MGLE01: S/CT COORDINATOR'S MEETING WITH LEBANESE

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 001680

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/WERNER/SINGH

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/26/2016
TAGS: PTER PREL MARR MOPS LE
SUBJECT: MGLE01: S/CT COORDINATOR'S MEETING WITH LEBANESE
ARMED FORCES G-2


Classified By: Jeffrey Feltman, Ambassador. Reason: Section: 1.4 (b)
and (d).




1. (C) SUMMARY: S/CT Coordinator Crumpton and the
Ambassador, accompanied by Defense Attache, met May 23 with
Director of LAF G2 Brigadier General Georges Khoury. BG
Khoury provided an overview of the terrorism situation from
the LAF G2 perspective. He noted three distinct terrorist
threat levels: a) significant events that require immediate
action, b) terrorist targeting of foreign interests, and c)
organized international terrorism. BG Khoury described LAF
activities to counter these three threats and the need for
continued cooperation and support from the U.S. Repeating a
common LAF view, he voiced his concern that the ISF, in
moving into counter-terrorism activities, was creating a
para-miltary capability focused on supporting narrow
political interests rather than the nation as a whole. BG
Khoury then explained that in the LAF's recent clash with
Fatah-Intifada, GOL politicians, not the LAF, made the
decision not to take further military action. BG Khoury
stressed that his Directorate,s definition of terrorism
mirrored USG policy and stated that the LAF was ready to
support all counterterrorism efforts but needed the support
of the GOL and more assistance from the USG.

THREE LEVELS OF THREATS
--------------


2. (C) After an exchange of greetings, Ambassador Crumpton
explained that his visit to the region was to meet with
various U.S. Embassy country teams as well as regional
partners to help develop strategies to combat common regional
and world threats. Ambassador Crumpton noted that his
mission required our regional partners to help assess the
threat and suggest ways to move forward.


3. (C) BG Khoury stated that the Lebanese Armed Forces
(LAF) G2 intelligence directorate broke the threat down into
three categories: 1) Incidents that needed an immediate
response, such as the recent string of bombings and
assassinations since October 2004, 2) targeting of foreign
interests in Lebanon, such as the bombing against a
McDonald's restaurant in 2002, and 3) organized international
terrorist groups. The first category requires immediate
actions to contain damage sustained.


4. (C) BG Khoury explained that the LAF is currently
providing active measures to protect foreign interests, such
as maintaining patrols around embassies and high visibility
foreign businesses. He added that the LAF considered
organized international terrorism to be a direct threat
against Lebanon and that his department dealt with it as
such. He cited the LAF arrest of terrorists from Dinniya in
northern Lebanon in 2000 as an example. BG Khoury went on to
explain that the G2 was also the protection and &eyes8 for
the LAF. He noted that the LAF had thirty years of
counterterrorism experience to draw upon. He expressed his
appreciation for past USG support for LAF G2 counterterrorism
efforts and asked for increased support in the future.
Ambassador Crumpton thanked him for the LAF,s partnership in
addressing common threats.

CONCERNS ABOUT ISF
COUNTERTERRORISM
--------------


5. (C) BG Khoury said he did not want to bring the the
Ambassador into Lebanese internal disputes, but he then went
on to voice his concerns (shared by many in the LAF) about
developments within the Lebanese Internal Security Force
(ISF). He claimed that recent efforts by the ISF to create a
para-military counterterrorism unit were not supported by
Lebanese law and were by definition illegal. Ambassador
Feltman questioned this point, and BG Koury reiterated that a
new law would need to be passed by the GOL to make such an
ISF unit legal. He stated that this situation is
particularly troubling because the ISF has a political
character, specifically in that it works directly for the
Prime Minister. He claimed that only the LAF is working for
the national interest, rather than in support of a particular
political group. Khoury apologized again for bringing the
issue up, but wanted advice and recommendations on the future
of the LAF in counterterrorism, especially in light of its 30
years of experience in this arena. (Note: This is basically
a bureaucratic turf issue. End note.)

BEIRUT 00001680 002 OF 003




6. (C) Khoury stressed that the LAF is working to
strengthen itself by training and maintaining an appropriate
distance from all political parties, and trying to isolate
the force from societal (read confessional) pressures. He
noted that the LAF is using assistance from various USG
offices to enhance its effectiveness. He also stated that in
the wake of the April 2005 Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon,
the LAF in general, and specifically the G2, has conducted a
massive internal reform, with large-scale changes in
personnel. Additionally, he claimed that the LAF G2 has
provided actionable counterterrorism intelligence to Jordan,
Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Yemen.

