PRC/BURMA: MORE ON SOE WIN VISIT AND BEIJING'S

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BEIJING 004216

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/07/2016
TAGS: PREL PHUM PGOV CH BM
SUBJECT: PRC/BURMA: MORE ON SOE WIN VISIT AND BEIJING'S
RELATIONS WITH RANGOON


Classified By: Political External Unit Chief Edgard Kagan. Reasons 1.4
(b) and (d)

Summary
--------------


1. (C) PRC Premier Wen Jiabao told Burmese PM Soe Win that
China hopes Burma will move forward with national, political
and ethnic reconciliation, according to MFA Asian Affairs
Department Division Director for Burma, Cambodia, Vietnam and
Laos Chen Dehai. Chen first denied that this was a new
message before acknowledging that it marked the first time
Beijing referred to the need for national and political
reconciliation in such direct terms, though he was unsure
whether Soe really understood the message. China wants Burma
to quickly achieve real progress on national reconciliation
and economic development but is firm that this should be done
internally. Chen admitted that besides Beijing's interest in
stable borders, China has important strategic concerns in
Burma. Contacts at the Malaysia, Singapore and Philippine
Embassies agreed, with Singapore particularly concerned about
China using Burma as a staging ground to project military
power. Our Malaysian Embassy contact said ASEAN is
considering expelling Burma but is concerned about China's
reaction. Citing the lack of consensus within ASEAN, Chen
downplayed the possibility of ASEAN taking serious action
against Burma while admitting to being perplexed at Rangoon's
refusal to allow an ASEAN delegation to visit. Chen also
discussed VFM Wu's management style and personality, saying
Wu is willing to take risks because he is planning on
retiring at the end of 2006. End Summary.

Consultations with EAP/MLS
--------------


2. (C) On March 3 Poloffs met over a working lunch with MFA
Asian Affairs Department Division Director Chen Dehai who is
responsible Burma, Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam. Poloff
expressed appreciation for the MFA agreeing to the February
13 consultations on Burma with EAP/MLS Deputy Director
Rapson. Recognizing that the discussions were frank and
positive, Chen reported that it had been difficult for the
MFA to reach a decision on the meeting, citing Premier Soe
Win's arrival on the following day and the unprecedented
nature of the consultations. Our request quickly climbed up
the MFA chain, Chen continued, finally reaching VFM Wu Dawei,
who immediately gave his blessing. Chen said the PRC did not
tell Premier Soe Win about the consultations, but would not
hesitate to brief the Burmese government if asked.

Premier Wen's Message to Premier Soe Win
--------------


3. (C) Chen at first rejected the idea that the Premier
Wen's public usage of "national reconciliation" was new,
saying Premier Wen had used this wording as well as "ethnic
reconciliation" in the past. When pressed, however, Chen
admitted that Premier Wen referred to "political
reconciliation" in addition to "national and ethnic
reconciliation" during his meetings with Premier Soe Win,
though the PRC official media only reported the latter two.
He went on to say that PRC officials have been moving to this
language over the past few years but that Soe's visit may
have been the first time that Beijing publicized these
comments. Chen was unsure whether PM Soe actually noticed
the subtle shift in China's stance or message in any case.

More Details on Premier Soe Win's Visit
--------------


4. (C) Chen said it was noteworthy that Senior General Than
Shwe and various ministers saw Premier Soe Win off at the
airport and welcomed him when he returned from China, showing
the importance of the trip and the bilateral relationsip to
Burma. The trips to Xi'an, the capital or twelve Chinese
dynasties, and Shenzhen, a booming city just twenty five
years old, were purposely planned to show Burma China's 5000
year history as well as its modern economic achievements as a
result of economic reform and opening.

Different Paths to Same Goal
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5. (C) Chen contended that the China, the United States and
most of the world share similar goals for Burma, with the

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main disagreement being over the path to the objectives.
China wants Burma to move quickly down the seven-step road
map, make real progress on national reconciliation and
achieve economic development in order to build a stable and
prosperous society. Burma's neighbors and the international
community should encourage Burma and create an environment
conducive for Burma to internally solve its problems and
achieve these goals, argued Chen.


6. (C) Chen contended that the situation in Burma is not a
major pressing issue for Burma's neighbors, who feel the
issues will be solved with time. This is not the case for
the United States whose main goal is to spread democracy now,
Chen claimed. Poloffs pointed out that ASEAN, India and
other nations can see that the lives of the Burmese people
are getting worse while those in all nations in the region
are improving. Cross-border issues of narcotics trade,
infectious diseases and trafficking in person originating in
Burma have a regional and global impact. A democratic Burma
that incorporates the various sectors of society and ethnic
groups into the government would be better far better
equipped to establish stable and peaceful political control
over the whole country, generate economic growth and make
progress in solving the problems that spill over beyond
Burma's borders.

NLD Gets No Respect and ASSK Has No Experience
-------------- -


7. (C) Commenting on the February 12 proposal by the NLD to
acknowledge the junta as the transitional government if the
junta agrees to convene the People's Parliament according to
the results of the 1990 election, Chen said there is no
chance that the regime will ever take any NLD proposal
seriously because the ruling regime has no respect for the
NLD or ASSK. Contrasting ASSK to former Indonesian
President Megawati and current Philippines President Arroyo,
all daughters of former national leaders, Chen said ASSK was
only three or four years old when her father General Aung San
died and therefore does not have the same experience growing
up in the "halls of power." No one in Burma believes she has
the ability to govern the country, Chen claimed. Poloffs
pointed out that the United States is not demanding ASSK
become President but does consider her continued detainment a
clear symbol of the lack of political and human rights in
Burma. Releasing ASSK from house arrest would allow the
regime to show that it is serious about addressing the
political issues facing Burma.

