MGLE01: S/CT CRUMPTON MEETING WITH MICHEL AOUN --

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 001677

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NSC FOR ABRAMS/WERNER/DORAN/SINGH

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/25/2016
TAGS: PTER KPAL KDEM PINS LE SY IR
SUBJECT: MGLE01: S/CT CRUMPTON MEETING WITH MICHEL AOUN --
BEWARE OF HIZBALLAH

Classified By: Jeffrey Feltman, Ambassador. Reasons: Section 1.4 (b)
and (d).

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) On May 23, Coordinator for Counterterrorism
Ambassador Crumpton met with Lebanese parliamentary minority
leader Michel Aoun at Aoun's home near Beirut. S/CT Crumpton
encouraged Aoun to use his influence to make Lebanon a solid
partner with the USG in the fight against terrorism. He
expressed USG concerns that although Hizballah denies that it
plays any role beyond Lebanon's borders, the organization
continued to support terrorist activities outside of Lebanon
and in Iraq. S/CT Crumpton told Aoun that because of
Hizballah's transnational role in terrorism, and its
obstructionist role inside Lebanon, the USG did not look
favorably on Aoun's association with Hizballah. He suggested
that broad agreement on a policy concerning Palestinian and
Hizballah arms might be useful to bring all political sides
in Lebanon together to accomplish a common goal. That unity
would also put Hizballah on notice that the Lebanese
leadership did not support its activities. Aoun -- insisting
that his MOU with Hizballah did not constitute an alliance --
said that if the USG could provide intelligence proving
Hizballah's role in supporting terror, he would use that to
discredit the organization locally.

HIZBALLAH AND THE NATIONAL DIALOGUE:
A CHANCE FOR UNITY?
--------------


2. (C) Ambassador Crumpton, accompanied by the Ambassador
and PolChief, met with Michel Aoun and Aoun aide Gebran
Basile on May 23. S/CT Crumpton began the discussion by
asking Aoun how he would deal with a pro-Hizballah, national
defense strategy outlined by Hizballah Secretary-General
Hassan Nasrallah in the most recent national dialogue
session. Aoun admitted that the Lebanese do not have many
tools for dealing with Hizballah. He said he would challenge
Nasrallah's strategy with a call for Hizballah to submit its
arms to the authority of the Lebanese state, and to recognize
the exclusive right of the state to defend itself against an
external threat. Aoun said that he hoped to undermine
Nasrallah's use of the threat of possible Israeli aggression
as a tool to justify Hizballah's weapons. Aoun said that
once the Shebaa farms are liberated or turned over to
international observers, Lebanon would have to come up with a
new legal framework for its relationship with resistance and
with Israel. In contrast to Nasrallah's statements in the
dialogue, Aoun foresaw that "some kind of a truce, or
armistice" would have to be worked out with Israel at that
point.


3. (C) The Ambassador pointed out that there was a broad
political consensus among non-Shia groups in Lebanon on the
need to control Hizballah's arms. That consensus could be
the starting point for political cooperation between the
majority and the other political factions. The Ambassador
suggested that Aoun and the other members of the national
dialogue might produce a common position on Hizballah's arms
that showed unity of purpose and put Hizballah on notice.
Aoun acknowledged that the idea was sound, but added that the
majority would have to make the "first call." Ambassador
Crumpton told Aoun that his best tools for dealing with
Hizballah could be his cooperation with other Lebanese
parties to reach a common position on Hizballah's arms.

HIZBALLAH IS AN IRANIAN TOOL
AND NO FRIEND OF LEBANON
--------------


4. (C) Ambassador Crumpton said the USG would only be
reassured that assistance to Lebanon is well-merited if there
were cohesion in the Lebanese response to terrorism. He
cautioned that the USG was not pleased with Hizballah's
actions or with the political support they have received
inside of Lebanon. He asked Aoun what he had gained by
entering into an alliance with Hizballah in February 2006.
Aoun corrected Ambassador Crumpton by saying that he had no
alliance with Hizballah; he had signed on 2/6 an MOU with
Nasrallah that covered ten specific points of policy. Aoun
said Hizballah frequently protests government policies that
he also questions, but they are allied with the parliamentary
majority and members of the government. "I am in the
opposition -- alone," Aoun said, carefully distinguishing
himself from Hizballah.

BEIRUT 00001677 002 OF 003




5. (C) While repeatedly rejecting that he was Hizballah's
ally, Aoun insisted his agreement with Nasrallah had achieved
two victories. First, he had achieved a rhetorical and
ideological change in Hizballah. The group dropped their
demand to liberate Palestine from their political discourse.
Now they acknowledge that they defend the borders of Lebanon
from Israeli threats. His second achievement was peace on
the border with Israel. Aoun took credit for the months of
relative calm on the Blue Line, and promised to keep the
situation calm. Ambassador Crumpton asked Aoun why, in light
of this achievement, Hizballah continued to improve its
fighting positions on the Blue Line, adding sophisticated
bunkers and communications equipment. Aoun said this was a
defensive maneuver in keeping with Hizballah's ideology. The
Ambassador asked how this new posture jibes with Hizballah's
claims to be small and mobile to avoid an Israeli strike.
Aoun quipped, "All the better for the Israelis. They can hit
them easier."


