Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06BEIJING23883
2006-11-18 03:34:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Beijing
Cable title:  

DAS CHRISTENSEN DISCUSSES NORTH KOREA AND TAIWAN

Tags:  PREL PGOV CH KN KS JA 
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O 180334Z NOV 06
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIJING 023883 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: AFTER KOREAN REUNIFICATION
TAGS: PREL PGOV CH KN KS JA
SUBJECT: DAS CHRISTENSEN DISCUSSES NORTH KOREA AND TAIWAN
WITH CHINA REFORM FORUM SCHOLARS

Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission David S. Sedney.
Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

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Summary
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIJING 023883

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: AFTER KOREAN REUNIFICATION
TAGS: PREL PGOV CH KN KS JA
SUBJECT: DAS CHRISTENSEN DISCUSSES NORTH KOREA AND TAIWAN
WITH CHINA REFORM FORUM SCHOLARS

Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission David S. Sedney.
Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

--------------
Summary
--------------


1. (C) The North Korean nuclear problem should be the focus
of the Six-Party Talks and we should not let other issues
interfere with the primary goal of denuclearizing the DPRK,
Vice Chairman of the China Reform Forum (CRF) DING Kuisong
(strictly protect),told visiting EAP DAS Thomas
Christensen on November 7. Failure to achieve progress on
the nuclear issue in the next round of Six-Party Talks
would likely lead to the Talks' failure, an outcome that
would entail great political risk for China, as President
HU Jintao himself has been managing the DPRK problem, Ding
stated. YU Meihuan (strictly protect),Director of CRF's
Center for Korean Peninsular Peace Studies, stressed that
the DPRK nuclear issue cannot be solved overnight and
therefore argued that the Six-Party Talks should act as a
"crisis-management" mechanism while the parties work toward
a final resolution. As a first step, Yu said the United
States should compromise on financial "sanctions" in
exchange for a "freeze" of the North Korean nuclear
program. She proposed an eventual "high-value exchange" in
which Washington would agree to normalization of relations
and a permanent peace treaty in exchange for Pyongyang's
denuclearization. In reply, DAS Christensen emphasized
that the Six-Party Talks are not a crisis-management
mechanism but rather a mechanism to denuclearize North
Korea. Pyongyang needs to implement its commitments
contained in the September 2005 Joint Statement and carry
out a complete, verifiable, and irreversible
denuclearization. China's role in this process is crucial,
DAS Christensen asserted, stating that Beijing needs to
continue to apply pressure on Pyongyang and fully implement
UNSCR 1718. The conversation closed with Ding Kuisong
commenting briefly on the situation in Taiwan. End
Summary.

-------------- ---
DPRK: YU Meihua Advocates "High-Value Exchange"

-------------- ---


2. (C) EAP DAS Thomas Christensen's meeting at the China
Reform Forum (CRF) on November 7 began with YU Meihua
(strictly protect),Director of CRF's Center for Korean
Peninsular Peace Studies, providing her views on the North
Korean nuclear problem. Yu, a Korea expert who lived in
North Korea for more than 25 years, emphasized that because
the nuclear issue cannot be solved overnight, the Six-Party
Talks should act as a "crisis-management" mechanism while
the parties work toward a final resolution. She advocated
a step-by-step process, whereby both the United States and
North Korea would make compromises. Unless Pyongyang can
be given "something," the talks will be "over," Yu stated.
As a first step, Yu proposed that the United States
compromise on "financial sanctions" in exchange for a
"freeze" of the North Korean nuclear program. She proposed
an eventual "high-value exchange" in which Washington would
agree to normalization of relations and a permanent peace
treaty in exchange for Pyongyang's denuclearization.


3. (C) Although pessimistic about the chances of North
Korea giving up its nuclear weapons anytime soon, Yu said
the situation is not completely hopeless. She argued that
the DPRK's concern about the "security threat posed by the
United States" was the primary reason for its developing
nuclear weapons, and that, therefore, the United States
carries the greatest responsibility for solving the nuclear
problem. Therefore, for Pyongyang, developing nuclear
weapons has enhanced its security, provided it with a
negotiating card, raised its international position and
increased domestic unity. As a result, the DPRK will not
easily give up these weapons. There are, however, certain
scenarios under which it might do so. The first would be
Kim Jong-Il's death or removal by some sort of domestic
rebellion. (Even this would not guarantee North Korea's
denuclearization, however, as that would depend on who
succeeded Kim and whether that person was one of the "very
few" pro-American (qinmei) North Koreans.) The second
possible scenario is an external overthrow of the Kim Jong-
Il regime. The third is the "high-value exchange" Yu
mentioned above, in which Washington would trade
normalization of relations and a comprehensive peace for
Pyongyang's denuclearization. She considered this third
approach by far the most likely to succeed but said its
prospect for success was less than 100 percent.


