MGLE01: SINIORA SEES SYRIAN AND PALESTINIAN

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 001746

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/WERNER/SINGH
LONDON FOR TSOU
PARIS FOR ZEYA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/01/2016
TAGS: PTER KDEM MOPS KPAL KPAO LE IS SY
SUBJECT: MGLE01: SINIORA SEES SYRIAN AND PALESTINIAN
FINGERPRINTS ON WEEKEND VIOLENCE

Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey D. Feltman. Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

SUMMARY
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1. (S) In a 6/1 meeting, Prime Minister Siniora told the
Ambassador he suspects Syrian and Palestinian agents were
behind a violent 5/28 exchange with Israel. He also said it
was impossible for the attacks to have been carried out
without Hizballah's knowledge, and expressed concern that
Hizballah's activities jeopardized security and stability for
all of Lebanon. In the next round of National Dialogue
talks, "March 14" leaders would try to hold Hizballah
accountable for the incident: Siniora said it created a
perfect opportunity to reach out to Michel Aoun and separate
him from Hizballah. Siniora was not convinced of Israeli
responsibility for the 5/26 assassination of PIJ militants in
Sidon, suggesting that it may have been a Hizballah "house
cleaning" operation. Siniora confirmed that the Lebanese
Armed Forces (LAF) and Hizballah security personnel are
conducting separate investigations into the assassination.
Siniora dismissed Speaker of Parliament Nabih Berri's
allegations that he, Siniora, had spurned an invitation to
Damascus as "preposterous." Pulling the Ambassador aside,
Siniora told him that he considered a 5/25 newspaper op-ed by
Syrian Ambassador in Washington Imad Mustafa to be a personal
threat. End summary.

SUNDAY VIOLENCE A SYRIAN MESSAGE TO ISRAEL AND HIZBALLAH
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2. (C) On June 1, the Ambassador and emboff called on Prime
Minister Siniora in his office at the Grand Serail. The
Ambassador asked the prime minister what his thoughts were on
the violent May 28 exchange in south Lebanon. The prime
minister replied that only the Popular Front for the
Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC) and
Hizballah have the operational capability to pull off a
rocket attack with the range and precision demonstrated in
Sunday's attack. He added that, had Hizballah not been
directly involved, it would be nearly impossible to carry out
the attack without Hizballah's knowledge, or at the very
least their implicit consent.


3. (C) Siniora said that, while the range of the rocket
attack was not in his view that exceptional (a view certainly
not shared by all),the precision demonstrated in the attack
was beyond that normally demonstrated by Hizballah or
Palestinian groups. It seemed that whoever was responsible
for the attacks was showing off, and wanted to provoke a
strong reaction from the Israelis. Siniora pointed to the
sniper attack at 1500 hours local time on May 28, which
wounded an Israeli soldier, as a further provocation. It had
been as if the attackers were suggesting that Israel's first
response, targeting the Na'ameh tunnels and Sultan Yacoub
depot, was insufficient.


4. (C) "Hizballah wasn't ready for such a large offensive,"
Siniora explained, as he described the Israeli destruction of
a number of new Hizballah positions along the Blue Line. The
Ambassador pointed out that Hizballah had evacuated the
positions before the Israelis hit them. Even so, Siniora
replied, Hizballah would not have pushed the Israelis so far
as to risk the destruction of positions that they have been
building over the past eight months. Siniora added that,
according to UNIFIL Forces Commander Alain Pellegrini, the
Hizballah positions had been utterly destroyed. The prime
minister's assistant, Rola Noureddine, also noted several
reports that Hizballah casualties far exceeded the one
Hizballah fighter reported killed.


5. (C) Siniora speculated that Syria had used the PFLP-GC on
May 28 to show the Israelis that they were still capable of
"bloodying their nose," and to show Hizballah who "really
controls south Lebanon." Siniora added that, nearly a week
after the exchange, Hizballah has not claimed responsibility
for the attack, and that they have not accused anyone else of
doing so either, "which makes me feel that Hizballah is not
agreeable to this whole thing."

SIDON BOMB MAY HAVE BEEN A HIZBALLAH OPERATION
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6. (C) The Ambassador asked Siniora if he was convinced that
Israel was responsible for the May 26 assassination of

BEIRUT 00001746 002 OF 003


purported Palestinian Islamic Jihad leader, Abu Hamza, in the
southern Lebanese city of Sidon. Without hesitating, Siniora
firmly replied, "no," and added that the Russian ambassador
had categorically told him that the Israelis were not
responsible. Siniora said he thought the car bombing was
carried out by one or two other Palestinian groups operating
in south Lebanon, both of which, he added, are linked to
Hizballah.


