Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06BASRAH67
2006-05-05 12:00:00
SECRET
REO Basrah
Cable title:  

BASRAH EMERGENCY ACTION COMMITTEE MEETING 05/01/06

Tags:  ASEC PTER IZ 
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VZCZCXRO5269
PP RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK RUEHMOS
DE RUEHBC #0067 1251200
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 051200Z MAY 06
FM REO BASRAH
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0328
INFO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
RUEHBC/REO BASRAH 0347
S E C R E T BASRAH 000067 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 5/5/2016
TAGS: ASEC PTER IZ
SUBJECT: BASRAH EMERGENCY ACTION COMMITTEE MEETING 05/01/06

REF: (A) BASRAH 02; (B) 05 BASRAH 159

CLASSIFIED BY: David M. Satterfield, Deputy Chief of Mission,
Embassy Baghdad, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)



S E C R E T BASRAH 000067

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 5/5/2016
TAGS: ASEC PTER IZ
SUBJECT: BASRAH EMERGENCY ACTION COMMITTEE MEETING 05/01/06

REF: (A) BASRAH 02; (B) 05 BASRAH 159

CLASSIFIED BY: David M. Satterfield, Deputy Chief of Mission,
Embassy Baghdad, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)




1. (SBU) The Regional Coordinator for Regional Embassy Office
Basrah (REO) chaired a meeting of the Emergency Action Committee
(EAC) on May 1 to discuss the security situation in Basrah. The
Deputy Regional Coordinator, RSO, ORA, CPATT, Triple Canopy,
POL/ECON Section, USAID, SCID and KBR management attended. The
two main points of discussion were intimidation of the REO's
local staff and the April 30 mortar attack on the compound.


2. (SBU) The Regional Coordinator outlined recent threats and
intimidation against local staff and asked that the discussion
focus on this issue and on the REO's overall security. The RSO
briefed the EAC on recent FSN intimidation in Basrah. On April
30, copies of a pamphlet were left by the main gate that
threatened all the Coalition Forces' employees. The local
employees from KBR have been particularly affected. On May 1,
only 26 of the 180 KBR local employees came to work; 41 KBR
employees resigned on April 30. Few local employees at the
other agencies within the REO plan to come to work this week.
Triple Canopy has only one of its six interpreters still working
- one is on leave and is expected to return, but four refused to
leave the compound on missions and took leave. (Comment: This
latest warning came after the REO went through a period a month
ago when local employees' fears for their safety led some to
contemplate resigning. The murders of a British military
interpreter and a former KBR local employee triggered the
previous incident. As a result of those murders many employees
took a few days of vacation before returning to work. End
Comment.)


3. (S) REO Basrah has had several instances of intimidation in
the past (Refs A and B). As a result of this latest
intimidation the RSO briefed the EAC on an operation conducted
at the main entrance gate on the afternoon of April 30: The RSO
coordinated with local police to cordon off the area and
interview and photograph all the individuals within several
hundred meters of the REO's entrance gate. After the cordon was
established and the area cleared of personnel, the REO's
employees were released. The RSO also briefed the EAC that the
UK 17th Battery would conduct a larger show of force on May 2 to
sweep units along the main avenue of approach to the REO in the
early morning hours.


4. (S) The EAC discussed how to limit the effects of FSN
intimidation. The Regional Coordinator explained that the REO
would look at hiring third country nationals and borrowing
employees from other locations within Iraq. The KBR Camp
Manager informed the EAC that three critical areas in the camp
that must be staffed are the power generation, HVAC and water
purification sections. If KBR does not have enough local
employees to work in these sections, the option of hiring third
country nationals should be considered as a long-term solution.
Additionally the camp requires its septic tank system to be
emptied every 24 hours. The total number of critical employees
was determined to be 50 KBR personnel. The KBR manager said
that it is not necessary to request additional personnel from
Baghdad at this time, and the Regional Coordinator asked him to
keep the REO informed if this changes.


5. (S) The EAC believes that the pressure on local staff will
continue unless there is a show of force by Coalition or Iraqi
military units. One possible measure that the EAC suggested is
the establishment of Iraqi Army (IA) checkpoints in the vicinity
of the REO compound. The IA is believed to be less compromised
than the Iraqi police and would be a deterrent to hostile
surveillance. Another suggestion was the hiring of an Iraqi
Kurdish security force such as the "Sandi" company that does
counter surveillance and guard operations in Baghdad for DOD
elements.


6. (C) The EAC also discussed the latest indirect fire attack.
The REO was hit in the evening of April 30 with three 60 mm
mortar rounds that damaged a KBR maintenance trailer and several
vehicles. The same general area was targeted on April 4, the
most effective indirect fire to date. The EAC decided that
mission personnel would not work after evening hours in their
office trailers until the current T-wall project is able to
provide better protection from side impacts. The EAC also
decided that MWR facilities would close at 2100 until it
determines the reaction from the British military operation
scheduled for May 2.


7. (U) The EAC will monitor events and reconvene as necessary.

GROSS