MGLE01: A/S HILLEN MEETS WITH UN REPRESENTATIVE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 001465

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/WERNER/SINGH
PARIS FOR ZEYA
LONDON FOR TSOU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/09/2016
TAGS: PREL MASS ASEC SNAR PTER LE SY IS
SUBJECT: MGLE01: A/S HILLEN MEETS WITH UN REPRESENTATIVE
TO LEBANON


BEIRUT 00001465 001.2 OF 003


Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey Feltman. Reason: Section 1.4 (b).

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) UN Representative Geir Pedersen believes the events
of the past few months have greatly changed the political
situation in Lebanon, particularly concerning Hizballah.
Whereas before, Hizballah essentially had a free pass on its
arms and political objectives, now the terrorist organization
finds it has to defend its positions both in the National
Dialogue and the media. Pedersen also believes the Lebanese
decision to pursue disarmament of Palestinian militias
located outside the refugee camps is significant, even though
the actual number of militiamen involved is relatively small.
He stated it has re-energized the overall disarmament
process and, if successfully implemented, will deprive Syria
of a means of instability. The UN Representative stated that
Lebanon and the international community should push Syria
hard on border demarcation, diplomatic recognition, and
committing to a formal position on Shebaa Farms. Lastly, he
believed the recent stability in Lebanon could be rapidly
undone if the Iranian nuclear standoff badly deteriorates and
Iran instructs its Hizballah proxies to react. End summary.


2. (U) UN Secretary General's Personal Representative to
Lebanon Geir Pedersen met with Pol-Mil A/S John Hillen and
the Ambassador on May 4 at the UN Headquarters in Beirut. UN
senior advisors Imran Riza and Salman Sheikh, as well as A/S
Hillen's Special Assistant Matthew Lehrman, military advisor
Major Reginald Robinson and poloff, also attended the
meeting.


3. (C) A/S Hillen, who had just completed a tour of
UNIFIL's operating area in south Lebanon, noted the rapid
pace of economic development in the border region since his
last visit, as well as the apparent calm. Representative
Pedersen commented that the entire UNIFIL zone had been
stable for several weeks, ever since the beginning of the
National Dialogue process (March 3),and said he hoped the
dialogue would continue because it appears to have dampened
Hizballah's aggressive behavior, if not its rhetoric.


4. (C) Pedersen maintained that a combination of factors
has produced a positive atmosphere that should be exploited,
specifically noting the applicable Security Council
resolutions and presidential statement, moderate success in
the National Dialogue process, PM Siniora's willingness to
meet with the Syrian president to discuss bilateral
relations, and the continuing strong international support of
Lebanon's pro-reform government. Pedersen believes these
developments have made both Syria and Hizballah uncomfortable
and the pressure should be maintained.

JUMBLATT'S IMPORTANT CHANGE OF HEART
--------------


5. (C) Pedersen said that perhaps the most significant
recent change was the willingness of Druse leader Walid
Jumblatt to confront Syrian leadership and demand that
Lebanon's leaders discuss topics that were previously
off-limits. "Walid broke the taboos and went public,"
remarked the UN envoy. He said Jumblatt's actions put
considerable pressure on Hizballah -- and they are not used
to it. He argued that before Jumblatt put Hizballah's
disarmament on the table, the terror organization had free
reign in the south and serious leverage with the government.
Now, Pedersen continued, Nasrallah had to defend their
weapons and political objectives, and had been compelled to
put the latter in a Lebanese context. In his opinion,
Hizballah is uncomfortable trying to explain its relationship
with Tehran and Damascus to the Lebanese public and has
committed several mistakes. The most notable is that they
are now caught in a clear contradiction: are they
philosophical allies with Tehran's leadership, or are they a
"genuinely Lebanese" entity.


6. (C) Pedersen remarked it was interesting to see
Nasrallah declare he does not respond to Syrian direction and
then try to explain actions which have an obvious connection
with regional events. He remarked that it will become even
more interesting to see how Hizballah responds to
developments in the Iranian nuclear dossier.


BEIRUT 00001465 002.2 OF 003


DISARMING THE PALESTINIAN MILITIAS
--------------


7. (C) According to Pedersen, the second major change in
the political landscape has been the National Dialogue's
"historic" agreement to disarm Palestinian militias that have
positions outside the 12 main refugee camps. Although the UN
envoy admitted those groups only account for a "few hundred"
militiamen, he maintained it was politically significant
because it placed disarmament in full public view and could
not fail to impact Hizballah.


