MGLE01: UN SYG'S REPRESENTATIVE DISCUSSES

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 001676

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/WERNER/SINGH
PARIS FOR ZEYA
LONDON FOR TSOU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/29/2016
TAGS: PTER KISL MOPS KDEM SOCI LE SY IR IS
SUBJECT: MGLE01: UN SYG'S REPRESENTATIVE DISCUSSES
HIZBALLAH WITH S/CT COORDINATOR CRUMPTON


BEIRUT 00001676 001.2 OF 003


Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey D. Feltman for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d
).

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (S) In a 5/23 meeting, the UN Secretary-General's
Personal Representative to Lebanon told visiting S/CT
Coordinator Crumpton that Hizballah emerged as a "mixture" of
Iranian Islamic-revolutionary links, social grievances in the
Shi'a community, a fight against Israel, and what eventually
became an "extremely complicated relationship" with the SARG
and its security services. It is pulled in opposite
directions by loyalty to the SARG versus an identification
with Lebanon, a stake in a modicum of stability versus the
need to give its full-time fighters a mission, and a claim to
decide war and peace on its own versus the consensus-driven
nature of Lebanese politics. To move the process of
disarming Hizballah forward, he recommended that the
international community: 1) "build more trust within
Lebanon," and 2) "calm the regional situation." End summary.


2. (S) S/CT Coordinator Crumpton's May 22-23 visit to Beirut
allowed an opportunity to compare notes with Geir Pedersen,
the UN Secretary-General's Personal Representative to
Lebanon. Pedersen and his staff, in their official
capacities, frequently meet with representatives of Hizballah
(although not, Pedersen insists -- denying persistent rumors
to the contrary -- with Hassan Nasrallah). Conversation
during a May 23 lunch meeting that included Ambassadors
Crumpton and Feltman, Pedersen, Pedersen's senior political
affairs officer Salman Shaikh, and emboff, focused on
Hizballah and the problem of its disarmament, as called for
by UNSCR 1559.

UNDERSTANDING HIZBALLAH
--------------


3. (S) Pedersen said that a proper understanding of
Hizballah required that its origins be taken into account.
He described how Hizballah started as a breakaway from the
Amal Movement, and how it drew inspiration and support from
the Islamic revolution in Iran. Israel's 1982 invasion
mobilized a large segment of Lebanon's Shi'a population "fed
up" with Amal's corruption, and this gave Hizballah an
important boost. The presence of Iran's Islamic
Revolutionary Guard Corps in the Biqa'a Valley was another
potent element inQhe making of Hizballah. Ultimately,
Hizballah was "a mixture" of Iranian Islamic-revolutionary
links, social grievances in the Shi'a community, a fight
against Israel, and what eventually became an "extremely
complicated relationship" with the SARG and its security
services.

HIZBALLAH AND ITS CONTRADITIONS
--------------


4. (S) Pedersen saw different strands within Hizballah's
leadership. There was a "small group" that, over a year
after the April 2005 withdrawal of Syrian military and overt
intelligence personnel from Lebanon, remained loyal to
President Asad's regime in Damascus. There was another group
in the leadership that was more interested in the development
of Lebanon. Hizballah representatives, however, always deny
that such different schools of thought exist within their
organization. Memories of a previous split that came out
into the open, in 1992, made this a sensitive issue for them.



5. (S) Pedersen said that Hizballah's current leadership has
an interest in maintaining a degree of stability in Lebanon,
yet was faced with the problem of keeping its guerilla forces
"focused," making sure that they "feel that they have a
mission in life." Full-time fighters form an important
constituency for Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah. This,
Pedersen suggested, provided the context for Hizballah's
paramilitary activities along Lebanon's border with Israel.


6. (S) Pedersen described as "the Hizballah contradiction"
the fact that the organization necessarily looks to Iran's
supreme leader as its own, yet it also has a stake in the
national interests of Lebanon. Given the nature of Lebanon's
confessional system of government, major political decisions
tend to be made on the basis of consensus. However,

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Hizballah alone -- through its paramilitary presence along
the border with Israel -- enjoys a virtual monopoly over
decisions of war and peace. Hizballah persists in holding
onto this monopoly, even as it realizes that its case for
doing so is "weak." It is "going to get more interesting" as
this particular contradiction is explored, said Pedersen.

"EDUCATING" HIIZBALLAH?
--------------


7. (S) Pedersen suggested that there might be opportunities
to "educate" Hizballah by forcing it to define what, exactly,
was the "Israeli threat" to Lebanon. He noted that continued
Israeli overflights of Lebanese territory helped create a
popular perception of an Israeli threat, which in turn
bolstered Hizballah's argument for holding onto its arms.
Israeli overflights almost stopped during March and April,
and Hizballah had taken notice. Resumed Israeli restraint --
following a sharp escalation in overflights since April --
could serve this objective, Pedersen said.


