Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06BEIJING8788
2006-05-11 08:56:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Beijing
Cable title:  

CHINESE MUSLIM COMMUNITY MARKED BY DIVISIONS,

Tags:  PGOV PREL PARM KISL CH 
pdf how-to read a cable
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIJING 008788 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/11/2026
TAGS: PGOV PREL PARM KISL CH
SUBJECT: CHINESE MUSLIM COMMUNITY MARKED BY DIVISIONS,
MUSLIM WORLD'S INFLUENCE STILL SIGNIFICANT

REF: A. FBIS 20050819000148

B. 04 BEIJING 20186

C. BEIJING 07353

D. STATE 74399

Classified By: Classified by Acting Political Internal Unit Chief
Susan Thornton. Reasons 1.4 (b/d).

Summary
-------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIJING 008788

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/11/2026
TAGS: PGOV PREL PARM KISL CH
SUBJECT: CHINESE MUSLIM COMMUNITY MARKED BY DIVISIONS,
MUSLIM WORLD'S INFLUENCE STILL SIGNIFICANT

REF: A. FBIS 20050819000148

B. 04 BEIJING 20186

C. BEIJING 07353

D. STATE 74399

Classified By: Classified by Acting Political Internal Unit Chief
Susan Thornton. Reasons 1.4 (b/d).

Summary
--------------


1. (C) The most significant trend in Chinese Islam is
the rise in factions within the Muslim community,
largely due to increasing domestic migration and
closer ties with the Muslim world, several Chinese
Islam scholars observed recently. The Saudi Arabian-
influenced Salafiyya, for example, advocate returning
to a "purist" form of Islam and are highly critical of
other Muslim orders. Another growing sect, the Sala
movement, is opposed by the Chinese Government and
other Muslim groups because its leaders preach a
"doomsday" theory and manipulate congregants into
donating all their possessions. The influence of
South and Central Asia on Chinese Muslims has been
felt in the increasing number of Chinese Hizb ut-
Tahrir followers, most notably in Xinjiang. In
contrast to the often heavy-handed treatment of
Xinjiang's Uighurs, Ningxia, Gansu and Qinghai
officials approach religious affairs more cautiously
and are reluctant to overtly interfere in Muslims'
activities. End Summary.

Fragmentation of Muslim Community
--------------


2. (C) The underlying trend in contemporary Chinese
Islam is increasing division within the Muslim
community, especially in China's heavily Muslim
northwest provinces, Central University of
Nationalities Professor Yang Guiping told poloff in a
recent meeting. Closer ties with the Muslim world and
greater internal migration are transforming the
traditional nature of Chinese Islam and spawning
numerous smaller factions. The traditional Qadim
order, which follows the Hanafi School of Islam and
originated in China over a thousand years ago, is
still the dominant Islamic group in the country. In
recent years, however, newer sects such as the Saudi
Arabian-influenced Salafiyya, which broke away from

the Ikhwan movement in the early 20th century, have
witnessed the fastest growth, Yang observed.


3. (C) The Salafiyya, Yang pointed out, advocate
returning to a "purist" form of Islam and modeling
their lives strictly in accordance with the life of
the Prophet Mohammed. Some of their unique
characteristics, such as the long beards grown by most
Salafi men, are viewed by non-Muslim Chinese as
conflicting with China's trend toward modernization.
The Salafiyya are highly critical of the mystic Sufi
orders and have occasionally clashed with the Sufi due
to disagreements over rituals. Yang noted that the
Salafiyya appear to have significant financial
resources to construct mosques and other projects.
While remarking that the source of the funding is
unclear, she said that Muslim countries have been
allowed to contribute financially to infrastructure
projects in Chinese Muslim areas as long as there are
"no strings attached."

Sala Preach Doomsday Theory
--------------


4. (C) Asked about media reports that Xinjiang
authorities had banned the Sala, a Sufi sub-order (Ref
A),Yang did not directly confirm the reports but
remarked that local authorities object to the
practices of certain Sala communities. She noted that
the Sala, who consist of only 10-20 thousand
followers, primarily ethnic Hui Muslims, began
expanding in the northwest provinces in the 1980s.
Dispersed across the region, some Sala community
leaders preach a "doomsday" theory and have convinced
congregants to donate their entire livelihoods to the

BEIJING 00008788 002 OF 003


community. This has sparked anger among other Muslim
groups and led to government censure of the Sala's
practices. Yang remarked, however, that this is not
true of all Sala, and that in some localities, such as
southern Gansu's Linxia Prefecture (Ref B),they are
accepted as a mainstream group.

