STATE OF EMERGENCY IN BASRAH IS "MESSY"

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BASRAH 000095

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 6/5/2016
TAGS: AMGT ASEC PGOV PREL PTER IZ
SUBJECT: STATE OF EMERGENCY IN BASRAH IS "MESSY"

REF: A) BASRAH 94, B) BASRAH 56

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CLASSIFIED BY: Mark Marrano, DEPUTY REGIONAL COORDINATOR, REO
BASRAH, DEPARTMENT OF STATE.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)




1. (C) SUMMARY: Little changed on the streets the day after
Prime Minister Nouri Al-Maliki completed his one-day visit to
Basrah on May 31 and declared a state of emergency for one month
in Basrah. REO contacts report that the PM's visit was well
received by all residents of Basrah, except local government
officials who bore the brunt of the PM's public criticism. More
intimidation of local staff who work for Coalition Forces
occurred during the PM's visit. Four REO-related deaths have
occurred since May 31. END SUMMARY.

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What Does State of Emergency Mean?
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2. (C) Little has changed as a result of the PM's declaration of
a state of emergency in Basrah on May 31. On the recommendation
of the Basrah Security Council, the Basrah Chief of Police
issued a signed document on June 1 stating that an "Emergency
Plan" will be carried out in Basrah Province for thirty days,
beginning June 2. All police stations have been placed on high
alert. The implications of a state of emergency are still
unclear to most REO contacts. REO staff who have left the
compound report fewer Iraqi Police than normal on streets and
several new Iraqi Army vehicle checkpoints.


3. (C) REO Basrah contacts who attended the May 31 meetings
between Maliki and local government, political parties, police,
and community leaders uniformly described the proceedings as
"messy" and "chaotic." All contacts reported that Governor
Mohammed Al Wahili and BPC Chair Obadi attempted to storm out of
a meeting with Maliki after he publicly criticized Basrah's poor
security and corruption problems; however, they were convinced
to return to the meeting before leaving the building. An Iraqi
police officer was shot and wounded by one of the PM's
bodyguards, who was subsequently arrested. The police officer
was treated at the Basrah Teaching Hospital.

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Delegation Formed to Address Security
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4. (C) A five-member central government delegation in Basrah
spent most of June 1 conferring with Basrah Provincial Council
(BPC) members and community leaders on security issues. These
five members reportedly included: Safa Al Safi (Dawa),Minister
for Provincial Affairs; Seyid Abid, Deputy of former Prime
Minister Jafari; Salam Odel Maliki (OMS),former Transportation
Minister and originally from Basrah; Hadi Amery, Head of Badr
Organization; and an as yet unidentified Sunni representative
from the Iraqi Islamic Party.


5. (C) Rajeh Al Mosawi, Assistant to the Governor, told the
Deputy Regional Coordinator (DRC) in a June 1 meeting that he
believed the delegation would allow Governor Mohammed to retain
his title but remove all his authoritative power. (NOTE: The
Governor has been placed at the head of the Security Committee
to implement the police emergency plan. END NOTE.) Rajeh said
he believes the government delegation would also replace Chief
of Police, Hassan Sewadi, whom Rajeh described as too weak and
ineffectual to address the problem of militia infiltration into
the police. In Rajeh's opinion, Governor Mohammed was the root
cause of most of Basrah's security problems. "There is no need
for an emergency plan. Just get rid of the Governor," he said.
(NOTE: Rajeh is a civil servant with no political affiliation.
END NOTE.)

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Intimidation and Deaths of Local Staff
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6. (C) Sheikh Kadim Al Gatrani, Chief of the Council of Nobles
in Basrah, told the DRC on June 1 that vehicles circulating
through downtown Basrah on May 31 warned people over
loudspeakers not to work for British or American organizations
and threatened those who do. Al Gatrani said he heard the
threats but did not see the cars himself, but he alleged that
"certain political parties" were behind the intimidation.
Although he would not name the parties, Gatrani's bias against
Governor Mohammed and the Fadillah party are well known (reftel
B). Sheikh Kadim was not opposed to the state of emergency
declaration, and -- like Rajeh -- said that the residents of
Basrah welcomed the PM visit and his hard-line approach to
security problems in the city. However, Kadim was pessimistic
about the central government's ability to counter the

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militia-infiltrated police in Basrah, and he said that so far
all he has seen is talk and no action.


7. (C) Two REO-related deaths occurred on May 31. An Iraqi who
works for a laundry company subcontracted by KBR was shot and
killed after work on May 31. Also on May 31, the father of an
Iraqi woman employed by the Danish Mission on the REO compound
was shot and killed, possibly after having driven his daughter
home. (NOTE: The father is Sunni, which his family believes is
why he was targeted. END NOTE.)


8. (C) On June 4, a Department of State (DOS) Locally Engaged
Staff (LES) member, who worked as the administrative assistant
for the REO, and her husband were shot and killed by a
motorcyclist while driving home from the REO in their car.


9. (C) On June 5, two of the remaining three DOS LES at the REO
resigned and the third remained at home. Out of 212 total KBR
positions at the REO, only 79 reported for work on the morning
of June 5.


10. (C) COMMENT: We expect to see a further decrease in staffing
at the REO because of the perceived threat of assassination for
affiliating with the REO. How the State of Emergency will be
implemented in Basrah is far from clear at this point, and
militias may take advantage of the chaotic situation to ramp up
attacks. END COMMENT.
MARRANO