8. (C) Pedersen said that Syria has a difficult decision to
make -- it understands disarming "rejectionist" Palestinian
militias will require its acquiescence, and it could gain
some international goodwill by allowing it to proceed. But,
according to Pedersen, the Syrian leadership also realizes it
will be losing an important tool for destablizing Lebanon and
the ability to attack Israel by proxy. One aspect that may
help the process is that, in Pedersen's view, it does not
require an Asad-Siniora meeting, like most of the other
issues discussed by the National Dialogue. Pedersen asked
the US to maintain its steady pressure on Syria on this and
other bi-lateral issues. "If successful," he concluded, "we
could unlock the situation and reduce much of the current
cynicism."

SHEBAA FARMS
--------------


9. (C) Representative Pedersen recognized the US position
that Lebanon's emphasis on Shebaa Farms is excessive and
likely to lead to a Syrian/Hizballah trap. But, he argued,
that like it or not, the "liberation" of the disputed area
had entered Lebanon's national consciousness and had somehow
to be addressed. In the most recent National Dialogue
meetings, Hassan Nasrallah had made an issue out of Lebanon's
national defense strategy that specifically included the
return of Shebaa -- and the Lebanese public appear to have
accepted his premise. The question posed by Pedersen was how
to "unlock" this stalemate without Syria's (problematic)
participation. Pedersen said the UN is unlikely draw the
borders, but perhaps the Security Council could "recognize"
Lebanon's claim, as long it was not challenged by Syria.


10. (C) According to Pedersen, the greatest problem with
Shebaa is its geographic definition -- there is little
agreement about how much area is actually involved. The
Ambassador also pointed out that not all Lebanese factions
(i.e. Hizballah) even wanted it defined; ambiguity serves
their purpose. But Pedersen countered that if an acceptable
boundary could be agreed upon and it were "returned" to
Lebanese sovereignty, it would put enormous pressure on
Hizballah, not only from the international community, but
from almost all of Lebanon's political spectrum.


11. (C) Obviously, he continued, there would have to be a
national consensus (via the National Dialogue process) that
Shebaa would indeed be Lebanon's (and Hizballah's) final
demand and that resolution of the issue would remove all
pretext for action against Israel. Pedersen concluded by
noting that Hizballah has committed itself and the chance to
make it abide by its commitment was worth the effort.

PROPOSAL TO REPEAT A GESTURE
--------------


12. (C) Along with Shebaa Farms, it was noted that
Hizballah has long made an issue of the location of Israeli
minefields in territory they withdrew from in 2000, even
though Israeli forces at that time provided maps to the GOL
with this information. The Ambassador observed that despite
this fact, many Lebanese continue to believe this important
humanitarian information was never released. It was
suggested that Pedersen could propose that the IDF repeat the
turnover of this data in a way by which the Lebanese could no
longer maintain that they had not received the maps. This
gesture would be perceived in a positive manner by most
Lebanese and remove one more justification for its arms from
Hizballah's rhetoric.

SYRIAN ACTIVITY INSIDE LEBANON'S BORDER
--------------


BEIRUT 00001465 003 OF 003



13. (C) According to his sources, Pedersen said Syrian
border guards had indeed built a number of earthen barriers
and manned "two or three" new guard posts inside Lebanese
territory near the villages of Ras Baalbek and Arsal. He
confirmed the berms were new construction and were located
1-4 kilometers inside a fairly well recognized border (it
runs along the top of a ridge in this area). Pedersen
thought the Syrian claim of stopping smuggling was
disingenuous at best. He said his contacts in Hizballah had
fallen in line with their Syrian mentors and were parroting
the same excuse, but Pedersen got the clear impression they
were slightly embarrassed by the weak Syrian charade.


14. (C) Pedersen praised PM Siniora's initial low-key
response to the situation by calling on local officials to
discuss and settle the matter. A meeting between the
respective Lebanese and Syrian governors has already been
scheduled for next Tuesday and Pedersen felt the indications
were positive. UN senior advisor Salman Sheikh, however,
stated his belief that, as international pressure ratchets up
on Syria, there may be some near-term increase in tensions,
with the resulting increased likelihood of a serious
incident. He did not have solid proof, but said he based his
opinion on his understanding of past Syrian behavior in
similar situations.


15. (C) Representative Pedersen opined that continued
stability in Lebanon, particularly in the south, depended
much on regional developments, specifically how the
international community dealt with Iran's nuclear ambitions
-- and Iran's response.


16. (C) In summation, A/S Hillen assured Pedersen that US
policy was to provide firm support to Lebanon's pro-reform
trajectory, full implementation of UNSCR 1559, and the
country's on-going National Dialogue process. Regarding
political-military assistance, A/S Hillen stated that the US
and its international partners could provide Lebanon with
capabilities, but it was up to the Lebanese themselves to
effective use them in their transition to democracy.


17. (U) This cable has been cleared by A/S Hillen.
FELTMAN