DOE OLYMPIC RADIATION SECURITY WORKSHOP IN BEIJING

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 06 BEIJING 005618

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SENSITIVE
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USDOC FOR 6000/ITA/TD/RPACE
USDOE FOR OFFICE OF SECRETARY
USDOE FOR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
DS/P/PL FOR MIKE VANBUSKIRK
S/CT FOR TIM WALSH
EAP/CM FOR NOAH ZARING

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL PTER KNNP MNUC ENRG ECON ETRD BTIO RGY
CH, KOLY
SUBJECT: DOE OLYMPIC RADIATION SECURITY WORKSHOP IN BEIJING
PROMPTED MANY QUESTIONS FROM PRC OFFICIALS

Summary
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1. (SBU) The Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security
Administration (NNSA),in conjunction with the China
Institutes for Contemporary International Relations (CICIR),
held an Olympic Radiation Security Workshop on February 28.
DOE officers made two presentations titled: "The DOE's
Emergency Response Capabilities and Support Provided at the
2004 Olympics" and "Second Line of Defense Prevention and
Preparedness Support to the 2004 Olympics and Possibilities
for Supporting the 2008 Olympics". Each presentation was
followed by an extensive question and answer period where
Chinese officials from many agencies peppered the DOE
delegation with a wide range of questions, exposing the
concerns of China's security apparatus and their
understanding of how to provide security for a large
international event. NNSA Delegation Head Admiral Krol
congratulated the Beijing Organizing Committee for the 29
Olympiad Games (BOCOG) for its forward leaning approach to
tackling Olympic Security issues, noting that in Greece this
process began only one year before the opening of the Games.
He also reiterated the USG's offer to send an assessment team
to evaluate opportunities for security cooperation. End
Summary.

Security Needs Assessment Process
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2. (SBU) The Beijing Olympic Games Organizing Committee,
Coordinating Office for Olympic Security Division Chief Zhang
Jian was interested in the process for assessing a venue's
vulnerabilities to nuclear or radiological attacks and how
should responses to these types of emergencies be organized.
Admiral Krol emphasized that China must determine its own
nuclear oversight structure and the approach it takes to
handling a crisis. The DOE has a search capability to check
venues before events and to monitor them during the events.
In cooperation with Beijing's Olympic Committee, the DOE is
ready to provide appropriate assistance. Beijing must take
into careful consideration how it will handle public
perception of its ability to provide a safe and secure
environment for the Games. A prank phone call claiming that
a radiological device has been set off inside a venue could
be just as damaging to the Games as an actual attack if China
cannot assuage public perceptions that venue security is weak.

Timeline for Security Needs Assessment
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3. (SBU) Beijing People's Police College Vice President Zhang
Wenping requested more details on the actual assistance
programs DOE provided the Government of Greece (GOG) during
the 2004 Olympics. In particular, he wanted to know how far
in advance DOE and the GOG began collaborating, what specific
training DOE provided the Greek police and what was the Greek
Government's feedback. Admiral Krol congratulated BOCOG for
its forward-leaning approach to tackling Olympic Security
issues, noting that in Greece this process began only one
year before the opening of the Games. He stressed that the
host country must first request assistance and then a joint
assessment of the threat situation will be created.


4. (SBU) During the Greek Olympics, joint assessments were
conducted of the various venues as well as the hosting
cities. The FBI, DOD and local police worked together to
draw up plans for various contingency situations. Krol said
that having an outside entity assess your security situation
provides you with a different perspective and often can
reveal previously overlooked risks.


5. (SBU) The United States is willing to provide a Foreign
Emergency Support Team (FEST) tailored to China's needs
should the PRC request such assistance through the U.S.
Embassy in Beijing and after completing an initial joint
assessment. DOE Response and Exercise Program Manager Steven
Buntman pointed out that during the 2004 Games, DOE provided
the Greek police with radiological pagers, isotopes analysis
and training of various protocols for interviewing
individuals who set off radiological detectors.


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6. (SBU) Beijing People's Police College Vice President Zheng
Weiping asked what specific methods he should employ when
planning exercises for his police team. Mr. Buntman replied
that DOE together with the State Department held a tabletop
exercise in Athens with GOG agencies where the parties
involved walked through responses to 20 emergency scenarios.
The exercise exposed interagency command and cooperation
issues. Admiral Krol suggested that a similar exercise could
be held in preparation for the 2008 Games.

Guidelines For Conducting an Assessment
--------------


7. (SBU) Beijing People's Police College Vice President Zheng
Weiping stated that China should cooperate with United States
to ensure the safety of the Games. To that end what kind of
documents and what type of data does the United States need
from China to make an assessment? Admiral Krol responded
that the assessment process should be completed together.
Working together would provide the best information for both
sides to identify vulnerabilities. The assessment should
address current responses to crisis situations, the overall
response to the Beijing Olympics in terms of how many people,
from how many different countries, will be attending as well
as a review of all venues, transportation and services
associated with the Games.

