MGLE01: SCENE-SETTER FOR VISIT OF IO/AS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 BEIRUT 001481

SIPDIS

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NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/WERNER/SINGH

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/10/2012
TAGS: PREL PTER MARR KCRM PGOV UN LE SY IS
SUBJECT: MGLE01: SCENE-SETTER FOR VISIT OF IO/AS
SILVERBERG TO LEBANON

Classified By: Jeffrey Feltman, Ambassador. Reason: Sections 1.4 (b)
and (d).

Lebanon is divided
--------------


1. (C) Summary: Your visit to Lebanon will underscore USG
interest in Lebanon, and the role of the United Nations here.
PM Siniora and four of his ministers visited Washington and
New York April 17-22 to discuss the government's reform
efforts and U.S. support for the country in its transition to
democracy. Neither we nor the Lebanese made any specific
commitments. Siniora,s visits to the White House and later
the UN were successful, and showed both Lebanon and Siniora
in a positive light. Back at home, Siniora has faced
criticism from his opponents for visiting Washington as well
as for promoting of an economic reform plan that contains
austerity measures, and increased taxes, bound to be
unpopular locally. The National Dialogue process, begun in
early April by Parliamentary Speaker Nabih Berri, was
initially successful in lowering communal tensions, but after
several weeks of inactivity, appears to have run its course.
The rivalry between the pro-reform "March 14" coalition
(consisting of blocs led by Saad Hariri, Walid Jumblatt and
Samir Ja'ja') and the pro-Syrian "March 8" coalition (led by
Hizballah and Amal with Michel Aoun as a loose affiliate) is
as heated as ever. Prime Minister Fouad Siniora, who heads
the pro-reform government, claims a mandate to pursue the
goals of "March 14," but the way forward has not been easy
since he took office in July 2005. Lebanese sovereignty has
been under attack during his term in office, and "governance
by consensus" has limited Siniora's ability to push for
closure in the Hariri assassination case. Pro-Syrian
President Emile Lahoud remains in office in defiance of UNSCR
1559 and is an additional obstacle to reform. End Summary.


A Momentous Past Year
--------------


2. (C) Fouad Siniora, longtime associate and political
supporter of assassinated Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri, took
office as Prime Minister in July 2005. Supporting the
government is a 71-member (out of 128) parliamentary
majority, elected in May-June 2005 and led by Hariri's son,
Sa'ad. Siniora,s 24-member Cabinet began its work just
months after the April 2005 withdrawal of Syria's military
and overt intelligence personnel from Lebanon. Although
undoubtedly you will hear valid criticism of the election law
used, the May-June Parliamentary elections were relatively
fair and free, thus rendering Siniora's cabinet was the first
genuinely "made in Lebanon" government after nearly 30 years
of de facto rule from Damascus.


3. (C) The pro-reform, pro-sovereignty March 14 coalition is
led by the younger Hariri, along with Druze leader Walid
Jumblatt, and Lebanese Forces leader Samir Ja'ja'. This
coalition takes its name from the massive rally held in
Beirut one month after the elder Hariri's murder on February
14, 2005. The coalition's stated political objectives are:
determining the truth and meting out justice in the Hariri
assassination, restoring Lebanon's sovereignty, and pursuing
much-needed, but long-delayed reforms.


4. (C) Facing the pro-reform bloc is the "March 8" coalition
(also named after the date of a rally, only a pro-Syrian one,
in 2005),composed of the Shia movements Hizballah, led by
Hassan Nasrallah, and Amal, led by Speaker of Parliament
Nabih Berri. Free Patriotic Movement leader Michel Aoun,
with 21 parliamentary seats, mostly Maronite, often sides
with Hizballah and Amal on political issues and entered into
a "cooperative alliance" with Hizballah on February 6, with
the issuance of a joint communique that outlined common
political goals. Michel Aoun has made clear on numerous
occasions his desire to be Lebanon's next president.


5. (C) The unique nature of post-civil war Lebanese politics
makes the Siniora Cabinet more like a miniature Parliament
(minus Michel Aoun's bloc) than an executive body controlled
by the parliamentary majority. In it are ministers belonging
to, or at least serving at the pleasure of, Hizballah and the
Amal Movement -- the "March 14" coalition's primary,
pro-Syrian opponents. This situation has made it difficult
for Siniora to govern effectively.


6. (C) Syria's ally Hizballah remains a
state-within-a-state, with its own militia arguably stronger

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than the Lebanese Armed Forces. Hizballah has ignored UNSCR
1559's requirement that they disarm and give way to the
deployment of Lebanese Armed Forces along the Blue Line
between Lebanon and Israel. Hizballah justifies its violent
actions by claiming that is a legitimate "resistance" to
Israeli occupation of the Shebaa Farms, which it and many
other Lebanese parties claim to be Lebanese territory. This
claim is not widely shared by the international community.


