MGLE01: SHIA CONTACTS SEE NASRALLAH'S CULT OF

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 001807

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/WERNER/SINGH

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/06/2016
TAGS: IR IS KISL LE PGOV PTER
SUBJECT: MGLE01: SHIA CONTACTS SEE NASRALLAH'S CULT OF
PERSONALITY AND SHIA "OVEREMPOWERMENT" AT HEART OF JUNE 1
RIOT

REF: A. BEIRUT 1747

B. BEIRUT 336

Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey D. Feltman. Reason: Section 1.4 (d).

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) On June 6, Hizballah expert Amal Saad-Ghorayeb told
econoff that the June 1 riot in response to a LBCI parody of
Hizballah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah (ref A) was an
embarrassment to Hizballah and the Shia community. She
believed the riot was spontaneous, but Hizballah was not
conciliatory enough in apologizing for it. Young Shia males
took it upon themselves to engage in thuggery, which is not a
new trend. According to Saad-Ghorayeb, the June 1 riot was a
manifestation a growing cult of personality around Nasrallah.
The Shia will not accept any insult to Nasrallah, who many
see as a religious figure, not a mere politician. Amal
Movement foreign affairs director Ali Hamdan and Shia
journalist Abbas Sabbagh concurred in separate meetings,
saying that poking fun at Nasrallah was off-limits. Both
expressed alarm at the violence and destruction, but also
noted that LBCI should have parodied an ordinary Hizballah
figure instead. Saad-Ghorayeb sees the June 1 riot as only
the latest incident demonstrating "overempowerment" in the
Shia community. She explained that Shia are feeling strong
and powerful as a community at the same time remaining afraid
of other communities as a lingering effect of past
injustices. As a result, Shia feel both capable of taking
coercive action and justified in doing so. End summary.

OF THUGS AND "NASRALLAH-MANIA"
--------------


2. (C) On June 6, econoff met with Hizballah expert and
Shia professor Dr. Amal Saad-Ghorayeb to discuss the impact
of the June 1 riot in Beirut in response to an LBCI broadcast
mocking Hizballah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah (ref A).
She described the riot as an embarrassment for Hizballah,
which handled the situation badly. Hizballah did not
organize the protest that turned into a riot, according to
Saad-Ghoryeb. Has Hizballah been the organizer, the protest
would have been more orderly, more peaceful, and much larger.
Hizballah's mistake was that its response was tepid in
condemning the senseless mayhem, and failed to reassure
non-Hizballah supporters of the party's devotion to Lebanese
stability, she said. Nasrallah, addressing the incident in a
news conference on June 5, called the riot a mistake, but was
less conciliatory than expected.


3. (C) The June 1 riot was a spontaneous demonstration
carried out by young Shia men infuriated by the show's
depiction of Nasrallah. Saad-Ghorayeb knows the kind of
young Shia men who participated; she has many of them in her
classes at Lebanese American University (LAU). Shia students
have told her that they follow her from semester to semester
because they will only accept a grade from a Shia professor.
Some, especially the Amal supporters, are rowdy, lazy, and
just want to discuss politics rather than learn anything.
Her students told her that Amal supporters were among the
thousands of rioters on June 1. They were likely some of the
same students who thuggishly beat up student supporters of
Walid Jumblatt on May 25 in plain view of the dean of LAU.


4. (C) Saad-Ghorayeb attributed the spontaneous, violent
response to the LBCI program to the growing cult of
personality surrounding Hassan Nasrallah. Saad-Ghorayeb, who
describes herself as sympathetic to the "resistance," refuted
any justification for the riot. Sure, Nasrallah is a Sayyed
(descendant of the Prophet Mohammad) and is considered by
many Shia to be a religious figure, but he is only a
mid-ranking cleric. If the program had made fun of Shia
spiritual leader Mohammad Fadlallah or the Ayatollah
Khamanei, then she could understand the outrage. But
Nasrallah is more a political figure than religious scholar.
LBCI was irresponsible, but anyone involved in politics in
Lebanon should expect such treatment.


5. (C) Saad-Ghorayeb said this growing "Nasrallah-mania"
started with the Hariri assassination. Subsequent
confessional tensions and a sense of threat from the U.S. and
Israel has elevated Nasrallah into a cult of personality
status. Her Shia students have shown her that they keep
Nasrallah's picture on their cellphones and use sound bites
of his speeches as ringtones. There are also Nasrallah key

BEIRUT 00001807 002 OF 003


rings and cellphone neck bands. Saad-Ghorayeb was recently
surprised to see one of her most liberal Shia female
students, who wears European-style dress and leaves her hair
uncovered, carrying around a notebook with a Nasrallah
picture on the cover. (Note: Other Shia contacts have
observed this growing cult of personality around Nasrallah
(ref B). End note.)

