Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06BEIRUT1464
2006-05-10 06:45:00
SECRET
Embassy Beirut
Cable title:  

MGLE01: PM A/S HILLEN MEETS DEPUTY PM AND DEFENSE

Tags:  PREL MASS ASEC SNAR PTER LE SY 
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PP RUEHAG RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHMOS
DE RUEHLB #1464/01 1300645
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 100645Z MAY 06
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3445
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE
RUEHROV/AMEMBASSY VATICAN 0554
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 BEIRUT 001464 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/WERNER/SINGH
LONDON FOR TSOU
PARIS FOR ZEYA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/09/2016
TAGS: PREL MASS ASEC SNAR PTER LE SY
SUBJECT: MGLE01: PM A/S HILLEN MEETS DEPUTY PM AND DEFENSE
MINISTER MURR


BEIRUT 00001464 001.2 OF 004


Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey D. Feltman for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d
).

SUMMARY
-------

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 BEIRUT 001464

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/WERNER/SINGH
LONDON FOR TSOU
PARIS FOR ZEYA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/09/2016
TAGS: PREL MASS ASEC SNAR PTER LE SY
SUBJECT: MGLE01: PM A/S HILLEN MEETS DEPUTY PM AND DEFENSE
MINISTER MURR


BEIRUT 00001464 001.2 OF 004


Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey D. Feltman for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d
).

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (S) In a 5/4 dinner meeting with the Ambassador and PM
A/S Hillen, Deputy Prime Minister and Defense Minister Elias
al-Murr said that enhanced U.S. security assistance would
boost morale in the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) and make his
job easier in soliciting equipment donations from Gulf
countries. Murr claimed that he simply wanted to keep the
LAF "alive" for the next half-decade, until a regional
"solution" could ease pressure on Lebanon. Worried about
both Hizballah and Sunni militants, Murr was particularly
interested in the LAF's counter-terrorism capabilities,
claiming to have already formed the "best counter-terrorism
strike force in the Middle East." Admitting that this
particular unit was predominantly Christian, Murr claimed to
have dramatically shifted the sectarian balance of the LAF in
favor of Christians and Sunnis over the past year. End
summary.

NO "SHOPPING LISTS"
--------------


2. (S) At a May 4 dinner hosted by the Ambassador, visiting
PM Assistant Secretary Hillen told Murr in general terms
about U.S. plans for enhanced security assistance to Lebanon.
Murr responded positively, adding that the Lebanese
government needed to keep its requirements for assistance --
specifically, military equipment -- "down to earth." He
criticized the "shopping lists" of equipment that both the
LAF and Internal Security Forces (ISF) had put together in
the past, saying they exceeded those organizations' needs as
well as their capabilities.

U.S. HELP PROVIDES LEVERAGE IN THE GULF
--------------


3. (S) Murr said that, once the Defense Ministry had a
realistic list of equipment needs, U.S. support -- even if it
consisted only of spare parts and training -- would let him
make a stronger case for assistance from Gulf Arab states as

well. He preferred donations of second-hand equipment to
funding, and Gulf countries were the ideal sources. This was
because much of their own equipment was U.S.-origin and
therefore compatible with the LAF's existing stocks of
equipment and its maintenance know-how. Also, the military
equipment of Gulf countries has typically not seen much use,
so it tends to be reasonably well maintained and low on wear
and tear.

U.K. ASSESSMENT: ESSENTIAL STARTING POINT
--------------


4. (S) Murr said he would personally take charge of
developing a list of LAF equipment needs. (He claimed to
have told an assembly of senior LAF officers on his first day
on the job that he would not be the kind of minister who
delegates everything to the LAF Commander). An important
starting point was a written assessment of LAF capabilities
developed by the British military and provided just two days
earlier to Murr by the British Ambassador. (Comment: We
separately received a copy from the British.) It included a
"very realistic" list of immediate LAF equipment needs, the
projected cost of which would be "normal," not excessive. "I
have to use it," Murr said of the British document.

SECURITY ASSISTANCE GOOD FOR MORALE
--------------


5. (S) Murr told Hillen that, besides giving Lebanon more
leverage as it "marketed" for military equipment from Gulf
countries, U.S. assistance provided an important boost to LAF
morale. It even helped keep the LAF, with its
multi-confessional makeup, united. Murr asserted that even
Shi'a personnel in the LAF would get a morale boost from
enhanced U.S. assistance.


6. (S) Increased U.S.-Lebanese military-to-military ties
also kept Lebanon's civilian security services in better
shape, according to Murr. Citing his experience in running
both the LAF (in his current position) and the ISF (in his

BEIRUT 00001464 002.2 OF 004


earlier terms as Interior Minister from 2000 to 2004),Murr
said he knew that, "without a strong army, we'll lose
independence. . . we'll lose control of the ISF." A strong
LAF was essential "if we have to implement (UN Security
Council Resolution) 1559," he added.