Frustration Over the Move to Pyinmana
--------------


8. (C) Chen said the move of the capital continues to be an
annoyance. The PRC Ambassador to Rangoon recently objected
to an instruction to meet with the Burmese Foreign Minister
in Pyinmana because "he did not want to spend a over a full
day of travel and an overnight stay just to have a ten minute
meeting." China has no plans to shift its Embassy to
Pyinmana until it is clearer whether the move will really be
permanent, according to Chen. Instead, Beijing is planning
to open eventually a small office in Pyinmana, although Chen
lamented that it is difficult to find anyone at the minister
or minister-counselor level who is available and willing to
be posted there.

Burma's Strategic Position
--------------


9. (C) Chen acknowledged that besides the interest in
maintaining stability on its border, China also sees Burma's
energy resources and Andaman Sea ports as strategically
important. Chen said Burma recognizes this as well, saying
that Premier Soe Win called attention to Burma's position
between India and China during his dinner with Premier Wen.
As for the proposed pipeline from Yunnan through Burma to the
gas reserves off Burma's west coast, Chen discounted this as
an agreement between Yunnan Province and Burma and noted that
China is not pushing for action because of concerns about
political, security and economic instability in Burma. China
does not consider India to be a competitor in Burma or in the
region, declared Chen, saying China is actively seeking
better relations with India.


10. (C) During a separate meeting, Singapore Embassy
Political Officer Patrick Lim agreed that Burma is important

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economically to China as a potential source of energy and a
key trading partner with Yunnan Province. The pipeline,
however, has become a bit of a "pipedream" since in reality
there are many obstacles, including difficlt terrain,
political an economic instability and expensive adjustments
to China's domestic pipeline network to accommodate a feed
from Burma. Strategically, China wants access to ports on
the Andaman Sea, Lim continued, not only for trade, but also
as a possible staging ground and basing location for
aircraft, warships and troops. If a road and railway were
built alongside the pipeline it would allow China to base
troops along the road and deliver supplies to Chinese naval
vessels using Burmese west coast ports. Lim said this
potential increase in China's ability to project power in the
region is a key concern in Singapore's long-term strategic
thinking.

ASEAN and Burma: Perspective from Beijing Embassies
-------------- --------------


11. (C) Malaysian Embassy Counselor Shublee Othman told
Poloff that there has been no progress on the planned
Malaysia FM-led ASEAN delegation visit to Burma. If there is
no movement soon, Malaysia will invite the Burmese Prime
Minister to Malaysia and convey a clear message of ASEAN's
displeasure. Calling the ouster of former Premier Khen Nyut
"a last straw," Shublee said ASEAN is "fed-up" with Burma and
is seriously considering expelling Burma from ASEAN because
of the lack of positive change. While noting that expelling
Burma would take a long time, partially due to ASEAN's need
to "save face," Shublee said ASEAN is very concerned about
how China would react to an ASEAN expulsion of Burma is
beginning to test the waters in with Beijing.


12. (C) Embassy contacts at the Philippines and Singapore
embassies say there is no serious movement to expel ASEAN.
Philippines Embassy Minister and Consul General Jaime Ledda
said the stronger voice of ASEAN as a whole during the 2005
ASEAN Summit in Kuala Lampur and the Chairman's Statement
expressing concern about the situation in Burma has satisfied
those that were most vocal behind the scenes in calling for
expulsion. Singapore Political Officer Lim said ASEAN would
be loath to lose the Burma's strategic position between China
and India, though ASEAN is clearly losing patience with Burma
and will continue to send strong messages of displeasure at
the lack of real political change and economic development.
Both Lim and Ledda agreed that even if ASEAN were to take
some steps against Burma, China would not come out forcefully
against ASEAN consensus, although Beijing would probably
publicly support Burma.


13. (C) Chen was not surprised by the inclusion of a
statement critical of Burma in the ASEAN Chairman's statement
since ASEAN has been voicing frustration with the slow pace
of change in Burma. ASEAN is unlikely to expel Burma, Chen
said, citing the lack of consensus within ASEAN, with the
Philippines, Indonesia, Singapore and Malaysia advocating a
harder line towards Burma, Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam being
more sympathetic and Thailand and Brunei fence-sitting. Chen
said Burma's refusal to receive the ASEAN delegation to be
lead by Malaysia FM Hamid is perplexing. One reason might be
that the delegation composition is unclear, with Burma
probably ready to accept a delegation from a single country
but not one consisting of members from multiple ASEAN states
because it would seem like ASEAN was lecturing Burma, which
would make the regime "not feel very good."

Chen on VFM Wu
--------------


14. (C) Chen called VFM Wu a "crazy" man because he is so
active and aggressive, but is not hard to work for. Chen
claimed to have a very good relationship with Wu, saying he
freely challenges the VFM, whether in the office or on the
golf course, which Wu appreciates. Wu is serious about
encouraging dialogue with the United States on any topic,
telling his subordinates that it is important for China to be
able to explain its position with confidence. Chen said Wu
calls himself "a rabbit's tail" (i.e. about to disappear)
because he is retiring at the end of 2006. Wu is therefore
unconstrained by career aspirations or what others think and
just wants to move the ball down the road, according to Chen.
Noting Wu's role in the Six-Party Talks, Chen reported Wu as
saying that he had been given "extra power" by the central
authorities during the September 2005 round "in order to get

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the job done."

Sedney