Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06BASRAH87
2006-05-28 09:48:00
CONFIDENTIAL
REO Basrah
Cable title:  

BASRAH YOUTH - ANGRY AND FRUSTRATED

Tags:  PREL PTER PGOV IZ 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO0105
OO RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK RUEHMOS
DE RUEHBC #0087/01 1480948
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O P 280948Z MAY 06
FM REO BASRAH
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0358
INFO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RUEHBC/REO BASRAH 0377
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BASRAH 000087 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 5/28/2016
TAGS: PREL PTER PGOV IZ
SUBJECT: BASRAH YOUTH - ANGRY AND FRUSTRATED

REF: (A) BASRAH 84 (B) BAGHDAD 1745

BASRAH 00000087 001.2 OF 002


CLASSIFIED BY: Mark F. Marrano, Deputy Regional Coordinator,
Basrah Regional Embassy Office, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)




C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BASRAH 000087

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 5/28/2016
TAGS: PREL PTER PGOV IZ
SUBJECT: BASRAH YOUTH - ANGRY AND FRUSTRATED

REF: (A) BASRAH 84 (B) BAGHDAD 1745

BASRAH 00000087 001.2 OF 002


CLASSIFIED BY: Mark F. Marrano, Deputy Regional Coordinator,
Basrah Regional Embassy Office, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)





1. (C) Summary. In a series of meetings with political,
religious and youth leaders in Basrah over the past month, the
Deputy Regional Coordinator (DRC) discussed the attitudes of the
local youth towards the Coalition Forces (CF). A combination of
unemployment, dashed hopes, religious and militia influence all
appear to be pushing the youth of Basrah to increasingly
challenge and confront Coalition Forces with violence. The
recent clashes between local youth and the British military
during the past month clearly show that local frustration has
reached the boiling point. To improve the attitude of the youth
of Basrah toward the CF, security must be restored to Basrah and
economic opportunities that are readily attainable must be
created to counteract the influence of hard line religious
clerics and militia leaders. End Summary.

Students
--------------


2. (C) Issam Khadim, President of the Students Union at Shat Al
Arab University, stated on May 16 that students are generally
frustrated and angry with the Coalition Forces for not
intervening enough in Basrah to "punish those causing the
violence." He expressed frustration with the Islamic groups
that frequent the universities. Khadim mentioned that after the
fall of Saddam, religious leaders from Sadr, Badr and Fadheela
went to all the universities in Basrah to recruit and influence
the students. He added that these religious leaders tried to
change the nature of the union to make it more political.


3. (C) Khadim stated that at Shat Al Arab University there are
constantly people from different political parties handing out
pamphlets. He described the 2,000 students at his university as
liberal, open minded and becoming increasingly frustrated with
the current security situation and the Coalition Forces. Khadim
added that the students on the other larger main campus of
Basrah University are a "lost cause" because different political

and religious groups have heavily influenced them.
Specifically, he mentioned that Iran has been using Badr in the
universities as a way to spread its influence.


4. (C) Provincial Council member Dr. Hamid Al Thalmi of the
Iraqi National Accord voiced the same opinion on April 24. He
stated that the USG needs to focus on the students in the
universities in order to counter the influence of the religious
hard liners. Dr. Al Thalmi suggested that the USG not take a
direct approach, but rather work through non-governmental
organizations (NGO's) to quietly influence the students towards
a more positive, open-minded approach with regards to the United
States. When asked for more details, Dr. Al Thalmi said he did
not know exactly how the USG could accomplish this only that it
should be looked at more carefully by the USG.

Street Kids
--------------


5. (C) Sayed Ghali, Provincial Council and Iraqi National
Accord member, stated on April 27 that local youths between
12-20 years old who are unemployed and without direction are the
most susceptible to militia and religious leaders. He pointed
to Sayed Al Shuhada Movement, a well-known political party in
Basrah with strong links to Iran, as one political group that
concentrates their recruitment efforts on these youths. Ghali
stressed that more work needs to be done with getting the kids
off the streets and into sports programs.


6. (C) Also on April 27, the Assistant to the Governor of
Basrah, Rajeh Al Musawi, highlighted the dashed hopes of the
average kid in the street. He stated that the youth of Basrah
had very high expectations with regards to the Coalition Forces.
According to Al Musawi, the arrival of the Coalition Forces in
Basrah signaled for the local youth a new era of economic
opportunity and higher standard of living. However, three years
later, they do not consider their lives are any better, nor do
they see any good prospects for the future. Al Musawi stressed
that it would be easy to change their negative opinion of the
Coalition Forces by reaching out with more reconstruction
projects, even small scale ones. He added that some projects
done by the British 60 years ago still have a lingering good
effect on the older generation in Basrah. On the other hand,
Said Youssef, the Head of Thar'allah in Basrah, stated on May 14
that something "big" needs to happen to calm the anger of the
youth. He suggested that the removal of the Governor by the
British military or by the Provincial Council through the voting

BASRAH 00000087 002.2 OF 002


process would help to alleviate some anger.


7. (C) Provincial Council member and Shiite cleric, Sayed Bahaa
Jama al Deen, echoed the same sentiments on May 23. He stated
that many local youth are extremely frustrated with being unable
to find a job and the lack of basic services. Sayed Bahaa added
that some political groups and militias are taking advantage of
this frustration by channeling it towards the Coalition Forces.
The Chief of Police, Hasan al Swaidi, stated on April 25 that
the frustration has reached such levels that the only way to
control it is for the British military to increase their
visibility with more patrols. He opined that this was the only
way to dampen the desire of the local youth to make trouble.


8. (C) Comment: Clearly there are local leaders willing to
take advantage of the poor security situation for their own
respective agendas. It may be too late to radically change
local youth opinion at this point since it appears that the
religious and political groups have been allowed the time and
freedom to exert their respective influences. Perhaps the best
approach now would be to focus on restoring security to Basrah
to dissipate come of the current anger and frustration felt by
the youth and create an environment conducive to the development
of new economic opportunities (see refs A and B) End Comment.
MARRANO