MGLE01: SCENESETTER FOR MAY 3-5 VISIT OF PM A/S

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BEIRUT 001310

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

FOR PM A/S HILLEN, PM/RSAT, AND NEA/ELA
NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/WERNER/SINGH
LONDON FOR TSOU
PARIS FOR ZEYA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/26/2016
TAGS: PREL MASS PTER KPKO OTRA LE
SUBJECT: MGLE01: SCENESETTER FOR MAY 3-5 VISIT OF PM A/S
JOHN HILLEN


BEIRUT 00001310 001.2 OF 004


Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey D. Feltman for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d
).

INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) During his recent visit to Washington, Prime Minister
Siniora expressed confidence about Lebanon's ability to
tackle critical problems through a process of national
dialogue. Of these problems, the two most prominent are the
fate of President Lahoud, who remains in place through a
Syrian-orchestrated extension of his term in office; and
Hizballah, a designated foreign terrorist organization that,
through its paramilitary presence on the border with Israel,
holds decision-making power over war and peace that rightly
belongs to the Lebanese state. Siniora did request U.S.
support as the Lebanese tackled these difficult issues. He
urged the United States to "empower" the Lebanese state and
help Lebanon become a model of democracy and religious
tolerance in the region.


2. (C) Your May 3-5 visit to Lebanon is an important
opportunity to follow up on the commitments expressed to
Siniora by President Bush, Secretary Rice, and other USG
officials in support of Siniora's reform agenda, including in
the security sector. You will be able to brief Siniora and
other Lebanese officials on the recent decision under section
1206 authority to provide another USD 9.9 million in security
assistance, information about which has not yet been widely
shared. In addition, you can use the opportunity to press
the Lebanese on the need to pursue genuine reform of the
security sector.


3. (C) Syria's withdrawal from Lebanon opened up new
opportunities for enhancing our security assistance
relationship. Deputy Prime Minister and Defense Minister
Murr, LAF Commander Suleiman, and ISF Director-General Rifi,
all of whom you will see, are key players. Ultimately, a
coordinated approach to reforming the security sector with
U.S. assistance must come from the top, that is, from
Siniora. With Hizballah and Syria's other Lebanese allies
back on the offensive, we must present new security
assistance initiatives in ways that minimize our and
Siniora's exposure to attack. The Sheba'a Farms issue --
which Hizballah exploits as a pretext for remaining armed --
directly affects UNIFIL's mission. End introduction and
summary.

A NEW ERA FOR SECURITY ASSISTANCE
--------------


4. (C) Post-civil war Lebanon had two distinctive,
regressive characteristics: Syrian overlordship and a
Lebanese regime intended to serve Ba'athist Syrian agendas
rather than the Lebanese people. At the same time, two
trends steadily diminished the capabilities of the security
sector, particularly the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF). First,
a rising mountain of national debt squeezed the Lebanese
government's discretionary spending ability, resulting in
steadily lower defense budgets each year. Second, LAF
equipment (much of it U.S.-supplied in a previous era of much
more extensive defense cooperation) steadily aged under U.S.
restrictions on military assistance and training to Lebanon.


5. (C) The terrorist assassination of former Prime Minister
Hariri in February 2005 triggered a massive public reaction
against Syrian control of Lebanon. Combined with
international pressure, this led to the withdrawal of Syrian
military and overt intelligence forces from Lebanon -- after
30 years of presence -- in April 2005. Prime Minister
Siniora's cabinet, arguably the first one genuinely "made in
Lebanon" at least since the end of the civil war in 1990,
took office in the summer of 2005. While the presence of the
first-ever Hizballah cabinet member surely complicates the
matters, Siniora's government is nonetheless intent on
securing an upgraded military-to-military relationship and
other forms of security assistance from the United States.

KEY FIGURES BESIDES SINIORA: SULEIMAN, MURR, RIFI
-------------- --------------


6. (C) A decade-and-a-half of Syrian control over the
Lebanese security sector bred a cautious LAF leadership.

BEIRUT 00001310 002.2 OF 004


Some of our contacts describe its commander, General Michel
Suleiman, as a fence-sitter. While he leaned in a "Lebanese"
direction earlier in 2005, when Syria and its Lebanese allies
were clearly on the defensive following the Hariri
assassination, he has been leaning back towards Damascus in
recent months, as Hizballah and the Asad regime's other
allies in Lebanon have gone on the offensive.


7. (C) You may hear a different perspective from Defense
Minister (and Deputy Prime Minister) Elias al-Murr. Murr,
son-in-law of President Lahoud, was seen as a "loyalist" (in
the perverse use of that term, meaning loyal to Syria) prior
to the July 2005 attempt on his life. Murr has since blamed
that attack on Syria, whose military intelligence "proconsul"
had what seems in retrospect to have been a tense
relationship with him. The attempt on his life -- a bomb
that destroyed Murr's armored vehicle, and from which he has
not yet fully physically recovered -- literally blasted Murr
from the pro-Syrian "loyalist" camp to the pro-sovereignty
camp.


