual resources for a public awareness campaign on
electoral reform. We would recommend that the MEPI grant
they received for this purpose be extended for a period of
six months to one year, so that they can continue to build
constituencies for reform. The statement of work for the
grant extension should include development of a simple
curriculum to explain the draft law and important electoral
principals to Lebanese voters, town hall meetings in local

BEIRUT 00001808 006.2 OF 006


communities across Lebanon to explain the draft proposal, an
advocacy campaign to encourage parliamentary support for the
draft law and electoral reform, and (in coordination with NDI
and other members of the civil society consortium) design and
implementation of a mass media campaign.

-- Extend DRL Bureau funding for IFES.
--------------


33. (SBU) IFES, along with NDI (see below) is an essential
NGO partner in our programmatic strategy to promote electoral
reform in Lebanon. IFES has provided valuable research
services to members of the national electoral law reform
commission during the drafting phase of the electoral reform
program, and their work had a direct, positive impact on the
commission's final product. For example, "what IFES did on
out-of-country voting," one commission member told us
recently, "was ten times better than what EAD tried to do."


34. (SBU) As we enter the next, critical phase of the
electoral reform process, we would recommend additional DRL
funding for IFES to expand its activities. Its global
expertise and analysis capabilities can help educate
policy-makers and opinion leaders on the options they face as
they deliberate over the commission's final draft. One
electoral reform commission member told us recently that IFES
and NDI, as non-Lebanese organizations, are well positioned
to serve as disinterested "referees" in a public debate over
the draft law.

-- Extend DRL Bureau funding for NDI.
--------------


35. (SBU) NDI,s electoral activities to date have included
focus groups, technical assistance to political parties, and
coordination among other Lebanese and international NGO
partners engaged in electoral reform. Perhaps most
important, however, has been NDI,s work in developing a
strategic media campaign aimed at building public support for
electoral reform. Working with civil society activists and
media experts, NDI can help ensure that a media campaign,
which will take place during "Phase II," has sufficient reach
and depth.


36. (SBU) Note: Post understands that USAID funding is not
available for use in continuing the IFES and NDI programs
into "Phase II." Therefore, we strongly recommend that DRL,
which had the strategic vision to fund and implement IFES and
NDI programs in "Phase I," is the best source for additional
funding to continue this important work. As for IRI, it
started its DRL-funded electoral assistance program in Beirut
in May 2006. At the time of this writing, we understand it
has sufficient funding to see it through "Phase II." End
note.

-- Extend the MEPI grant for public opinion polling.
-------------- --------------


37. (SBU) We would also recommend using MEPI funds to extend
the existing grant to Statistics Lebanon, Ltd., through FY

2007. Originally funded as a MEPI small grant in FY 2005,
this program has arguably established itself as our most
cost-effective, highest-impact MEPI grant. Additional
polling efforts could focus on topics in reform, especially
the crucial electoral reform efforts of the next several
months.
FELTMAN