MILITIAS IN BASRAH -- DIRTY POLITICS PERSONIFIED

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 BASRAH 000055

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 4/15/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER PINR KDEM IZ
SUBJECT: MILITIAS IN BASRAH -- DIRTY POLITICS PERSONIFIED

REF: (A) BAGHDAD 812; (B) BASRAH 49; (C) BASRAH 30; (D) BASRAH 49; (E) BASRAH 26; (F) BASRAH 52; (G) BASRAH 53; (H) 05 BASRAH 140

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CLASSIFIED BY: Ken Gross, Regional Coordinator, REO Basrah,
Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)




1. (C) Summary: Most of the militias in Basrah are controlled
by political parties or, in some instances, are now political
parties in their own right. The insidious nature of militias
acting as political parties - or vice versa - makes politics in
Basrah particularly perverse. The Fadillah party denies that it
has a militia, though through its members in the police and the
Oil Protection Force it has the most powerful armed group in
Basrah. The Badr Organization is the best organized and most
professional of the militias. Its members are deeply embedded
in the government, but its leader in Basrah, Hassan al-Rashid,
strongly avers that Badr has transitioned and now is a political
party that will not resort to strong-arm or illegal tactics. A
smaller militia is Sayid al-Shuhadaa, led by parliamentarian
Sayid Dagher and loosely linked to Badr/SCIRI. It has strong
connections to Iran. Jaysh-al-Mahdi is wildly unpredictable and
lacks concrete direction. Many of its members and units operate
autonomously from Muqtada al-Sadr and pursue different
interests. The members of Thar Allah are small in number, and
its leader, Sayid Yusif, also professes - though less
convincingly than al-Rashid - to have traded the role of militia
commander for political leader. End Summary.


2. (C) The insurgency in Basrah differs from that faced by
Iraqi government and Coalition Forces in many other areas in
Iraq. The insurgency in Basrah is Shia militia based; Sunni
insurgents and foreign terrorists' presence in southern Iraq is
minimal. Militias, however, are just as perilous to the fabric
of Iraq's society and its future as the operations mounted by Al
Qaeda and other terrorist groups. (See Ref A for background on
militias.) Shia militias are an integral part of the political
process in Basrah, and the leaders of particularly virulent
militias are key political figures. Hasneen al-Safi, a member
of the BPC and a focal point for human rights, recently
complained to Regional Embassy Office (REO) Basrah that militia
forces control the streets of Basrah - much more so than the
Iraqi police. Based on conversations with political and militia
leaders, this cable describes the predominant militias in Basrah.

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"Fadillah Party Has No Militia"
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3. (C) Governor Muhammad Mossibh al-Wa'eli, who reputedly is
involved in oil smuggling, assassinations and other political
skullduggery, repeatedly stated quite clearly to the Basrah
Regional Coordinator (RC) that Fadillah has no militia. Perhaps
he meant that Fadillah does not have one particular entity that
operates as a militia; Fadillah -- or more precisely the
governor and Abu Salom, a Basrah Provincial Council member
representing Fadillah (see Ref B) - controls substantial
portions of the Oil Protection Force (OPF) and the Serious
Crimes Unit (SCU) and Tactical Support Unit (TSU) of the Basrah
police. These units act as a de facto militia for Fadillah.
(See Ref C for more on the governor's relationship with Abu
Salom.) Sayid Yusif, the head of Thar Allah and a sworn enemy
of the governor, accuses him of being behind most of the
violence in Basrah, including recent rocket attacks on the REO
Basrah compound.

4, (S) In fact, as noted by Sheik Mansour al-Khanaan, a
prominent tribal leader in Basrah, the Fadillah militia is the
strongest and most dangerous since its members run operations
under the cloak of governmental authority. Members wear their
OPF or police uniforms, use their government-issued weapons and
drive their official vehicles while carrying out illegal
activities. Fadillah has an estimated 1,500 active members
currently working in the OPF, SCU and TSU. Other Fadillah party
members besides the governor deny the existence of any sort of
party-based militia. The titular head of Fadillah in Basrah,
Dr. Hayder al-Wa'eli, told the RC that militias "are not present
in Basrah at all." Though still disavowing any Fadillah
militia, the governor does admit that many militias have
infiltrated the police.


5. (S) According to Majed al-Sari, the intelligence chief and
representative of the Ministry of Defense (MOD) in Basrah, the
governor's brother, Ismail Mossibh al-Wa'eli, leads a group that
functions as a death squad or sort of quick reaction force for
the governor. (See Ref D.) Bio Note: Ismail was an
unsuccessful independent candidate on List 756 in the December
15 parliamentary election. During the election campaign he told
the RC that the coalition needed to remain in Iraq for a few
more years to provide security. He also boasted of his Sadr
roots: he said he formerly was the head of the public affairs

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office for Sadr, and his name was listed on Sadr.com. According
to Ismail, he even was at one time Muqtada al-Sadr's boss. End
Bio Note.