Economic reform agenda: bitter pills to swallow
-------------- ---


7. (C) Prime Minister Siniora has assembled a capable
economic team and forged ahead in drafting a detailed reform
program. Its goal is to bring under control Lebanon's
mammoth debt-to-GDP ratio. Beyond fiscal adjustment, the
government also wants to increase economic growth and
employment by making Lebanon an easier place in which to do
business. The plan includes some social safety nets.
Siniora's opponents accuse the PM of proposing a plan that
would exact a high social cost from the Lebanese people,
already overburdened with taxes.


8. (C) The "Core Group" of friends of Lebanon -- including
the United States, France, the United Kingdom, the UN, and
the World Bank agrees that Lebanon enjoys an unprecedented
window of opportunity for support for a credible and
sustainable reform program. The government's economic team
understands this well, but -- as demonstrated by today's
labor demonstration against Siniora's cabinet and reform plan
-- has not won domestic political "buy-in" to the program.


The Political Reform Agenda:
Changing how the people pick their leaders
--------------


9. (C) The Siniora government recognizes that political
reform must accompany economic reform priority. While still
a work in progress, the new draft electoral law as currently
written will introduce reforms, including the establishment
of an independent
commission to oversee elections.


10. (C) Changing the electoral status quo will not
necessarily benefit the "March 14" parliamentary majority in
the next election. PM Siniora will face a challenge in
shepherding a draft law, once it is finally produced, through
his cabinet and on to the Parliament. For now, he simply
needs a final draft law, now slated for announcement in late
May.


11. (C) A series of national dialogue sessions -- hosted by
Speaker of Parliament Nabih Berri, with Siniora, as well as
Aoun and the leadership of Hizballah and Amal at the table
-- has tentatively agreed to ask Syria to demarcate the
Syrian-Lebanese border, establish normal diplomatic relations
between the two countries, and restrict armed Palestinians to
the camps. The dialogue also affirmed the Lebanese identity
of the disputed lands known as Sheba'a farms. However, the
talks show no sign of cutting through the immediate impasse
over the Lahoud presidency, as well as the longer-term
problem of Hizballah's disarmament.


UNIFIL and safeguarding the Blue Line
--------------


12. (C) You will visit the headquarters of the United
Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL),which was created
in 1978 to confirm Israeli withdrawal and to help Lebanon
re-establish control of the border with Israel. At present,
the force is made up of just under 2,000 troops under the
command of French Major-General Alain Pellegrini.


13. (C) In the past year, incidents of varying degrees of
intensity took place along the Blue Line, although the last
incident of major fighting was in November 2005. Most
recently, on December 28, 2005, unidentified persons fired
122mm rockets into Israel from Lebanon. On February 3, 2006,
Hizballah and the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) exchanged fire
in the Sheba'a Farms after the IDF shot a Lebanese shepherd
near the Blue Line. Israeli overflights have continued, most
recently spiking on May 1 when UNIFIL observed 10 Israeli
jets crossing the Blue Line


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14. (C) There is a widespread assumption that Syria and Iran
manipulate Hizballah to stage attacks across the Blue Line.
The Syrian and Iranian connection with Hizballah (which
receives up to $480 million per year from Iran for its
military, political, and social service activities) is
disruptive to regional stability, given the Israeli
retaliation that it provokes and the attendant pressure on
the Siniora government.


15. (C) In December 2005, the Secretary-General recommended
the renewal of UNIFIL's mandate. The Security Council
subsequently approved (on January 31, 2006) resolution 1655,
which extended the mandate by six months to July 31, 2006.
Important new points in the resolution -- compared to
previous ones renewing UNIFIL's mandate -- included specific
mention of Hizballah, recognition of Lebanese government
efforts to strengthen cooperation with UNIFIL, urging of the
Lebanese government to do more to assert its authority in the
South, and the Security Council's intention to continue to
review the mandate and structure of UNIFIL in order to adjust
the force, as appropriate, to its mission.


16. (C) The Lebanese government has made some limited
progress of late, such as the LAF's co-location of its
liaison offices with UNIFIL headquarters in Naqoura. Also,
the Joint Security Force (JSF),an amalgam of the ISF and
LAF, has more actively patrolled southern Lebanon. However,
the JSF remains well below its advertised level of 1,000
personnel.