8. (C) Murr's subsequent requirements for medical treatment
have kept him out of Lebanon for long periods of time since
July 2005. While in Lebanon, concerns about continued
security threats have limited his freedom of movement. All
of this has limited his ability to influence security policy
decision-making.


9. (C) The current Director-General of the Internal Security
Forces (ISF),General Ashraf Rifi, was appointed following
his predecessor's arrest on suspicion of involvement in the
Hariri assassination, at the recommendation of the UN
commission investigating the assassination. Rifi is highly
competent, cooperative with the United States and other
friendly countries, and -- while close to Prime Minister
Siniora and the Hariri family, and unlike other pro-Hariri
ISF officials -- not obviously "political." He reports to
the acting Interior Minister, Ahmad Fatfat, who will not be
in Lebanon during your visit.

SECURITY SECTOR REFORM: WHAT IS NEEDED
--------------


10. (C) The needs for reform and capacity-building within
the security sector vary from one element to another.
Arguably, no element needs them more than the ISF. There is
a widespread phenomenon of the LAF filling in the gaps left
by civilian security services -- primarily the ISF -- such as
in border security. In this light, security sector reform
and capacity-building can serve the purpose of attaining a
more appropriate balance of responsibility between the
military and civilian security services.


11. (C) While happy to see the LAF receive more U.S.
assistance, neither Suleiman nor Murr have pushed the
envelope in pursuit of meaningful reform. For example, there
has so far been no real attempt to match projected LAF
equipment needs with future missions. Ninety percent of the
defense budget goes to personnel, and cuts in the highest
ranks, even though they are bloated, will probably not
realize significant savings. The LAF, especially its
intelligence organization, the G-2, continues to be
responsible for things that, in a normal democracy, domestic
civilian security and law enforcement services would be
doing.


12. (C) To be effective, security sector reform, addressing
the ISF and LAF as well as various other elements, will need
to be coordinated at the highest level of Lebanon's political
leadership. For most of the post-civil war area, the
President of the Republic took the lead on national security
while the Prime Minister -- usually Rafiq al-Hariri -- dealt
with the economy. Now, with President Lahoud in many ways
the last vestige of Syrian domination of Lebanon, this
division of labor is not realistic.


13. (C) In this situation, with the USG and other potential
security partners unwilling to deal with the discredited
Lahoud, leadership in security sector reform will have to
come from the Prime Minister's office. While Prime Minister
Siniora in 2005 said he would establish a security reform
coordination unit in his office, this has yet to happen.
Siniora will require prodding on this issue.

BEIRUT 00001310 003.2 OF 004



SECURITY SECTOR REFORM: WHAT WE ARE DOING
--------------


14. (SBU) On the military and civilian sides of the security
sector, we are working to build capacity and promote reform.
Post's Office of Defense Cooperation has managed an
International Military Education and Training (IMET) program
for years. USD 1 million in Foreign Military Financing (FMF)
approved by Congress in 2005 will supplement IMET in FY-06,
allowing 100 hundred LAF members to participate, as opposed
to 16 LAF members in FY-05. USD 9.9 million in mid-year
funding under Section 1206 (Global Train and Equip) will
purchase spare parts for U.S.-origin vehicles and equipment,
body armor, ammunition for existing U.S.-origin weapons, and
communications. The proposed purchases are drawn from the
findings of November-December 2005 CENTCOM assessments of
U.S.-origin equipment within the LAF.


15. (SBU) In response to a series of terrorist bombings,
assassinations, and assassination attempts during 2005 that
were clearly aimed at rolling back Lebanon's recent gains in
sovereignty, USD 1 million from Economic Support Fund for
Lebanon will fund FBI training of two 10-member "evidence
response teams." This will measurably boost the capability
of the ISF (and possibly other civilian services) to secure
and investigate scenes of terrorist attacks. In addition,
the FBI will shortly donate some USD 1 million worth of crime
laboratory equipment to the ISF.


16. (SBU) Following on this initial FBI training program,
the Department of State dispatched Anti-Terrorism Assistance
(ATA) pre-assessment and assessment teams to Lebanon in March
and April 2006. These visits laid the groundwork for an ATA
program to begin work, for the first time ever, in Lebanon.


17. (C) There are pitfalls here that require us to tread
carefully in expanding our security assistance ties to
Lebanon. Seemingly every major political decision in
Lebanon's confessional system of government has to be taken
by consensus, a reason why Siniora has a card-carrying
Hizballah member of his cabinet (as well as one
non-card-carrying Hizballah supporter). In December 2005,
Hizballah virtually shut down Siniora's cabinet in response
to his call for broadening the mandate of the UN
investigation of the Hariri assassination, organizing a
boycott by the cabinet's Shi'a ministers that lasted until
February 2006.