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Badr Organization: Well Organized and Entrenched
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6. (C) Badr Organization, closely affiliated with SCIRI and the
second most powerful militia, is the largest in Basrah with
2,500 - 3,000 members, most of them "underground" in the police
and other governmental organizations. Its members are
professional, with good military expertise; they follow
instructions and unlike Fadillah's militia, they are not readily
identified as members of Badr because they work for a particular
organization or unit. After the conflict with Saddam was over,
Badr reorganized itself and inserted its members into government
positions. Sheik Mansour estimates that 50 percent of the
police are members of Badr. (Comment: Given the secrecy
surrounding Badr membership, it is difficult to ascertain the
exact number of Badr members in the police. However, the 50
percent estimate of Sheik Mansour's probably is too high a
figure. End Comment.) Its strength comes from its strong
organization and the loyalty of its members.


7. (C) The Secretary General of Badr Organization in Basrah is
Hassan al-Rashid, a former governor of Basrah and current member
of its Provincial Council. He is a polished politician, careful
and measured in his speech, who could be next in line for the
governorship should Governor Muhammad's many enemies succeed in
toppling him. (See Refs F and G.) He spent six years in Iran
and travels there frequently, though he says that he does not
speak Farsi. When the RC offered to interpret for Hassan during
his next trip to Iran, Hassan jokingly offered to bring him
along.


8. (C) Hassan said that Badr maintains a friendly relationship
with Iran since it provided a safe haven and support for so many
Iraqis during the Saddam years and asserted that he agrees with
Iran on some issues. He denied, however, any direct support
from Iran at this time and pointed out that any issue related to
Iran for Badr must go through him. Hassan reaffirmed that Badr
is committed to the political process. In discussing militias -
and particularly Fadillah's - he recently said, "the most
powerful militia is not the one with the most weapons but the
one that has the most people behind it."

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Masters of the Martyrs Really Masters of the Political Process
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9. (C) Closely related to SCIRI/Badr, Sayid al-Shuhadaa, or
Masters of the Martyrs, is led by Sayid Dagher al-Musawi.
Besides being general secretary for Sayid al-Shuhadaa, Sayid
Dagher represents Muthanna province in the Council of
Representatives. During a recent meeting at his headquarters,
he told the RC that Sayid al-Shuhadaa's goals are one Iraq,
united under democratic principles, with a strong federalist
system that provides for equal distribution of revenues and free
medical insurance. Speaking in platitudes, Sayid Dagher
stressed his love of democracy and said that this is the "golden
time" for political parties in Iraq since they could now operate
in a truly free political environment. Sayid Dagher said that
there were similarities between Sayid al-Shuhadaa and
SCIRI/Badr, but they also have slight differences of opinions.
However, Abdul Aziz al-Hakim leads the political process for
them all.


10. (C) Sayid Dagher totally rejected any Iranian influence in
Basrah, saying that though both peoples are Shia, "they're
Iranians and we're Iraqis." Many Iraqis are called "Iranian"
because of time spent in Iran during Saddam's era, but Sayid
Dagher said Iranians and Iraqis have divergent interests. He
denied any evidence existed of Iranian influence or pressure.
Majed al-Sari, the MOD's intelligence representative, tells a
different story. According to him, Sayid al-Shuhadaa members
are specially chosen by Iran, and the organization functions as
an "advance intelligence unit" in Basrah. He asserted that it
cooperates with SCIRI, but is not closely linked at the lower
levels. The number of armed members of Sayid al-Shuhadaa is
uncertain, but best estimates put it at a few hundred. More so
than the other militias, its activities are shrouded in secrecy.
When the RC asked Sayid Dagher about the oft-repeated
description of Sayid al-Shuhadaa as the "Iranian Embassy in
Basrah," he quickly changed the subject and launched into an
esoteric and convoluted discussion of democracy.

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Jaysh al-Mahdi - Lots of Action, Less Direction

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11. (C) Jaysh al-Mahdi, or JAM, is the best known of the
militias in Basrah and receives the most press coverage.
Created as the military wing of the Office of the Martyr Sadr,
it maintains ties but rejects the prospect of bring part of the
political process. JAM has an estimated 1,500-1,700 hard-core
members in Basrah, though it can rally substantial numbers of
sympathizers for demonstrations.as evidenced after the bombing
of the Golden Mosque in Samarra on February 22 (Ref E). JAM
members are suspected of being behind many of the rocket and IED
attacks against Coalition Forces..


12. (C) JAM lacks strong leadership in Basrah, and its units
are very diffuse. Muqtada al-Sadr is only a figurehead for JAM,
exerting only partial control on the more important issues.
Local operations, however, are out of the scope of Muqtada's
control, and the crazy quilt of actions by various local JAM
units shows no coherency. JAM units in Basrah frequently follow
their own individual agendas, sometimes in tandem with Fadillah
and other times according to the direction of the individual
unit's leader. The current leader - if there is one - of JAM in
Basrah is unknown.


