MGLE01: JUMBLATT CONCERNED WITH GROWING IRANIAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 001308

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/WERNER/SINGH

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/27/2016
TAGS: IS KDEM LE PGOV PREL SY
SUBJECT: MGLE01: JUMBLATT CONCERNED WITH GROWING IRANIAN
INFLUENCE

Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey Feltman. Reason: Section 1.4 (b).

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) Walid Jumblatt expressed concern that Iran appears
to be gaining influence in south and north Lebanon. In both
regions, the economically disadvantaged are vulnerable to
well-funded and growing Iranian efforts. When he visited
Saudi King Abdullah two weeks ago, Jumblatt discussed this
issue and said he received assurances that the Saudi
leadership is aware of the threat and is mobilizing resources
to oppose it. Jumblatt remarked that Iran's nuclear claims
have "shaken the Saudis from their slumber." Concerning
Michel Aoun, whose recent criticism of the Siniora government
has noticeably worsened, Jumblatt reasoned that as the
presidency recedes from his grasp, the Free Patriotic
Movement leader is becoming more anxious and unpredictable.
Jumblatt suggested that an effort be made to break Aoun away
from Hizballah/Syrian influence, but it would be difficult to
do so with his current close circle of pro-Syrian advisors.
Finally, in his view, the National Dialogue process has run
its course and should be de-emphasized. End summary.


2. (U) Druse leader Walid Jumblatt received the Ambassador
and poloff at his residence in Mukhtara on April 26. A week
earlier, Jumblatt had returned from a trip to Riyadh where he
had discussed Lebanon's political situation in an extended
meeting with King Abdullah.


3. (C) Jumblatt expressed satisfaction that PM Siniora's
visit to Washington had been successful, and said the
statements of the prime minister with President Bush, and
later at the United Nations, would serve the country well.
In both content and imagery, he said the meetings had been
well received and, thus far, there had been little overt
criticism in Lebanon's press. And despite some indications
to the contrary, Jumblatt maintained that Future Movement
leader Saad Hariri was also satisfied with the results of the
visit.

JUMBLATT'S TALKS WITH KING ABDULLAH
--------------


4. (C) The veteran Druse leader spoke of his recent meeting
with Saudi Arabia's King Abdullah, where the primary topic of
conversation appears to have been the rise of Iranian
influence. Remarking that Iran's nuclear ambitions were
clearly worrying the Saudi regime, Jumblatt said the growing
involvement of Iran in Lebanon's affairs had not gone
unnoticed by the Saudi leadership. And it is no longer
simply that Iran uses Hizballah as a tool, Jumblatt noted.
He said the Saudi discomfort stems in part from what is
clearly increased Iranian funding to the economically
depressed Sunni community in Lebanon, particularly in the
impoverished north and far south. According to Jumblatt, the
Saudi ruler also alluded to possible assistance to Syrian
opposition forces when, after a discussion of Syrian
interference in Lebanon and the unacceptable behavior of the
Syrian regime, King Abdullah remarked, "...leave this matter
to us."


5. (C) He inferred that some of the Saudi funding may come
in the form of the payment of arrears owed to Saad Hariri's
financial empire. These payments, which reportedly exceed
USD $1 billion, could be used to fund some of the unfulfilled
commitments Hariri made to his Sunni constituencies during
last year's election campaign, particularly in economically
distressed north Lebanon, where Sunni fundamentalism has
taken strong root and attracted the interest of the Iranian
regime.

LAND PURCHASES IN SOUTH LEBANON
--------------


6. (C) Jumblatt expressed concern that not only were
Iraian funds making their way to Sunni fundamentalist in
north Lebanon and Hizballah in the south, bu there were
reliable reports that Iranian interets were purchasing
significant amounts of land inthe Shebaa Farms area from
Sunni and Druse landoners. Jumblatt said he had discussed
this with ing Abdullah and had recommended that Saudi
inteests balance the situation, since Lebanese could nt
compete with the well-funded newcomers.