4. (C) While China shares the goals of denuclearizing North

BEIJING 00023883 002 OF 003


Korea and will continue to implement UNSCR 1718, its
tactics on dealing with Pyongyang differ from the United
States, Yu said. Regarding the use of pressure, Yu told
DAS Christensen that even though China can "understand"
U.S. requests for increasing pressure on North Korea,
China's "long history" of relations with Pyongyang has
taught it that the more one pressures the Koreans, the more
they resist. Nevertheless, Yu conceded that pressure had
played a role in bringing the DPRK back to the Six-Party
Talks, though she argued that Pyongyang's increased
"confidence" following its successful nuclear test was also
a significant factor. Chinese and American views on the
nature of the North Korean threat also differ, Yu stated.
North Korea is located far from the mainland United States,
but it sits right on China's border. Beijing fears that an
unstable North Korea could lead to large refugee flows into
China. Under such circumstances, even terrorists and
suicide bombers could enter China, Yu asserted. Though
China has an important role to play, it is the United
States and North Korea that will determine the outcome of
the Six-Party Talks, Yu averred. The North Koreans do not
want anything from China, she argued, what they want is to
deal directly with the United States.


5. (C) Responding to Yu's "high-value exchange" comments,
DAS Christensen emphasized that what Pyongyang needs to do
is to implement its commitments contained in the September
2005 Joint Statement and to carry out a complete,
verifiable, and irreversible denuclearization. That
agreement already contains security guarantees, as well as
positive economic and diplomatic incentives for North
Korea. Therefore, it makes no sense to propose that the
United States make some sort of compromise in exchange for
possible DPRK denuclearization. The DPRK must first start
to carry out the denuclearization to which it has already
committed itself. DAS Christensen said the Six-Party Talks
are not a crisis-management mechanism but rather a
mechanism to denuclearize North Korea. China's role in the
talks will continue to be crucial. Beijing must continue
to both implement UNSCR 1718 and apply pressure to the
DPRK. Noting Yu's comments on China's concerns about the
"threat" of DPRK refugee flows, DAS Christensen told her
that the threat to China from continued North Korean
development of nuclear weapons is certainly greater still.
The consequences of the threat these weapons pose to Japan,
the United States, the East Asian region and the entire
world are unpredictable and extremely serious. Moreover,
failure to solve the DPRK nuclear problem carries great
opportunity costs, as successful Six-Party Talks could
create a precedent for future multilateral security
cooperation in Northeast Asia.

-------------- --------------
DPRK: DING Kuisong Urges Focus on Denuclearization
-------------- --------------


6. (C) Vice Chairman of the China Reform Forum DING Kuisong
(strictly protect),who joined the meeting in progress,
emphasized that it is essential to must remain focused on
the North Korean nuclear problem and not to allow other
issues to interfere with the ultimate goal of the Six-Party
Talks, which is the denuclearization of the DPRK.
Denuclearizing North Korea is far more important than
financial issues or concerns over refugees. Furthermore,
the goal should not be regime change. If what we seek is
regime change, we will find it very difficult to get North
Korea to abandon its nuclear weapons, Ding stated. Failure
to achieve progress on the nuclear issue in the next round
of Six-Party Talks would likely lead to the Talks' failure,
an outcome that would entail great political risk for
China, as President HU Jintao himself has been managing the
DPRK problem, Ding stated. Although Beijing will
resolutely implement UNSCR 1718, we must think of
comprehensive, creative measures, apart from pressure, to
bring about a diplomatic solution to the DPRK nuclear
problem.


7. (C) DAS Christensen replied that the U.S. goal in the
Six-Party Talks is not regime change, but the
denuclearization of the DPRK through diplomatic means. The
September 2005 Joint Statement is a comprehensive agreement
that contains the elements necessary to solve the problem
and enable the DPRK to improve the economic situation for
the North Korean people. But Pyongyang must first fulfill
its promises contained in that agreement. Pyongyang is
merely using the "financial sanctions" issue as an excuse
to avoid carrying out its commitments, DAS Christensen
stated, warning Ding and Yu not to believe DPRK excuses.
At the time of the September 2005 Joint Statement, our
financial measures had not yet begun to affect North Korea,
yet Pyongyang rejected that agreement within 24 hours of

BEIJING 00023883 003 OF 003


its signing. He stressed that if the DPRK does not
denuclearize, U.S. measures will become stricter. If such
measures lead to instability in North Korea, China would
have Pyongyang, not the United States, to blame.

--------------
Taiwan: The "Second Crisis" Facing China
--------------


8. (C) Ding Kuisong described the situation in Taiwan as
the "second crisis," along with North Korea, that China
faces in East Asia. Ding said it would be best for Taiwan
and its democratic future for Chen Shui-bian to resign
peacefully. If that were to happen, Annette Lu would
succeed Chen and then the KMT would likely come to power in

2008. Nevertheless, several variables make the situation
unpredictable. First, Shi Ming-teh, former DPP leader and
head of the recall Chen movement, is ill with cancer and
near death. Were he in fact to die soon, he could become a
"hero" or "martyr" to the recall Chen campaign.
Furthermore, Chen Shui-bian's wife, Wu Shu-chen, is also
quite ill, Ding claimed, and some say she may die before
the year's end, which also could change the Taiwan
political dynamic. Lee Teng-hui is another factor that
must be taken into account. Though suffering from heart
trouble, Lee might take advantage of a Chen resignation to
try to attract some DPP support to himself, Ding said.
While Beijing hopes the United States will take action to
get Chen Shui-bian to "do something," China itself will not
attempt to exert any influence in Taiwan, Ding said. DAS
Christensen said the United States would nt be attempting
to influence the outcome of the current political disputes
in Taiwan. We support democracy and the rule of law, but
we do not support any individual leader. We hope to see
stability in Taiwan and the avoidance of violence by the
parties involved, DAS Christensen stated.


9. (U) DAS Christensen cleared this message.
Randt