6. (C) Ambassador Crumpton told Aoun that Hizballah
continues to participate in terrorist attacks beyond
Lebanon's conflict with Israel. He said that Hizballah
provides material support for Palestinians and is training
fighters who kill U.S. soldiers in Iraq. Aoun replied that
he asked Hassan Nasrallah directly if Hizballah was involved
in activities outside of Lebanon and Nasrallah assured him
they were not. Nasrallah admitted to political support for
Hamas in Israeli but no other operations. Hizballah has also
repeatedly denied being controlled by Iran. Aoun said
Nasrallah deputy Naiim Qassim announced publicly that
Hizballlah is a Lebanese organization not an instrument of
Iran. Ambassador Crumpton told Aoun Qassim was lying. He
said that Hizballah is financed and controlled out of Iran
and responsive to Iran's instructions.

USG LOOKING FOR A RELIABLE
PARTNER IN LEBANON
--------------


7. (C) Ambassador Crumpton told Aoun that the USG wants to
help strengthen Lebanon so that the institutions of the state
can make the republic sovereign and stable. He said the USG
was prepared to provide assistance to Lebanon so that the
country could defend itself against terrorist threats.
However, the USG wanted to ensure the assistance was used
effectively in the fight against extremism. Ambassador
Crumpton said the USG was outraged at the recent killing of a
Lebanese soldier by Palestinian extremists and the subsequent
failure by the GOL to bring the guilty parties to justice.
Aoun's aide, Gebran Basile, said that responding to the
Palestinian attack was the responsibility of the GOL. The
ambassador acknowledged that but said the USG wanted to
express its view that Lebanon needed to act to take control
of Palestinian weapons.


8. (C) Aoun said he would ask the GOL why there had been no
action against the Palestinians guilty of attacking the LAF.
He said members of the parliamentary majority claim that they
are waiting for the Palestinians to come together so that
they can speak with one voice. Aoun advised the GOL to
approach the Palestinian groups one group at a time, rather
than waiting for unity that is unlikely to develop.


9. (C) Basile said that Aoun and his Free Patriotic
Movement see Sunnis as the true terrorists, not the Shia.
Ambassador Crumpton disagreed with Basile and explained that
the USG had Sunni and Shia partners in the war on terror. We
saw the extremists, who make up a small minority of Islamic
communities, as a source of terror. It was not a question of
Sunni or Shia. Aoun quickly said that he agreed with the
U.S. position, and wanted to "disarm the minds" of Sunni and
Shia of good will to make them allies. When Ambassador
Crumpton asked who might be on his list of people of good
faith, Aoun named Nasrallah, although he has to deal with
extremists in his own camp. Once again, Ambassador Crumpton
disagreed, saying that Nasrallah's opposition to UNSCR 1559,
and his opposition to the role of the Lebanese armed forces
do not appear to be the acts of a person of good faith.
Ambassador Crumpton said that Hizballah needs to decide if it
will be a Lebanese political organization of a tool of Iran.


10. (C) Aoun said that he was consistent in his support for
UNSCR 1559 and disarmament of militias in Lebanon, ideas that
he claimed to have supported while in exile in Paris. After
his return to Lebanon in 2005, Aoun said he found the
Lebanese leadership united against him, and defending

BEIRUT 00001677 003 OF 003


Hizballah. This near-universal resistance to Aoun's position
caused him to alter his own position, as a tactical maneuver.


11. (C) In drawing the meeting to a close, Ambassador
Crumpton cautioned Aoun that he must be aware of the threat
Hizballah poses directly and indirectly to Lebanon. Aoun
said that Lebanon does not want to face the consequences for
Hizballah's actions. He added that Lebanon could be a
partner in the war on terror, but they were not prepared to
suffer another civil war. He would try to achieve stability
and peace. But Lebanon's future was influenced by the
regional political situation. Aoun asked again that
information about Hizballah's role in Iraq be handed over to
him so that he could use it at the appropriate time.

COMMENT
--------------


12. (C) To Basile's evident discomfort, Aoun was
uncharacteristically willing to distance himself from
Hizballah in his meeting with Ambassador Crumpton. For the
first time in recent conversations with us, Aoun questioned
Nasrallah's veracity, and denied an alliance with Hizballah.
On the subject of military cooperation and counterterrorism,
the former General seemed to find his link to Hizballah a bit
too confining for comfort. Much of his support here is
predicated on his strength in the face of a Muslim challenge.
Aoun has tried to demonstrate to his followers that he has
tamed Hizballah and only the Sunni present a challenge. It
would be difficult for Aoun to sustain publicly his alliance
with Hizballah in the face of hard evidence of Hizballah's
links to Shia militia in Iraq and beyond. End comment.
FELTMAN