18. (C) Hizballah and the Syrian regime's other remaining
allies in Lebanon will similarly try to frustrate our efforts
to expand security assistance. To avoid giving them
ammunition -- figuratively if not literally -- we will need
to present our security assistance initiatives strictly in
terms of support for Lebanese state institutions and
sovereignty. While these initiatives can objectively serve
the goal of full implementation of UNSCR 1559, explicitly
linking them to UNSCR 1559 will expose them to attacks by
Hizballah and others, who will portray them as nothing more
than ploys to disarm "the resistance," Hizballah.

UNFIL
--------------


19. (U) You will also visit the headquarters of the United
Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL),which was created
in 1978 to confirm Israeli withdrawal and to help Lebanon
re-establish control of the border with Israel. (According
to UNIFIL, you are the highest-ranking Washington official
ever to visit their current headquarters.) At present, the
force is made up of just under 2,000 troops under the command
of French Major-General Alain Pellegrini.


20. (U) In the past year, incidents of varying degrees of
intensity took place along the Blue Line, although the last
incident of major fighting was in November 2005. Most
recently, on December 28, 2005, unidentified persons fired
122mm rockets into Israel from Lebanon. On February 3, 2006,
Hizballah and the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) exchanged fire
in the Sheba'a Farms after the IDF shot a Lebanese shepherd
near the Blue Line.


21. (C) There is a widespread assumption in Lebanon that

BEIRUT 00001310 004.2 OF 004


Syria and Iran manipulate Hizballah to stage attacks across
the Blue Line. The Syrian and Iranian connection with
Hizballah (which receives up to $480 million per year from
Iran for its military, political, and social service
activities) is disruptive to regional stability, given the
Israeli retaliation that it provokes and the attendant
pressure on the Siniora government.


22. (U) In December 2005, the Secretary-General recommended
the renewal of UNIFIL's mandate. The Security Council
subsequently approved (on January 31, 2006) resolution 1655,
which extended the mandate by six months to July 31, 2006.
Important new points in the resolution -- compared to
previous ones renewing UNIFIL's mandate -- included specific
mention of Hizballah, recognition of Lebanese government
efforts to strengthen cooperation with UNIFIL, urging of the
Lebanese government to do more to assert its authority in the
South, and the Security Council's intention to continue to
review the mandate and structure of UNIFIL in order to adjust
the force, as appropriate, to its mission.


23. (C) The Lebanese government has made some limited
progress of late, such as the LAF's co-location of its
liaison offices with UNIFIL headquarters in Naqoura. Also,
the Joint Security Force (JSF),an amalgam of the ISF and
LAF, has more actively patrolled southern Lebanon. However,
the JSF remains well below its advertised level of 1,000
personnel.

THE SHEBA'A FARMS ISSUE
--------------


24. (SBU) Related to UNIFIL's mission is the issue of the
Sheba'a Farms area. This tiny, semiarid, unpopulated corner
of the Israeli-occupied Golan in the Syria-Lebanon border
area comprises about 96 square kilometers of land --
according to some estimates, which vary because the
boundaries are not clear. Importantly, the Sheba'a Farms lie
south of the Blue Line (i.e., in Israeli-occupied territory),
which the UN had demarcated in 2000 for confirming Israeli
withdrawal from southern Lebanon, in compliance with UNSCR
425 (1978). The United States and other countries view the
Sheba'a Farms as Israeli-occupied territory of Syria's Golan
region.


25. (C) The Blue Line is not a final border demarcation
between Lebanon and Israel or the Israeli-occupied Golan, but
it does stand as a point of demarcation in which both sides,
Lebanon and Israel, are to enforce their own sovereignty and
respect the sovereignty of the other party. Despite this,
Hizballah, with most of the Shi'a community behind it, has
insisted that the Sheba'a Farms are Lebanese territory. This
interpretation is used by Hizballah to justify its military
efforts to "liberate" this scrap of land as "legitimate
resistance to occupation."


26. (C) While few Lebanese, Shi'as or otherwise, have found
it worth their while to challenge Hizballah on this issue,
many people of various political persuasions support border
demarcation and a potential declaration that the Sheba'a
Farms really are Lebanese. They do so on the grounds that
such a finding (and the possibility of a subsequent Israeli
withdrawal),would eliminate Hizballah's justification for
its arms.


27. (C) It takes two to tango when it comes to border
demarcation, however, and there is little reason to believe
that Damascus would do anything -- like agreeing to the
Lebanese status of the Sheba'a Farms -- that would expose
Hizballah's main pretext for remaining armed. Continued
ambiguity over the Sheba'a Farms suits the interests of the
SARG. Moreover, there is little reason to believe that
Israel would respond to any change in the Sheba'a's
international status by withdrawing its military positions
there. We need to work to lower Lebanese expectations on
this issue, and certainly want to distance ourselves from any
efforts that wind up reinforcing Hizballah's justification
for "armed resistance."
FELTMAN