8. (S) Pedersen suggested that Hizballah be urged to "put
Israel to the test," that is, to stand down its paramilitary
activities on the border in anticipation of reciprocal
Israeli behavior with overflights. However, he said,
Hizballah's leadership probably does not want Israel to cease
overflights. This is because doing so would put the onus on
Hizballah to take steps towards disarmament. (Ambassador
Feltman noted Hizballah's stepped-up level of military
construction along the Blue Line as a probable reason for the
resumption of Israeli overflights at record levels --
Hizballah was not making the case for Israeli restraint any
easier in doing so.)

SYRIA'S ROLE
--------------


9. (S) Pedersen said that the ongoing National Dialogue
process -- which brings Hizballah's Secretary-General, Hassan
Nasrallah, to the negotiating table with the leadership of
Lebanon's other main factions -- has provided a helpful
change of atmosphere. Its participants initially arrived at
consensus on several important issues, including support for
a continued international investigation of the Hariri
assassination and restriction of Palestinian arms and
fighters to the refugee camps. Later on in the process,
however, things "fell apart."


10. (S) Explaining how this may have happened, Pedersen said
he understood that Hizballah's leadership had approached the
SARG leadership for approval of the National Dialogue
consensus. When the answer from Damascus was negative,
Hizballah was caught in a bind. Since it could not publicly
put the blame for an impasse on its historic ally, the SARG,
"Hizballah decided to blame it on March 14," that is, on the
pro-sovereignty alliance led by Sa'ad Hariri and Walid
Jumblatt, the base of support in Parliament for Prime
Minister Siniora's government.


11. (S) This was a sign, Pedersen said, that Hizballah does
not want to "confront Syria." Hizballah appears to be
assuming that the SARG will emerge intact or even
strengthened at the end of its current travail, which
includes the UN investigation of the Hariri assassination.
The SARG is still "key" in Lebanon, Pedersen said, because
"so many people here are keyed to it rather than to Lebanese
interests." He noted, however, that, in his private meetings
with Hizballah officials, "they're much more critical of
Syria" than they are in public.

THINKING ABOUT NEXT STEPS
--------------


12. (S) Pedersen said that any solution of the Hizballah
problem required a two-pronged approach on the part of the
international community: 1) "build more trust within
Lebanon," and 2) "calm the regional situation." On this
second point, greater "clarity on the Iranian nuclear file"
would help. Given the SARG's nonchalant response to UNSCR
1680, clearly a more concerted approach to Syria on the part
of UN member states was needed as well. It would involve an
"approach to Putin," said Pedersen, who referred to reports
that the Russian government is "increasingly frustrated" with
the SARG.

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13. (S) Wondering whether it would be possible to get
Hizballah to think about "the day after" a decision to
disarm, Pedersen described the issues that would be of
primary concern to Hizballah's leadership. First, they would
be concerned about their own physical safety. In addition,
they would be concerned about providing social services (in
other words, political patronage) at current levels as a
genuinely Lebanese institution, one presumably not enjoying
as much Iranian largesse as it does today.

HIZBALLAH AT A CROSSROADS?
--------------


14. (S) Ambassador Crumpton suggested that Libya might be a
positive example for Hizballah, should it seek an exit from
the USG's list of designated foreign terrorist organizations.
Carrying this idea a step further, Salman Shaikh suggested
that the USG consider publicly stating that it saw Hizballah
at a "crossroads," and that it had an opportunity to make a
Libya-style change of direction, getting out of the terrorism
business in the process.


15. (S) Hizballah's main political opponents in Lebanon, the
pro-sovereignty "March 14" coalition, also had a great deal
of work to do, according to Pedersen. To date, "March 14"
had yet to provide a unified, well thought-out approach to
the ultimate goal of Hizballah's disarmament. "What exactly
would they propose," he asked?


16. (S) Shaikh suggested that we have a message aimed at
concentrating the attention of Lebanese interlocutors on the
need to disarm both Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias, as
called for in UNSCR 1559. While many of our Lebanese
interlocutors refer to the need to preserve "stability" as an
excuse not to take steps forward, current events were
demonstrating that the status quo is not tenable, he said.

COMMENT
--------------


17. (S) The fatal shooting of a Lebanese Armed Forces
soldier by Palestinian rejectionist militiamen in the Biqa'a
Valley is the most recent example of an untenable status quo.
The Lebanese government has avoided the problem of disarming
Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias -- even the ones with by
far the least local support, namely, Palestinian rejectionist
bases outside the refugee camps -- in the interest of
"stability." In reality, the result of this
hyper-risk-averse approach is likely to be the opposite.
FELTMAN