SHIA VOICES: LBCI IRRESPONSIBLE,
BUT RIOTS WERE INEXCUSABLE
--------------


6. (C) On June 5, Ali Hamadan, foreign affairs director of
the Amal movement, gave econoff a similar, if more gentle,
assessment of the June 1 riot. Hamdan condemned the LBCI
broadcast as irresponsible, but did not spare any
condemnation for the rioters. He said the riot was an
embarrassment to the Shia community and was an unacceptable
lapse in self-control. Hamadan identified the main problem
as LBCI's satire against a religious figure "like Patriarch
Sfeir or Archbishop Audi." He explained that Nasrallah is a
Sayyed, so any insult to him is more inflammatory than to a
civilian Hizballah officials. The riots would not have
happened if the satire had poked fun at Minister of Energy
and Water Mohammad Fneish or MP Mohammad Raad, according to
Hamdan. He admitted that the press routinely criticizes his
boss, Speaker of Parliament Nabih Berri, but that the Amal
movement just accepts it as a part of politics. The key
difference is that Berri is not a Sayyed.


7. (C) Abbas Sabbagh, a Shia journalist based in southern
Beirut, observed the riot and agreed that it was largely
spontaneous. According to Sabbagh, Hizballah MP Ali Ammar
joined the protesters in the street, but there is no evidence
he was acting on orders from Nasrallah. Sabbagh did not view
the LBCI parody of Nasrallah as unusually insulting.
However, the fact that Nasrallah is seen by many as a
religious figure and that the show was aired on LBCI (viewed
as sympathetic to the Lebanese Forces) made Shia so angry.
Sabbagh condemned the violence. He saw it as an expression
of power and fear by the Shia. They seem to think they can
take to the streets for any reason. Like Saad-Ghorayeb,
Sabbagh also saw Amal supporters among the protesters.

"OVEREMPOWERMENT" AT PLAY
--------------


8. (C) Saad-Ghorayeb viewed the June 1 riot in south
Beirut, in addition to the May 25 LAU violence and May 28
Blue Line fighting, as datapoints in the trend among Lebanese
Shia of what she termed "overempowerment." She explained
that Shia had been dispossessed for most of Lebanese history
until their revival movement in the late 1970s and 1980s.
Now that Shia have gained equal footing with the other sects
and more, they think in overempowerment terms. It is a
dangerous phenomenon of the Shia feeling strong and powerful
at the same time they still feel threatened because of past
injustices. As a result, the Shia community feels justified
in using coercion to get its way at the same time it knows it
possesses the capability to do so. Saad-Ghorayeb expects
more such incidents to occur despite her hope that they won't.


9. (C) According to Saad-Ghorayeb, the Shia feel empowered
by Hizballah's perceived military successes against Israel,
the Shia community's newfound clout in Lebanese politics, and
by Iran and its nuclear weapons program. She gave a
practical example of this overempowerment. In the past,
Lebanese prejudice against Shia was such that a pejorative
term for a Shia Muslim, metawli ("follower of Ali"),was used
to describe anything that was low-class, shabby, or ruffian.
For example, a Christian or Sunni might say to their fellow
confessionalists: "What are you wearing, you are dressed like
a metawli!" Now, Shia are taking control of the word and are
calling themselves and each other "metawli" as a kind of a
statement of confessional brotherhood. The flip side is that
they are taunting non-Shia, who are now afraid to use that
word in front of Shia for fear of verbal or physical attack.

COMMENT
--------------


10. (C) Embassy's Shia contacts have been warning us for
more than a year that confessionalism and angst within the
Shia community was increasing, due in part to Hizballah
rhetoric. The June 1 riot was a sign of that Shia anger and
seemed to suggest that Hizballah may not be able to control

BEIRUT 00001807 003 OF 003


what it fomented. Saad-Ghorayeb's analysis helps explain how
a community -- one that boasts the only remaining militia, is
possibly the largest in Lebanon, is lavishly supported by
Iran and Syria, and whose parties seem to exercise a veto on
all political and economic reform -- still acts as if it is
the one under siege. End comment.
FELTMAN