Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06BEIRUT1579
2006-05-22 06:00:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Beirut
Cable title:  

MGLE01: A/S SILVERBERG MEETING WITH UN SYG REP

Tags:  PREL PTER EAIC KDEM KWMN LE 
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ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 220600Z MAY 06
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3619
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHROV/AMEMBASSY VATICAN PRIORITY 0577
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIRUT 001579 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/WERNER/SINGH
PARIS FOR ZEYQ
LONDON FOR TSOU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/16/2016
TAGS: PREL PTER EAIC KDEM KWMN LE
SUBJECT: MGLE01: A/S SILVERBERG MEETING WITH UN SYG REP
GEIR PEDERSEN

REF: BEIRUT 1540

BEIRUT 00001579 001.2 OF 002


Classified By: AMBASSADOR JEFFREY D. FELTMAN. REASON: SECTIONS 1.4 (B)
AND (D)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIRUT 001579

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/WERNER/SINGH
PARIS FOR ZEYQ
LONDON FOR TSOU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/16/2016
TAGS: PREL PTER EAIC KDEM KWMN LE
SUBJECT: MGLE01: A/S SILVERBERG MEETING WITH UN SYG REP
GEIR PEDERSEN

REF: BEIRUT 1540

BEIRUT 00001579 001.2 OF 002


Classified By: AMBASSADOR JEFFREY D. FELTMAN. REASON: SECTIONS 1.4 (B)
AND (D)


1. (C) SUMMARY: IO A/S Silverberg hosted UN envoy Geir
Pedersen to a relaxed dinner on 5/16. Pedersen had no
definitive answer regarding why Hizballah had stepped up the
construction of military infrastructure along the Blue Line,
but he argued that Hizballah tried to maintain "constructive
ambiguity" to keep Israel somewhat off balance. He said that
Hizballah tries to balance its Iranian ties with a Lebanese
agenda. On Sheba'a Farms, Pedersen agreed that definition of
the territory in question and guarantees of disarmament are
needed before Israel can be expected to take seriously any
proposal for withdrawal. Regarding UNIFIL renewal, Pedersen
expressed hope that the upcoming UNIFIL report might have
details the UNSC could cite as benchmarks in any new
resolution. End Summary.

HIZBALLAH SEEKS CREATIVE AMBIGUITY
--------------


2. (C) Accompanied by the Ambassador and PAO, A/S Silverberg
on 5/16 recounted for UN Secretary General's Personal
Representative for Lebanon Geir Pedersen and his assistant
Salman Shaikh, her visit to UNIFIL headquarters that morning.
Pedersen affirmed UNIFIL Force Commander General Alain
Pellegrini's assesment of increased construction in Hizballah
positions on the Lebanese side of the Blue Line. In response
to A/S Silverberg's question about Hizballah's motives,
Pedersen assessed that Hizballah's message to the Israelis
was that the resistance was well funded, had plenty of
resources, and that as a result Israel could "never rest."
Pedersen repeated Pellegrini's hypotheses that the Lebanese
Armed Forces (LAF) had not objected to the new construction
either because they hoped one day to take possession of the
sites, or -- more worrying -- because LAF elements were
quietly cooperating with Hizballah on the construction.


3. (C) Pedersen noted that Hizballah believed they had
caused Israel to reduce its overflights during the month of

April; he did not have an explanation for the spike in
Israeli overflights in May. Pedersen said he had warned his
Hizballah contacts against any actions to heat up the Blue
Line, arguing it would not serve anyone's interest. Any
action would be used as proof to the Lebanese that Hizballah
was a tool of Iran, rather than a Lebanese party. Asserting
that Hizballah feared a strong, international community stand
against them, Pedersen assessessed that Hizballah prefered to
maintain a state of constructive amibiguity. Attempts to
unnerve Israel rendered the situation more unstable and thus
more difficult for both Israel and the international
community to retain the focus on disarmament. Nevertheless,
Pedersen acknowledged that some in Hizballah are begining to
recognize that for Hizballah to play a role in Lebanon in the
future, there must be disarmement.


4. (C) Responding to a question from A/S Silverberg,
Pedersen said that, as he understood it from his meetings
with Hizballah leaders, Iran gives clear instructions to
Lebanon's Shi'a on religious issues. Although the extent of
Iran's instuctions for military operations was not clear to
him, Pedersen said he believed Iran preferred that Hizballah
appear as Lebanese as possible. He reminded A/S Silverberg
that not all members of Hizballah were loyal to Iran, with
some of Lebanon's Shia looking toward Iraq, not Iran, for
leadership. In general, Hizballah tries to balance its
strong links to Iran with a Lebanese agenda.

SHEBAA FARMS, SYRIA AND UNIFIL RENEWAL
--------------


5. (C) On options for responding to the Government of
Lebanon's request to resolve the issue of Shebaa Farms,
Pedersen underscored the importance of delineating clearly
what portion of Shebaa Farms was in dispute. He noted Prime
Minister Fouad Siniora's strong pitch to resolve Shebaa as a
first step towards disarmament of Hizballah. Pedersen
recognized that without a clear sense of the area to be
negotiated and without any guarantee that Hizballah would
disarm, no one could expect Israel to respond positively.
Shaikh noted three requirements to any negotiation over
Shebaa: (1) Definition of the exact territory; (2) national

BEIRUT 00001579 002.2 OF 002


consensus that would show that no more territory would be
demanded; and (3) realism. The Ambassador emphasized that
guaranteed disarmament would be imperative.


6. (C) The Ambassador re-iterated the importance of the
international community's pressure on Syria. Pedersen agreed
"we should keep pushing the Syrians." But, he cautioned, "we
don't expect them to deliver. And then what do we do?" He
assessed, however, that the Syrian regime was begining to
feel isolated. Pedersen argued that US should work on the
Israelis to resolove long standing issues and proposed
setting up steps and counter steps to build confidence and
promote movement.


7. (C) On extending UNIFIL in July, Pedersen agreed we
needed to include benchmarks in the next resolution to
encourage the GOL to take more steps in asserting authority
in the south. He hoped that the UNIFIL report itself could
give the sort of details the UNSC could use.


8. (U) This cable has been cleared by A/S Silverberg.

FELTMAN
FELTMAN