Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06BEIJING21224
2006-10-09 11:50:00
SECRET
Embassy Beijing
Cable title:  

REPORTED DPRK NUCLEAR TEST: RARE MFA ""STATEMENT""

Tags:  PREL MNUC CH KN JA KS RU 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO3494
OO RUEHCN RUEHGH RUEHVC
DE RUEHBJ #1224/01 2821150
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 091150Z OCT 06
FM AMEMBASSY BEIJING
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9071
INFO RUEHOO/CHINA POSTS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 2958
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 0662
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA PRIORITY 1070
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIJING 021224 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EAP, IO, ISN

E.O. 12958: DECL: AFTER KOREAN REUNIFICATION
TAGS: PREL MNUC CH KN JA KS RU
SUBJECT: REPORTED DPRK NUCLEAR TEST: RARE MFA ""STATEMENT""
CONDEMNS TEST; CHINESE OBSERVERS EXPRESS SURPRISE,
FRUSTRATION

Classified By: Classified by Political Minister Counselor Daniel
Shields. Reasons 1.4 (b/d).

Summary
-------

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIJING 021224

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EAP, IO, ISN

E.O. 12958: DECL: AFTER KOREAN REUNIFICATION
TAGS: PREL MNUC CH KN JA KS RU
SUBJECT: REPORTED DPRK NUCLEAR TEST: RARE MFA ""STATEMENT""
CONDEMNS TEST; CHINESE OBSERVERS EXPRESS SURPRISE,
FRUSTRATION

Classified By: Classified by Political Minister Counselor Daniel
Shields. Reasons 1.4 (b/d).

Summary
--------------


1. (S) The Chinese Foreign Ministry issued a rare
official ""statement"" (text at para 11) on October 9
condemning the reported DPRK nuclear test that day.
China had only issued four previous MFA statements of
this kind in the last decade and a half. Chinese
contacts we spoke with expressed surprise and
frustration over the reported test and its timing and
pointed to the MFA statement as evidence of Beijing's
anger with Pyongyang over the test. Several contacts
we spoke with believe that China will support
imposition of sanctions by the UN Security Council ""to
some extent"" and assessed that the heart of the
discussion would be over what sanctions to impose.
One contact said the Pakistan nuclear test precedent
will be highly relevant, given the similarities
between Beijing's historically close relations with
Islamabad and with Pyongyang. Netizens discussing the
issue on popular websites indicated concern about
increased threats to China's security as a result of
the test. End Summary.

Rare MFA Statement Condemning Test
--------------


2. (S) The Chinese Foreign Ministry issued on October
9 a rare, harshly worded and high-level statement
(text at para 11) condemning the reported DPRK nuclear
test that day. China issues MFA statements of this
kind only on unusual occasions to signal strong
leadership concern over a foreign policy issue. The
October 9 statement expresses China's ""resolute
opposition"" to the ""flagrant nuclear test"" and
""strongly demands the DPRK to live up to its
commitment to a non-nuclear Korean Peninsula, stop any
activity that would lead to a deterioration of the
situation and return to the Six-Party Talks."" (Note:
China has only issued four MFA statements in the last
decade and a half, regarding the U.S. sale of F-16s to

Taiwan in 1992, Taiwan President Li Teng-hui's visit
to the United States in 1995, India's nuclear test in
1998 and Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi's visit to
Yasukuni Shrine in October 2005. End Note.) The
October 9 statement calls on all sides to ""respond
calmly and adhere to peaceful resolution of the issue
through consultations and dialogue.""

Scholars Cite Surprise, Harsh Official Reaction
-------------- --


3. (S) According to XXXXXXXXXXXX
(protect),North Korea's nuclear test was ""highly
unexpected,"" catching both the Chinese government and
independent observers off guard. Pyongyang's decision
to test so soon after the October 6 UNSC Presidential
statement, which China supported, is particularly
surprising, XXXXXXXXXXXX said. XXXXXXXXXXXX stressed that China has
shown both its displeasure and surprise by issuing a
""very strong"" Foreign Ministry Statement.


4. (S) XXXXXXXXXXXX (protect) told Polmincouns that the Foreign
Ministry statement condemning the DPRK nuclear test
was remarkable. It is highly unusual for Beijing to
publicly criticize Pyongyang in blunt terms like ""the
Democratic People's Republic of Korea disregarded the
international community's universal opposition and
flagrantly conducted a nuclear test."" XXXXXXXXXXXX said he was
astonished to see the MFA use the word ""flagrantly"" to
criticize an action by the DPRK. He could only recall
the word being used by China previously to condemn
actions by the United States and the former Soviet
Union. In the past Beijing strove to project the
image that any criticism of Pyongyang was reluctant
and moderate. This statement is different, XXXXXXXXXXXX stated,
particularly in terms of the negative official Chinese
attitude it expresses toward North Korea.