13. (C) Sheikh Mansour equates this lack of strong leadership
in JAM with institutional weakness. Though JAM members are easy
to rally and exhibit much enthusiasm, without a strong religious
figure to follow they are subject to many other influences.
Most JAM members follow their own interests or those of their
unit leader or their mosque. Sheik Mansour asserts that
providing decent employment opportunities for young men would
reduce JAM membership considerably.


14. (C) Sayid Yusif, the head of Thar Allah, corroborated
Muqtada al-Sadr's lack of operational control over JAM in
Basrah. His example was an alleged order by Sadr that JAM
should retain its separate identity and not cooperate with
Fadillah; Sayid Yusif said that individual JAM units work with
Fadillah whenever they have a confluence of interests despite
Sadr's strictures. Sheikh Mansour complained about cooperation
between Fadillah and JAM after an IPS office two months ago
arrested a member of a Fadillah hit squad who had killed a
member of Sheikh Mansour's tribe. Both Fadillah and JAM
elements attacked tribal members protecting the police station
where the Fadillah member was jailed. This commonality of
interests among some of the militias, according to Sheikh
Mansour, has "reduced the trust of the people in the law to
below zero."

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Thar Allah - Punching Above its Weight
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15. (C) Thar Allah, or "Revenge of God," dates back to the
Saddam regime when, according to its leader, Sayid Yusif, it
conducted military operations against government forces. It
formerly was known as the "Followers' Committee." Sayid Yusif
told the RC that Thar Allah now is strictly an Islamic political
party that adheres to the political path. Hassan al-Rashid of
Badr recently told the RC that Seyid Yusif had decided to turn
to politics rather than stay outside of the political process.
Differentiating it from other militias, Sayid Yusif said that
Thar Allah is not like Badr Organization - "that's still a
military organization." Sayid Yusif is next in line to sit on
the Basrah Provincial Council and seeks to burnish his political
credentials. (See Ref D.)


16. (C) Seyid Yusif reportedly has approximately 100-150 armed
militia members available to do his bidding. In an "odd couple"
like pairing, Majed al-Sari, the MOD representative in Basrah,
is a close friend of Seyid Yusif. (Comment: Repeated attempts
by the RC to meet with Seyid Yusif were unsuccessful until the
RC asked Majed al-Sari to assist. Without bothering to check
with Seyid Yusif, Majed al-Sari immediately arranged for a
meeting three days later. End Comment.) Majed al-Sari told the
RC that he was investigating Seyid Yusif before launching an
arrest operation, but once he had an opportunity to speak to him
Majed al-Sari realized "he is not a fanatic." Majed al-Sari
admitted that Seyid Yusif had killed some people, but not all of
those he is reported to have murdered. Seyid Yusif makes his
money from working with people in commerce and in government and
sometimes extorting money from those who smuggle goods. Majed
al-Sari added, "Seyid Yusif believes that it is good when bad
activities are attributed to him since it makes more people
afraid of him."


17. (C) The close friendship between Majed al-Sari and Seyid
Yusif may have been cemented because of a mutual hatred of
Basrah Governor Muhammad. Both ardently desire his removal,
with Seyid Yusif perhaps interested in a more violent
termination of services. During a meeting with the RC, Seyid

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Yusif repeatedly asked when Coalition Forces would arrest the
governor, and as he was leaving Seyid Yusif requested that "if
some sort of independent action is taken against the governor,
please do not intervene." The RC told Seyid Yusif that
Coalition Forces would enforce the law against any group taking
illegal actions and strongly recommended that Seyid Yusif abjure
any extra-legal means to oust the governor. The governor
wholeheartedly reciprocates Seyid Yusif's enmity, accusing him
of being responsible for conducting assassinations for Iran and
vowing to arrest him soon.


18. (C) Comment: The influence of militias is pervasive in all
elements of Basrah society. Militias conduct political
vendettas, extortion, murders and kidnappings, and some enforce
a strict fundamentalist version of Islam on local residents.
(See Ref H for background on the Islamification of Basrah.)
Businesses operate in this militia-influenced atmosphere by
either acquiescing to militia pressure or trying to maintain
some separation. Jabbar A.H. al-Ueibi, the general manager of
South Oil Company, said he does not interfere with the Oil
Protection Force and only "coordinates" with it. He remains
apolitical, though even with his non-partisan stance his
headquarters building was set on fire last year and a small bomb
exploded outside of his office six weeks ago.


19. (C) Comment continued: There is no simple solution to rid
Basrah of militias. The best way forward is to encourage what
already is occurring to a very limited degree with Badr
Organization - the transformation of a militia into a political
party committed to a democratic system of government. We need
to work closely with Badr and all militia/political parties to
persuade them that full participation in the political process
is more rewarding for its members. For some Basrah militias,
this will not be feasible, but they still need to be encouraged
to rely solely on political activities. This will be a long
process, but one that offers the best chance for success.
GROSS