PLAN FOR A FUTURE LAF
--------------


7. (S) Murr concluded by saying that secondhand equipment
from Gulf countries, combined with U.S.-provided training and
equipment, would allow him to build a "well-equipped" LAF
"within six months." A/S Hillen told Murr that the security
assistance package (Section 1206) currently awaiting
President Bush's signature was appropriate for Lebanon's
needs as Murr had described them. It was a simple package
that met Lebanon's needs directly. Hillen said that the USG
could also play a supportive role as Lebanon sought
supplemental assistance from Gulf countries.


8. (S) Murr said his plan for the LAF involved:

-- Recruiting 8,000 more personnel;

-- Securing needed equipment from foreign donors;

-- Maintaining a sectarian equilibrium within the ranks; and

-- Maximizing training opportunities in countries like the
United States and the United Kingdom.


9. (S) On the last point, Murr said he would emphasize
foreign training for the approximately 5,000 junior officers
within the LAF's officer corps of 7,000. His goal was to
gradually erode the influence of the "Syrian-Russian" model
inculcated over a decade-and-a-half of Syrian-provided
training.


10. (S) Murr added that he did not want a "heavy" army, but
a "light" one. He envisioned a force structure consisting of
five heavy brigades, one for each of Lebanon's governorates.
The rest of the LAF would be transformed into light,
highly-mobile groups that could deal with problems in the
country's interior.


11. (S) Murr suggested that his ultimate goal was relatively
modest. He simply wanted to keep the LAF "alive" for the
next half-decade. Beyond that, he counted on "a solution in
the region" -- addressing Iran, Syria, and the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict -- to ease the pressures that
Lebanon is currently experiencing. Describing himself as
"not very optimistic" about Lebanon's future, Murr said that
the best Lebanon could hope for was to become a
Singapore-like entrepot for the region.

JORDANIAN TANKS OFFER
--------------


12. (S) Murr said that a reported Jordanian offer of M-60
tanks so far was only "a story." The LAF could use M-60
tanks, because its existing tanks were obsolete. However,
Murr was unwilling to devote limited resources to cover the
costs (refurbishment, shipping, maintenance) he expected the
supposed Jordanian offer to involve.


13. (S) Murr said he would prefer to spend limited resources
on M-113 tracked vehicles and light wheeled vehicles for the
use of the LAF's special forces. If things ever got to the
point where the LAF actually needed to use M-60s, Murr said,
it would be too late for them to do much good. By that
point, he suggested, Lebanon would be in a state of civil
war, and the LAF would have split into three parts.

BUILDING COUNTERTERRORISM FORCES...
--------------


14. (S) Murr appeared keenly interested in the LAF's special
forces and their counter-terrorism applications. He claimed
to have made a major effort over the past year, since taking
office, to build the special forces' capabilities. As a
result, Lebanon had the "best counter-terrorism strike force
in the Middle East."


15. (S) "I can count on this group," Murr said of the LAF

BEIRUT 00001464 003.2 OF 004


special forces' counter-terrorism strike force, in a variety
of contingencies, including airplane hijackings, school
hostage-takings, and attacks on foreign embassies. Since
taking office, he had presided over the training of 500 LAF
counter-terrorism personnel. They currently made up eight
brigades that were adequately equipped. They had certain
unmet equipment needs, such as telecommunications equipment
and helicopters, according to Murr.

... THAT COULD EVEN CONFRONT HIZBALLAH?
--------------


16. (S) Pressed for more details on this group (comment: of
which we have heard nothing from LAF contacts who should
know),Murr said that its sectarian composition (a
classically Lebanese matter) was about 70 percent Christian,
30 percent Sunni Muslim. To ensure reliability from a
security point of view, members of the group had been
recruited from sons of trusted LAF personnel. Murr expressed
hope that the group would be reliable and capable enough
that, if necessary, it could be used against Hizballah.

WHOSE JOB IS COUNTER-TERRORISM?
--------------


17. (S) Asked whether counter-terrorism was properly the
LAF's mission or the ISF's, Murr said that this was a
"classical problem" that pitted militaries against police
departments all over the world. "The results are important,"
he said, and this meant that, in Lebanon's case, both the ISF
and LAF needed involvement, preparation, and support. Murr
noted that the LAF's (Maronite) commander, General Michel
Suleiman, had doubts about the ISF's role in
counter-terrorism. Suleiman based his concerns on the
grounds that ISF intelligence director Wissam El-Hassan -- a
Sunni Muslim and Hariri family protege -- was incapable of
tackling the threat posed by Sunni militants.