Sheba'a Farms and the Lebanese-Syrian borders
--------------


17. (C) The Sheba,a Farms comprise about 24 square
kilometers of land, occupied by Israel after the 1967 war,
and located in the southern Lebanon-Syria border area.
Importantly, the Sheba,a Farms lie south of the Blue Line
(i.e., in Israeli-occupied territory),which the UN had
demarcated in 2000 for confirming Israeli withdrawal from its
occupation of southern Lebanon. The Blue Line is not a final
border demarcation between Lebanon and Israel or the
Israeli-occupied Golan, but it does stand as a point of
demarcation in which both sides, Lebanon and Israel, are to
enforce their own sovereignty and respect the sovereignty of
the other party.


18. (C) The United States and other western countries view
the Sheba,a Farms as Israeli-occupied territory of the
Syrian Golan. The Shia, led by Hizballah, insist that the
Sheba,a Farms are Lebanese territory, which renders
Hizballah,s efforts to liberate this land a legitimate
resistance to occupation. The national dialogue recently
affirmed the Lebanese identity of Sheba'a Farms. Syria has
remained vague in its statements of Sheba'a calling it simply
"Arab lands." Complicating matters are the differing
opinions on where exactly the boundaries of the Shebaa Farms
lie as well as the status of nearby villages. Accordingly,
there is recent interest in demarcating the border between
Lebanon and Syria, which could produce an outcome that
declares the Sheba,a Farms to be Lebanese. The Syrians
might support such a finding, since it would give legitimacy
to Hizballah,s military efforts against Israel. It is also
important to note, however, that when the UN demarcated the
Blue Line in 2000, for confirming Israeli withdrawal from
southern Lebanon, the Lebanese government assented to the
demarcation carried out by the UN which put the Sheba,a
Farms south of the Blue Line and thus in Israeli-occupied
territory.


UNIIIC and the Hariri investigation
--------------


19. (C) A second major UN-related issue here is the UN
International Independent Investigation Commission,
established by UNSCR 1595 in mid-2005 to investigate the
February 2005 assassination of former Prime Minister Rafiq
Hariri. Serge Brammertz replaced Detlev Mehlis as the
commissioner in January 2006. The Commission began its
work in summer 2005, has issued three reports on the
assassination, one in October and a second in December. The
UNIIIC reports have pointed the finger at Syrian complicity
in the assassination, as well as likely knowledge of it on
the part of four leading former Lebanese security service
heads, who are now jailed on the order of the Lebanese
judiciary.


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20. (C) Serge Brammertz issued his first report in March

2006. He confirmed that the commission would continue to
press for cooperation from the Syrian authorities. In April
2006, Brammertz traveled to Syria and interviewed President
Asad. UNSCR 1644 of December 2005 extended the mandate of
the UNIIIC for another six months, through June of 2006.
UNSCR 1644 also calls for the UN and Lebanese authorities
toward the possible establishment of a special tribunal with
internatioanl character to try the Hariri assassination
suspects, and expand the Commission,s work to cover not just
the Hariri assassination, but all 16 bombings,
assassinations, and attempted assassinations in Lebanon since
October 2004. You will be meeting with Lebanon,s lead
negotiators for this tribunal, judges Ralph Riachy and
Shoukri Sadr. They and Lebanon,s Justice Minister, Charle
Rizk, are unhappy that the UN,s Office of Legal Affairs, led
by Nicolas Michel, has not been as energetic as they would
like in working toward a joint Lebanese-UN agreement on the
special tribunal. But their motives are political as much as
judicial: they want to absolve themselves of responsibility
for a poiltically-charged and potentially dangerous trial, by
shifting witnesses, detainees, etc. to the special tribunal.



Follow-up to UNSCR 1559
--------------


21. (C) After the adoption of UNSCR 1559 in September 2004,
the Secretary General appointed Terje Roed-Larsen as his
Special Envoy to monitor implementation of 1559. Larsen
issued his third report on implementation, under the
authority of the Secretary General, on April 18, 2006. As of
this writing, the U.S., UK, and France are co-sponsoring a
resolution to follow up this report, with the objective of
giving momentum to 1559 implementation. Key requirements
still outstanding are the disbanding and disarming of all
militias (this includes Hizballah for us, though not all
Lebanese would agree),the extension of Lebanese government
control overall all Lebanese territory, and achieving strict
respect for Lebanese sovereignty, territorial integrity, and
political independence. On these issues, we advocate
delineation of the Syrian-Lebanese border, and establishment
of embassies between the two countries. Syria is resisting a
dialogue with Prime Minister Siniora on these and other
bilateral issues.


