BASRAH GOVERNOR SIDELINES IRAQI ARMY ROLE IN BASRAH

C O N F I D E N T I A L BASRAH 000098

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 6/6/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER ECON IZ
SUBJECT: BASRAH GOVERNOR SIDELINES IRAQI ARMY ROLE IN BASRAH
SECURITY

REF: A) BASRAH 93, B) BAGHDAD 1869

CLASSIFIED BY: Mark Marrano, DEPUTY REGIONAL COORDINATOR, REO
BASRAH, DEPARTMENT OF STATE.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)




1. (C) Summary: In a June 5 meeting, Basrah Governor Mohammed
Wa'hili told the Deputy Regional Coordinator that the Iraqi Army
would have a small role in the recently-enacted emergency
security plan for Basrah, and the Iraqi police would carry out
most of the plan. The 5-person delegation left Basrah today to
return to Baghdad. The governor said he is trying to coordinate
the security committee with the police and security forces. He
identified employment and basic services, along with financing
from the central government, as crucial issues to be resolved.
End Summary.


2. (C) In a June 5 meeting, Governor Wa'hili told the DRC that
the Iraqi Army would have only a small role in the
recently-enacted emergency security plan for Basrah because
"there were not that many of them." The role of the Iraqi Army
would be limited to manning vehicle checkpoints on major roads.
The Iraqi Police, he said, would have the biggest role to play
in carrying out the emergency plan. This plan had been approved
by Minister of Provincial Affairs, Dr. Safa al-Saafi.


3. (C) The 5-person delegation sent to Basrah by Prime Minister
Nouri al-Maliki all returned to Baghdad earlier on June 5, the
governor said. When pressed for information about the
delegation, the governor avoided naming the members. The
governor said he had spent the day meeting with the Chief of
Police and other security forces in Basrah, and described these
individuals and organizations as part of an "investigation
committee" that would work cooperatively, but separately, from
the security committee. (Comment: Chief of Police Hassan Sewadi
was present in the Governor's office as the REO delegation
arrived. End comment.)


4. (C) He said that everyone involved in security and
investigations had agreed to try to implement the emergency
plan, but he admitted that there were still issues that needed
to be resolved, such as the exact roles of the Iraqi police and
Iraqi army in carrying out the plan. He said that he believed
the June 3 marketplace bombing in Basrah had been carried out by
Sunnis who were seeking revenge for recent assassinations. He
alluded to outside forces trying to destabilize Basrah in order
to protect their own interests.


5. (C) When asked what he thought of the PM's visit to Basrah
on May 31, the governor diplomatically responded that the visit
certainly made everyone in Basrah, especially the Basrah
Provincial Council (BPC),focus on security. The worldwide
attention on Basrah, he said, was not a bad thing either. He
expressed guarded pessimism that the 30-day state of emergency
would resolve all of Basrah's security issues because "the enemy
is always changing its strategy." He said that the real
problems in Basrah were the lack of employment opportunities and
basic services such as electricity and running water, and that
he could not address these problems because he had received no
budget from the central government.


6. (C) Comment: A political survivor and smooth-talker,
Governor Wa'hili has successfully used the PM's visit to Basrah
and his declaration of a state of emergency to maneuver himself
into a position of even greater power as head of the emergency
security committee. Now that he has acquired even more
authority over security matters, the governor had no qualms
about admitting to us that he did not foresee a major role for
the Iraqi Army in securing Basrah, and planned to have the Iraqi
Police in charge of implementing the emergency security plan.
On the contrary, we believe that the Iraqi Police are too
compromised by militia-infiltration to be trusted with securing
Basrah, and that the Iraqi Army must play a significant role in
carrying out the PM's state of emergency in Basrah.


7. (C) Comment Continued: Wa'hili's view that he is in charge
of enforcing the emergency measures will exacerbate his poor
relations with the national government. As pointed out by
British Ambassador Patey in a recent Ministerial Council for
National Security (MCNS) meeting (septel),the Governor has no
control over Coalition Forces, the Iraqi Army, or National
Police assets. He has no standing to say what role the Iraqi
Army will or will not play in enforcing emergency measures
declared by the Prime Minister. End comment.

MARRANO