Duality of Islamic Affairs Management
--------------


5. (C) While echoing Professor Yang's view of the
growing schism within the Muslim community, Peking
University Islamic Studies Professor Sha Zongping,
himself a practicing Hui Muslim, highlighted the
differences between two main strains of Chinese Islam.
The first group, Xinjiang's Turkic Muslims, including
Uighurs, Kazakhs and Kyrgyz, is on the whole not as
devout and learned in religious studies as the Hui
Muslims in Ningxia, Gansu and Qinghai. Nonetheless,
during recent trips to Xinjiang, Sha perceived an
increasing interest in religion among the Uighurs.
Because Xinjiang is a border region that also faces a
separatist threat, religious activity is strictly
controlled by local government authorities. In
contrast to the often heavy-handed treatment of
Uighurs in Xinjiang, officials in other regions, such
as Ningxia, Gansu and Qinghai, approach religious
affairs more cautiously. They are reluctant to
overtly interfere with the activities of local
Muslis, except when a conflict arises and impacts
social stability within the Muslim community, Sha
stated.


6. (C) Comment: Sha's observation of greater Islamic
scholarship among the Hui is probably linked to a much
more open environment for religious study and practice
in Muslim areas outside Xinjiang. End Comment.

Christianity Gaining Ground in Xinjiang
--------------


7. (C) Sha recalled that Xinjiang religious affairs
officials told him that Christianity is spreading
rapidly in Xinjiang. These officials reported that
the number of house churches is increasing largely due
to the influence of Western missionaries, many of whom
come to the region to serve as teachers. Christianity
appeals to many locals, mostly Han but also a growing
number of Uighurs, because it is viewed as a more
"civilized" and "Western" religion than Islam. The
Xinjiang Government is nonetheless concerned about any
rapidly growing popular movement, Sha remarked.

Foreign Influence on Chinese Muslims
--------------


8. (C) Despite the Chinese Government's close
monitoring of financial assistance provided by Muslim
countries to China's Muslim communities, financial and
other forms of aid from the Muslim world have
occasionally been funneled through unofficial
channels, according to Chinese Academy of Social
Sciences (CASS) Institute of West Asian and African
Studies scholar Yin Gang (Ref C). In some cases the
government has tacitly approved such assistance,
especially to underdeveloped areas. However, because
of Beijing's policy of channeling all financial aid
through the semi-official Islamic associations,
assistance has often taken the form of supplying
Islamic texts, many of which originate in Pakistan.
In the past years, Yin recalled, police raids in
Xinjiang have uncovered unsanctioned versions of the
Koran and various other "illegal publications" printed
in Pakistan. The influence of the Muslims from South
and Central Asia on Chinese Muslims has been
particularly evident in the increasing number of Hizb
ut-Tahrir followers, most notably in Xinjiang.
Although they maintain a low profile, a number of
Uighur Hizb ut-Tahrir followers have been detained,
and police recently raided the dormitories of several
Xinjiang university students who were suspected of
belonging to the movement, Yin noted.

Information Age Heightens Interest, Ties

BEIJING 00008788 003 OF 003


--------------


9. (C) Increasing access to information, through both
the television and electronic media, is posing
significant challenges to the Chinese Government's
ability to manage Muslims' affairs, Sha indicated.
For example, detailed media reporting of the 2003 Iraq
War prompted groups of Muslims throughout the country,
even in central China's Hubei Province, to petition to
fight alongside the Iraqis. This sparked alarm within
the government, which naturally denied their request.
The modernization of the media has caused Chinese
Muslims to take a much greater interest in the affairs
of the Muslim world, Sha remarked.


10. (C) In order to address these problems, the
Chinese Government has mandated a nationwide training
course for imams, which should be completed within
about five years, Sha reported. This program, which
was launched in 2002, he recalled, aims to guide
Muslim leaders in helping their communities adjust to
the information age and other problems posed by
modernization. The training focuses on techniques to
handle conflicts within the community arising from
events in the outside Muslim world. Imams will be
better equipped to resolve or prevent a local backlash
over outside events after the training, Sha indicated.

RANDT