LAF COMBATTING INTERNATIONAL TERORISTS
--------------


7. (C) BG Khoury noted that the current aim of
international Islamist extremists is to attack foreign
interests, especially the U.S. This is because these
extremists want to target those who are trying to promote
change, and the U.S. is the leading force for positive change
in the region. The extremists accept political authority
only in relations to their view of God, and therefore see
democracy, establishing the authority of the people, as
illegitimate. The extremists seek to impose Sharia law and
target those who promote democracy, especially the U.S.,
since again the U.S. is the leading force for democratic
change in the world.


8. (C) The LAF G2 is working to eradicate extremist
influence in Lebanon. BG Khoury claims that his directorate
is working with moderate Salafists to deal with the issue
from an Islamic viewpoint. He explained that the G2
Directorate is also trying to penetrate extremist Salafist
cells in order to break them apart from the inside.


9. (S/NF) In reply to Ambassador Crumpton,s question about
information concerning extremists linked to Iraq, BG Khoury
noted that his directorate immediately passes such
information to the USG. He noted that his Directorate has
and continues to provide information to the U.S. concerning
movement of extremists, either to or from Iraq, as he
receives it. BG Khoury said that the G2 shares the U.S. view
of Al-Qaeda and the U.S. definition of terrorism. Terrorism
is the enemy of both countries and success would be achieved
only though continued partnership, especially with the U.S.
Lebanon suffered through 30 years of terrorism and will need
continued U.S. support to fight it successfully in the future.

CREATING A COMMON LEBANESE
VIEW ON TERRORISM
--------------


10. Ambassador Crumpton stressed the importance of the LAF
G2 helping to inform GOL decision makers about the terrorist
threat posed by Al-Qaeda and other Sunni extremists.
Ambassador Feltman highlighted the fact that the Lebanese
Parliament pardoned the Dinniya terrorists in 2006, negating
G2 efforts against that group. BG Khoury noted that this
decision was politically bound up with the release of
Lebanese Forces leader Samir Geagea and was a purely
political decision. Ambassador Feltman reiterated the need
for the G2 to help translate threat information into positive
GOL policy decisions. BG Khoury explained that until right
now there is no government consensus concerning the
definition of terrorism versus &resistance.8 He said that
he reports directly to the LAF commander, but on terrorism
issues he sends reports directly to the Minister of Defense
and the Prime Minister as well. He noted that his
directorate provides analysis and suggested courses of
action.

RECENT LAF CLASH
WITH FATAH-INTIFADA
--------------


11. (C) BG Khoury outlined the string of events leading up
to the attack by elements of Fatah-Intifada against the LAF
durng the past week. Several days prior to the clash the
Palestinians erected a tent in a new position which the LAF
then took down. The Palestinians put up another tent and
fortified the position. The LAF was attacked when its troops
went to deal with this second position. The LAF did take
over the site and brought in reinforcements to better secure
the area. The GOL, not the LAF, made the decision to limit
the LAF response for fear of jeopardizing the National

BEIRUT 00001680 003 OF 003


Dialogue. BG Khoury confirmed that the Palestinians were
receiving reinforcements and resupply from across the border.
He noted that in the future the reinforcements might be
Syrian troops, not just Palestinian fighters.


12. (C) Ambassador Crumpton stressed his disappointment at
the lack of response by the LAF and the GOL concerning this
issue. He reiterated PM Siniora,s words from his visit to
the U.S. that the GOL must help itself, and get help from
others. Ambassador Crumpton noted that getting USG decision
makers to assist Lebanon is made that much more difficult if
the GOL does not appear willing to help itself.


13. (C) BG Khoury concluded by thanking the USG for its
support, and repeating his request for additional technical
assistance in patrolling the border. He cited U.S. help to
Jordan for its border patrol operations as an example of the
kind of support necessary to secure Lebanon,s 350km land
border. Ambassador Crumpton thanked BG Khoury for his
support and cooperation and, noting the strong support of
President Bush for Lebanon, promised that the USG would
seriously consider all future requests for assistance.
FELTMAN