Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06BASRAH78
2006-05-16 10:51:00
CONFIDENTIAL
REO Basrah
Cable title:  

SUNNI LEADERS EXPRESS THEIR ANGER OVER KILLINGS

Tags:  PGOV PREL PTER SOCI KISL IZ 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO5998
OO RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK RUEHMOS
DE RUEHBC #0078/01 1361051
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O P 161051Z MAY 06
FM REO BASRAH
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0344
INFO RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUMICEA/USCENTCOM INTEL CEN MACDILL AFB FL
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0009
RUEHCP/AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN PRIORITY 0008
RUEHBC/REO BASRAH 0363
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BASRAH 000078 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 5/16/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER SOCI KISL IZ
SUBJECT: SUNNI LEADERS EXPRESS THEIR ANGER OVER KILLINGS

REF: A) BASRAH 35 B) BASRAH 54

BASRAH 00000078 001.2 OF 002


CLASSIFIED BY: Ken Gross, Regional Coordinator, REO Basrah,
State Department.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)



C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BASRAH 000078

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 5/16/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER SOCI KISL IZ
SUBJECT: SUNNI LEADERS EXPRESS THEIR ANGER OVER KILLINGS

REF: A) BASRAH 35 B) BASRAH 54

BASRAH 00000078 001.2 OF 002


CLASSIFIED BY: Ken Gross, Regional Coordinator, REO Basrah,
State Department.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)




1. (C) Summary: On May 14 2006, the Regional Coordinator (RC),
Deputy RC and Poloff attended a meeting with six prominent Sunni
leaders at the diwan at the Al Abayachi mosque of Sheik Khalid
al-Mulla, a moderate Sunni imam and a close contact of the
Regional Embassy Office (see Ref. A). The Sunni leaders voiced
their strong dissatisfaction with the lack of security for
Sunnis in Basrah. The Sunnis leaders blamed the local
government and coalition forces for failing to prevent four
recent murders in the Sunni community (ref B). Threatening to
hold a press conference with international media to stress the
responsibility of the coalition and the local government for not
preventing the murders of their co-religionists, the leaders
said that only immediate and effective actions by coalition
forces would prevent this media event. After a long discussion,
the Sunni leaders agreed to pursue a joint meeting with
coalition diplomats and military commanders to review efforts to
protect the Sunni community. End Summary.


2. (SBU) The Sunni leaders in attendance included the
following: Sheikh Khalid al-Mulla, host of the meeting and imam
of the Al Abayachi mosque, Sheik Mohammed Zaki Abid al-Majeed
al-Hamdani, leader of the Al-Hamdan tribe, Sheik Adnan Majeed
al-Ghanim, leader of the Al-Ghanim tribe, Sheik Yousif Abid
al-Majeed al-Hamdani, imam of the Al-Sager mosque, Sheik
Mohammed Abid al-Hashim, imam of the Hamdan Bridge Mosque, and
Sheik Abid al-Karim Nassir, head of the Sunni Endowment. The
six Sunni leaders claimed to represent one million Sunnis.


3. (C) Sheik Khalid opened the meeting with a welcoming
statement, and the RC expressed his condolences for the recent
murders of Sunnis including Sheik Khalid's friend, Sheik Khalil
Jaber Abdul Ali, and his eleven-year-old son who were
assassinated on May 12 in front of the Al-Khudairi mosque in

Basrah. These killings followed the assassination of two other
Sunni leaders, Sheik Khalid Abdullah Jarad al-Saadon and Tarik
Ali Sultan on May 10 in Al Zubair.


4. (C) Sheik Adnan, the leader of a Sunni tribal association in
Basrah, immediately questioned the benefit of MNF-I forces in
Basrah and inquired whether they were stationed there to
maintain safety or were strictly for show. He said that
assassinations against Sunnis in Basrah were increasing at an
alarming rate. He expressed his intention to raise
international awareness of the "inaction" by the local
government and coalition forces by holding a press conference
with international media in which blame would be placed squarely
upon the United States, United Kingdom and the local government.
The only way to avoid the condemnation of coalition forces in
front of the media, Sheik Adnan said, would be if immediate
action were taken to guarantee the safety of Sunnis. Per Sheik
Adnan the Sunni community planned to set up a camp for their
people in the desert, away from the city, where they could be
protected. The Sheiks did not elaborate on how this camp would
be protected and who would protect it. Placing much of the
blame for the killings on Basrah Governor Muhammad al-Wa'eli and
his brother Ismail, Sheik Adnan said that the time for words is
over and quick action to protect the Sunni population is needed.


5. (C) Sheik Zaki al-Hamdani, a tribal leader and imam from Abu
Khassib, said that the nerves of the members of his tribe are
frayed and most Sunnis are afraid to go to the hospital or other
public places. He described in grisly detail the torture and
murder of Sunnis in Basrah (see Ref. B for more on the
killings). He said that Sunnis "have no problems with Shias"
and only want to be able to live a normal life in the
neighborhoods where they have dwelled for hundreds of years.


6. (C) The other Sunni leaders echoed Sheik Adnan and Sheik
Zaki's concerns and warned that Sunni landowners would send
their families to the camp in the desert and then would fight to
protect their property. Sheik Nassir, the head of the Sunni
Endowment, along with Sheik Khalid, were the only leaders who
said that further dialogue with coalition forces was possible,
but Sheik Nassir warned that it is imperative to make immediate
and tangible efforts to improve security since "people are being
killed like insects."


7. (C) To address the concerns of the Sunni leaders, the RC

BASRAH 00000078 002.2 OF 002


proposed a meeting of American, British and Danish diplomats and
military commanders to exchange information and review the
current security situation for Sunnis. In a subsequent meeting
with RC and DRC the acting UK Consul General, agreed to such a
meeting. The head of the Danish office is on leave. The goal
would be to review concrete steps that are being taken by
coalition forces and to consider what else could be done to stop
the killings. After having vented their frustrations and anger,
the Sunni leaders concurred that a meeting would be useful. The
meeting closed with an agreement by both sides that we would
move forward together on organizing the meeting.


8. (C) Comment: The meeting highlighted smoldering rage and a
feeling of impotence by the Sunni leaders as murders of Sunnis
in Basrah continue. All agreed that immediate action - by
someone -- is needed to alleviate the suffering of the Sunni
community. In addition, they faulted the Governor for not
taking the necessary measures to protect Sunnis. Although
several of the leaders were adamant that they had had enough of
meetings that produced nothing, at the end they all agreed that
the only way to move forward is through dialogue with MNF-I
diplomats and military commanders. REO believe these Sunnis
leaders are as influential as they claim and that they
legitimately speak for the Basrah Sunni community. However, the
emotion expressed at the diwan clearly indicates that the Sunni
community soon will take independent action to protect
themselves if further discussions do not yield results quickly.
End Comment.
GROSS