MGLE01: TRIPOLI SUNNI MP ADVOCATES A HARIRI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIRUT 001796

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/SINGH/WERNER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/06/2026
TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEM LE SY
SUBJECT: MGLE01: TRIPOLI SUNNI MP ADVOCATES A HARIRI
PREMIERSHIP AND INCENTIVES TO BRING AOUN INSIDE THE CABINET


Classified By: Jeffrey Feltman, Ambassador, per 1.4 (b) and (d).

SUMMARY AND COMMENT
--------------


1. (C) During a 6/6 meeting with the Ambassador, Tripoli
(Sunni) MP and Minister of Public Works and Transport
Mohammed Safadi deflected questions about the June 8 session
of the National Dialogue, in which he participates. Instead,
he wanted to share his ideas on correcting what he sees as an
increasingly dysfunctional cabinet. Citing a meeting he had
with MP Saad Hariri in Oman last week, Safadi claimed that
Hariri's poor relationship with PM Fouad Siniora will not
easily be improved. Instead, Safadi said, it is time for
Hariri to assume the premiership -- even if Emile Lahoud
remains as President -- with a national unity cabinet that
includes representation from Michel Aoun's bloc. Safadi said
that he was ready to shift his four MP seats to Aoun's bloc
away from March 14 as an incentive to get Aoun to play a more
constructive role and break his alliance with Hizballah.
Comment: Safadi has some self-interest in moving closer to
Aoun. With personal ambitions of his own, Safadi knows that,
as long as he is in the Hariri-dominated March 14 movement,
he will have to defer to Saad Hariri on the premiership. End
summary and comment.

DEFLECTING DIALOGUE DISCUSSION
--------------


2. (C) The Ambassador asked to see Safadi on 6/6 in order
to urge the MP to use his participation in the June 8
National Dialogue session to help refute Hizballah Secretary
General Hassan Nasrallah's proposals for preserving the
"resistance." Safadi agreed that Nasrallah's approach in the
previous dialogue session was deeply flawed. He said that
the March 14 participants would coordinate positions today
and tomorrow. The Ambassdor suggested that the National
Dialogue, at a minimum, get Nasrallah to commit now to
implementation of the Dialogue's agreement on Palestinian
disarmament. Nasrallah, the Ambassador said, should also be
cornered into ensuring that Hizballah's arms will not be used
in regional issues such as protection of Iran or liberating
Palestine. Safadi again agreed but did not demonstrate
particular urgency, saying that the National Dialogue would
continue for some time.

BAD RELATIONS BETWEEN SAAD AND SINIORA
HARM EFFECTIVENESS OF CABINET
--------------


3. (C) Safadi then turned to the cabinet, saying that "it
is simply not working." The cabinet is becoming more and
more dysfunctional, he said, a problem exacerbated by PM
Siniora's "stubbornness on little issues." Describing
himself as "disenchanted," Safadi said that he had moved from
being a strong to a lukewarm supporter of Siniora. The
deterioration in the relationship between Hariri and Siniora
contributes a major part to the problem, he said. The
Ambassador noted that a successful partnership between
Siniora and Hariri was essential to the success of the March
14 movement, a point we were making to both men.
Particularly given the increasingly vitriolic Syrian rhetoric
against Siniora, it is important for Hariri to back strongly
and publicly his PM, the Ambassador said. Safadi said that
he was not sure that he agreed.

HARIRI TOYING WITH IDEA
OF BECOMING PM NOW?
--------------


4. (C) Safadi said that he thought the Hariri-Siniora
relationship was currently broken beyond repair. Citing a
meeting he had with Hariri the previous week in Muscat,
Safadi argued that it is time for Hariri to become PM. If
Hariri waits for a year and a half (the remainder of Emile
Lahoud's extended term as President),"he's finished" -- the
cabinet deadlock will have destroyed Hariri's and March 14's
popularity. Thus Safadi said that he urged Hariri to take
the premiership now, despite Emile Lahoud's presence in
office. When Hariri said that he refused to become PM as
long as Lahoud remained in office, "everyone knew he was just
talking tactics," Safadi said. "He can change his mind."
The Ambassador asked whether Hariri would really be able to
work with a man he believes is implicated in the murder of
his father. "I think so," Safadi said, hinting that Hariri
in Muscat was already toying with the idea of becoming PM
now, perhaps after the publishing of the Brammertz report.

BEIRUT 00001796 002 OF 002



BRINGING AOUN INTO THE CABINET
--------------


5. (C) In changing the PM, Safadi argued, "we also need to
change the cabinet." He proposed giving three cabinet slots
to Michel Aoun's bloc, at the expense of two ministers
appointed at Lahoud's request (Yaacoub Sarraf and Charles
Rizk) and one at Siniora's request (Sami Haddad). Assuming
Deputy Prime Minister/Defense Minister Elias Murr continues
his informal alliance with the March 14 alliance, that leaves
the crucial two-thirds majority with March 14: 16 ministers,
compared to five for the Hizballah-Amal bloc and three with
Aoun. Lahoud would not dare to reject a cabinet decree that
was topped with Hariri's name and included Aoun ministers,
Safadi said. While Aoun would push for four or five
ministers, Safadi said confidently that Aoun would settle for
three portfolios.

PROVIDING INCENTIVES FOR AOUN
TO MOVE AWAY FROM HIZBALLAH
--------------


6. (C) Safadi said that, with such a cabinet change, he
would also work to nudge Aoun away from Hizballah and back
toward March 14, "where he belongs philosophically." Safadi
did not expect Aoun and March 14 to enter into any formal
partnership, for the distrust was too deep. But if Aoun
could be lured away from Hizballah and into taking
independent decisions based on principle, then the March 14
ideals would have a better chance of prevailing in any case.


7. (C) Safadi said that, as an incentive to get Aoun to
shift in the direction he was suggesting, he would be willing
to pull his own parliamentary bloc -- with four MPs from
Tripoli -- out of the March 14 alliance and into the Aoun
bloc, increasing its share from 21 to 26 members. There
might be a few other defections from March 14, Safadi said,
such as Metn MP (and Industry Minister) Pierre Gemayel. If
Aoun could have a bloc of 30 seats and be inside the cabinet,
then he would no longer feel the need to ally himself with
Hizballah in order to feel he has some power. The losses of
seats within the 71-member March 14 parliamentary majority
and within the cabinet shouldn't be a problem, Safadi said,
since the March 14 crowd will be able to govern more
decisively if the Aoun-Hizballah alliance is broken. Safadi
said that he would use his weight within the Aoun bloc to
make sure that Aoun did side with March 14 principles, in the
parliament and in the cabinet.

COMMENT
--------------


8. (C) There is increasing talk that Hariri might be
willing to take the premiership now, rather than at the end
of Emile Lahoud's presidency. With Hariri still out of town,
we do not know how realistic this is, but we suspect that
some people are engaged in wishful thinking, in hopes of
finding a way out of the current dispiriting impasse. As for
Safadi, he has some personal interest in what he is
proposing. He knows that, as long as he is subsumed in the
more powerful Hariri bloc, he has little chance of fulfilling
his dream to be a serious contender as Prime Minister. If
Aoun is strengthened as a result of Safadi's handiwork, Aoun
might be persuaded to help Safadi. We hope to see Hariri as
soon as he is back to get his assessment of whether the
Hariri-Siniora relationship can be fixed, or what the
alternatives are. We agree with Safadi that the current
situation harms the reputation of the March 14 principles and
players.
FELTMAN