Airport Security and Assessments
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8. (SBU) Beijing Capital International Airport Public
Security Director of the General Office Li Xuha was
interested in how the United States provided assistance to
monitor Greece's international airport. Dr. Charles Massey
responded that DOE conducted an assessment one year prior to
the Olympic Games focusing on the flow of people, luggage and
cargo. Based on this assessment the two countries developed
a system to screen all people and cargo moving through the
airport. The program was implemented well in advance of the
Games to prevent terrorists from attempting to move
radiological devices into Greece ahead of the Games.

Securing Ground Transportation and Responding to Incidents
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9. (SBU) Deputy Director of the Beijing Subway Command Center
Wang Haiying requested information on how to best monitor the
subway and local ground traffic. He also wanted to know how
to handle a suspected radiological device and whether or not
he should cover it with a box or blanket until experts could
assess the situation. Wang went on to explain that he was
not familiar with radiological devices and is concerned that
calling in radiological specialists to inspect each
suspicious item would disable the subway system. Admiral
Krol said the best way to handle a suspected radiological
device is to put as much space as possible between it and
people by closing the immediate area around the suspicious
device. In the United States, first responders such as the
police and fire companies have basic equipment that can
determine whether or not the suspect item is radioactive.
Admiral Krol stated that the subway system and local
transportation, particularly into the Olympic Village, should
be monitored. One way to do this is by setting up
checkpoints were several roads or trains converge.

Dirty Bombs and Special Teams
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10. (SBU) Beijing Olympic Games Organizing Committee
Coordinating Office for Olympic Security Division Chief Zhang
Jian requested information on how to handle a dirty bomb and
whether or not each specific type of radiological device
needs a special dedicated team to handle it. Admiral Krol
said that DOE has not inactivated an actual dirty bomb but
has conducted numerous exercises. The United States has
teams of specialists that include weapons designers and
engineers that respond to all radiological events.

Speed Requirements for Train Detectors
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11. (SBU) Zhang Jian wanted to know the maximum speed at
which a radiological detector could effectively monitor a
train. He noted that train transportation is still the
backbone of China's transportation infrastructure and could
not handle long delays without interrupting services across
the country. Dr. Charles Massey replied that the slower the
train passes through the detector the better and noted that
eight km per hour is the optimal speed. Detectors are
usually placed along the rail lines in places where trains
are starting or stopping so that the optimal speed is built
into the system and does not impede normal train operations.

Terrorist Radiological Attacks by Underwater Explosives
-------------- --------------


12. (SBU) China Institutes for Contemporary International
Relations (CICIR) Assistant President Yang Mingjie wanted to
know if the United States had the capability to detect
radiological bombs attached to the bottom of ships and said
that he believed that this was an easy scenario with high
probability. Dr. Robert York from the U.S. DOE Oak Ridge
National Laboratory explained that four feet of water
provides a shield for gamma particles and neutrons, making it
impossible to detect a radiological device at that depth or
deeper. The water acts as a perfect shield. Admiral Krol
stated that swimmers or divers could be used to inspect
suspect ships.

Intranet Vice Internet
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13. (SBU) CICIR Assistant President Yang Mingjie wanted to
know if Second Line of Defense detectors are linked together
by using computers operating on the Internet, noting that
this would make the system very vulnerable to hackers. Dr.
Charles Massey said the host government is responsible for
how it sets up its network. Most governments use intranets
or resident systems.

Managing Public Perception of a Crisis
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14. (SBU) CICIR President Yang Mingjie asked for best
practices in managing the public's desire to know details
about an incident. Yang said that without an official
government statement, the media tends to speculate and create
panic surrounding a suspected event. Yang wondered if the
United States uses a national broadcast system to issue
official statements regarding possible radiological events.
Admiral Krol responded that the DOE is a "response"
organization but before responding to public concerns careful
analysis of the situation is conducted to alleviate public
fears.

Concerns Over Cost
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15. (SBU) The Beijing Municipal Counter terrorism Office
Division Chief Jin Yujie asked directly how much DOE provided
radilogical equipment would cost and whether the DOE was
willing to provide any equipment without charge. Jin noted
that recently Beijing has bcome concerned over the rapidly
escalating costs of hosting the Games. Admiral Krol said
that Beijing has two options: DOE could provide comprehensive
training and equipment but at a significant expense, or based
on the joint assessment, DOE could provide basic training,
planning and some equipment that would then be supported by a
FEST. At no expense to China, a FEST would deploy
highly-trained and experienced people as well as sensitive
detection equipment for the duration of the Games. The FEST
members and the equipment would return to the United States
upon the conclusion of the Games. Furthermore, during the
Greece Games, under the Second Line of Defense program the
United States installed in several ports and border crossings
radiological detection equipment and trained personnel how to
use them at no charge to the GOG.

First Line and Second Line of Defense
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16. (SBU) Beijing Municipal Counterterrorist Office Division

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Chief Jin Yujie requested an explanation of the different
roles of the DOE's First Line of Defense and Second Line of
Defense programs. Dr. Charles Massey explained that the DOE
provides assistance to countries that need help protecting
their nuclear materials and weapons to prevent them from
illegally crossing borders. The Second Line of Defense is
then used to monitor international borders throughout the
world to prevent the illegal spread of radiological
materials. Currently there are thirty countries
participating in the program. The program concentrates on
air, land and sea crossings. The portals monitor the
crossing points 24 hours a day and the host country responds
to any suspect readings.