China Will Support Sanctions
--------------


5. (S) XXXXXXXXXXXX (protect) all separately predicted that China
would cooperate with other parties including the
United States to bring additional pressure on North
Korea through possible sanctions or other measures.
XXXXXXXXXXXX told Polmincouns that a North Korean nuclear test
represents a turning point for China. Beijing, while
still not an adversary of North Korea, will shift from
being a relatively neutral mediator to being a more
active player willing to apply pressure on North
Korea. The North Koreans did not learn their lesson
from Chinese support for UNSCR 1695 following the DPRK
missile tests. They have apparently taken a step that
harms China's interests. The Chinese Government is
now likely to accept UN sanctions against North Korea,
just as China accepted UN sanctions against India and
Pakistan follwing the nuclear tests by those
countries. Te key will be precisely which sanctions
are poposed. XXXXXXXXXXXX said the Pakistan precedent will be
highly relevant, given the similarities between
Beijing's historically close relations with Islamabad
and with Pyongyang.


5. (S) XXXXXXXXXXXX told poloff that the DPRK has now played
its biggest and only remaining card. ""Kim Jong-Il is
used to games of brinksmanship,"" he commented. ""Kim
will use the nuclear test to see whether the U.S.
redline is a nuclear North Korea or a nuclear North
Korea that proliferates to other countries."" XXXXXXXXXXXX
predicted that China would support sanctions ""to some
extent"" in the wake of a test, but declined to predict
how far China would go in cutting off Chinese support
for the DPRK. XXXXXXXXXXXX thought that Beijing would support
some sort of sanctions against North Korea, as long as
such actions were taken through the UN Security
Council. China wants to be viewed as a ""great"" and
""responsible"" power, XXXXXXXXXXXX said, and has opposed nuclear
proliferation, including by supporting strong UNSC
resolutions against both North Korea and Iran.

Questions over Test Remain
--------------


6. (S) XXXXXXXXXXXX commented that
China's statement on the test had harshly condemned
the DPRK and she said that China is now waiting to see
what the U.S. reaction will be. XXXXXXXXXXXX said that most
Chinese analysts are skeptical of North Korean claims
that 100 percent of radioactive emissions have been
contained. ""Unless North Korean technology is much
better than we think it is, there should be traces of
radioactive emissions at some point,"" she commented.


7. (S) XXXXXXXXXXXX said he
had interviewed XXXXXXXXXXXX after the news of
the test became public, who reportedly said that ""it
appears that many aspects of the North Korean test
were unsuccessful,"" but XXXXXXXXXXXX said XXXXXXXXXXXX would
not elaborate. XXXXXXXXXXXX expressed concern that the test
shows that there is no leverage available to coax good
behavior from the DPRK and that the contradiction
between China's priority interests regarding the DPRK
nuclear issue, seeking to maintain stability and
eliminate nuclear weapons in North Korea, is becoming
sharper. ""China is in a difficult spot,"" XXXXXXXXXXXX said.

Frustration High Among Experts
--------------


8. (S) Other academics and contacts we reached
expressed surprise and frustration over the DPRK's
announced test. XXXXXXXXXXXX commented that the test could usher in a new era of instability in the region that would benefit no
one. XXXXXXXXXXXX predicted that China would work closely with the
United States on next steps, but expressed frustration
that none of China's previous efforts to resolve the
DPRK nuclear issue had been successful.


9. (S) Several contacts noted that the topic of the
North Korean nuclear test might come up in discussions
on the margins of the ongoing Party Plenum, but
asserted that the North Korean issue would not be
discussed in the plenary sessions. ""The issue will be
discussed by the Politburo or Politburo Standing
Committee, but not by the Plenum,"" said XXXXXXXXXXXX. Going one step further, XXXXXXXXXXXX separately said
that there is ""no way"" that the DPRK nuclear test
would affect the Plenum, which is a ""major domestic
event"" and largely ""immune"" from foreign affairs.

Story Looms Large on Web
--------------


10. (C) The North Korean nuclear test was the number
one headline on popular Chinese Internet news sites,
but the official Xinhua news site ran the story behind
news about cracking down on corruption (in connection
with a theme of the ongoing Party Plenum) and a
headline about Japanese Prime Minister Abe's visit to
Beijing on October 8. Popular Chinese chatrooms
carried some commentary on the North Korean test on
October 9, most of it focused on the threat that North
Korea could pose to China and the potential reaction
of China's neighbors. Examples were, ""now Japan and
South Korea will both try to get nuclear weapons,""
""the North Korean test is an affront to China"" and
""terrifying."" One netizen posted a list of Chinese
cities that are within reach of North Korean missiles.

Text of MFA Statement
--------------


11. (U) Begin text.

Statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the
People's Republic of China

9 October 2006

On 9 October, the Democratic People's Republic of
Korea disregarded the international community's
universal opposition and flagrantly conducted a
nuclear test. The Chinese Government expresses its
resolute opposition in this regard.
It has been the firm, unshakable, and consistent
stance of the Chinese Government to realize non-
nuclearization on the Korean Peninsula and oppose
nuclear proliferation. The Chinese side strongly
demands that the DPRK side abide by its commitment to
non-nuclearization, stop all actions that may lead to
further deterioration of the situation, and return to
the course of the six-party talks.
Maintaining peace and stability in the Northeast Asia
region conforms with the common interests of all
parties concerned. The Chinese Government calls on
all parties concerned to respond calmly and adhere to
a peaceful resolution of the issue through
consultation and dialogue. The Chinese side will
continue to devote unremitting efforts toward this
end. End text.

SEDNEY