BEIJING'S TAIWAN WATCHERS WARN OF CONSTITUTIONAL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIJING 023355

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/02/2031
TAGS: PREL PGOV CH TW
SUBJECT: BEIJING'S TAIWAN WATCHERS WARN OF CONSTITUTIONAL
LINES IN THE SAND


Classified By:
Classified by Ambassador Clark T. Randt, Jr. Reasons
1.4 (b/d).

Summary
--------------


1. (C) Beijing-based Taiwan scholars fully expect
Chen Shui-bian to try to cause problems in cross-
Strait relations to further his own political
interests between now and summer 2007. Beijing does
not believe that Chen will have the necessary support
to pass a new Constitution, but is concerned that Chen
would use the debate over a new Constitution to
provoke China, call a referendum or otherwise "stir up
trouble" that would threaten cross-Strait stability.
Questioned closely on Beijing's possible red lines
with regard to a new Constitution, several scholars
stated that any new Constitution would mean de jure
independence and would be unacceptable to the
Mainland. Others described Beijing's red line as
unclear, but said that Chen is determined to push
Beijing to the brink of its patience, which they said
is "a dangerous game." Noting that Beijing is staying
quiet in order not to influence Taiwan political
dynamics, scholars stressed the importance of "active"
U.S. efforts to rein in Chen. They assessed that the
2008 Presidential race is still wide open and that KMT
leader Ma Ying-jeou is not a shoo-in.

Beijing Wary of Chen Surprise
--------------


2. (C) Visiting Washington analysts and poloff met
with several Beijing-based scholars who work on cross-
Strait issues, including CASS scholars Xu Shiquan and
Tao Wenzhao, China Reform Forum Deputy Secretary
General Cao Huayin, CCP Party School scholar Guo
Jianping and People's University scholar Huang Jiashu
to discuss Mainland views of cross-Strait relations
and developments on Taiwan. Xu and Tao, who
accompanied (along with Tsinghua University Law School
Dean Wang Zhenmin) Taiwan Affairs Office Director Chen
Yunlin to the United States in September, rejected the
notion that Chen Shui-bian's current political
troubles have "put him in a box." Pointing to Chen's
recent statements about creating a "second republic,"
Xu and Tao warned that Beijing was not simply being
alarmist in anticipating trouble. Huang predicted
that Chen will use the process of constitutional
reform to aggravate both cross-Strait and U.S.-China
relations over the coming year.

Maneuvering on Constitution, Second Republic
--------------


3. (C) Scholars we spoke with doubted that Chen could
get a new constitution through Taiwan's legislature,
believing that the KMT would block it in the
procedures committee. They broadly expected,
nevertheless, that Chen would resort to extreme
measures to promote a new constitution, including
calling for a referendum. Xu suggested that Chen's
recent reference to freezing the current constitution
and forming a "second republic" was an attempt to
repeat the strategy used for what Xu termed Chen's
"abolishing" the National Unification Council and
Guidelines earlier this year.


4. (C) Xu described Chen as a shrewd, opportunistic
politician who could manufacture and take advantage of
an atmosphere of crisis. Cao noted that the unsettled
political climate in Taiwan, in which splits were
appearing among the Pan-Green and Pan-Blue camps,
would likely work in Chen's favor in this regard.
Huang Jiashu said Chen would seek a formula for
constitutional change that appealed to Washington and
to Taiwan's mainstream public, but at the same time
would provoke Beijing and put Taiwan opposition
parties on the defensive. Chen is "very determined"
to act on constitutional reform and sees it as the
only way to change the domestic debate on Taiwan, Tao
commented.


5. (C) These Chinese Taiwan-watchers stressed Chen's
role as a provocateur and the need to further restrain
him, but did not offer ideas to the visiting analysts
on specific steps or draft constitutional language

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that a more pragmatic Chen might pursue. Xu suggested
that Chen might seek a new constitution that appeared
to avoid sensitive, high-profile sovereignty issues,
but would engage in "word games" throughout the
document to advance his agenda. Xu, Huang, Tao and
Guo all warned that the DPP already has several draft
versions of a new Constitution and that Chen and his
Party would preview one version, but introduce
another. Neither Xu nor other scholars offered
specific examples, however, of potential problem areas


6. (C) All the scholars we spoke with indicated that
any new constitution draft would be problematic for
Beijing. Huang Jiashu said that Chen may seek to use a
West German model in which the original constitution
intended for the whole country would be "frozen" until
such time as unification had become possible and be
replaced in the interim with a temporary basic law,
which in this case would essentially be a new
constitution. Huang described this as a "dangerous
step" that might keep the "Republic of China" name,
but eliminate the "one China" essence of the current
constitution. Xu asserted that the key for Beijing is
to avoid a new constitution, even if wholly focused on
good governance issues, and urged that Washington
insist that changes be limited only to selected good
governance amendments to the current constitution that
do not touch upon sensitive sovereignty issues such as
name and territorial changes. When pressed to explain
what made the current constitution a "one China"
document, Xu and Huang stressed the historical
circumstances of its formulation on the mainland in
1947, and that a creating new document inevitably
would break these ties and change the status quo.

Chinese Urge U.S. To Actively Restrain Chen
--------------


7. (C) Chinese scholars across the board underscored
their desire for a tough U.S. posture toward potential
Chen moves on the constitution, asserting that Beijing
has already made too many concessions. Huang's view
is that Beijing has taken a light hand in responding
to recent developments on Taiwan and has reversed
longstanding opposition to Washington's involvement,
but said that the current leadership is facing
significant domestic blowback for doing so. "Chen,
like Kim Jong-Il, is prone to brinksmanship," Huang
stated. To prevent a crisis, Chen needs to be
deprived of the vehicle for pursuing his goal, since
the process is as dangerous as the goal itself.
"Chinese leaders will not be able to ignore public
calls to react on the Taiwan issue," Huang said.


8. (C) Tao noted what he described as the strong U.S.
Government reaction to Chen's October 15 reference to
a "second Republic of China" and commented that both
Beijing and Washington are closely watching Chen's
actions. Tao said Beijing understands that Chen will
become more dangerous if cornered and that he will
make good use of any Mainland reaction to his
"provocations." China will try to exercise restraint,
he said, but the U.S. role is "key."

Beijing Believes its Outreach is Effective
--------------


9. (C) Several scholars were quick to blame Taiwan's
political system and its immaturity for the current
woes and played down the possibility that Beijing
would need to make political concessions to improve
relations over the long term. They highlighted the
potential for cross-Strait exchanges, but blamed Chen
and Taiwan's politics for the lack of progress. Guo
noted that the 2008 Beijing Olympics offered an
opportunity to reach out to Taiwan, but said that Chen
had scotched joint Olympics-related projects. Cao
claimed that Beijing's economic concessions and
outreach to opposition Taiwan politicians are having a
substantial positive impact on Taiwan attitudes toward
the Mainland.


10. (C) In discussing the 2008 Presidential race in
Taiwan, scholars emphasized that the race is still
wide open and that KMT leader Ma Ying-jeou is not a
shoo-in. They nevertheless believe that once another
leader beyond Chen takes power in Taiwan, the status
quo should be maintained more easily and relations

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will develop more smoothly. They recognize, though,
that Chen's departure will not, in and of itself,
bring about a quick resolution of the Taiwan issue.


Randt