18. (S) Murr said that, as Interior Minister, he had created
the ISF's counter-terrorism groups as well. Unfortunately,
his successor as Interior Minister, Suleiman Franjieh -- a
member of the pro-Syrian "loyalist" cabinet of then-Prime
Minister Omar Karame -- had "destroyed" them. (Apparently
the SARG was unhappy that Murr had created them in the first
place.) However, the ISF counter-terrorism groups'
capabilities could be rebuilt "quickly" once the decision to
do so was taken, Murr said.

DOES THE LAF HAVE "TOO MANY" MUSLIMS?
--------------


19. (S) Sectarian balance was very much on Murr's mind. He
claimed to have dramatically shifted the confessional balance
of the LAF during his tenure as minister, so that it was not
excessively weighted in favor of Shi'a Muslims.
Specifically, he claimed to have created 10,000 new positions
in the LAF, for which he had exclusively recruited Christians
(mostly) and Sunnis. As a result, the ratio of Muslims to
Christians in the LAF had gone from 58 percent a year ago to
35 percent. Over time, he hoped that Shi'a communal support
for Hizballah would diminish.

DARK VIEW OF SYRIA
--------------


20. (S) In the meantime, Lebanon remained in a dangerous
neighborhood, according to Murr. There was no "minimum role"
in Lebanon that Syrian President Asad's regime would accept.
Murr was scathing when it came to Asad. Were it not for
Asad, he said, "you wouldn't have 2,000 troops killed in
Iraq. . . you wouldn't have instability in Lebanon."


21. (S) Murr accused the SARG of playing a double game,
winning the support of Arab and European governments by
presenting itself as a bulwark against Sunni militants, while
at the same time manipulating Sunni militant groups for its
own purposes. He also expressed concern about the effect a
nuclear-armed Iran would have on the situation in Lebanon.

GOING IT ALONE?
--------------


22. (S) Murr -- whose hobbies include piloting jets and
helicopters -- described himself as flying solo in more ways

BEIRUT 00001464 004.2 OF 004


than one. Other than him, "nobody" was working to build
strong national institutions. "I am alone," said Murr, who
recently divorced his wife -- and President Lahoud's daughter
-- Carine. The assassination attempt he survived in July
2005 had been directed against him -- undoubtedly by the
SARG, in his view -- because "I was doing a good job."


23. (S) Murr noted that the Hizballah member of Prime
Minister Siniora's cabinet, Mohammad Fneish, during a break
in a recent cabinet meeting, had passed on a warning that
al-Qa'ida-like groups might make another run at Murr in the
form of a suicide attack. (Note: A stationary,
vehicle-borne explosive device was used in the previous
attempt on Murr's life.) Murr worried about the "message"
that Hizballah, via Fneish, had passed him, saying it
appeared to be "laying the groundwork" for another attack.
Murr even suggested -- without offering specifics -- that
many terrorist attacks in Lebanon were a "joint venture"
between Sunni militants, who provided the operatives;
Hizballah, which offered surveillance and intelligence; and
the SARG, which took the decisions to execute attacks.

READY TO DEAL WITH SUNNI
MILITANTS "ONCE AND FOR ALL"
--------------


24. (S) On the subject of Sunni militants, Murr said that
those released under a 2005 amnesty law -- the so-called
"Danniyeh" and "Majdel Anjar" groups -- were being kept under
close surveillance, particularly after the February 5 riots
in Ashrafieh. (Murr noted that, had he been in Lebanon
rather than undergoing medical treatment in Switzerland
during the February 5 riots, he would have given the LAF
orders to shoot to kill.)


25. (S) Murr said that, if amnestied Sunni militants
attempted to conduct any further attacks, he would "go after
them, once and for all." In case it was not clear what he
meant by this, he said that he did not want to run the risk
that Parliament -- with elections coming by 2009 -- would
grant amnesty yet again to "Danniyeh" and "Majdel Anjar"
militants captured alive.

COMMENT
--------------


26. (S) We have not been able to verify Murr's claims to
have so dramatically shifted the sectarian balance of the LAF
(although we have seen evidence of new billets being
created). The fact that Murr has had to do so -- assuming he
really has done as much as he claims -- will strike American
observers as at least a little disconcerting. For one thing,
surely a counter-terrorism force without any Shi'as -- in a
country where Shi'as make up the largest single confessional
group (one credible estimate puts them at 35 percent, about
the same proportion as all Christian groups put together) --
is not viable over the long term.


27. (S) Comment, continued: But the fact is that Murr may
not have much of a choice. There is a disturbing rift
between the Shi'a community and all other confessional groups
on almost every basic issue facing Lebanon. A large
proportion of Shi'as, in their support for Hizballah,
effectively reject the standard definition of a territorial
state. Pending future developments regarding Hizballah's
weapons and greater political pluralism in the Shi'a
community, stopgap measures may be needed. End comment.


28. (U) A/S Hillen did not have an opportunity to clear this
cable.
FELTMAN