7. C) The veteran leader said that Hizballah was now
responding directly to Iranian guidance and were adroitly

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manipulating Michel Aoun and his powerful Christian bloc. To
illustrate his point, he spoke of the retraction issued this
week by Hassan Nasrallah of an agreement made at the National
Dialogue regarding demarcation of the Lebanese-Syrian border.
Jumblatt stated it was perfectly clear that the Dialogue
members had reached consensus on this important issue, but
now it was obvious that Hizballah was responding to Iranian
and Syrian direction. In his opinion, the Syrian regime had
calculated that their best chance for survival was to align
themselves as closely as possible to what they perceived to
be an ascendant Iran and Hizballah was logically following
suit.

MICHEL AOUN
--------------


8. (C) With regard to Aoun, the Druse leader expressed
frustration with the willingness of the former general to
play into Hizballah's hands. He believed it was a mixture of
ambition and naivete, as well as a pro-Syrian coterie of
advisors, that was propelling Aoun deeper into the March 8
coalition. Jumblatt said he had discussed with other March
14 members the value of trying to bring Aoun back into the
pro-reform fold, but nothing much had come of it. He
suggested that the Ambassador could discuss with Aoun the
peril of his relationship with Hizballah, but strongly
advised that such a discussion be conducted outside the
presence of his advisors, particularly Gebran Bassil and
Alain Aoun.


9. (C) When asked about the possibility the Aounists, in
conjunction with Hizballah, would resort to street
demonstrations on or about May 1st to protest the policies of
the Siniora government, Jumblatt said he had just spoken with
several union leaders who indicated to him that there was
unrest in the labor movement, particularly over the proposal
to raise new taxes, but that nothing would occur until
mid-May.


10. (C) Jumblatt said the Siniora government and the
Hariri-led parliamentary majority had to be careful in the
coming weeks. He said he had spoken with Saad Hariri about
the perception that not only was the Sunni majority filling
all the top posts in the government, but were also being a
bit too effective in also corralling the second and third
tier positions of the bureaucracy. Jumblatt said many of
these appointments were competent and qualified people, but
the perception of Sunni political greed was becoming a
serious issue that had to be addressed.


11. (C) Jumblatt observed that despite receiving some
advice from outsiders, Saad Hariri continues to depend
largely on a small circle of Future Movement advisors -- all
of whom are on his payroll, and therefore, not the most
reliable providers of legitimate criticism. In Jumblatt's
opinion, due to his inexperience and the unwise screening by
his advisors, Saad Hariri fails to understand the depth of
two popular complaints: first, that the Sunni leadership is
trying to monopolize power, and second, that poorer elements
of the Sunni community feel neglected, particularly in north
Lebanon where radical fundamentalism is growing. Jumblatt
feels strongly that Hariri has to develop a better feel for
politics as practiced in Lebanon.

NEXT STEPS FOR MARCH 14 COALITION
--------------


12. (C) Jumblatt argued that the government's economic
reform package, as it now stands, will generate considerable
popular opposition, particularly if the plan's proposed tax
increases and elimination of energy (gas/electricity)
subsidies remain intact. He maintained the Siniora
government has to fully explain the reasons for measures that
will require sacrifice by the electorate. Concerning
privatization, Jumblatt remarked it was clear numerous vested
interests will be adversely affected, which of course will
produce further opposition. But he also acknowledged the
country's precarious financial position required a radical
departure from business as usual. He agreed that unless
Lebanon improves transparency and reduces corruption, badly
needed international investment capital will simply pass it
by.


13. (C) In the political realm, Jumblatt indicated the
pro-reform movement will take advantage of opportunities to
criticize the March 8 ministries when they present
themselves. Jumblatt commented that Minister of Energy

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Mohammad Fneish and Minister of Labor Trad Hamadeh were
especially vulnerable due to mismanagement and corruption.
As an example, he mentioned a recent gas deal with Algeria
negotiated by Fneish which contained an inexplicable USD $60
million "black hole" discrepancy. After all the criticism
absorbed by the March 14 ministers, he said it would be good
"to turn up the heat on the Shia ministers."


14. (C) Finally, he stated that despite admirable
achievements in the areas of Palestinian refugees, normalized
relations with Syria, the international tribunal, and the
issue of Shebaa Farms, the National Dialogue process had run
its course. He anticipated the April 28 meeting to be short,
with a possible agreement to continue meeting on a far less
frequent basis.
FELTMAN