Supplementary Background on Lebanon and the United Nations
-------------- --------------


22. (C) Despite the importance of the UN in Lebanese
politics, the Foreign Ministry still has not yet proposed a
permanent Representative to take over their UN mission in New
York. The post has been vacant since 2004. Because of the
high level of UN attention given Lebanon, the Foreign
Minister (he is one of the five Shi,a boycotting cabinet
meetings) personally follows UN-related portfolios within the
ministry. During your visit with the Foreign Minister, it
would be helpful for you to ask him when his government plans
to fill key diplomatic posts such as New York.


23. (C) UNIFIL (United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon) was
created in 1978 to confirm Israeli withdrawal and to help
Lebanon re-establish control of the border with Israel, among
its objectives. At present, the force is made up of just
fewer than 2000 observers commanded by French Major-General
Alain Pellegrini. In the past year there have been incidents
of Lebanese violations of the border. Most of these
violations have been attributed to either Hizballah or to
Palestinian rejectionist groups operating inside Lebanon. A
series of incidents of varying degrees of seriousness has
continued along the Blue Line. Attacks also have been
launched from outside of the designated UNIFIL area of
operations in southern Lebanon. Most recently, on December
28, unidentified persons fired 122mm rockets into Israel from
Lebanon . (There were no fatalities on the Israeli side.)
Israel responded with air strikes within a few kilometers of
Beirut International Airport. In December 2005, the
Secretary-General recommended the renewal of UNIFIL's

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mandate. Discussions on UNIFIL mandate renewal will take
place this month in New York. The foregoing issues, as well
as others such as Israeli overflights of Lebanese territory,
and which infringe on Lebanese sovereignty, will be raised.


24. (C) Geir Pedersen, Personal Representative of the
Secretary-General for Lebanon, took up his present mandate in

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BEIRUT 00001481 005 OF 005


November 2005. His newly-expanded mandate includes economic
and social development issues as well as peace and security.
This effectively makes Pedersen the head of all UN-related
activities in Lebanon. Pedersen's previous portfolio was
limited to southern Lebanon. He is widely experienced in
regional issues including the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
Pedersen and his small staff manage all of the political
issues in Lebanon from the Blue Line to support for
democratic reforms.


25. (C) As noted above, perhaps the highest profile UN body
in Lebanon is now the United Nations International
Independent Investigation Commission (UNIIIC). (UNIIIC
Brammertz, mindful of attempts to paint him as a USG tool,
maintains a distance from us. When we do see him, he cites
the independent nature of his comission in declining to share
information on the substance of his work. We have thus not
requested a meeting for you with Brammertz.) We stand with
Egyptian President Mubarak, British Foreign Secretary Straw
and French President Chirac in their public calls for full
Syrian cooperation with the UNIIIC. We expect the
international pressure on Syria to continue. The United
Nations Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia
(ESCWA) does not play a major role in development in Lebanon.
The organization organizes regional conferences and monitors
development trends for reporting purposes.


26. (C) UNRWA is another important UN organization for
Lebanon, with PRM playing the lead role for our relations
with the organization. UNRWA's Lebanon field director,
Richard Cook, is now working with the GOL on alleviating some
of the worst humanitarian issues of Palestinian refugee
camps. The government of Lebanon is an uneasy partner in
refugee issues, especially on the highly sensitive issue of
the refugees, future. Lebanese are very concerned that the
300-400,000 Palestinian refugees in Lebanon not be resettled
in Lebanon. Most of the refugees reside in camps outside the
direct control of the Lebanese government. Most are Sunni
Muslim, and their permanent settlement in Lebanon would not
only present a severe economic challenge to this densely
populated country, but it would alter the even more highly
charged issue of Lebanon,s internal confessional balance.
Palestinian issues are colored by some fear, still lingering
after the civil war, of armed Palestinian groups both inside
and outside the refugee camps. Of particular concern is the
PFLP-GC, which has mounted armed attacks against Israel from
Lebanese soil.


27. (C) Lebanese citizens and their government do not
believe their judicial system is capable of following up on
the UNIIIC conclusions about Syrian complicity without
international involvement in the investigations and
subsequent trials. However, there is much suspicion of the
UN, especially among Lebanese Shia, who see all UN activity
as eventually leading to implementation of UNSCR 1559.
During your meetings here, you will be asked to reassure
Lebanese that the international community remains committed
to helping Lebanon discover the truth of Hariri's
assassination. You will ask face the conspiracy theories
that the U.S. is about to make a deal with Syria at Lebanon's
expense, and we recommend that you repeat at every occasion
that U.S. support for Lebanon is strong and non-negotiable.
FELTMAN