Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06BASRAH93
2006-06-04 17:33:00
CONFIDENTIAL
REO Basrah
Cable title:  

SERIOUS CONCERNS WITH NEWLY-APPOINTED BASRAH SECURITY

Tags:  PGOV PREL PTER KISL ASEC IZ 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO7105
OO RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHBC #0093/01 1551733
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 041733Z JUN 06
FM REO BASRAH
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0367
INFO RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
RUEHBC/REO BASRAH 0386
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BASRAH 000093 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 6/4/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER KISL ASEC IZ
SUBJECT: SERIOUS CONCERNS WITH NEWLY-APPOINTED BASRAH SECURITY
COMMITTEE

REF: BAGHDAD 1869

BASRAH 00000093 001.2 OF 002


CLASSIFIED BY: Mark Marrano, DEPUTY REGIONAL COORDINATOR, REO
BASRAH, DEPARTMENT OF STATE.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BASRAH 000093

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 6/4/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER KISL ASEC IZ
SUBJECT: SERIOUS CONCERNS WITH NEWLY-APPOINTED BASRAH SECURITY
COMMITTEE

REF: BAGHDAD 1869

BASRAH 00000093 001.2 OF 002


CLASSIFIED BY: Mark Marrano, DEPUTY REGIONAL COORDINATOR, REO
BASRAH, DEPARTMENT OF STATE.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)

1. (C) Summary: It is unlikely that the 5-person emergency
security committee appointed by PM Nouri Al Maliki will be able
to positively impact on the security situation in Basrah. Three
of its members, Badr Corps head Hadi al-Amiri, former Minister
of Transportation Salam al-Maliki, and Minister of Provincial
Affairs Dr. Safa al Saafi, have close ties to Basrah Governor
Mohammed Wa'hili, who has been identified by numerous sources as
one of the main reasons for Basrah's deplorable security
situation. Security in Basrah continues to be a main concern,
as a direct attack on the REO compound, a bomb in a marketplace,
and an attack on a Sunni mosque all occurred within the past 24
hours (to be reported in septel). End Summary.

Emergency Committee Has No Plan, Wants to Leave Basrah
-------------- --------------
--------------


2. (C) The British Consul General reported that in a June 2
meeting, the emergency committee spent the initial few minutes
of the meeting outlining a plan to establish 24-hour vehicle
police checkpoints in order to arrest unmarked cars. This was
the extent of their security plan. During the remainder of the
meeting, the committee members, and Dr. Safa in particular,
chastised the British representatives on detainee issues. After
an hour on the subject of British military failures, the
committee then requested British military transport back to
Baghdad on Sunday.


3. (C) The British Consul General expressed concern that the
emergency plan as outlined in the June 2 meeting was
insufficiently developed to adequately address Basrah's numerous
security concerns. He also expressed disbelief that this was
the outcome that the PM had been hoping to achieve, and
questioned the decision to put the governor in charge of
security. He noted that Dr. Safa has come out strongly in

support of the governor.

Emergency Committee Compromised
-------------- --------------


4. (C) In a June 4 meeting, Majed al-Sari, Ministry of Defense
Advisor for the Southern Region, told the Deputy Regional
Coordinator (DRC) that the emergency security committee had no
hope of stabilizing the situation in Basrah with the Governor at
its head, comparing the situation to "a thief minding the
store." He described Dr. Safa as a close personal friend of
Governor Wa'hili. Former Transportation Minister Salam
al-Maliki used to be the Deputy Governor of Basrah in 2004,
Majed said, and has too many personal interests in Basrah to be
able to deal with the security crisis neutrally. Amiri, a
well-known Badr Organization member, went to the same school as
Governor Wa'hili and was also a close friend of his. Majed was
unable to name the Sunni Arab representative on the committee,
although he said he thought there was one. (Comment: We have
heard three different names for the Sunni representative:
Samara'ee (no further information),Amer (no further
information),and Khalaf al-Issa, head of the Sunni Iraqi
Islamic Party and parliamentarian. We have been unable to
confirm any of these names. End Comment.)


5. (C) When asked why he thought the PM had appointed these
people to be on the committee, Majed answered that he believed
it was out of desire to avoid bringing in "outsiders" who would
be viewed with distrust by the provincial government. He said
this was fine, but the mistake was in not balancing out the
"insiders" with technocrats and other political independents.
He noted that all of the members on the committee were political
figures who would look at the Basrah problem through the
perspective of their parties' interests, not in terms of how to
solve the problem. He suggested that representatives from the
Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Human Rights should have
been included on the council. He expressed disbelief that the
emergency committee included no representatives from the Iraqi
Army or police.


6. (C) Comment: The issue of British-held detainees and
forcing their release has been Governor Mohammed's favorite
theme for months. That Dr. Safa took this issue on in the
security committee meeting, even though it is not directly
related to Basrah's security situation, concerns us. The
committee appears to be more concerned with laying the blame for
Basrah's poor security on coalition forces than actually doing
anything to address the problem. Vehicle checkpoints alone will
do little to improve matters in Basrah, especially if they are
under the control of the Basrah police. Even this part of the
plan has not been fully implemented yet in the city.


7. (C) Comment continued: We concur with the British and with
Majed al Sari that the emergency security committee, as it now

BASRAH 00000093 002.2 OF 002


stands, will fail because the emergency plan is unworkable and
inadequate, and because the security committee is not committed
to finding solutions to the security crisis in Basrah. The
Governor has been implicated repeatedly in militia-related
attacks and assassinations, as well as oil smuggling and other
corrupt activities. It is inconceivable that he will be able to
positively impact Basrah's security. Central government
involvement is crucial in order to remove the Governor from the
head of the emergency committee; if he cannot be physically
removed, his influence on the committee must be reduced. We
also believe that making the emergency committee more
representative by including non-political members of the
Ministries of Defense and Human Rights, for example, would be a
step in the right direction. End comment.
MARRANO