Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06BEIJING22919
2006-10-30 13:01:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Beijing
Cable title:  

PRC/AFRICA: CHINA-AFRICA FORUM GOALS: POLITICS,

Tags:  PREL PGOV AGOA ECON EAID CH 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXYZ0016
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHBJ #2919/01 3031301
ZNY CCCCC ZZH (CCY ADDEE ON FORMAT LINE 7 - MSI4785 - AD3FFFFB)
O 301301Z OCT 06
FM AMEMBASSY BEIJING
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1139
INFO RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE
RUEHOO/CHINA POSTS COLLECTIVE
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 3953
C O N F I D E N T I A L BEIJING 022919 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR AF, EAP, EAP/CM
INR FOR GILLES

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y - COLLECTIVE CORRECTED ON FORMAT LINE 7

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/30/2026
TAGS: PREL PGOV AGOA ECON EAID CH
SUBJECT: PRC/AFRICA: CHINA-AFRICA FORUM GOALS: POLITICS,
OPTICS AND TAIWAN

REF: A. BEIJING 22370

B. BEIJING 22713

C. BEIJING 02952

Classified By: Political External Unit Chief Edgard Kagan. Reasons 1.4
(b/d).

Summary
-------

C O N F I D E N T I A L BEIJING 022919

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR AF, EAP, EAP/CM
INR FOR GILLES

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y - COLLECTIVE CORRECTED ON FORMAT LINE 7

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/30/2026
TAGS: PREL PGOV AGOA ECON EAID CH
SUBJECT: PRC/AFRICA: CHINA-AFRICA FORUM GOALS: POLITICS,
OPTICS AND TAIWAN

REF: A. BEIJING 22370

B. BEIJING 22713

C. BEIJING 02952

Classified By: Political External Unit Chief Edgard Kagan. Reasons 1.4
(b/d).

Summary
--------------


1. (C) Politics remains the cornerstone of Sino-African
relations even though the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation
(FOCAC)(Ref A) will tout extensive economic ties, including
burgeoning two-way trade and as many as 2,500 bilateral
agreements, Chinese scholars have told us. As China
increasingly asserts itself on the international stage, FOCAC
has become China's most visible framework for advancing its
interests in Africa by enabling China to group cohesively
numerous and disparate bilateral initiatives for greatest
optical effect. The PRC still implements its Africa policies
through strictly bilateral agreements. The PRC's desire to
isolate Taiwan diplomatically was perhaps the driving force
behind FOCAC's creation in 2000 and Chinese leadership's
decision to host this year's forum as a summit reflects the
PRC's intent to maximize political pressure on the five
African countries still in Taiwan's camp. However, with the
rapid growth of China's economy and Sino-African economic
relations, as well as the PRC's recent success in expanding
its one-China policy in Africa, the PRC now views FOCAC and
its overall efforts in Africa as opportunities to "build its
international reputation" and show China has become an active
participant in such areas as international security
cooperation, Chinese scholars assert. China is willing to
consider specific proposals from the West for cooperating on
development initiatives in Africa but is wary of being too
closely associated with Western conditionality, according to
MFA officials and Chinese scholars. End Summary.


2. (C) Poloffs separately discussed Sino-African relations in
the FOCAC context with Xu Weizhong, Director of the

Department of African Studies of the Ministry of State
Security-affiliated China Institute of Contemporary
International Relations (CICIR),Wang Yingying, Senior
Research Fellow at the MFA-affiliated Chinese Institute of
International Studies (CIIS),Wang Hongyi, CIIS Associate
Research Fellow, An Hongquan, Deputy Director of the State
Council Development Research Institute (an in-house think
tank for the State Council),Professor Xiao Bai of Renmin
University's Institute for Strategic Studies, MFA officials
and a number of Beijing-based African diplomats.

A Political Cornerstone
--------------


3. (C) Politics remains the cornerstone of Sino-African
relations even though FOCAC's Beijing Summit will tout
extensive economic ties, including burgeoning two-way trade
and as many as 2,500 bilateral agreements (Ref B),CIIS's
Wang Yingying and Wang Hongyi said. Chinese scholars have
told us that for many years China's primary diplomatic
concerns in Africa were Taiwan and more general ideological
support (such as "South-South cooperation"). As China
increasingly asserts itself on the international stage, the
PRC now sees FOCAC and China's efforts in Africa as
opportunities to "build its international reputation" and
show China has become an active participant in such areas as
international security cooperation, according to Wang
Yingying and Wang Hongyi. FOCAC has become China's most
visible mechanism for forging a "strategic partnership" with
Africa, reflecting Beijing's views that Africa is an
increasingly important political bloc for the PRC both to
protect its interests and "democratize" international
relations, Wang Yingying said. China's attention to the
Africa bloc paid dividends in PRC efforts to stifle what it
viewed as unfavorable United Nations Security Council
reforms. MFA officials have told us that China lobbied
African countries bilaterally to thwart possible African
Union proposals on UNSC reform that could potentially lead to
political compromises resulting in a permanent Security
Council seat for Japan (Ref C).


4. (C) With China's preeminent foreign policy goal to create
a relatively stable international environment in order to
ensure China's internal development will continue unchecked,
Africa plays an important role in China's national security
strategy, Wang Hongyi said. By way of illustration, Wang
cited the link between China's energy needs and possible


market disruptions caused by political chaos in the Sudan or
the Horn of Africa. In Africa, "stability is of paramount
importance," MFA Deputy Africa Department Division Director
Hu Zhangliang told us (in response to a discussion on China's
frequent opposition to targeted sanctions).

