Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06BEIRUT1107
2006-04-10 07:21:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Beirut
Cable title:  

MGLEO1: NASSIB, NAYLA, BOUTROS EVALUATE THEIR

Tags:  PREL PGOV KDEM LE SY 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO7605
OO RUEHAG RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHMOS
DE RUEHLB #1107/01 1000721
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 100721Z APR 06 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2982
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 001107 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/SINGH/WERNE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/07/2026
TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEM LE SY
SUBJECT: MGLEO1: NASSIB, NAYLA, BOUTROS EVALUATE THEIR
STANDING IN THE PRESIDENTIAL SWEEPSTAKES

Classified By: Jeffrey Feltman, Ambassador, per 1.4 (b) and (d).

SUMMARY
-------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 001107

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/SINGH/WERNE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/07/2026
TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEM LE SY
SUBJECT: MGLEO1: NASSIB, NAYLA, BOUTROS EVALUATE THEIR
STANDING IN THE PRESIDENTIAL SWEEPSTAKES

Classified By: Jeffrey Feltman, Ambassador, per 1.4 (b) and (d).

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) Over the past week, the Ambassador had one-on-one
lunches with the three presidential candidates generally
considered the front-runners of the March 14 presidential
contenders: Nayla Mouawad, Boutros Harb, and Nassib Lahoud.
The policy differences among the three pro-independence
politicians are slight. Each is thus focused on tactics --
on who has the best chance of winning the parliamentary vote
and standing up to Michel Aoun's considerable popular support
-- whenever presidential elections at last occur. Their
presidential ambitions are now testing their shared promise
not to undercut each other. Nassib, the most statesman-like
of the three, counts on being the first choice of Saad
Hariri, Walid Jumblatt, Patriarch Sfeir and some
international players like Saudi Arabia. He not surprisingly
favors March 14 zeroing in on a single presidential candidate
as soon as possible. Acknowledged as a good tactician,
Boutros counters that Nassib's very popularity with the
Muslims makes him suspect among the Christians. Opposed to a
single March 14 candidate, Boutros wants to utilize the deep
hatred of Nassib by some Christian politicians -- Michel Aoun
and President Emile Lahoud, inter alia -- to build consensus
for himself and earlier presidential elections. As for Sitt
Nayla, she said that she will pursue her candidacy as long as
possible, as an important symbol of the power of women in
Lebanon and the region. But, realistic about her chances,
she said that, when it is time to choose a March 14
candidate, she will shift her support to Nassib, despite her
long-term north Lebanon alliance with Boutros. End summary.

NO REAL POLICY DISPUTES
BETWEEN THE THREE CANDIDATES
--------------


2. (C) With the removal of Emile Lahoud from the
presidential palace more difficult -- and taking more time --
than the March 14 forces anticipated or hoped, the Ambassador
had separate one-on-one lunches to discuss next steps with

the three presidential candidates most often considered (by
themselves and others) to be the front-runners from the March
14 movement: Minister of Social Affairs Nayla Mouawad,
Member of Parliament Boutros Harb, and former MP Nassib
Lahoud. The three friends and political allies, in a private
dinner several months ago that quickly became public
knowledge, had a handshake agreeing that none would undermine
the other in the presidential sweepstakes. When the time
came to vote in a new president (conducted in Lebanon by
parliament, not the citizenry),then they would all back
whichever of the three of them had the best chance of
success. Until then, they vowed to cooperate.


3. (C) What each says about his or her policy goals --
upholding the Taif-amended Lebanese constitution,
strengthening the institutions of the state, supporting
positive relations with Syria contingent upon Syria
recognizing and respecting Lebanon's independence, using
internal dialogue to build consensus on disarming Hizballah
without destabilizing the country, etc. -- Nassib, Boutros,
and Nayla seem to think alike on the principles. Thus, they
focused in their lunches with the Ambassador on tactics. All
three recognize that, once the presidency at last becomes
vacant, Michel Aoun is their most formidable opponent. While
Aoun will not have the parliamentary nod if the 71-member
March 14 parliamentary majority maintains unity, Aoun can use
his popularity to discredit others. In collusion with
Hizballah and Amal, he could also threaten to prevent a
quorum in parliament to influence the presidential elections.

NASSIB, TOP CHOICE BY KEY PLAYERS,
SUPPORTS A SINGLE MARCH 14 CANDIDATE NOW
--------------


4. (C) Nassib explained that his strength was the support
he gets from Walid Jumblatt and Saad Hariri, who believe that
Nassib is the best choice. Most important, Maronite
Patriarch Sfeir has "whispered to me that I am his favorite."
In addition, he said, Saudi Arabia backs him; Saudi
influence can be used with Syria and others. Nassib also
expressed belief that, internationally, he is generally the
top choice. While still bruised from his loss, Nassib denied
that his 2005 parliamentary defeat by Michel Aoun's Metn list
eliminated his chances for the presidency. According to
Nassib, when pollsters ask Lebanese citizens "off the top of

BEIRUT 00001107 002 OF 003


their heads" who is their top choice for president, Michel
Aoun comes out on top, with Nassib second. But when Lebanese
are forced by pollsters to choose between Aoun and Nassib,
then Nassib comes out ahead.