7. (C) Siniora noted that both Abu Hamza and his brother,
also killed in the May 26 blast, were Lebanese citizens, not
Palestinians, and were members of Hizballah. He pointed out
that Hizballah personnel were the first responders to the
blast site, and immediately began their own investigation
(which they were still continuing as of June 1, while the
GOL has given official investigative jurisdiction to the
LAF). Siniora said he did not think that Hizballah was going
so far as to conceal evidence from the blast, but he
suggested that their investigation may be at cross purposes
with that of the LAF.

VIOLENCE IN SOUTH COULD BRING MARCH 14 AND AOUN TOGETHER...
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8. (C) When the Ambassador asked Prime Minister Siniora how
last Sunday's violence would affect the next session of the
National Dialogue, Siniora said that there was a developing
consensus that no one single party (e.g., Hizballah) should
be able to destroy stability in Lebanon and threaten the
entire country's security. He said that "March 14" leaders,
including Lebanese Forces leader Samir Ja'ja' and Druze
leader Walid Jumblatt, were working on their positions
separately. He hoped they would meet before the June 8
meeting to put together a unified program to challenge
Hizballah.


9. (C) The Ambassador asked if anyone from "March 14" had
reached out to Michel Aoun, noting that, after last week's
violence, Aoun must be deeply embarrassed by his association
with Hizballah. Siniora immediately sat up and said that, to
his knowledge, no one had yet contacted Aoun. This was the
time to do it, however. Pointing at his senior advisor, Dr.
Mohammad Chatah, Siniora said, "Mohammad, contact Aoun's
people and see." He then turned back to the Ambassador and
said, 'We'll do it." Siniora said that this was "the moment
we've been waiting for," to reach out to Aoun and "pull him
away from Hizballah and closer to us."

... BUT THE GOL NEEDS TO ASSERT ITSELF IN THE SOUTH
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10. (C) As the prime minister relished the idea of pulling
Aoun back from his partnership with Hizballah, the Ambassador
asked if the "March 14" alliance had any specific ideas to
propose in the National Dialogue. The Ambassador suggested
the full deployment of 1,000 LAF soldiers in the south, or
perhaps pressuring Hizballah to commit to the disarmament of
Palestinian militias. Nouredddine responded that many of the
400 LAF soldiers already deployed in the south are
"administrative support" only, incapable of assuming a
broader security mission.


11. (C) The Ambassador warned the prime minister that,
following the events of the past two weeks, including the
killing of an LAF corporal by Palestinian militia members, as
well as the May 28 Blue Line incident, there was mounting
dissatisfaction among UN Security Council members that the
Lebanese government was not taking sufficient steps to
guarantee security between Lebanon and its neighbors, and
within its own borders. "You've let two months slip for your
six-month window (on disarming Palestinian militias outside
the camps)," the Ambassador said.


12. (C) Siniora responded that he had already sent letters
to Arab League Secretary-General Amr Mousa, Saudi King
Abdullah, and Egyptian President Mubarak asking for their
support. He also noted that, earlier this week, Mubarak and
King Abdullah had discussed Lebanese-Syrian relations
seriously and in considerable detail. He admitted, however,
that, in the short term, he did not expect much progress in
this area.

BERRI ON THE OFFENSIVE
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BEIRUT 00001746 003 OF 003



13. (C) The conversation then turned to recent press reports
that Prime Minister Siniora had spurned an invitation
arranged by Speaker of Parliament Nabih Berri to discuss
bilateral issues with Syrian President Bashar al-Asad in
Damascus. Siniora dismissed the story as "preposterous," and
explained that, some two weeks ago, Berri offered a window
between a Saturday and a Monday when Siniora could see Asad
in Damascus. Siniora said that he would be traveling to
Sharm el-Sheikh on that Sunday, but that he could then travel
to Damascus on Monday. He said Berri then came back DQQlQQD
Minister. The Ambassador warned that, in the past, Berri had
always presented an amenable demeanor when discussing the
prime minister. However, in the Ambassador's last meeting
with him, Berri was openly hostile and had de86vAQv --------------


15. (S) At the end of the meeting, Siniora pulled the
Ambassador aside and, unprompted, told him that he considered
a May 25 op-ed in the pan-Arab daily "al-Hayat" by the Syrian
Ambassador in Washington, Imad Mustafa, to be a personal
threat against him. In referring to Siniora, Mustafa had
used the same language that the SARG uses for Jumblatt, who
is certain that his life is in danger. Syrian officials had
also used the same language against the late former Prime
Minister Rafiq al-Hariri, prior to his February 2005
assassination. Siniora urged that the USG make an effort to
collect intelligence on threats to his personal security,
about which the Mustafa op-ed may have been a warning.
FELTMAN