Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06BASRAH57
2006-04-17 15:06:00
CONFIDENTIAL
REO Basrah
Cable title:
HIZB DAWA ISLAMIYA PERSPECTIVES IN BASRAH
how-toVZCZCXRO5370 PP RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK RUEHMOS DE RUEHBC #0057 1071506 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 171506Z APR 06 FM REO BASRAH TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0313 INFO RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD PRIORITY 0081 RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC RUMICEA/USCENTCOM INTEL CEN MACDILL AFB FL RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE RUEHBC/REO BASRAH 0331
C O N F I D E N T I A L BASRAH 000057
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 4/17/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM IZ
SUBJECT: HIZB DAWA ISLAMIYA PERSPECTIVES IN BASRAH
CLASSIFIED BY: Ken Gross, Regional Coordinator, REO Basrah,
State Department.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)
C O N F I D E N T I A L BASRAH 000057
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 4/17/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM IZ
SUBJECT: HIZB DAWA ISLAMIYA PERSPECTIVES IN BASRAH
CLASSIFIED BY: Ken Gross, Regional Coordinator, REO Basrah,
State Department.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)
1. (C) Regional Coordinator (RC) and Poloff on April 6 met with
Amer Al-Khuzaei, field coordinator for the Basrah branch of the
Hizb Dawa Islamiya party and Deputy Health Minister, to discuss
the Dawa party's views on various issues. Poloff on April 14
conducted a similar conversation with Abu Fatma, member of the
party's provincial council. The party members presented the
history of Dawa to emphasize its stature and stressed the Dawa
party's key role in making democracy succeed in Iraq. Closely
tied to this was their insistence that the election of Ibrahim
Al Jafari as prime minister would be essential to the democratic
process.
2. (C) Al-Khuzaei described the history of the Dawa movement and
its commitment to democracy. The RC asked about the Basrah
Provincial Council's boycott of the British and Danes and the
effect it was having on reconstruction democracy-building
projects. Al-Kuzaei said that he did not approve of the
boycott, but he also emphasized that Coalition Forces needed to
increase the transparency of its actions, particularly relating
to the detention of Iraqi citizens.
3. (C) Both party members asserted that the Dawa party's rich
political tradition made it a unique partner for the Coalition
Forces. Abu Fatma insisted that there was a misperception that
Dawa supports Iran because of a close connection it forged with
Dawa party members who spent many years in exile there. Poloff
asked Abu Fatma if Dawa attracted support from youth. Initially
Abu Fatma insisted that it did, but when pressed admitted that
Dawa did not fire their imagination.
4. (C) The prime message from the two Dawa members was how
important it was that Ibrahim Al-Jafari remain as prime
minister. They argued that it was the Unified Iraqi Coalition
majority that decided on him as prime minister, and any
deviation from this election would be inimical to democracy.
Al-Khuzaei and Abu Fatma equated a failure of the Jafari
candidacy to an unconstitutional action. RC responded by
asserting that a possible failure of Jafari to become prime
minister would not contravene the Iraqi constitution and
provided analogies to the U.S. political system. Al-Khuzaei
commented that Jafari's personality was not to his liking, but
Jafari's selection as prime minister would prove democracy in
Iraq a success.
GROSS
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 4/17/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM IZ
SUBJECT: HIZB DAWA ISLAMIYA PERSPECTIVES IN BASRAH
CLASSIFIED BY: Ken Gross, Regional Coordinator, REO Basrah,
State Department.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)
1. (C) Regional Coordinator (RC) and Poloff on April 6 met with
Amer Al-Khuzaei, field coordinator for the Basrah branch of the
Hizb Dawa Islamiya party and Deputy Health Minister, to discuss
the Dawa party's views on various issues. Poloff on April 14
conducted a similar conversation with Abu Fatma, member of the
party's provincial council. The party members presented the
history of Dawa to emphasize its stature and stressed the Dawa
party's key role in making democracy succeed in Iraq. Closely
tied to this was their insistence that the election of Ibrahim
Al Jafari as prime minister would be essential to the democratic
process.
2. (C) Al-Khuzaei described the history of the Dawa movement and
its commitment to democracy. The RC asked about the Basrah
Provincial Council's boycott of the British and Danes and the
effect it was having on reconstruction democracy-building
projects. Al-Kuzaei said that he did not approve of the
boycott, but he also emphasized that Coalition Forces needed to
increase the transparency of its actions, particularly relating
to the detention of Iraqi citizens.
3. (C) Both party members asserted that the Dawa party's rich
political tradition made it a unique partner for the Coalition
Forces. Abu Fatma insisted that there was a misperception that
Dawa supports Iran because of a close connection it forged with
Dawa party members who spent many years in exile there. Poloff
asked Abu Fatma if Dawa attracted support from youth. Initially
Abu Fatma insisted that it did, but when pressed admitted that
Dawa did not fire their imagination.
4. (C) The prime message from the two Dawa members was how
important it was that Ibrahim Al-Jafari remain as prime
minister. They argued that it was the Unified Iraqi Coalition
majority that decided on him as prime minister, and any
deviation from this election would be inimical to democracy.
Al-Khuzaei and Abu Fatma equated a failure of the Jafari
candidacy to an unconstitutional action. RC responded by
asserting that a possible failure of Jafari to become prime
minister would not contravene the Iraqi constitution and
provided analogies to the U.S. political system. Al-Khuzaei
commented that Jafari's personality was not to his liking, but
Jafari's selection as prime minister would prove democracy in
Iraq a success.
GROSS