Loopholes in Megaports
--------------


17. (SBU) CICIR researcher Xu Feibao assessed that the
Megaports program is a passive prevention technique because
it only targets large ports while leaving smaller or less
traveled crossing points unscreened. Dr. Charles Massey
responded that DOE uses a prioritization methodology for
determining which ports should participate in the Megaports
program. This includes analyzing maritime trade routes. The
goal is to take away convenient large routes that offer some
protection for illegally transporting radiological materials
because of the large volume to containers that pass through
them. This forces terrorists to use less obvious paths
through smaller ports making it easier for intelligence and
security services to detect.

Effective Cooperation?
--------------


18. (SBU) Mr. Zhang Jian was also interested in what was more
effective and efficient at the Greece Games, bilateral
cooperation or multilateral cooperation? Admiral Krol
responded that both types of cooperation are necessary.
China must work with international organizations such as the
IAEA while at the same time working with individual countries
to guarantee the safety of their citizens, athletes and
dignitaries. During the 1996 Atlanta Olympic Games, the
United States reached out to the IAEA and other countries for
support. China should look for assistance not because it
needs it but because the world wants a successful event and
all countries and international organizations have a stake in
making sure the Games are safe. Mr. Zhang raised the
security brief the United States provides to its Olympic
athletes and was interested in what role the DOE plays in
composing the report. DOE stated that it does not write the
report or contribute directly to it. The State Department
authors this report based on all-source intelligence analysis.

DOE and Intelligence Sharing
--------------


19. (SBU) CICIR Deputy Director Ouyang Liping noted that
intelligence sharing can be very complicated between
different agencies and governments and wondered how
intelligence derived from the radiological screening process
is shared. Admiral Krol stated that once the detection
equipment is installed it is turned over to the host
government. The host government has to decide how it will
introduce the intelligence component into the screening
program. The equipment package is a confidence building
measure that naturally leads to more intelligence sharing.
Admiral Krol pointed out that after all we share the same
goal, to stop the illegal transportation of nuclear material.

Seminar Participants
--------------


20. (SBU) U.S. Participants:

Head of Delegation
Admiral Joseph Krol Associate Administrator for Emergency
Operations, National Nuclear Security Administration, DOE

Dr. Charles Massey Principal, Marsec Government Services
LLC


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Daniel Hartnett Second Line of Defense Program, National
Nuclear Security Administration, DOE

Steven Buntman Response and Exercise Program Manager,
National Nuclear Security Administration, DOE

Rob York Technical Working Lead Group, Oak Ridge National
Laboratory, DOE

Wendy Bashnan Deputy Olympic Security Coordinator, U.S.
Embassy Beijing

Melissa J. Lan Olympics Coordinator, U.S. Embassy Beijing

Don Rogers U.S. Embassy Beijing

Brian C. Chang Transportation Administration, U.S. Embassy
Beijing

Note taker
Interpreters


21. (SBU) Chinese Participants:

Institute of Strategic and Security Studies, CICIR
Mr. Yang Mingjie Assistant President
Ms. Ouyang Liping Deputy Director
Ms. Gao Ying
Mr. Sun Bo
Mr. Xu Feibao

Department of International Exchanges, CICIR

Ms. Du Yanjun Director
Mr. Liu Bo Deputy Director

Coordinating Office for Olympic Security, Beijing Olympic
Games Organizing Committee

Mr. Zhang Jian Division Chief
Mr. Liu Wei Deputy Division Chief
Mr. Hu Xueshan Deputy Division Chief
Mr. Wang Guiqing Deputy Division Chief
Mr. Li Jianhua Staff Member
Mr. Zhao Haifei Staff Member
Mr. Cheng Yongwei Staff Member
Mr. Yuan Jinghui Staff Member
Mr. Han Dong Staff Member

Public Security Bureau, Beijing Capital International Airport

Mr. Li Xuhua Director of General Office
Mr. Wang Ming Staff Member, General Office
Mr. Jiang Huawei Staff Member, General Office
Mr. Wan Changming Guardhouse
Mr. Pan Jianqiang Security Office

China National Nuclear Industrial Group

Mr. Duan Jiaqing Department of Security

Beijing People's Police College

Mr. Zheng Weiping Vice President

Security Coordination Group for Sailing Competitions

Mr. Ye Jianwen Division Chief
Mr. Teng Xuyou Division Chief

SWAT College of China People's Armed Police Forces
Mr. Qin Yumin Editor, Special Police of China
Mr. Chang Ping

National Counterterrorism Office

Ms. Jiang Liyun

Beijing Municipal Counter-Terrorism Office

Mr. Jin Yujie Division Chief

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Intelligence Center for Olympic Security, Beijing Olympic
Games Organizing Committee

Mr. Zhao Hongqing
Mr. Zhang Hongtian
Mr. Zang Xiangjun
Mr. Zhang Shaoning
Mr. Liang Zhiwei
Ms. Liu Rufang

Command Center of Beijing Subway

Mr. Wang Haiying Deputy Director
RANDT