Taiwan's Significance
--------------


5. (C) Renmin University Institute for Strategic Studies
Professor Xiao Bai told us that competition with Taiwan
continues to be an important factor in PRC Africa policy.
The State Council Development Research Institute's An
Hongquan stressed that China's desire to isolate Taiwan
diplomatically was perhaps the driving force behind China's
decision to establish FOCAC in 2000. The PRC's success at
bringing African countries under its one-China policy over
the past several years (including Liberia, Senegal and Chad),
as well as the rapid growth of both its own economy and
Sino-African economic relations, have created the opportunity
to broaden FOCAC's scope, An said. Noting that he had
attended an October 26 internal meeting at the People's Daily
to discuss the FOCAC Summit, Xiao said that the PRC
leadership's decision to hold a summit-level forum this year
in Beijing reflects not only the intention to show China as a
major player in Africa but also to place maximum political
pressure on African countries still in the Taiwan camp. Xiao
commented that the PRC expects most if not all five to send
observer delegations at the Foreign Minister or Vice Minister
level.


6. (C) African diplomats in Beijing generally say they
believe that China will run the table in the near future and
establish diplomatic ties all 53 African countries, shutting
out Taiwan. "The economic incentives are great," a South
African diplomat said, while noting that African countris
also face some pressures from counterparts n sub-regional
organizations to abandon Taiwa for the sake of both protocol
and convenience. The PRC also vigilantly guards against
backsliding on Taiwan. "During high-level visits, we always
lead off with the one-China policy," an Egyptian diplomat
said, "but after that we turn to a broad range of substantive
issues."

Omnibus Framework
--------------


7. (C) Practically, the Forum for China-Africa Cooperation
has become China's most visible framework for advancing its
interests in Africa by enabling the PRC to group cohesively
numerous and disparate bilateral initiatives for greatest
optical effect, Chinese academics and African diplomats have
told us. Africa policy continues to be implemented on a
strictly bilateral basis through government-to-government
agreements and PRC support for Chinese enterprises, but China
uses the FOCAC mechanism to maintain and improve
continent-wide relations, CICIR's Xu Weizhong said. "We
conduct serious business bilaterally," Xu added by way of
underscoring constraints on the Forum's potential to evolve
into a broader multilateral mechanism.


8. (C) A Ugandan diplomat told us the Forum's principle value
is that it demonstrates that China takes Africa seriously,
both politically and economically. While initiatives such as
debt reduction or special preferential treatment (SPT) for
African imports will not necessarily benefit every country,
China encourages many African countries to strengthen
bilateral ties, an Ethiopian diplomat stated. On a more
cautionary note, a Nigerian diplomat said some African
delegations may view the Beijing Summit as "another jamboree"
but expressed his confidence that China will "pursue
aggressively" any bilateral commitments undertaken. The PRC
is not concerned that African countries will seek to co-opt
the Forum for any particular cause because the Africans
respect China and are generally constrained by parochial
concerns from speaking with one voice, according to a South
African diplomat, who added that "there is simply no African
consensus on Sino-African relations."

Opportunities To Cooperate?
--------------


9. (C) The Beijing Summit is largely closed to Western
participation. In public and private, Chinese and African
officials vigorously refute Western criticism that
Sino-African relations are mercantile, neo-colonial or
otherwise tilted sharply in China's favor at the expense of


African economic sovereignty. Asked whether the FOCAC
mechanism presents opportunities for cooperation with the
West on African development initiatives, Chinese academics
and officials generally answer that China seeks cooperation
"on an equal basis." The Chinese view FOCAC as a bilateral
mechanism. CIIS's Wang Hongyi said that "China sees more and
more cooperation with the West on African development
initiatives, but generally will seek cooperation through
United Nations agencies and other multilateral mechanisms."
Wang said that China has long-expressed a desire to cooperate
with Western pharmaceutical companies for the provision of
medicines to Africa but has received little interest. When
pressed as to why the PRC Ministry of Commerce will not
provide basic information on country-specific assistance,
making it difficult for Western aid donors to build trust or
coordinate development initiatives, Wang conceded that "China
lags in information flow" but argued that current leadership
is trying to improve China's transparency.


10. (C) CICIR's Xu said China is "thinking seriously of
expanding international cooperation on Africa but is hesitant
to become associated with Western conditionality." In
addition, Xu said, the "West is not willing to have equal
cooperation." When pressed that on-the-ground efforts to
involve China in donor coordination mechanisms in Africa are
often not successful, Xu cited China's gradualist approach to
economic initiatives, such as the introduction of Special
Economic Zones. Xu said China's wariness of Western
intentions may be overcome through discrete development
proposals that can build trust through their implementation.
"The Chinese way is to start small, see if something works,
then expand," Xu added. MFA Deputy Division Director Hu said
China will "attach great importance" to specific Western aid
proposals, particularly in the areas of health, agriculture
or infrastructure development. A Zimbabwean diplomat noted
that China is keen to access Western donor funds for its
construction projects in Africa. However, Chinese academics
and officials generally say that the onus is on Western
countries or companies to propose initiatives, stressing that
any China cooperation with the West on Africa must include
African input. "The ball is in (the West's) court," MFA
Deputy Division Director Hu said, arguing that China and the
West do not have any major conflicts of interest in Africa.
Randt