BEIJING SCHOLARS ON DPRK DEVELOPMENTS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIJING 021796

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: AFTER KOREAN REUNIFICATION
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR MARR CH KS KN
SUBJECT: BEIJING SCHOLARS ON DPRK DEVELOPMENTS

Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Daniel Shields.
Reasons 1.4 (b/d).

Summary
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1. (C) China's issuance of a tough statement in reaction to
the DPRK claimed nuclear test reflected President Hu Jintao's
anger over Pyongyang's defiance, according to Beijing think
tanker An Hongquan (protect). The Chinese leadership was
particularly "shocked and angered" by the timing of the DPRK
test, which came during the Communist Party Plenum and on the
heels of Japanese Prime Minister Abe's visit to Beijing, said
Party School scholar Qin Zhilai (protect). An said China's
serious consideration of punitive measures against the DPRK
will be tempered by China's desire to preserve the
possibility of dialogue with Pyongyang by not being perceived
as tracking too closely with the position of the United
States. Party School scholar Liu Jianfei (protect) was sure
that China would be willing to support some sanctions, but
said China would have difficulty with some of the proposals
made by the United States and Japan, particularly intrusive
inspections and interdiction activities. Qin was "extremely
pessimistic" about the possibility of resuming the Six-Party
Talks, arguing that Pyongyang's objective is to establish
itself as a nuclear power and that North Korea has no
intention of abandoning its nuclear weapons. The USD 24
million in DPRK funds currently frozen in Macau are
inflicting greater hardship on the North Korean regime than
initially assumed, An said. End Summary.

Hu Jintao's Ire Dictates Tough PRC Reaction
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2. (C) China's issuance of a tough statement in reaction to
the DPRK nuclear test was directly due to President Hu Jintao
taking personal offense over Pyongyang's defiance of China's
October 3 warning not to go through with the test, said State
Council Institute of World Development Deputy Director An
Hongquan (protect) in an October 13 discussion with poloffs.
This was the second time the DPRK had defied President Hu in
little more than three months, An added, the first being
after the July missile test when Kim Jong-Il refused to meet
with Hu's envoy Vice Premier Hui Liangyu in Pyongyang. Hu
had personally requested the meeting through the North Korean
Ambassador in Beijing, but Kim still "did not listen."


3. (C) The Chinese leadership was particularly "shocked and
angered" by the timing of the DPRK test, said Central Party
School Institute of International Strategic Studies scholar
Qin Zhilai (protect) in a separate conversation with poloff
on October 13. The nuclear test came on the heels of
Japanese Prime Minister Abe's visit to Beijing and during the
October 8-11 Communist Party Plenum, when China's senior
leadership had neither the time nor ability to influence
Pyongyang's decision. In a separate conversation on October
12, Central Party School scholar Liu Jianfei (protect) told
poloff that many officials and scholars are calling for a
tougher Chinese line toward the DPRK and Chinese opinion has
begun to shift in this direction.


4. (C) According to Ma Licheng, former People's Daily editor
and long-time Embassy contact, China's adoption of a harder
line toward North Korea is "one of Hu Jintao's three most
important accomplishments" to date (the other two being
restarting a real China-Japan dialogue and sacking of
Shanghai Party Secretary Chen Liangyu). Nevertheless, even
though it is a substantive change, its practical impact may
not be that great. Ma said there has long been no love lost
between Chinese leaders and Kim Jong-Il, claiming that even
Jiang Zemin has long been frustrated with Kim. Ma related a
series of past incidents in which Kim reportedly exasperated
the Chinese leadership, including constantly changing his
mind on whether and when he would visit China or talk to the
Chinese leadership and insisting that he get off his train
and be greeted at locations of his choosing, and not those of
Hu Jintao's, when Kim previously visited China.


5. (C) The scale of the DPRK claimed nuclear blast was
smaller than it should have been and measured only 1,500
tons, An stated, noting the DPRK might conduct another test.
The test prompted a Chinese government-wide emergency action
meeting to assess potential threats to China from the test,
both in terms of possible radiation drift and possible North
Korean refugees seeking shelter at the Chinese border
crossing in Dandong, said An. Both An and Qin noted a
growing anxiety among many government and think tank analysts
over North Korea's unpredictable nature and both expressed
their reservations regarding China's ability to influence
North Korea.

Sanctions: Will China Support?

BEIJING 00021796 002 OF 002


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6. (C) China's serious consideration of punitive measures
being discussed by the UNSC, the United States, and regional
players will be tempered by China's desire to preserve
opportunities for dialogue within the China-DPRK relationship
and to avoid being perceived as tracking too closely to the
position of the United States, An said. In reality, China's
position towards the DPRK has actually moved much closer
philosophically to that of the United States as a result of
the test. An believed the shift may become more evident in
the future, but for now China will look for a resolution that
expresses its full displeasure with Pyongyang's actions, but
that is more symbolic in nature and has a specified time
limit.


7. (C) Lamenting the "dilemma" that China faces on the
sanctions issue, Qin said voting for a sanctions resolution
is a difficult choice. Pyongyang's insecurity is part of
what is driving its behavior, and some in Beijing believe
that Chinese support for sanctions would only further
destabilize the situation. China at all costs wants to avoid
a military conflict on the Korean Peninsula, which would
likely lead to refugee flows that could impact China's
domestic stability and could even draw in China, given its
treaty obligations to North Korea. The "influential interest
groups" affiliated with the state-owned enterprises that
supply North Korea with oil strongly oppose the imposition of
sanctions on the DPRK.


8. (C) Liu was sure that China would be willing to support
some sanctions, including those on luxury goods and possibly
other products. He agreed, however, that China would have
difficulty with some of the proposals made by the United
States and Japan, particularly intrusive inspections and
interdiction activities.

Six-Party Talks: Possibility of Resumption?
--------------


9. (C) Even though Beijing still hopes it can persuade
Pyongyang to return to the talks, Qin said he was "extremely
pessimistic" about the likelihood of that happening. The
international community's and Pyongyang's objectives are
diametrically opposed: the world still hopes to persuade
North Korea to abandon its nuclear weapons program, while the
DPRK's objective is to establish itself as a nuclear power
that has no intention of abandoning its nuclear weapons, he
declared.


10. (C) The DPRK's reaction to the USD 24 million in funds
frozen in Macau illustrates how desperate the DPRK government
has become, An stated. DPRK's triage attempts on several
converging problems, including rural flooding, government
bankruptcy and the leadership's weakening domestic control,
may have pushed DPRK toward the nuclear test, An said. He
claimed the DPRK had even suggested that if China would just
lend them the USD 24 million, they would return to the
Six-Party Talks. China has declined to take the offer
seriously, An said.
Randt