5. (C) The Ambassador asked whether the same wouldn't
happen with other candidates, once the danger is eliminated
that non-Aoun votes would be divided among many candidates.
Yes, Nassib acknowledged, Boutros, too, comes out ahead of
Aoun, although with less support than Nassib. But the point,
he says, is that such polls show that the loss of Nassib's
parliamentary seat does not make him an unacceptable choice
for the presidency in terms of public opinion.


6. (C) In Nassib's view, the best way for the March 14
block to stand up to Michel Aoun's challenges is to "put a
face" on their principles by choosing a single presidential
candidate now. Expecting to be that person, Nassib said that
he could then concentrate on distinguishing himself from Aoun
in ways that the Christian public will begin to reject Aoun's
insistence that only he can be a credible, strong leader. In
essence, Nassib and Aoun could begin a kind of presidential
debating process, in which Nassib believes that he would come
across as the more thoughtful, sensible leader. As the
Lebanese compare Nassib and Aoun, then President Emile Lahoud
(Nassib's despised second cousin) becomes irrelevant, Nassib
said. "The price will drop for getting rid of him," for
people will stop focusing on Lahoud altogether.

BOUTROS COUNTS ON HATRED FOR NASSIB
PROPELLING HIS OWN CANDIDACY FORWARD
--------------


7. (C) Two days later, Boutros Harb acknowledged that
Nassib is the March 14 frontrunner. But Nassib's Saudi
connections -- his wife's sister was the wife of Saudi King
Abdullah and has children with him -- and his backing by
Jumblatt and Hariri do not help him with the Christian
street, Harb said. Nassib is an easy target for Michel Aoun
to attack. Moreover, Boutros said, Nassib is deeply hated by
some key figures: Michel Aoun (who believes that, in 1990,
Nassib -- then Lebanon's ambassador to Washington -- colluded
with Washington and Damascus in having Aoun bombed out of
Baabda Palace),President Emile Lahoud (generational family
disputes),powerful Metn political boss Michel Murr (local
political rivalries),and former president Amin Gemayel (more
Metn politics). A Nassib candidacy will drive these four
politicians into a common pact to prevent his presidency.
The Ambassador asked whether Gemayel would really abandon his
March 14 allies to back Aoun, whom Gemayel often describes as
"crazy," vs. Nassib. "Absolutely," Boutros said, citing the
deep antipathy Gemayel has for Nassib.


8. (C) This hatred, Boutros said, gives his own candidacy a
boost. While claiming he has not forgotten his handshake
with Nassib and Nayla, Boutros said that he is also sending
out signals to people that, if Emile Lahoud stays in office
until the end of his term, then it is highly likely that the
parliamentary majority will simply elect Nassib Lahoud as
president. For those who want at all costs to prevent a
Nassib presidency, then they can make a deal now to have a
Boutros presidency instead. For although Jumblatt and Hariri
favor Nassib, they want Emile Lahoud out. So even they would
accept a second choice -- Boutros -- as president, if that
means a quicker disposal of Emile and thus a quicker
assumption of the premiership by Saad. Although the
Ambassador thought he was engaging in wishful thinking,
Boutros saw a chance even Aoun, despite his presidential
obsession, might find this argument appealing, especially as
Aoun's son-in-law/advisor Gebran Bassil could then run for
Boutros' abandoned parliamentary seat.

NAYLA WILL FIGHT ON AS LONG AS POSSIBLE,
BUT CONCEDES SHE WILL ULTIMATELY BACK NASSIB
--------------


9. (C) Sitt Nayla, on the other hand, accepted that she
probably has the least chance of the three. She talked of
how much wanted the presidency, what a credible president she
would make, and how important it was for Lebanon and the Arab
world to see a woman who insists on trying. "I think I
deserve it," she said, talking of her years of public service
and foundation work. But, when the time is right, she will
give her backing to Nassib, she said. While she and Boutros
have had a northern Lebanon alliance for years, she declared
Nassib a more "trustworthy and wise" candidate whose
international ties and credibility "would be good for

BEIRUT 00001107 003 OF 003


Lebanon." Wistfully referrnig to her own presidential
wishes, she also noted the symbolism, during this period of
transformation in Lebanon, of having the widow of a previous
president murdered by the Syrians ascend to Baabda Palace.

COMMENT
--------------


10. (C) In our view, Nassib is preferable in the abstract
to all the other presidential candidates, including Boutros
and Nayla (and Michel Aoun, too, for that matter),in terms
of vision and statesman-like bearing and positions. He also
seems to have the least baggage attached to him, especially
as he closed down all family businesses in Lebanon when he
entered politics and broke with the Syrian occupiers earlier
than either Boutros or Nayla. But the choice of Lebanon's
president is not ours to make, and Emile Lahoud shows no sign
of budging from Baabda Palace. If any of these three could
replace Emile Lahoud now, our interests would be well served
in embracing the winner.
FELTMAN