PM MALIKI DECLARES STATE OF EMERGENCY IN BASRAH

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BASRAH 000094

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SIPDIS

CONFIDENTIAL//REL USA AND MCFI

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 6/5/2016
TAGS: AMGT ASEC PGOV PREL PTER IZ
SUBJECT: PM MALIKI DECLARES STATE OF EMERGENCY IN BASRAH

REF: A) BASRAH 67, B) BASRAH 79, C) BASRAH 84, D) BAGHDAD 1745

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CLASSIFIED BY: Mark Marrano, DEPUTY REGIONAL COORDINATOR, REO
BASRAH, DEPARTMENT OF STATE.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)




1. (C) SUMMARY: In a press conference in Basrah on May 31, Prime
Minister Nouri al-Maliki declared a one-month state of emergency
in Basrah and requested that the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF)
devise a security plan to stabilize the city. This announcement
follows a May 29 press conference in Basrah in which the Deputy
Basrah Provincial Council (BPC) Chair, Nassaif Jassim Ali
(Fadillah),publicly denied that a security problem existed in
Basrah. REO Basrah saw a temporary decrease in indirect fire
after the May 16 increase of British military patrols and arrest
operations, but continues to manage a number of challenges in
carrying out mission-related activities due to the poor security
situation in the city. END SUMMARY.

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Press Conference
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2. (U) In a May 31 press conference at the Basrah South Oil
Company Cultural Center, PM Maliki declared a state of emergency
for one month in Basrah and requested that the Iraqi Security
Forces (ISF) devise a security plan to stabilize the city. The
PM had delivered a public speech about security in Basrah that
morning, followed by a press conference. The PM held smaller
group meetings with political party heads and clerics, Governor
Mohammed Al Wahili and other BPC members, the Chief of Police
and other security personnel, and finally with tribal leaders.
The state of emergency was declared at the end of the day after
the last of the small group meetings.

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Basrah Politicians Deny Existence of Security Problem
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3. (U) On May 29, Deputy BPC Chair Nassaif Jassim Ali (Fadillah)
gave a press conference in which he publicly denied that a
security problem existed in Basrah. The few isolated incidents
that occurred, he said, were tribal battles. He criticized
media reports that characterized the security situation in
Basrah as "unstable" and excoriated the central government for
focusing on security in Basrah when Baghdad was much worse.


4. (C) Other BPC members have admitted that the streets of
Basrah are dangerous, that there is an informal curfew from 2200
to 0800, and that investments have suffered as a result (Basrah
86). Since May 17, the only issue addressed in the BPC has been
voting out and replacing Governor Mohammed. However, three
weeks later, the BPC has been unable to muster the necessary
votes or agree on a replacement for the Governor (Basrah 85).

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Intimidation of Locally Engaged Staff
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5. (C) On May 29, pamphlets again were posted and distributed in
the city warning all those who worked with the Coalition Forces
to quit or face death. Locally Engaged Staff (LES) reported
seeing individuals handing out these pamphlets in broad
daylight. The pamphlets were marked "Release No. 2" and signed
by "Media Office, Imam Hussein Brigades." The document ended
with the warning, "We will never show any mercy to anyone
working or dealing with the occupation forces including
interpreters, local workers who are serving them and some
traitors from the security forces. We warn anybody who goes to
their locations."


6. (C) The British Consul General told the Deputy Regional
Coordinator (DRC) on May 31 that the above pamphlet was probably
released as a result of British and Iraqi military operations in
Basrah that led to numerous arrests and seizures of large
weapons caches. In a meeting with the DRC and RSO on May 29,
the Brigade Commander, Brigadier General James Everard, outlined
extensive operations being carried out by the 20th Brigade and
the Iraqi Army. Everard stated that the number of both day and
night patrols had increased, as well as the number of hours per
patrol. The general public, he said, appears to be "sleeping
better with the sound of Warriors (Armored Fighting Vehicles) on
the streets."

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REO Operations
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7. (C) Following the appearance of "Release No. 2," the number
of local KBR workers at REO Basrah fell. Prior to the
appearance of the pamphlet, the numbers of local workers had
reached an average of 135 per day (out of a total of 212 local
positions). The day after the pamphlet was distributed, the
number fell to 95. The REO continues to have KBR expatriates
drive Sewer Sanitation Trucks (SSTs) that empty directly into
the Shat al-Arab River and pick up the garbage for burning on
the compound. Regarding the lack of drivers for fuel trucks
coming to the REO, the British military is providing escort
until KBR can have storage tanks installed on the compound.


8. (C) On May 25, the REO's air bridge to Kuwait -- managed by
the Coalition Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC) based in
Camp Arifjan -- resumed operations and completed one round-trip
flight. The current plan for the air bridge is for it to
continue to provide one flight per week, predicated on a minimum
of 20 passengers.


9. (C) The British military has indicated it will sustain the
increased tempo of its operations indefinitely and move the UK
Battle Group headquarters located at Shat al-Arab Hotel to the
Basrah Palace Compound, consolidating forces here and at the
Basrah Air Station. This will make more UK troops available at
the Basrah Palace Compound for patrols and arrests. (COMMENT:
Coalition bases may experience a violent backlash due to the
recent increase in arrest and patrol operations of the British
military and the Iraqi Army. END COMMENT.)


10. (C) COMMENT: The poor security situation in Basrah involves
a number of factors including militia infiltration of the police
(Basrah 63); sectarian violence between the Sunni minority and
Shia majority; corruption in the BPC; and outside interference,
most likely from Iran, in the form of supplying resources to
militias. Militias and death squads are dominated by men who
currently have few other options for employment. Investments,
business, and even the REO are not able to staff positions
because of harassment and intimidation of local staff.


11. (C) COMMENT CONTINUED: From REO Basrah's perspective, PM
Maliki's declaration of a state of emergency is a bold step
forward in addressing the complexity of the security situation
in Basrah. We expect the majority of Basrah's residents to
welcome or at least accept the declared state of emergency, as
long as it results in an increase in security within a short
amount of time. There may be tense confrontations between the
Iraqi police and the Iraqi Army as the state of emergency is
implemented. It remains to be seen if a month will be
sufficient to correct the situation. Central government
involvement is essential to resolving the security impasse, and
PM Maliki's visit to Basrah is timely and has the potential to
set Basrah back on track. END COMMENT.
MARRANO