Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06BEIJING6349
2006-04-05 12:58:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Beijing
Cable title:  

PRC/SUDAN: LEVERAGING UN TROOP CONTRIBUTING

Tags:  PREL KPKO SU CH 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO3001
OO RUEHCN RUEHROV
DE RUEHBJ #6349/01 0951258
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 051258Z APR 06
FM AMEMBASSY BEIJING
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2089
INFO RUEHOO/CHINA POSTS COLLECTIVE
RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIJING 006349 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/05/2016
TAGS: PREL KPKO SU CH
SUBJECT: PRC/SUDAN: LEVERAGING UN TROOP CONTRIBUTING
COUNTRIES TOWARD DARFUR

REF: A. SECSTATE 52950


B. BEIJING 6077

Classified By: DCM David S. Sedney. Reasons 1.4 (b/d).

Summary
-------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIJING 006349

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/05/2016
TAGS: PREL KPKO SU CH
SUBJECT: PRC/SUDAN: LEVERAGING UN TROOP CONTRIBUTING
COUNTRIES TOWARD DARFUR

REF: A. SECSTATE 52950


B. BEIJING 6077

Classified By: DCM David S. Sedney. Reasons 1.4 (b/d).

Summary
--------------


1. (C) The PRC is giving serious consideration to
participating in the "possible" UN peacekeeping operation
(PKO) in Darfur, MFA IO Department UN Division Director Yang
Tao told Poloffs in response to Reftel A points. The PRC
does not want to a Darfur UN peacekeeping operation (PKO)
without the Sudan Government's acquiescence. The African
Union (AU),not the Security Council, is best positioned to
win the Sudan Government's support for a Darfur UN PKO. Any
PRC military contributions must be approved by President Hu
Jintao and the Central Military Commission (CMC),Yang added,
though noting that a civilian police contribution from the
Ministry of Public Security would not need approval at such
high levels. Poloffs stressed the urgent need for a timely,
robust Darfur UN PKO and urged China to give serious
consideration to joining the United States in supporting an
expanded and enhanced UN PKO in Darfur. We assess that China
would only cautiously and slowly even consider a military
contribution to a Darfur PKO, but might provide civilian
policy more quickly. End Summary.


2. (C) Poloffs met April 5 with MFA IO Department UN Division
Director Yang Tao to deliver ref A points. Yang said the PRC
is giving serious consideration to participating in the
"possible" UN PKO in Darfur but stressed that any PRC
military contribution would need to be decided by President
Hu and the Central Military Commission (CMC). He noted that
even in the case of a positive decision, the process is very
slow, pointing to the delays in deploying China's
contribution to the existing Sudan PKO. Yang commented that
a contribution of civilian police elements from the Ministry
of Public Security would not require a decision at such a
senior level. He noted that the MFA has more latitude to
discuss Civ-Pol contributions with the Ministry of Public
Security than troop contributions with the PLA. China would
not contribute troops unless the Sudan Government agreed to a
PKO, Yang stressed.



3. (C) The PRC is waiting for the UN to provide more details
of its requirements, though he noted Beijing's understanding
that SYG Koffi Annan had discussed the need for highly mobile
contingents capable of rapid response. Commenting that the
PLA would need to assess whether it is capable of supplying
the desired forces should it receive a formal request, Yang
reiterated (Ref B) that the PRC does not want to see a UN PKO
in Darfur without the Sudan Government's consent. The PRC
understands prior planning is necessary to facilitate the
possible deployment of UN PKO troops in Darfur and will not
block such planning, although the PRC still has concerns and
would be more comfortable if Sudan supported the possible
operation. The PRC views U.S. participation in the planning
as important for ensuring a successful Darfur UN PKO and is
watching closely U.S. involvement to determine the level of
U.S. commitment to supporting a PKO. The PRC does not have
expectations one way or the other of U.S. troop
contributions, Yang added.


4. (C) The PRC does not want to set a precedent for deploying
a UN PKO without in a country (or region) without the host
country government's consent, Yang said. The PRC position
reflects practical realities, he argued. In Somalia lack of
host country support created a disaster for peacekeepers,
said Yang, who acknowledged that the lack of central
authority created a unique situation. If the Sudan
Government strongly opposes a Darfur UN PKO, China does not
want to be pushed to agree to the Darfur PKO, he said. The
PRC believes that the African Union (AU) must drive the
process of obtaining Sudan Government acquiescence to a
Darfur UNPKO, not the UN Security Council. Rejecting the
position that the AU has already done so, Yang said that the
AU is capable of an unambiguous statement if it sees the
need. If South Africa and Nigeria press hard enough, the PRC
is certain that the Sudan Government will permit a
"re-hatting" of African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) troops
under UN PKO auspices. President Obasanjo, in particular,
can significantly influence the AU position, Yang posited.
The United States strongly urges the PRC consider
contributing troops and otherwise joining the United States
in supporting and expanded and enhanced UN peacekeeping
operation in Darfur, Poloffs stressed.


5. (C) The Sudan Government's decision to bar UN
Undersecretary for Humanitarian Affairs Jan Egeland from

BEIJING 00006349 002 OF 002


visiting Darfur sent a negative signal to the international
community, Yang said. The PRC does not have any plans to
rebuke publicly the Sudan Government for this incident but
will press the Sudan Government for greater cooperation with
the international community through private diplomatic
channels. The PRC Embassy in Khartoum has not yet raised its
concerns with the Sudan Government, Yang added. Poloffs urged
the PRC to press the Sudan Government to allow unrestricted
UN access to Darfur.

Comment
--------------


6. (C) Our assessment is that the PRC will not contribute
forces absent the clear approval of the Sudanese Government
and even then a military contribution to a Darfur PKO would
require careful high-level consideration and likely be slow
in appearing. On the other hand, China might be able to
contribute civilian police on a more rapid basis. Beijing's
decision is unlikely to be linked to China's existing
commitments to other PKOs or limitations in numbers of
available forces.
RANDT